Assignment-Statcon1 Perez - PDFCOFFEE.COM (2024)

Table of Contents Case 1. Caltex Philippines, Inc. v. Palomar, G.R. No. L19650, 29 Sep 1966 2. Philippine Apparel Workers Union vs. NLRC, G.R. No. L-50320, 31 Jul 1981 3. Corpus v. People, G.R. No. 180016, 29 April 2014 4. Director of Lands v. CA, G.R. No. 102858, 28 July 1997 5. Secretary of the DPWH and District Engineer Contreras v. Sps. Tecson, G.R. No. 179334, 21 April 2015 6. People v. Mapa, G.R. No. L-22301, 30 Aug 1967 7. People v. Amigo, G.R. No. 116719, 18 Jan 1996 8. Lokin, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179431-32, 22 June 2010 9. Maglasang v. People, G.R. No. 90083, 4 Oct 1990 10. In re Appointments dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallaria, A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, 9 Nov 1998 11. De Castro v. JBC, G.R No. 1991149, 17 March 2010 12. Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, 19 Aug 1994 13. Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and Management, G.R. No. 164987, 24 April 2012 14. Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208556, 19 Nov 2013 15. Remman Enterprises, Inc. and Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’ Association v. Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service and Professional Regulation Commission, G.R. No. 197676, 4 Feb 2014 16. Roos Industrial Construction, Inc v. NLRC, G.R. No. 1

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12-14

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14-15

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172409, 4 Feb 2008 17. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan and People, G.R. No. 148560, 19 Nov 2001 18. First Metro Investment Corp, v. Este Del Sol Mountain Reserve, G.R. No. 141811, 15 Nov 2001 19. Norma Del Socorro v. Ernst Johan Brickman Van Wilsem, G.R. No. 193797, 10 Dec 2014 20. Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad Water District, G.R. No. 116471 21. Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Party-list v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177508, 7 Aug 2009 22. Hon. Ma. Lourdes Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College, G.R. No. 161107, 12 March 2013 23. White Light Corp. v. City of Manily, G.R. No. 122846, 20 Jan 2009 24. Ortega v. People, G.R. No.151085, 20 Aug 2008 25. CIR v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R. No. 160528 26. Commissioner of Customs v. Esso Standard, Inc., G.R. No. L-28329, 7 Aug 1975 27. Soccoro Ramirez v. CA and Ester S. Garcia, G.R. No. 93833, 25 Sep 1995 28. Philippine National Bank v. Tejano, G.R. No. 173615, 16 Oct 2009 29. Domingo v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 112371, 7 Oct 1998. 30. Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 103882 & 105276, 25 Nov 1998 31. Espiritu v. Cipriano, G.R. No. L-32723, 15 Feb 1974 32. Bolos v. Bolos, G.R. No. 186400, 10 Oct 2010

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33. Quijano v. Development Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-26419, 16 Oct 1970

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34. Security Bank and Trust Company v. RTC of Makati,

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G.R. No. 113926, 23 Oct 1996 35. Go v. Distinction Properties Development and Construction, Inc., G.R. No. 194024 36. Luzon Development Bank v. Enriquez, G.R. Nos. 168464 & 168666, 12 Jan 2011 37. Municipality of Nueva Era, Ilocos, Norte v. Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos, Norte, G.R. No. 169435, 27 Feb 2008 38. Brent School, Inc. v. Zamor, G.R. NNNo. L-48494, 5 Feb 1990 39. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231, 4 Sep 2012

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.................... 40. Galicto v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 193978, 28 Feb 2012 Page 41. Wa-acon v. People, G.R. No.164575, 6 Dec 2006. 42. Lastrilla v. Granda, G.R. No. 160257, 31 Jan 2006. 43. Samson v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 133076, 22 Sep 1999. 44. LAMP v. Secretary of Budget and Management, supra. 45. Belgica v. Ochoa, supra. 46. Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. No. 192935, 7 Dec 2010. 3

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47. Francisco, Jr. et. al. v. Toll Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 166910, 19 Oct 2010. 48. Guingona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125532, 10 Jul 1998. 49. Quiño v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 197466, 13 Nov 2012. 50. Gancho-on v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 108033, 14 Apr 1997. 51. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, 3 May 2006. 52. Velarde v. Social Justice Society, G.R. No. 159357, 28 Apr 2004. 53. Lozano v. Nograles, G.R. Nos. 187883-187910, 16 Jun 2009. 54. Carbonilla v. Board of Airline Representatives, G.R. No. 193247, 14 Sep 2011. 55. Hacienda Luisita, Inc. v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, G.R. No. 171101, 5 Jul 2011. 56. Tropical Homes, Inc. v. NHA, G.R. No. L-48672, 31 Jul 1987. 57. Abakada Guro Party-list v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, 14 Aug 2008. 58. Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, G.R. No. 124360, 5 Nov 1997. 59. Deutsche Bank AG Manila v. CIR, G.R. No. 188550, 28 Aug 2013. 60. Sa L-acion v. Central Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 94723, 21 Aug 1997. 61. Gamboa v. Teves, G.R. No. 176579, 28 Jun 2011. 62. Privatization and Management Office v. Strategic Management and/or Philippine Estate Corporation, G.R. No. 200402, 13 Jun 2013. 63. Agbayani v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 183623, 25 Jun 2012. 64. Makati Shangri3la Hotel and Resort, Inc. v. Harper, G.R. No. 189998, 29 Aug 2012. 65. Ursua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112170, 10 Apr 1996. 66. Mecano v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 103982, 11 Dec 1992. 4

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67. Penera v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 181613, 11 Sep 2009. 68. Lledo v. Lledo, A.M. No. P-95-1167, 9 Feb 2010. 69. Executive Secretary, et. al. v. Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc., G.R. No. 199324, 7 Jan 2013. 70. Obiasca v. Basallote, G.R. No. 176707, 17 Feb 2010. 71. Dabalos v. RTC of Angeles City, Pampanga, G.R. No. 193960, 7 Jan 2013. 72. Sps. Plopenio v. DAR and Land Bank, G.R. No. 161090, 4 Jul 2012 a Plopenio v. DAR and Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 161092, 4 Jul 2012. 73. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, G.R. No. 193459, 15 Feb 2011. 74. People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante, G.R. No. 167304, 25 Aug 2009. 75. Gatchalian v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. L-32560-61, 22 Oct 1970. 76. City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr. G.R. No. 118127, 12 Apr 2005. 77. Amadora v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-47745, 15 Apr 1988. 78. Miranda v. Abaya, G.R. No. 136351, 28 Jul 1999. 79. National Power Corporation v. Angas, G.R. Nos. 60225-26, 8 May 1992. 80. Pelizloy Realty Corporation v. Province of Benguet, G.R. No. 183137, 10 Apr 2013. 81. People v. Bello, G.R. Nos. 166948-59, 29 Aug 2012. 82. GSIS v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 162372, 11 Oct 2011. 83. People v. Delantar, G.R. No. 169143, 2 Feb 2007. 84. Chavez v. JBC, G.R. No. 202242, 16 Apr 2013. 85. Canet v. Mayor Julieta Decena, G.R. No. 155344, 20 Jan 2004. 5

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86. Atienza v. Villaros, G.R. No. 161081, 10 May 2005. 87. Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Dando, G.R. No. 177456, 4 Sep 2009. 88. Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, G.R. No. L-4712, 11 Jul 1952. 89. Gachon v. Devera, Jr., G.R. No. 116695, 20 Jun 1997. 90. Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117188, 7 Aug 1997. 91. Hacienda Luisita, Inc. v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, supra. 92. Radaza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 177135, 15 Oct 2008. 93. Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 98382, 17 May 1993. 94. Borromeo v. Mariano, G.R. No. L-16808, 3 Jan 1921. 95. People v. Mediado, G.R. No. 169871, 2 Feb 2011. 96. Office of the Ombudsman v. Apolonio, G.R. No. 165132, 7 Mar 2012 97. Tuna Processing, Inc. v. Philippine Kingford, Inc., G.R. No. 185582, 29 Feb 2012. 98. Go v. Distinction Properties, supra. 99. People v. Sandiganbayan, supra. 100. In the matter of the Estate of Emil H. Johnson, Ebba Ingeborg Johnson, G.R. No. 12767, 16 Nov 1918.

102. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, supra. 103. Samar II Electric Cooperative, Inc., et. al. v. Seludo, Jr., G.R. No. 173840, 25 Apr 2012.

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104. Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, 22

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101. De Villa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 87416, 8 Apr 1991.

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Feb 1991.

.... ................ 105. Ursua v. Court of Appeals, supra. .... ................ 106. In the matter of charges of plagiarism against Associate Justice .... Mariano C. Del ................ Castillo, A.M. No. 10-7-17, 8 Feb 2011. .... ................ 107. Pelizloy v. Benguet, supra. .... ................ 108. Moreno, Jr. v. Private Management Office, G.R. No. 159373, 16 .... Nov 2006. ................ 109. De Castro v. JBC, supra. .... ................ 110. Floresca, et. al. v. Philex Mining Corp., G.R. No. 30642, 30 Apr .... 1985. ................ .... 111. Ting v. Velez-Ting, G.R. No. 166562, 31 Mar 2009. ................ 112. CIR v. Bicolandia Drug Corporation, G.R. No. 148083, 21 Jul .... 2006. ................ 113. Nestle Philippines v. Uniwide Sales, Inc., G.R. No. 174674, 20 Oct .... 2010. 114. Maria Luisa Park Association, Inc. v. Almendras, G.R. No. 171763, ................ .... 5 Jun 2009. 115. Estate of Nelson R. Dulay v. Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime, Inc., G.R. No. ................ .... 172642, 13 Jun 2012. ................ .... 116. Eslao v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 108310, 1 Sep 1994. ................ 117. CIR v. San Roque Power Corporation, G.R. No. 187485, 12 Feb .... 2013. ................ 118. Gamboa v. Teves, supra. .... 119. PDIC v. Stockholders of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc., G.R. ................ .... No. 181556, 14 Dec 2009. ................ .... 120. People v. Temporada, G.R. No. 173473, 17 Dec 2008. ................ 121. Dabalos v. RTC, supra. .... ................ 122. Lledo v. Lledo, supra. .... ................ .... 123. Pacanan v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 186224, 25 Aug 2009. 7

124. Barroso v. Ampig, G.R. No. 138218, 17 Mar 2000. 125. Violago, Sr. v. COMELEC and Alarilla, G.R. No. 194143, 4 Oct 2011. 126. Maquiling v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195649, 16 Apr 2013. 127. Suico Industrial Corp. v. Lagura-Yap, G.R. No. 177711, 5 Sep 2012. 128. Tomas v. Santos, G.R. No. 190448, 26 Jul 2010. 129. BPI v. Dando, supra. 130. Sec. Leila De Lima v. Gatdula, G.R. No. 204528, 19 Feb 2013. 131. CIR v. Filinvest Development Corporation, G.R. No. 163653, 19 Jul 2011. 132. Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Hon. Ferdinand J. Marcos, G.R. No. 120082, 11 Sep 1996. 133. Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court and Sps. Pastor, G.R. No. 69344, 26 Apr 1991. 134. Lincoln Philippine Life Insurance Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et. al., G.R. No. 118043, 23 Jul 1998. 135. Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation v. CIR, G.R. No. 159471, 26 Jan 2011.

................ .... 136. Accenture, Inc. v. CIR, G.R. No. 190102, 11 Jul 2012. ................ .... 137. CIR v. SC Johnson and Son, Inc. G.R. No. 127105, 25 Jun 1999. 138. CIR v. Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 163835, 7 ................ .... Jul 2010. ................ .... 139. CIR v. Procter & Gamble Philippines, G.R. No. 66838, 2 Dec 1991. ................ .... 140. Republic v. Kerry Lao Ong, G.R. No. 175430, 18 Jun 2012. 141. Department of Health v. Phil Pharmawealth, Inc., G.R. No. 182358, ................ .... 20 Feb 2013. ................ 142. Salvacion v. Central Bank, supra. 8

143. Hagad v. Gozo Dadole, G.R. No. 108072, 12 Dec 1995. 144. Social Justice Society v. Atienza, G.R. No. 156052, 13 Feb 2008. 145. Koruga v. Arcenas, Jr., G.R. No. 169053, 19 Jun 2009. 146. Hacienda Luisita v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, supra. 147. Tuna Processing, Inc. v. Philippine Kingford, Inc., supra. 148. Remo v. Secretary of Foreign Affairs, G.R. No. 169202, 5 Mar 2010. 150. Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Stockholders of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, supra. 151. Lintag v. National Power Corporation, G.R. No. 158609, 27 Jul 2007. 152. Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206844-45, 23 Jul 2013. 153. Dueñas v. Santos Subdivision Homeowners Association, G.R. No. 149417, 4 Jun 2004. 154. Eugenio v. Executive Secretary Drilon, G.R. No. 109404, 22 Jan 1996. 155. People s Industrial and Commercial Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112733, 24 Oct 1997. 156. Salvador v. Mapa, G.R. No. 135080, 28 Nov 2007. 157. People v. Adviento, G.R. No. 175781, 20 Mar 2012. 158. Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Ltd. V. Surio, et. al., G.R. No. 154213, 23 Aug 2012. 159. Narzoles v. NLRC, G.R. No. 141959, 29 Sep 2000. 160. Hon. Ma. Lourdes Fernando v. St. Scholastica s College, supra. 161. Maxey v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-45870, 11 May 1984. 162. Valencia v. Surtida, G.R. No. L-17277, 31 May 1961. 9

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163. Ponce v. Guevarra, G.R. No. L-19629 & L-19672-92, 31 Mar 1964. 164. Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, 3 Feb 1997. 165. Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No. 157870, 158633, & 161658, 3 Nov 2008. 166. Sabio v. Gordon, G.R. No. 174340, 17 Oct 2006. 167. Macalintal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 157013, 10 Jul 2003. 168. Chavez v. JBC, supra. 169. Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, 10 Sep 2003. 170. Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad Water District, supra.

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................ 171. Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. .... 147589 & 147613, 26 Jun 2001. 172. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, G.R. No. L- ................ .... 21064, 18 Feb 1970. ................ .... 173. Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, supra. ................ .... 174. Nitafan v. CIR, G.R. No. L-78780, 23 Jul 1987. ................ .... 175. Malacora v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-51042, 30 Sep 1982. ................ 176. Gamboa v. Teves, supra. .... ................ .... 177. Tañada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, 2 May 1997. ................ .... 178. Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 101083, 30 Jul 1993. ................ 179. Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. .... 177131, 7 Jun 2011. ................ .... 180. Espina v. Zamora, G.R. No. 143855, 21 Sep 2010. 181. Basco v. Philippine Amusem*nts and Gaming Corporation, G.R. No. ................ 10

91649, 14 May 1991. 182. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, 25 Aug 1994. 183. Gamboa v. Teves, supra.

G.R. No. L-19650 September 29, 1966 11

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CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC.,petitioner-appellee, vs. ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER GENERAL,respondent-appellant. CASTRO,J.: Facts: In the year 1960 the Caltex (Philippines) Inc. conceived and laid the groundwork for a promotional scheme calculated to drum up patronage for its oil products. Denominated "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest", it calls for participants therein to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period. Employees of the Caltex (Philippines) Inc., its dealers and its advertising agency, and their immediate families excepted, participation is to be open indiscriminately to all "motor vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers". For the privilege to participate, no fee or consideration is required to be paid, no purchase of Caltex products required to be made. Entry forms are to be made available upon request at each Caltex station where a sealed can will be provided for the deposit of accomplished entry stubs. The overtures were later formalized in a letter to the Postmaster General, dated October 31, 1960, in which the Caltex, thru counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored to justify its position that the contest does not violate the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law. The Postmaster General maintained his view that the contest involves consideration, or that, if it does not, it is nevertheless a "gift enterprise" which is equally banned by the Postal Law, and in his letter of December 10, 1960 not only denied the use of the mails for purposes of the proposed contest but as well threatened that if the contest was conducted, "a fraud order will have to be issued against it (Caltex) and all its representatives". Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing the present petition for declaratory relief against Postmaster General Enrico Palomar, praying "that judgment be rendered declaring its 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' not to be violative of the Postal Law, and ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of the mails to bring the contest to the attention of the public". Issues : 1. Whether or not the petition states sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief; and 2. Whether or not the proposed "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" violates the Postal Law. Ruling: 1. No, we cannot hospitably entertain the appellant's pretense that there is here no question of construction because the said appellant "simply applied the clear provisions of the law to a given set of facts as embodied in the rules of the contest", hence, there is no room for declaratory relief. The infirmity of this pose lies in the fact that it proceeds from the assumption that, if the circ*mstances here presented, the construction of the legal provisions can be divorced from the matter of their application to the appellee's contest. This is not feasible. Construction, verily, is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the lawwith respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others,by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law(Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 1). This is precisely the case 12

here. Whether or not the scheme proposed by the appellee is within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used therein. To our mind, this is as much a question of construction or interpretation as any other.

2. No, taking this cue, we note that in the Postal Law, the term in question is used in association with the word "lottery". With the meaning of lottery settled, and consonant to the well-known principle of legal hermeneuticsnoscitur a sociis —which Opinion 217 aforesaid also relied upon although only insofar as the element of chance is concerned — it is only logical that the term under a construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term "gift enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not in the law the slightest indicium of any intent to eliminate that element of consideration from the "gift enterprise" therein included. This conclusion firms up in the light of the mischief sought to be remedied by the law, resort to the determination thereof being an accepted extrinsic aid in statutory construction. Mail fraud orders, it is axiomatic, are designed to prevent the use of the mails as a medium for disseminating printed matters which on grounds of public policy are declared non-mailable. We find no obstacle in saying the same respecting a gift enterprise. In the end, we are persuaded to hold that, under the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law which we have heretofore examined, gift enterprises and similar schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the element of consideration. Finding none in the contest here in question, we rule that the appellee may not be denied the use of the mails for purposes thereof. Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief, and that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" as described in the rules submitted by the appellee does not transgress the provisions of the Postal Law. ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs.

G.R. No. L-50320 March 30, 1988 13

PHILIPPINE APPAREL, WORKERS UNION,petitioner, vs. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION APPAREL PHILIPPINE APPAREL, INC.,respondents. PARAS,J. : Facts: In anticipation of the expiration of their 1973-1976 collective bargaining agreement, the Union submitted a set of bargaining proposals to the company. Negotiations were held thereafter, but due to the impasse, the Union filed a complaint with the Department of Labor praying that the parties be assisted in concluding a collective agreement. Notwithstanding the complaint, the parties continued with negotiations. Finally, on 3 September 1977, the parties signed the agreement providing for a three-stage wage increase for all rank and file employees, retroactive to 1April 1977. Meanwhile, on 21 April 1977, Presidential Decree 1123 was enacted to take effect on 1 May 1977 providing for an increase by P60.00 in the living allowance ordained by Presidential Decree 525. This increase was implemented effective 1 May 1977 by the company. The controversy arose when the petitioner union sought the implementation of the negotiated wage increase of P0.80 as provided for in the collective bargaining agreement. The company alleges that it has opted to consider the P0.80 daily wage increase (roughly P22 per month) as partial compliance with the requirements of PD 1123, so that it is obliged to pay only the balance of P38 per month, contending that that since there was already a meeting of the minds between the parties as early as 2 April 1977 about the wage increases which were made retroactive to 1 April 1977, it fell well within the exemption provided for in the Rules Implementing PD 1123. The Union, on the other hand, maintains that the living allowance under PD 1123 (originally PD 525) is distinct from the negotiated daily wage increase of P0.80. On 13 February 1978, the Union filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and violation of the CBA against the company. On 30 May 1978, an Order was issued by the Labor Arbiter dismissing the complaint and referred the case to the parties to resolve their disputes in accordance with the machinery established in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. From this order, both parties appealed to the Commission. On 1 September 1978, the Commission (Second Division) promulgated its decision, setting aside the order appealed from and entering a new one dismissing the case for obvious lack of merit, relying on a letter of the Undersecretary of Labor that agreement between the parties was made 2 April 1977 granting P27 per month retroactive to 1 April 1977 which was squarely under the exceptions provided for in paragraph k of the rules implementing PD 1123. The union filed for reconsideration, but the Commission en banc dismissed the same on 8 February 1979. Hence, the petition. Issues: Whether the Commission was correct in determining the agreement falls under the exceptions. Ruling: The collective bargaining agreement was entered into on 3 September1977, when PD 1123 was already in force and effect, although the increase on the first year was retroactive to 1 April 1977. There is nothing in the records that the negotiated wage increases were granted or paid before May 1977, to allow the company to fall within the exceptions provided for in paragraph k of the rules implementing PD 1123. There was neither a perfected contract nor an actual payment of said 14

increase. There was no grant of said increases yet, despite the contrary opinion expressed in the letter of the Undersecretary of Labor. It must be noted that the letter was based on a wrong premise or representation on the part of the company. The company had declared that the parties have agreed on 2 April 1977 in recognition of the imperative need for employees to cope up with inflation brought about by, among others, another increase in oil price, but omitting the fact that negotiations were still being held on other unresolved economic and non-economic bargaining items (which were only agreed upon on 3 September 1977). The Department of Labor had the right to construe the word “grant” as used in its rules implementing PD 1123, and its explanation regarding the exemptions to PD 1123 should be given weight; but, when it is based on misrepresentations as to the existence of an agreement between the parties, the same cannot be applied. There is no distinction between interpretation and explaining the extent and scope of the law; because where one explains the intent and scope of a statute, he is interpreting it. Thus, the construction or explanation of Labor Undersecretary is not only wrong as it was purely based on a misapprehension of facts, but also unlawful because it goes beyond the scope of the law. The writ of certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the commission, and ordered the company to pay, in addition to the increased allowance provided for in PD 1123, the negotiated wage increase of P0.80 daily effective 1 April 1977 as well as all other wage increases embodied in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, to all covered employees; with costs against the company.

LITO CORPUZ,Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondent. G.R. No. 180016 April 29, 2014 Facts: Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral Royale Casino in Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Private complainant was then engaged in the business of lending money to casino players and, upon hearing that the former had some pieces of jewelry for sale, petitioner approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis. They both agreed that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same items, within a period of 60 days. The period expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of jewelry. When private complainant was able to meet petitioner, the latter promised the former that he will pay the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no avail. Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of estafa on or about the fifth (5th) day of July 1991, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines. The RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the Information. The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the appeal of petitioner and affirmed the decision of the RTC. An argument raised by Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, one of our esteemed amici curiae, is that the incremental penalty provided under Article 315 of the RPC violates the Equal Protection Clause. Issues: 1. Whether or not a photocopied evidence can be admitted in the court as the main conclusive evidence. 2. Whether or not an information must be submitted on when the pieces of jewelry were supposed to be returned and that the date when the crime occurred was different from the one testified to by private complainant. 3. Whether or not the incremental penalty provided under Article 315 of the RPC violates the Equal Protection Clause. Ruling: 1. Yes, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court, admitting in evidence a receipt dated May 2, 1991 marked as Exhibit "A" and its submarkings, although the same was merely a photocopy, thus, violating the best evidence rule. However, the records show that petitioner never objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was identified, marked and testified upon in court by private complainant. The CA also correctly pointed out that petitioner also failed to raise an objection in his Comment to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence and even admitted having signed the said receipt. The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived. 2. No, In the case at bar, a reading of the subject Information shows compliance with the 16

foregoing rule. That the time of the commission of the offense was stated as " on or about the fifth (5th) day of July, 1991" is not likewise fatal to the prosecution's cause considering that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the precise time only when the same is a material ingredient of the offense. The gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the offender. Thus, aside from the fact that the date of the commission thereof is not an essential element of the crime herein charged, the failure of the prosecution to specify the exact date does not render the Information ipso facto defective. Moreover, the said date is also near the due date within which accused-appellant should have delivered the proceeds or returned the said [pieces of jewelry] as testified upon by Tangkoy, hence, there was sufficient compliance with the rules. Accused-appellant, therefore, cannot now be allowed to claim that he was not properly apprised of the charges proferred against him.    

the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed.

3. No, the court therein ruled that three things must be done to decide whether a sentence is proportional to a specific crime, viz.; (1) Compare the nature and gravity of the offense, and the harshness of the penalty; (2) Compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, i.e., whether more serious crimes are subject to the same penalty or to less serious penalties; and (3) Compare the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. WHEREFORE, is hereby DENIED.

G.R. No. 102858 July 28, 1997 THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS,petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all surnamed ABISTO,respondents. PANGANIBAN,J.: Facts: On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529.The application was docketed as Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.However, during the pendency of his petition, applicant died. Hence, his heirs — Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado — represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was appointed their guardianad litem, were substituted as applicants. In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned: . . . However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529, requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of Initial Hearing (Exh. "E") in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Exhibit "E" was only published in the Official Gazette (Exhibits "F" and "G"). Consequently, the Court is of the well considered view that it has not legally acquired jurisdiction over the instant application for want of compliance with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation. The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged CA Resolution dared November 19, 1991. The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to us. This Court notes that the petitioner's counsel anchored his petition on Rule 65. This is an error. His remedy should be based on Rule 45 because he is appealing a final disposition of the Court of Appeals. Hence, we shall treat his petition as one for review under Rule 45, and not forcertiorariunder Rule 65.

Issues: 1. Whether or not the respondent committed grave abuse of discretion 2. Whether or not failure to comply with the requirement of publication in a newspaper of general circulation is a mere "procedural defect." 18

Ruling: 1. Admittedly, the provision Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides in clear and categorical terms that publication in the Official Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court. However, the question boils down to whether, absent any publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land registration court can validly confirm and register the title of private respondents. The Court through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. held that Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of the initial hearing by means of (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be complied with. "If the intention of the law were otherwise, said section would not have stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all persons named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties, and occupants of the land." Indeed, if mailing of notices is essential, then by parity of reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general circulation is likewise imperative since the law included such requirement in its detailed provision. It should be noted further that land registration is a proceedingin rem.Beingin rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as againstallpersons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the property. Anin remproceeding is validated essentially through publication. This being so, the process must strictly be complied with. Otherwise, persons who may be interested or whose rights may be adversely affected would be barred from contesting an application which they had no knowledge of. As has been ruled, a party as an owner seeking the inscription of realty in the land registration court must prove by satisfactory and conclusive evidence not only his ownership thereof but the identity of the same, for he is in the same situation as one who institutes an action for recovery of realty. He must prove his title against the whole world. This task, which rests upon the applicant, can best be achieved when all persons concerned. 2. In sum, the all-encompassingin remnature of land registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting. Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the law. Private respondents did not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it would not have mattered because the statute itself allows no excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application of private respondent for land registration is DISMISSED without prejudice. No costs.

G.R. No. 179334 April 21, 2015 SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS and DISTRICT ENGINEER CELESTINO R. CONTRERAS,Petitioners, vs. SPOUSES HERACLEO and RAMONA TECSON,Respondents. PERALTA,J.: Facts: In 1940, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) took respondents-movants' subject property without the benefit of expropriation proceedings for the construction of the MacArthur Highway. In a letter dated December 15, 1994, respondents-movants demanded the payment of the fair market value of the subject parcel of land. Celestino R. Contreras (Contreras), then District Engineer of the First Bulacan Engineering District of the DPWH, offered to pay for the subject land at the rate of Seventy Centavos (P0.70) per square meter, per Resolution of the Provincial Appraisal Committee (PAC) of Bulacan. Unsatisfied with the offer, respondents-movants demanded the return of their property, or the payment of compensation at the current fair market value.3Hence, the complaint for recovery of possession with damages filed by respondents-movants. Respondentsmovants were able to obtain favorable decisions in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA), with the subject property valued at One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (₱1,500.00) per square meter, with interest at six percent (6%) per annum. Both the RTC and the CA valued the property at One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (₱1,500.00) per square meter, plus six percent (6%) interest from the time of the filing of the complaint until full payment. We, however, did not agree with both courts and ruled instead that just compensation should be based on the value of the property at the time of taking in 1940, which is Seventy Centavos (P0.70) per square meter.4In addition, and by way of compensation, we likewise awarded an interest of six percent (6%) per annum from 1940 until full payment. Issues: 1. Whether or not the taking of private property without due process should be nullified 2. Whether or not the compensation is based on the market value of the property at the time of taking

Ruling: 1. No. The government’s failure to initiate the necessary expropriation proceedings prior to actual taking cannot simply invalidate the State’s exercise of its eminent domain power, given that the property subject of expropriation is indubitable devoted for public use, and public policy imposes upon the public utility the obligation to continue its services to the public. To hastily nullify said expropriation in the guise of lack of due process would certainly diminish or weaken one of the State’s inherent powers, the ultimate objective of which is to serve the greater good. 20

Thus, the non-filing of the case for expropriation will not necessarily lead to the return of the property to the landower. What is left to the landower is the right of compensation. 2. Yes. While it may appear inequitable to the private owners to receive an outdated valuation, the long-established rule is that the fair equivalent of the property should be computed not at the time of payment, but at the time of taking. This is because the purpose of ‘just compensation’ is not to reward the owner for the property taken but to compensate him for the loss thereof. As such, the true measure of the property, as upheld by a plethora of cases, is the market value at the time of the taking, when the loss resulted. This principle was plainly laid down inApo Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc. v. Land Bank of the Philippines. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator.It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the true measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss.

To entertain other formula for computing just compensation, contrary to those established by law and jurisprudence, would open varying interpretation of economic policies - a matter which this Court has no competence to take cognizance of. Time and again, we have held that no process of interpretation or construction need be resorted to where a provision of law peremptorily calls for application. Equity and equitable principles only come into full play when a gap exists in the law and jurisprudence. As we have shown above, established rulings of this Court are in place for full application to the case at bar, hence, should be upheld. WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

G.R. No. L-22301 August 30, 1967 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG,defendant-appellant. FERNANDO,J.: Facts: The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an information dated August 14, 1962 reading as follows: "The undersized accuses secret agent MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG of a violation of Section 878 in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act No. 4, committed as follows: That on or about the 13th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and control one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding authorities. Contrary to law." Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused "of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and one day to two years and to pay the costs. The firearm and ammunition confiscated from him are forfeited in favor of the Government." The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. The decision must be affirmed. Issues: 1. Whether or not a secret agent is not required to get a license for his firearm. Ruling: 1. Yes. The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. Our task is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. "Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them."7The conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be set aside. Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. 22

G.R. No. 116719 January 18, 1996 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee, vs. PATRICIO AMIGOalias"BEBOT",accused-appellant. MELO,J.: Facts: On December 29, 1989, at around 1:00 P.M., after having spent half-day at their store, located at No. 166-A, Ramon Magsaysay Avenue, Davao City, Benito Ng Suy was driving their gray Ford Fiera back home, situated at the back of Car Asia, Bajada, Davao City. On their way home and while traversing the National Highway of Bajada, Davao City, an orange Toyota Tamaraw driven by one Virgilio Abogada, suddenly made a left turn in front of the Regional Hospital, Bajada, Davao City, without noticing the Ford Fiera coming from the opposite direction. This Tamaraw was heading for Sterlyn Kitchenette, which was situated at the comer of the said hospital. With Virgilio was Patricio AmigoaliasBebot, a vulcanizer at Lingling's vulcanizing shop owned and operated by a certain Galadua. He was also seated at the right front seat beside Virgilio. Due to the unexpected veer made by Virgilio, an accidental head on collision occurred between the Fiera and the Tamaraw, causing a slight damaged to the right bumper of the latter. The accused approached Benito and mumbled "Ah, so you are a Chinese," and suddenly took a five inch knife from his waist and simultaneously stabbed Benito hitting him twice on the chest. Accused-appellant contends that under the 1987 Constitution and prior to the promulgation of Republic Act No. 7659, the death penalty had been abolished and hence, the penalty that should have been imposed for the crime of murder committed by accused-appellant without the attendance of any modifying circ*mstances, should bereclusion temporalin its medium period or 17 years, 4 months and 1 day, to 20 years ofreclusion temporal. Issues: Whether or not the penalty reclusion perpetua is too harsh or cruel for the consequence of stabbing Benito. Ruling: No, InPeople vs.Gavarra, Justice Pedro L. Yap declared for the Court that "in view of the abolition of the death penalty under Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the penalty that may be imposed for murder isreclusion temporalin its maximum period toreclusion perpetua thereby eliminating death as the original maximum period. A reading of Section 19(1) of Article III will readily show that here is really nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that the death 23

penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced toreclusion perpetua. Finally, accused-appellant claims that the penalty ofreclusion perpetuais too cruel and harsh a penalty and pleads for sympathy. Courts are not the forum to plead for sympathy. The duty of courts is to apply the law, disregarding their feeling of sympathy or pity for an accused.DURA LEX SED LEX. The remedy is elsewhere — clemency from the executive or an amendment of the law by the legislative, but surely, at this point, this Court can but apply the law. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

G.R. Nos. 179431-32 June 22, 2010 LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., as the second nominee of CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION (CIBAC),Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,Respondents. BERSAMIN,J.: Facts: The Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized groups duly registered under the party-list system of representation that manifested their intent to participate in the May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local elections. Together with its manifestation of intent to participate,CIBAC, through its president, Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted a list of five nominees from which its representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the required number of qualifying votes The nominees, in the order that their names appeared in the certificate of nomination dated March 29, 2007,were: (1) Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; (2) herein petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales; (4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5) Emil L. Galang. The nominees’ certificates of acceptance were attached to the certificate of nomination filed by CIBAC. Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees dated May 7, 2007,whereby it withdrew the nominations of Loki, Tugna and Galang. On July 6, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8219,whereby it resolved to set the matter pertaining to the validity of the withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the substitution of Borje for proper disposition and hearing. On September 14, 2007, the COMELECen bancresolved E.M. No. 07-054thuswise: WHEREFORE, considering the above discussion, the Commission hereby approves the withdrawal of the nomination of Atty. Luis K. Lokin, Sherwin N. Tugna and Emil Galang as second, third and fourth nominees respectively and the substitution thereby with Atty. Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as second nominee and Atty. Armi Jane R. Borje as third nominee for the party list CIBAC. Issue: 1. Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates the PartyList System Act; and 2. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the controversy. Ruling: 1. No. The legislative power of the Government is vested exclusively in the Legislature in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers. As a general rule, the Legislature cannot surrender or abdicate its legislative power, for doing so will be unconstitutional. Although the 25

power to make laws cannot be delegated by the Legislature to any other authority, a power that is not legislative in character may be delegated. Under certain circ*mstances, the Legislature can delegate to executive officers and administrative boards the authority to adopt and promulgate IRRs. The authority to make IRRs (Implementing Rules and Regulations) in order to carry out an express legislative purpose, or to effect the operation and enforcement of a law is not a power exclusively legislative in character, but is rather administrative in nature. The rules and regulations adopted and promulgated must not, however, subvert or be contrary to existing statutes. To be valid, therefore, the administrative IRRs must comply with the following requisites to be valid: 1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the Legislature; 2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the Legislature; 3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; and 4. It must be reasonable. The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7804 pursuant to its powers under the Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, and the Party-List System Act.Hence, the COMELEC met the first requisite. The COMELEC also met the third requisite. There is no question that Resolution No. 7804 underwent the procedural necessities of publication and dissemination in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the resolution itself. Whether Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was valid or not is thus to be tested on the basis of whether the second and fourth requisites were met. It is in this respect that the challenge of Lokin against Section 13 succeeds. As earlier said, the delegated authority must be properly exercised. The administrative agency issuing the IRRs may not enlarge, alter, or restrict the provisions of the law it administers and enforces, and cannot engraft additional non-contradictory requirements not contemplated by the Legislature. 2. Yes. Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC to seek the review of the September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC in accordance with Section 7 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the oath and assumption of office by Cruz-Gonzales. Undoubtedly, the Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over Lokin’s petitions for certiorari and for mandamus against the COMELEC.

WHEREFORE,we grant the petitions for certiorari and mandamus. We declare Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 invalid and of no effect to the extent that it authorizes a party-list organization to withdraw its nomination of a nominee once it has submitted the nomination to the Commission on Elections. 26

Principles: Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 reads: Section 8.Nomination of Party-List Representatives.-Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later that forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes. A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate of any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election.

Exceptions in Section 8 of R.A. 7941 are exclusive Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 enumerates only three instances in which the party-list organization can substitute another person in place of the nominee whose name has been submitted to the COMELEC, namely: (a) when the nominee dies; (b) when the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; and (c) when the nominee becomes incapacitated. The enumeration is exclusive, for, necessarily, the general rule applies to all cases not falling under any of the three exceptions. When the statute itself enumerates the exceptions to the application of the general rule, the exceptions are strictly but reasonably construed. The exceptions extend only as far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision rather than the exceptions. Where the general rule is established by a statute with exceptions, none but the enacting authority can curtail the former. Not even the courts may add to the latter by implication, and it is a rule that an express exception excludes all others, although it is always proper in determining the applicability of the rule to inquire whether, in a particular case, it accords with reason and justice. The appropriate and natural office of the exception is to exempt something from the scope of the general words of a statute, which is otherwise within the scope and meaning of such general words. Consequently, the existence of an exception in a statute clarifies the intent that the statute shall apply to all cases not excepted. Exceptions are subject to the rule of strict construction; hence, any doubt will be resolved in favor of the general provision and against the exception. Indeed, the liberal construction of a statute will seem to require in many circ*mstances that the exception, by which the operation of the statute is limited or abridged, should receive a restricted construction.

G.R. No. 90083 October 4, 1990 KHALYXTO PEREZ MAGLASANG,accused-petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Presiding Judge ERNESTO B. TEMPLADO (San Carlos City Court), Negros Occidental,respondents.

Facts: On January 22, 1990 to be exact, the Court received from Atty. Castellano a copy of a complaint dated December 19, 1989, filed with the Office of the President of the Philippines whereby Khalyxto Perez Maglasang, through his lawyer, Atty. Castellano, as complainant, accused all the five Justices of the Court's Second Division with "biases and/or ignorance of the law or knowingly rendering unjust judgments or resolution." By reason of the strong and intemperate language of the complaint and its improper filing with the Office of the President, which, as he should know as a lawyer, has no jurisdiction to discipline, much more, remove, Justices of the Supreme Court, on February 7, 1990, Atty. Castellano was required to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt or administratively dealt with for improper conduct. Issues: 1. Whether or not the complaint was a constructive criticism? Ruling: We note that in filing the "complaint" against the justices of the Court's Second Division, even the most basic tenet of our government system — the separation of powers between the judiciary, the executive, and the legislative branches has — been lost on Atty. Castellano. We therefore take this occasion to once again remind all and sundry that "the Supreme Court is supreme — the third great department of government entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public and private. No other department or agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them 'unjust.' Consequently, and owing to the foregoing, not even the President of the Philippines as Chief Executive may pass judgment on any of the Court's acts. Atty. Castellano's assertion that the complaint "was a constructive criticism intended to correct in good faith the erroneous and very strict practices of the Justices, concerned as Respondents (sic)" is but a last minute effort to sanitize his clearly unfounded and irresponsible accusation. WHEREFORE, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano is found guilty of CONTEMPT OF COURT and IMPROPER CONDUCT as a member of the Bar and an officer of the Court, and is hereby ordered to 28

PAY within fifteen (15) days from and after the finality of this Resolution a fine of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos, or SUFFER ten (10) days imprisonment in the municipal jail of Calatrava, Negros Occidental in case he fails to pay the fine seasonably, and SUSPENDED.

A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC November 9, 1998 In Re Appointments dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabananatuan City, respectively. NARVASA,C.J.:

FACTS: Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments signed by the President of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as judges of the RTC of Bago City and Cabanatuan City, respectively. These appointments appear prima facie, at least, to be expressly prohibited by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution. The said constitutional provision prohibits the President from making any appointments two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. The issue was first ventilated at the meeting of the Judicial and Bar Council on March 9, 1998. The meeting had been called, according to the Chief Justice asEx OfficioChairman, to discuss the question raised by some sectors about the "constitutionality of**appointments" to the Court of Appeals, specifically, in light of the forthcoming presidential elections. Attention was drawn to Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution reading as follows: ISSUE: Is the President nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Secs. 4 (1) and 9 of Art. VIII

Ruling: During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution “two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term” the President is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Sec. 15 of Art. VII. This prohibition on appointments comes into effect once every 6 years. The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were unquestionably made during the period of the ban. They valid in the prohibition relating to appointments. While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of the ban. 29

G.R. No. 191002 April 20, 2010 ARTURO M. DE CASTRO,Petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO,Respondents. Facts: After the compulsory retirement of former Chief Justice Reynato Puno, the position of Chief Justice was left vacant. Section 4 (1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution states that, "vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from occurrence thereof,"from a,"List of nominees prepared by the Judicial Bar Council for every vacancy"furthermore, Section 15, Article VII was also taken into consideration which prohibits the President or the Acting President from making appointments within two (2) months immediately before the next Presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. The JBC agreed that the vacant position must be filled and there were five (5) candidates for the position from the most senior of the Associates of the court and one of them is Associate Justice Reynato C. Corona who was chosen by the President and was appointed for the position of Chief Justice. Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice since the Constitution do not apply to the Supreme Court. If the framers of the Constitution intended the prohibition to apply in the Supreme Court then it should have expressly stated it in the Constitution. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the President can appoint the successor of the Chief Justice.

Ruling: Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court. Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.

G.R. No. 113105 August 19, 1994 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, EXEQUIEL B. GARCIA and A. GONZALES,petitioners, vs. HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, as Secretary of Budget and Management; HON. VICENTE T. TAN, as National Treasurer and COMMISSION ON AUDIT,respondents.

Facts: House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by the President. It also authorized members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the "pork barrels" allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets. On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to have become Republic Act No. 7663, entitled "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions. The Philippine Constitution Association, Exequiel B. Garcia and Ramon A. Gonzales as taxpayers, prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare as unconstitutional and void: (a) Article XLI on the Countrywide Development Fund, the special provision in Article I entitled Realignment of Allocation for Operational Expenses, and Article XLVIII on the Appropriation for Debt Service or the amount appropriated under said Article XLVIII in excess of the P37.9 Billion allocated for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports; and (b) the veto of the President of the Special Provision of Article XLVIII of the GAA of 1994. Issues: 1. Whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights, (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU’S) and (f) State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s) are constitutional. 2. Whether or not the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt service and the automatic appropriation of funds therefore is constitutional Ruling: 32

The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative process (Memorandum of Justice Irene Cortes asAmicusCuriae,pp. 3-7). That is why it is found in Article VI on the Legislative Department rather than in Article VII on the Executive Department in the Constitution. There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on those questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the Constitution. Under his general veto power, the President has to veto the entire bill, not merely parts thereof (1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27[1]). The exception to the general veto power is the power given to the President to veto any particular item or items in a general appropriations bill (1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27[2]). In so doing, the President must veto the entire item. A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited to specified sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit (Beckman, The Item Veto Power of the Executive, 31 Temple Law Quarterly 27 [1957]). Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization fund for payment of the trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by the AFP, is violative of the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts entered into by the Government itself. The veto of said special provision is therefore valid. The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution. Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything in the language used in the challenged Special Provision that would imply that Congress intended to deny to the President the right to defer or reduce the spending, much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But even if such is the intention, the appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention must be embodied and manifested in another law considering that it abrades the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and there are existing laws on the creation of the CAFGU’s to be amended. On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions relating to appropriations to the Supreme Court, constitutional commissions, the NHA and the DPWH, there is less basis to complain when the President said that the expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined whether they are proper or inappropriate. Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take “necessary and proper steps” to carry into execution the law. These steps are the ones to be embodied in the guidelines.

GR. No. 164987 April 24 2012 Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty Vs Secretary of Budget and Management MENDOZA,J.: Facts: Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) filed an action for certiorari assailing the constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004). According to petitioner, the provision is silent and prohibits an automatic and direct allocation of lump sums to individual senators, and congressmen for the funding of of projects. Petitioner insists that the silence in law of direct or even indirect participation by members of Congress betrays a deliberate intent on the part of the Executive and the Congress to scrap and do away with “pork barrel” system. Petitioner concluded that that the “pork barrel has become legally defunct under the present state of GAA 2004”. LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because in receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of Congress in effect intrude into an executive function. The proposal and identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws of the repeal or amendment thereof, which is the only function given to the congress by the Constitution. Respondent claimed that there is no concrete proof that PDAF, in the guise of “pork barrel” is a source of unwanted money for unscrupulous lawmakers and other officials who misuse their allocations. Respondent suffice to say that the perception of LAMP must not be based on mere speculations 34

circulated in the news media. Issue: Whether or not the implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress is unconstitutional and illegal.

Ruling: No. The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof was presented showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole discretion. Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress, the Court cannot indulge the petitioner’s request for rejection of a law which is outwardly legal and capable of lawful enforcement. Legislative authorization, the congress enters the picture and deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the Presidents, and congress in the exercise of its own judgement and wisdom formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process established by the Constitution, which specifies that no money may be paid from the Treachery except in accordance with an appropriation made by law. The powers of government are generally subdivided into three branches: Legislative, Executive and Judiciary. The Judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess in jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. Hence, in the case provides absent in clear showing that an offense to the principle of separation of powers as committed, much less tolerated by both the Legislative and Executive, the Court is constrained to hold that a lawful and regular government budgeting and appropriation process ensued during the enactment and all throughout the implementation of the GAA of 2004.

G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013 GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO,Petitioners, vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE,Respondents. FACTS: Before the Court are consolidated petitions, taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rules On Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus), all of which assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System. Pork Barrell refers to an appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative's district. The “Pork Barrel System” involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds: (a) Congressional Pork Barrel or the discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature (PDAF); and (b) Presidential Pork Barrel or certain funds of the President such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund. The Malampaya Funds was a special fund created under PD 910 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos for the development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth while the Presidential Social Fund is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR through which the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not funded under the regular budget. In July 2013, NBI began its probe into allegations that “the government has been defrauded of some P10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost projects.” The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation (stands for Janet Lim Napoles) had facilitated the swindling of billions of pesos from the public coffers for “ghost projects” using no fewer than 20 dummy non-government organizations for an entire decade. In August 2013, the Commission on Audit released report revealing substantial irregularities in the disbursem*nt and utilization of PDAF by the Congressmen during the Arroyo administration. As for the 'Presidential Pork Barrel', whistle-blowers alleged that "at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform 36

beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles controversy, several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the Pork Barrel System be declared unconstitutional ISSUE: 1. Whether or not THE PORK BARREL SYSTEM IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN THE PDAF 2. Whether or not THE PORK BARREL DIRECTED BY THE PRESIDENT UNCONSTITUTIONAL

RULING: YES. Congressional Pork Barrel is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Supreme Court declared that thePriority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF)and its predecessor, theCountrywide Development Fund (CDF)areunconstitutional, based on the following grounds:

(a.1)Separation of Powers.Under the 2013 PDAF Article, legislators have been authorized to participate in “the various operational aspects of budgeting,” including “the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities” and the “regulation and release of funds”, in violation of the separation of powers principle. From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. (a.2)Non-delegability of legislative power.The power to appropriate is lodgedin Congressand must be exercised only through legislation, pursuant to Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Insofar as the 2013 PDAF Article has conferred unto legislators the power of appropriation by giving thempersonal, discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine, it has violated the principle of non-delegability of legislative power;

NO. The Presidential Pork Barrel is only PARTLY UNCONSTITUTINAL. The phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes anundue delegation of legislative power insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to appropriate fundsintended by law for energy-related purposes onlyto other purposes he may deem fit as well as other public funds under the broad classification of “priority infrastructure development projects”, it has transgressed the principle of non-delegability. The funds under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund shall remain therein to be utilized for their respective special purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional. As a final order, DIRECTED all prosecutorial organs of the government to, within the bounds of reasonable dispatch, investigate and accordingly prosecute all government officials and/or private individuals for possible criminal offenses related to the irregular, improper and/or unlawful disbursem*nt/utilization of all funds under the Pork Barrel System. This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY but PROSPECTIVE in effect. WHEREFORE,the petitions arePARTLY GRANTED.

G.R. No. 197676 February 4, 2014 REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. and CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS'ASSOCIATION,Petitioners, vs. PROFESSIONAL REGULATORY BOARD OF REAL ESTATE SERVICE and PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION,Respondents. VILLARAMA, JR.,J.:

Facts: R.A. No. 9646, otherwise known as the "Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines" was signed into law on June 29, 2009 by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. It aims to professionalize the real estate service sector under a regulatory scheme of licensing, registration and supervision of real estate service practitioners (real estate brokers, appraisers, assessors, consultants and salespersons) in the country. Prior to its enactment, real estate service practitioners were under the supervision of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) through the Bureau of Trade Regulation and Consumer Protection (BTRCP), in the exercise of its consumer regulation functions. Such authority is now transferred to the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) through the Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service (PRBRES) created under the new law. The implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9646 were promulgated on July 21, 2010 by the PRC and PRBRES under Resolution No. 02, Series of 2010. On December 7, 2010, herein petitioners Remman Enterprises, Inc. (REI) and the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’ Association (CREBA) instituted Civil Case No. 10-124776 in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42. Petitioners sought to declare as void and unconstitutional the following provisions of R.A. No. 9646: After a summary hearing, the trial court denied the prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. According to petitioners, the new law is constitutionally infirm because (1) it violates Article VI, Section 26 (1) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which mandates that "[e]very bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be 39

expressed in the title thereof"; (2) it is in direct conflict with Executive Order (E.O.) No. 648 which transferred the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Housing Authority (NHA) to regulate the real estate trade and business to the Human Settlements Commission, now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), which authority includes the issuance of license to sell of subdivision owners and developers pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957; (3) it violates the due process clause as it impinges on the real estate developers’ most basic ownership rights, the right to use and dispose property, which is enshrined in Article 428 of the Civil Code; and (4) Section 28(a) of R.A. No. 9646 violates the equal protection clause as no substantial distinctions exist between real estate developers and the exempted group mentioned since both are property owners dealing with their own property. After a summary hearing, the trial court denied the prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. On July 12, 2011, the trial court rendered its Decision denying the petition. Issues: 1. Whether [R.A. No. 9646] is unconstitutional for violating the "one title-one subject" rule under Article VI, Section 26 (1) of the Philippine Constitution; 2. Whether [R.A. No. 9646] is in conflict with PD 957, as amended by EO 648, with respect to the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate real estate developers; 3. Whether Sections 28(a), 29, and 32 of [R.A. No. 9646], insofar as they affect the rights of real estate developers, are unconstitutional for violating substantive due process; and 4. Whether Section 28(a), which treats real estate developers differently from other natural or juridical persons who directly perform acts of real estate service with reference to their own property, is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause.3 Ruling: The petition has no merit.

There is no question here that petitioners who are real estate developers are entities directly affected by the prohibition on performing acts constituting practice of real estate service without first complying with the registration and licensing requirements for brokers and agents under R.A. No. 9646. The possibility of criminal sanctions for disobeying the mandate of the new law is likewise real. 1. R.A. No. 9646 does not violate the one-title, one-subject rule. The primary objective of R.A. No. 9646 is expressed as follows: SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes the vital role of real estate service practitioners in the social, political, economic development and progress of the country by promoting the real estate market, stimulating economic activity and enhancing government income from real propertybased transactions. Hence, it shall develop and nurture through proper and effective regulation and supervision a corps of technically competent, responsible and respected professional real estate service practitioners whose standards of practice and service shall be globally competitive and will promote the growth of the real estate industry. We find that the inclusion of real estate developers is germane to the law’s primary goal of developing "a corps of technically competent, responsible and respected professional real estate service practitioners whose standards of practice and service shall be globally competitive and will promote the growth of the real estate industry." Since the marketing aspect of real estate development projects entails the performance of those acts and transactions defined as real estate service practices under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9646, it is logically covered by the regulatory scheme to professionalize the entire real estate service sector.

2. No Conflict Between R.A. No. 9646 and P.D. No. 957, as amended by E.O. No. 648 Petitioners argue that the assailed provisions still cannot be sustained because they conflict with P.D. No. 957 which decreed that the NHA shall have "exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business."

It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. In order to effect a repeal by implication, the later statute must be so irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant with the existing law that they cannot be made to reconcile and stand together. The clearest case possible must be made before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn, for inconsistency is never presumed. There is no conflict of jurisdiction because the HLURB supervises only those real estate service practitioners engaged in the sale of subdivision lots and condominium projects, specifically for violations of the provisions of P.D. No. 957, and not the entire real estate service sector which is now under the regulatory powers of the PRBRES. The rule is that every statute must be interpreted and brought into accord with other laws in a way that will form a uniform system of jurisprudence. 3. No Violation of Due Process Petitioners contend that the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 9646 are unduly oppressive and infringe the constitutional rule against deprivation of property without due process of law. The contention has no basis. There is no deprivation of property as no restriction on their use and enjoyment of property is caused by the implementation of R.A. No. 9646. If petitioners as property owners feel burdened by the new requirement of engaging the services of only licensed real estate professionals in the sale and marketing of their properties, such is an unavoidable consequence of a reasonable regulatory measure. 4. R.A. No. 9646 does not violate the equal protection clause. The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. R.A. No. 9646 was intended to provide institutionalized government support for the development of "a corps of highly respected, technically competent, and disciplined

real estate service practitioners, knowledgeable of internationally accepted standards and practice of the profession." Hence, in approving R.A. No. 9646, the legislature rightfully recognized the necessity of imposing the new licensure requirements to all real estate service practitioners, including and more importantly, those real estate service practitioners working for real estate developers. Unlike individuals or entities having isolated transactions over their own property, real estate developers sell lots, houses and condominium units in the ordinary course of business, a business which is highly regulated by the State to ensure the health and safety of home and lot buyers. The foregoing shows that substantial distinctions do exist between ordinary property owners exempted under Section 28(a) and real estate developers like petitioners, and the classification enshrined in R.A. No. 9646 is reasonable and relevant to its legitimate purpose. The Court thus rules that R.A. No. 9646 is valid and constitutional. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 12, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42 in Civil Case No. 10-124776 is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD. No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 172409 February 4, 2008 ROOS INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTION, INC. and OSCAR TOCMO,petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and JOSE MARTILLOS,respondents. TINGA,J.: Facts: On 9 April 2002, private respondent Jose Martillos (respondent) filed a complaint against petitioners for illegal dismissal and money claims such as the payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement plus full backwages, service incentive leave, 13 month pay, litigation expenses, underpayment of holiday pay and other equitable reliefs before the National Capital Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), docketed as NLRC NCR South Sector Case No. 30-04-0185602. Respondent alleged that he had been hired as a driver-mechanic sometime in 1988 but was not made to sign any employment contract by petitioners. As driver mechanic, respondent was assigned to work at Carmona, Cavite and he worked daily from 7:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. at the rate ofP200.00 a day. He was also required to work during legal holidays but was only paid an additional 30% holiday pay. He likewise claimed that he had not been paid service incentive leave and 13 month pay during the entire course of his employment. On 16 March 2002, his employment was allegedly terminated without due process. Petitioners denied respondent’s allegations. They contended that respondent had been hired on several occasions as a project employee and that his employment was coterminous with the duration of the projects. They also maintained that respondent was fully aware of this arrangement. Considering that respondent’s employment had been validly terminated after the completion of the projects, petitioners concluded that he is not entitled to separation pay and other monetary claims, even attorney’s fees. 44

In a Resolutiondated July 29, 2004, the Second Division of the NLRC dismissed petitioners’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The NLRC stressed that the bond is an indispensable requisite for the perfection of an appeal by the employer and that the perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is mandatory and jurisdictional. The Labor Arbiter ordered petitioners to pay respondent the aggregate sum ofP224,647.17 representing backwages, separation pay, salary differential, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay and 13TH month pay. Petitioners received a copy of the Labor Arbiter’s decision on 17 December 2003. On 29 December 2003. Petitioners elevated the dismissal of their appeal to the Court of Appeals by way of a special civil action of certiorari. Issues:

1. Whether or not the filing of the appeal bond is substantial compliance with the NLRC rules.

Ruling: The Court denies the petition of certiorari. No. Contrary to petitioners’ assertion, the appeal bond is not merely procedural but jurisdictional. Without said bond, the NLRC does not acquire jurisdiction over the appeal.Indeed, non-compliance with such legal requirements is fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory.It must be stressed that there is no inherent right to an appeal in a labor case, as it arises solely from the grant of statute. Evidently, the NLRC did not acquire jurisdiction over petitioners’ appeal within the ten (10)-day reglementary period to perfect the appeal as the appeal bond was filed eight (8) days after the last day thereof. Thus, the Court cannot ascribe grave abuse of discretion to the NLRC or error to the Court of Appeals in refusing to take cognizance of petitioners’ belated appeal.

It is well to recall too our pronouncement inSenarillos v. Hermosisima, et al. that the judicial interpretation of a statute constitutes part of the law as of the date it was originally passed, since the Court’s construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the interpreted law carried into effect. Such judicial doctrine does not amount to the passage of a new law but consists merely of a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one, as is the situation in this case. At all events, the decision of the Labor Arbiter appears to be well-founded and petitioners’ ill-starred appeal untenable. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 148560 November 19, 2001 JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA,petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents. Facts : Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659, wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element ofmens reain crimes already punishable underThe Revised Penal Code,all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada,THEN A PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, together with his co-accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquireBY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, illgotten wealth in the aggregate amount orTOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS(₱4,097,804,173.17) thereby unjustly enriching himself at the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people, through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts. That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their popular meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative deliberations on the bill which eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law: 47

ISSUE : Whether or not the Plunder Law is unconstitutional or completely vague

Ruling : NO. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. The amended information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating w/ reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense w/c the petitioner is alleged to have committed. Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms“combination”and“series”in the key phrase“a combination or series of overt or criminal acts.These omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence violative of his fundamental right to due process. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used herein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them. A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects–it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conductto avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. Combination- the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. Tocombineis to bring into such close relationship as to obscure individual characters. Series- a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and temporal succession.

The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of the legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure society against the avarice and other venalities in public office. PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

G.R. No. 141811 November 15, 2001 FIRST METRO INVESTMENT CORPORATION,petitioner, vs. ESTE DEL SOL MOUNTAIN RESERVE, INC., VALENTIN S. DAEZ, JR., MANUEL Q. SALIENTES, MA. ROCIO A. DE VEGA, ALEXANDER G. ASUNCION, ALBERTO*M. LADORES, VICENTE M. DE VERA, JR., and FELIPE B. SESE,respondents. DE LEON, JR.,J.: Facts: On January 31, 1978, petitioner FMIC granted respondent Este del Sol a loan of P7,385,500.00 to finance the construction and development of the Este del Sol Mountain Reserve. Under its terms, the proceeds of the loan were to be released on staggered basis in which the interest was at 16% per annum based on the diminishing balance and was payable in 36 months, subject to a 20% one-time penalty on the amount due together with all the penalties, fees, expenses or charges, plus attorney's fees equivalent to twenty-five (25%). Respondent Este del Sol executed several documents as security for payment, among them, a Real Estate Mortgage and individual Continuing Suretyship agreements by co-respondents. Respondent Este del Sol also executed an Underwriting Agreement and Consultancy Agreement, where they shall pay petitioner FMIC an annual supervision fee 49

(P200,000.00) and consultancy fee (P332,500.00) per annum for a period of four (4) consecutive years. The said amounts of fees were deemed paid by respondent Este del Sol to petitioner FMIC which deducted the same from the first release of the loan. Este del Sol failed to meet the schedule of repayment in accordance with a revised Schedule of Amortization as a result petitioner FMIC caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage on June 23, 1980. After the trial, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioner FMIC. Finding the decision of the trial court unacceptable, respondents interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. On November 8, 1999, the appellate court reversed the challenged decision of the trial court. Issue: WoN the Underwriting and Consultancy Agreements were simply cloaks or devices to cover an illegal scheme employed by petitioner FMIC to conceal and collect excessively usurious interest.

Ruling: Yes. An apparently lawful loan is usurious when it is intended that additional compensation for the loan be disguised by an ostensibly unrelated contract providing for payment by the borrower for the lender's services which are of little value or which are not in fact to be rendered, such as in the instant case. In this connection, Article 1957 of the New Civil Code clearly provides that: Art. 1957. Contracts and stipulations, under any cloak or device whatever, intended to circumvent the laws against usury shall be void. The borrower may recover in accordance with the laws on usury. This Court agrees with the factual findings and conclusion of the appellate court, to wit: We find the stipulated penalties, liquidated damages and attorney's fees, excessive, iniquitous and unconscionable and revolting to the conscience as they hardly allow the borrower any chance of survival in case of default. And true enough, ESTE folded up when the appellee extrajudicially foreclosed on its (ESTE's) development project and literally closed its offices as both the appellee and ESTE were at the time 50

holding office in the same building. Accordingly, we hold that 20% penalty on the amount due and 10% of the proceeds of the foreclosure sale as attorney's fees would suffice to compensate the appellee, especially so because there is no clear showing that the appellee hired the services of counsel to effect the foreclosure, it engaged counsel only when it was seeking the recovery of the alleged deficiency. The Court is convinced that the appellate court committed no reversible error in its challenged Decision, thus the instant petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014 NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM,Petitioner, vs. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM,Respondent. Facts: Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990. On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months old. Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines. According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or less).However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo. Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been residing thereat. Respondent and his new wife established a business known as Paree Catering, located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City. To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City. 51

The RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against respondent.Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted bail. On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu dismissed the case for he being an alien. September 1, 2010, the petitioner presented a Petition for Review on Certiorari. Issues: 1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law 2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to support his minor child Ruling: The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel, the Court held that – Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are governed by their personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to which they belong even when staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15). It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son under Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether. The doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine 52

law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith. The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing offense,which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime charged in the instant case has clearly not prescribed. Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to petitioner’s child calls for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, and the truth and falsehood of facts being admitted, we hereby remand the determination of this issue to the RTC-Cebu which has jurisdiction over the case. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

G.R. No. 166471 March 22, 2011 TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVEPetitioner, vs. LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT,Respondent. Facts: La Trinidad Water District (LTWD) is a local water utility created under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 198, as amended. It is authorized to supply water for domestic, industrial and commercial purposes within the municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet. On 9 October 2000, TMPC filed with the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) an application for a certificate of public convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain a waterworks system in Barangay Tawang. LTWD opposed TMPC’s application. LTWD claimed that, under Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, its franchise is exclusive. Section 47 states that: Sec. 47.Exclusive Franchise. No franchise shall be granted to any other person or agency for domestic, industrial or commercial water service within the district or any portion thereof unless and except to the extent that the board of directors of said district consents thereto by resolution duly adopted, such resolution, however, shall be subject to review by the Administration. NWRB approved TMPC’s application for a CPC. NWRB held that LTWD’s franchise cannot be exclusive since exclusive franchises are unconstitutional. 54

LTWD filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 18 November 2002 Resolution,6the NWRB denied the motion. LTWD appealed to the RTC. Issues: Whether or not the RTC erred in holding that Section 47 of PD No. 198 is valid. Ruling: The President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises for the operation of a public utility that are exclusive in character. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly and clearly prohibit the creation of franchises that are exclusive in character. In PD No. 198, as amended, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) created indirectly franchises that are exclusive in character by allowing the BOD of LTWD and the LWUA to create directly franchises that are exclusive in character. Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, allows the BOD and the LWUA to create directly franchises that are exclusive in character. In case of conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the Constitution always prevails because the Constitution is the basic law to which all other laws must conform to. The duty of the Court is to uphold the Constitution and to declare void all laws that do not conform to it. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy,if a lawor contractviolates any norm of the constitution that lawor contractwhether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branchor entered into by private persons for private purposesis null and void and without any force and effect. Thus,since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statuteand contract. The petition is granted. Section 47 of PD No. 198 is declared unconstitutional. The judgment of the RTC is set aside and the resolution of NWRB is reinstated.

G.R. No. 177508 August 7, 2009 BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT) PARTY-LIST, represented by SALVADOR B. BRITANICO,Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,Respondent. Facts: Before the Court is a petition for prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction filed by petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Party List (petitioner) assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9369 (RA 9369)and enjoining respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing the statute. On 7 May 2007, petitioner, a duly accredited multi-sectoral organization, filed this petition for prohibition alleging that RA 9369 violated Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.Petitioner also assails the constitutionality of Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 of RA 9369. According to petitioner, these provisions are of questionable application and doubtful validity for failing to comply with the provisions of the Constitution. The COMELEC and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed their respective Comments. At the outset, both maintain that RA 9369 enjoys the presumption of 56

constitutionality, save for the prayer of the COMELEC to declare Section 43 as unconstitutional. Issues: 1. Whether RA 9369 violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution; 2. Whether Sections 37 and 38 violate Section 17, Article VIand Paragraph 7, Section 4, Article VIIof the Constitution; 3. Whether Section 43 violates Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution;and 4. Whether Section 34 violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution.

Ruling: The petition has no merit. is settled that every statute is presumed to be constitutional. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law. Those who petition the Court to declare a law unconstitutional must show that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful, speculative or argumentative one; otherwise, the petition must fail. In this case, petitioner failed to justify why RA 9369 and the assailed provisions should be declared unconstitutional.

1. RA 9369 does not violate Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution The constitutional requirement that "every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof" has always been given a practical rather than a technical construction. The requirement is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough to include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. 2. Sections 37 and 38 do not violate Section 17, Article VI and Paragraph 7, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution 57

Petitioner argues that Sections 37 and 38 violate the Constitution by impairing the powers of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). Petitioner concludes that in entertaining pre-proclamation cases, Congress and the COMELEC en banc undermine the independence and encroach upon the jurisdiction of the PET and the SET. The COMELEC maintains that the amendments introduced by Section 37 pertain only to the adoption and application of the procedures on pre-proclamation controversies in case of any discrepancy, incompleteness, erasure or alteration in the certificates of canvass. The COMELEC adds that Section 37 does not provide that Congress and the COMELEC en banc may now entertain pre-proclamation cases for national elective posts.1avvphi1 3. Section 43 does not violate Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution Both petitioner and the COMELEC argue that the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the "exclusive power" to investigate and prosecute cases of violations of election laws. Petitioner and the COMELEC allege that Section 43 is unconstitutional because it gives the other prosecuting arms of the government concurrent power with the COMELEC to investigate and prosecute election offenses. The grant of the "exclusive power" to the COMELEC can be found in Section 265 of BP 881, which provides: Sec. 265. Prosecution. - The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government: Provided, however, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within four months from his filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted. It is clear that the grant of the "exclusive power" to investigate and prosecute election offenses to the COMELEC was not by virtue of the Constitution but by BP 881, a legislative enactment. If the intention of the framers of the Constitution were to give

the COMELEC the "exclusive power" to investigate and prosecute election offenses, the framers would have expressly so stated in the Constitution. They did not. 4. Section 34 does not violate Section 10, Article III of the Constitution According to the COMELEC, poll watching is not just an ordinary contract but is an agreement with the solemn duty to ensure the sanctity of votes. The role of poll watchers is vested with public interest which can be regulated by Congress in the exercise of its police power. First, the non- impairment clause is limited in application to laws that derogate from prior acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties. Second, it is settled that police power is superior to the non-impairment clause.The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of contracts is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the community. Section 34 would still be constitutional because the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to promote the general welfare of the people. We agree with the COMELEC that the role of poll watchers is invested with public interest. WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 161107 March 12, 2013 HON. MA. LOURDES C. FERNANDO, in her capacity as City Mayor of Marikina City, JOSEPHINE C. EVANGELIST A, in her capacity as Chief, Permit Division, Office of the City Engineer, and ALFONSO ESPIRITU, in his capacity as City Engineer of Marikina City,Petitioners, vs. ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE and ST. SCHOLASTICA'S ACADEMYMARIKINA, INC.,Respondents.

Facts: Respondents St. Scholastica’s College (SSC) and St. Scholastica’s AcademyMarikina, Inc. (SSA-Marikina) are educational institutions organized under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, with principal offices and business addresses at Leon Guinto Street, Malate, Manila, and at West Drive, Marikina Heights, Marikina City, respectively. On April 2, 2000, the City Government of Marikina sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to demolish and replace the fence of their Marikina property to make it 80% see-thru, and, at the same time, to move it back about six (6) meters to provide parking space for vehicles to park. On April 26, 2000, the respondents requested for an extension of time to comply with the directive. In response, the petitioners, 60

through then City Mayor Bayani F. Fernando, insisted on the enforcement of the subject ordinance. Not in conformity, the respondents filed a petition for prohibition with an application for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court, Marikina, Branch 273 (RTC). RTC rendered a Decision, granting the petition and ordering the issuance of a writ of prohibition commanding the petitioners to permanently desist from enforcing or implementing Ordinance No. 192 on the respondents’ property. The RTC noted that the petitioners could still take action to expropriate the subject property through eminent domain. The CA denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the RTC. Issues: Whether or not Section 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192 are valid exercises of police power by the City Government of Marikina. Ruling: Section 3(1) Fences on the front yard – shall be no more than one (1) meter in height. Fences in excess of one (1) meter shall be of an open fence type, at least eighty percent (80%) see-thru; and Section 5 In no case shall walls and fences be built within the five (5) meter parking area allowance located between the front monument line and the building line of commercial and industrial establishments and educational and religious institutions. 80% See-Thru Fence Requirement The petitioners argue that while Section 5 of Ordinance No. 192 may be invalid, Section 3.1 limiting the height of fences to one meter and requiring fences in excess of one meter to be at least 80% see-thru, should remain valid and enforceable against the respondents. The enforcement of Section 3.1 would, therefore, result in an undue interference with the respondents’ rights to property and privacy. Section 3.1 of Ordinance No. 192 is, thus, also invalid and cannot be enforced against the respondents. Separability 61

Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192, as amended, are, thus, invalid and cannot be enforced against the respondents. Nonetheless, "the general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if susceptible to being separated from the invalid, may stand and be enforced." Considering the invalidity of Sections 3.1 and 5, it is clear that the petitioners were acting in excess of their jurisdiction in enforcing Ordinance No. 192 against the respondents. The CA was correct in affirming the decision of the RTC in issuing the writ of prohibition. The petitioners must permanently desist from enforcing Sections 3.1 and 5 of the assailed ordinance on the respondents' property in Marikina City. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The writ of prohibition is hereby issued commanding the respondents to permanently desist from enforcing or implementing Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192, Series of 1994, as amended, on the petitioners' property in question located in Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila. No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009 WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,Petitioners, vs. CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM,Respondent. Facts: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law the Ordinance.The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder: SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby the declared policy of the City Government to protect the best interest, health and welfare, and the morality of its constituents in general and the youth in particular. SEC. 2. Title. This ordinance shall be known as "An Ordinance" prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.

SEC. 3. Pursuant to the above policy, short-time admission and rate [sic], wash-up rate or other similarly concocted terms, are hereby prohibited in hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila. SEC. 4. Definition of Term[s]. Short-time admission shall mean admittance and charging of room rate for less than twelve (12) hours at any given time or the renting out of rooms more than twice a day or any other term that may be concocted by owners or managers of said establishments but would mean the same or would bear the same meaning. SEC. 5. Penalty Clause. Any person or corporation who shall violate any provision of this ordinance shall upon conviction thereof be punished by a fine of Five Thousand (₱5,000.00) Pesos or imprisonment for a period of not exceeding one (1) year or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court; Provided, That in case of [a] juridical person, the president, the manager, or the persons in charge of the operation thereof shall be liable: Provided, further, That in case of subsequent conviction for the same offense, the business license of the guilty party shall automatically be cancelled. On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional. On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-interventionon the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-inhotels and motels in Manila. RTC granted the motion to intervene. Issues: Whether or not the Ordinance No. 7774 is unconstitutional. Ruling: 64

Yes, the primary constitutional question that confronts us is one of due process, as guaranteed under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. Due process evades a precise definition.The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent arbitrary governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals. The due process guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even corporations and partnerships are protected by the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned. That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The Ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions. Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. WHEREFORE, the Petition isGRANTED, Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 151085 August 20, 2008 JOEMAR ORTEGA,petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondent. Facts: Petitioner, then about 14 years old, was charged with the crime of Rape in two separate informations both dated April 20,1998, for allegedly raping AAA. On February 27, 1990, AAA was born to spouses FFF and MMM. Among her siblings CCC, BBB, DDD, EEE and GGG, AAA is the only girl in the family. Before these disturbing events. BBB caught petitioner raping his younger sister AAA inside their own home. BBB then informed their mother MMM who in turn asked AAA. There, AAA confessed that petitioner raped her three (3) times on three (3) different occasions. The first occasion happened sometime in August 1996. Petitioner woke AAA up and led her to the sala. There petitioner raped AAA. The second occasion occurred the following day, again at the petitioner's residence. AAA testified that petitioner inserted his penis into her vagin* and she felt pain. In all of these instances, petitioner warned AAA not to tell her parents, otherwise, he would 66

spank her. AAA did not tell her parents about her ordeal. The third and last occasion happened in the evening of December 1, 1996. On May 13, 1999, the RTC finds the accused Joemar Ortega Y Felisario GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as Principal by Direct Participation of the crime of RAPE as charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 98-19083 and 98-19084 and there being no aggravating or mitigating circ*mstance. Issues: Whether or not the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9344 apply to petitioner's case, considering that at the time he committed the alleged rape, he was merely 13 years old. Ruling: A legislative enactment. In construing statutes the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonizes best with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of the legislature. Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. In this case, the plain meaning of R.A. No. 9344's unambiguous language, coupled with clear lawmakers' intent, is most favorable to herein petitioner. No other interpretation is justified, for the simple language of the new law itself demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the CICL. It bears stressing that the petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of the commission of the alleged rape. This was duly proven by the certificate of live birth, by petitioner's own testimony, and by the testimony of his mother. Furthermore, petitioner’s age was never assailed in any of the proceedings before the RTC and the CA. Indubitably, petitioner, at the time of the commission of the crime, was below 15 years of age. Under R.A. No. 9344, he is exempted from criminal liability. However, while the law exempts petitioner from criminal liability for the two (2) counts of rape committed against AAA, Section 6 thereof expressly provides that there is no concomitant exemption from civil liability. Accordingly, this Court sustains the ruling of the RTC, duly affirmed by the CA, that petitioner and/or his parents are liable to pay AAA P100,000.00 as civil indemnity. This award is in the nature of actual or compensatory damages, and is mandatory upon a conviction for rape. 67

The RTC, however, erred in not separately awarding moral damages, distinct from the civil indemnity awarded to the rape victim. AAA is entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of rape, pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code, without the necessity of additional pleading or proof other than the fact of rape. Moral damages are granted in recognition of the victim's injury necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Criminal Case Nos. 98-19083 and 98-19084 filed against petitioner Joemar F. Ortega are herebyDISMISSED.

G.R. No. 160528 October 9, 2006 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.,respondent. Facts: On November 5, 1997, VP-Revenue Operations and Tax Services Officer, Atty. Edgardo P. Curbita, filed a written request for refund of the amount ofP2,241,527.22 which represents the total amount of 20% final withholding tax withheld from the [respondent] by various withholding agent banks, and which amount includes the 20% final withholding tax withheld by the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) and Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) for the period starting March 1995 through February 1997. On December 4, 1997, the [respondent’s] AVP-Revenue Operations and Tax Services Officer again filed with [petitioner] CIR another written request for refund of the amount ofP1,048,047.23, representing the total amount of 20% final withholding tax withheld by various depository banks of the [respondent] which amount includes the 20% withholding tax withheld by the Philippine National Bank (PNB), Equitable Banking Corporation (EBC), and the Jade Progressive Savings & Mortgage Bank 68

(JPSMB) for the period starting March 1995 through November 1997. Issues: Whether or not the provision in Section 13 of PD No. 1590 applies even if there were in fact no taxes paid under any of subsections (A) and (B) of the said decree. Ruling: Two points are evident from this provision.First, as consideration for the franchise, PAL is liable to pay either a) its basic corporate income tax based on its net taxable income, as computed under the National Internal Revenue Code; or b) a franchise tax of two percent based on its gross revenues,whichever is lower.Second, the tax paid is "in lieu of all other taxes" imposed by all government entities in the country. It is clear that PD 1590 intended to give respondent the option to avail itself of Subsection (a) or (b) as consideration for its franchise. PAL was owned and operated by the government at the time the franchise was last amended. By basing the tax rate on the annual net taxable income, a) PD 1590 necessarily recognized the situation in which taxable income may result in a negative amount and thus translate into a zero tax liability. It can reasonably be contemplated that PD 1590 sought to assist the finances of the government corporation in the form of lower taxes. When respondent operates at a loss (as in the instant case), no taxes are due; in this instance, it has a lower tax liability than that provided by Subsection (b). While the Court recognizes the general rule that the grant of tax exemptions is strictly construed against the taxpayer and in favor of the taxing power, Section 13 of the franchise of respondent leaves no room for interpretation. Its franchise exempts it from paying any tax other than the option it chooses: either the "basic corporate income tax" or the two percent gross revenue tax. WHEREFORE, the Petition isDENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. L-28329 August 17, 1975 COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS,petitioner, vs. ESSO STANDARD EASTERN, INC., (Formerly: Standard-Vacuum Refining Corp. (Phil.),respondent.

Facts: On December 9, 1957, Respondent ESSO operates a petroleum refining plant in Limay Bataan. Under Article 103 of Republic Act No. 387 which provides: "During the five years following the granting of any concession, the concessionaire may import free of customs duty, all equipment, machinery, material, instruments, supplies and accessories," respondent imported and was assessed the special import tax. The Collector of Customs on February 16, 1962, held that respondent ESSO was subject to the payment of the special import tax provided in Republic Act No. 1394, as amended by R.A. No. 2352, and dismissed the protest. On March 1, 1962, respondent appealed the ruling of the Collector of Customs to the 70

Commissioner of Customs. The Commissioner of Customs , affirmed the decision of said Collector of Customs on March 19, 1965. Issues: Whether or not the exemption enjoyed by herein private respondent ESSO Standard Eastern, Inc. from customs duties granted by Republic Act No. 387, or the Petroleum Act of 1949, should embrace or include the special import tax imposed by R.A. No. 1394, or the Special Import Tax Law.

Ruling: It is a well accepted principle that where a statute is ambiguous, as Republic Act No. 1394 appears to be, courts may examine both the printed pages of the published Act as well as those extrinsic matters that may aid in construing the meaning of the statute, such as the history of its enactment, the reasons for the passage of the bill and purposes to be accomplished by the measure. Against this unambiguous language of R.A. No. 387, there is the subsequent legislation, R.A. No. 1394, the Special Import Tax Law, which, according to the herein petitioner, shows that the legislature considered the special import tax as a tax distinct from customs duties. We are convinced that R.A. No. 387, The Petroleum Act of 1949, was intended to encourage the exploitation, exploration and development of the petroleum resources of the country by giving it the necessary incentive in the form of tax exemptions. This is theraison d etrefor the generous grant of tax exemptions to those who would invest their financial resources towards the achievement of this national economic goal. The reason for this is very clear: The legislature wanted to continue the incentives for the continuing development of the petroleum industry. WHEREFORE, taking into consideration the weight given by this Court to the findings and conclusions of the Court of Tax Appeals on a matter it is well-equipped to handle, which findings and conclusions We find no reason to overturn, the petition of the Commissioner of Customs to reverse the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals should be, as it is hereby, denied. No costs. 71

G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995 SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ,petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA,respondents.

Facts: A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy." 72

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes." Issue: Whether or not the provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. Ruling: We disagree. First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides: Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described. The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". 73

The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. The applicable facts and circ*mstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private communications with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable. WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous and leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK,Petitioner, vs. CAYETANO A. TEJANO, JR.,Respondent. G.R. No. 173615 October 16, 2009 PERALTA,J.: Facts: Respondent Cayetano A. Tejano, Jr. supposedly with the participation of eight (8) other employees of petitioner Philippine National Bank (PNB) in its branch in Cebu City, allegedly committed grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service and acts violative of Republic Act No. 74

3019, relative to the corporate accounts of and transactions with corporations. All of these transactions transpired at the time that PNB was still a governmentowned and controlled corporation. In the meantime, on May 27, 1996, the PNB had ceased to be a government-owned and controlled corporation, and in view of its conversion into a private banking institution by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 80. Respondent, who was then the Vice-President and Manager of the bank, and the eight other employees were administratively charged before the PNB Management Hearing Committee on February 24 and March 17, 1994. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, it denied respondent’s reconsideration on that ground. Respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals on petition for review. The Court of Appeals found merit in respondent’s appeal. The Civil Service Commission are hereby REVERSED and the case is remanded to the Civil Service Commission for further proceedings. Issue: Whether or not E.O. No. 80 has the effect of removing from the jurisdiction of the CSC the appeal of respondent which was already pending before the CSC at the time the said law converted PNB into a private banking institution.

Ruling: We draw no merit in the petition. In essence, Section 6 of E.O. No. 80, also known as theRevised Charter of PNB, treats of the effects of converting the bank into a private financial and banking institution. Section 6. Change in Ownership of the Majority of the Voting Equity of the Bank. - When the ownership of the majority of the issued common voting shares passes to private investors, the stockholders shall cause the adoption and registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission of the appropriate Articles of Incorporation and revised by-laws within three (3) 75

months from such transfer of ownership. Upon the issuance of the certificate of incorporation under the provisions of the Corporation Code, this Charter shall cease to have force and effect, and shall be deemed repealed. Any special privileges granted to the Bank such as the authority to act as official government depositary, or restrictions imposed upon the Bank, shall be withdrawn, and the Bank shall thereafter be considered a privately organized bank subject to the laws and regulations generally applicable to private banks. The Bank shall likewise cease to be a government-owned or controlled corporation subject to the coverage of service-wide agencies such as the Commission on Audit and the Civil Service Commission. In a language too plain to be mistaken, the quoted portion of the law only states no more than the natural, logical and legal consequences of opening to private ownership the majority of the bank’s voting equity. Sound indeed is the rule that where the law is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without any interpretation or even construction. This is based on the presumption that the words employed therein correctly express its intent and preclude even the courts from giving it a different construction. Section 6 of E.O. No. 80 is explicit in terms. It speaks for itself. It does not invite an interpretation that reads into its clear and plain language petitioner’s adamant assertion that it divested the CSC of jurisdiction to finally dispose of respondent’s pending appeal despite the privatization of PNB. WHEREFORE, the petition isDENIED.

G.R. No. 112371 October 7, 1998 AIDA DOMINGO,petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT,respondent. PURISIMA,J.: Facts:

On March 23, 1987, petitioner Aida Domingo was appointed by the President as Regional Director, Region V of the Department of Social Welfare and Development, and she assumed office as such. Several government vehicles were thereafter endorsed to her office for the use of the personnel of the entire Region V of DSWD. On November 14, 1989, Regional Auditor Manuel Cañares sent a communication to the petitioner informing her that post-audit reports on the DSWD Regional Office disbursem*nt accounts showed that officials provided with government vehicles were still collecting transportation allowances. The said Auditor then requested the petitioner, in her capacity as Regional Director, to instruct all persons concerned to cease from collecting the transportation allowances in question. However, despite the assignment to her of a vehicle for her official use, the petitioner asserted entitlement to a commutable transportation allowance and collected a total amount of P48,600.00 as transportation allowance for the period from July 1, 1988 to December 31, 1990. Petitioner asked for reconsideration of the auditor's directive; contending that she should only be disallowed to claim transportation allowance on the days she actually used a government vehicle. According to petitioner, she already refunded P1,600.00 for the thirty two (32) days she actually utilized a government vehicle.

Issue: Whether or not a commutable transporlation allowance may still be claimed by a government official provided with a government vehicle, for the days the official did not actually use the vehicle. Ruling:

It is an elementary rule that when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no need, in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, for any interpretation. Words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. In the case under consideration, it must be noted that the provisions of law referred to in the General Appropriations Acts of 1988, 1989, 1990 and 1991, utilized the word "assigned" and not "used". Webster's Dictionary defines the word "assign" as "to transfer (property) to another in trust". Had legislative intent been that government officials issued an official vehicle could still collect transportation allowance if they do not actually use subject vehicle, the word "use" instead of "assign" should have been employed. It is undeniable that several government vehicles were issued to the Regional Office of DSWD in Region V. That the vehicles thereat were issued not to petitioner herself, as Regional Director, but to the Regional Office itself, is of no moment. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Commission on Audit is hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 103882 November 25, 1998 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND REPUBLIC REAL ESTATE CORPORATION, respondents, CULTURAL CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES,intervenor. 78

G.R. No. 105276 November 25, 1998 PASAY CITY AND REPUBLIC REAL ESTATE CORPORATION,petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents. PURISIMA,J.:

FACTS: On June 22, 1957,RA 1899 was approved granting authority to all municipalities and chartered cities to undertake and carry out at their own expense the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any foreshore lands bordering them, and to establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities may determine in consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No. 121 was passed by the city of Pasay for the reclamation of foreshore lands within their jurisdiction and entered into an agreement with Republic Real Estate Corporation for the said project. Republic questioned the agreement. It contended, among others, that the agreement between RREC and the City of Pasay was void for the object of the contract is outside the commerce of man, it being a foreshore land. Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in question is within the commerce of man because RA 1899 gives a broader meaning on the term “foreshore land” than that in the definition provided by the dictionary. RTC rendered judgment in favour of Pasay City and RREC, and the decision was affirmed by the CA with modifications.

ISSUE: I. Whether or not the term “foreshore land” includes the submerged area. II.Whether or not “foreshore land” and the reclaimed area is within the commerce of man.

RULING: The Court ruled that it is erroneous and unsustainable to uphold the opinion of the respondent court that the term “foreshore land” includes the submerged areas. To repeat, the term "foreshore lands" refers to: The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the part of a seashore between the low-water line usually at the seaward margin of a low-tide terrace and the upper limit of wave wash at high tide usually marked by a beach scarp or berm.

The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot broaden its meaning; much less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention of Congress were to include submerged areas, it should haveprovided expressly. That Congress did not so provide could only signify the exclusion of submerged areas from the term “foreshore lands.” Well entrenched, to the point of being elementary, is the rule that when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for application. So also, resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional convention, is unwarranted, the language of the law being plain and unambiguous. It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as amended by Ordinance No. 158, and the Agreement under attack, have been found to be outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899, and thereforeultra viresand null and void.

G.R. No. L-32743 February 15, 1974 PRIMITIVO ESPIRITU and LEONORA A. DE ESPIRITU,petitioners, vs. 80

RICARDO CIPRIANO and THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, RIZAL, BRANCH XV,respondents. ESGUERRA,J.: Facts: The case originated as one for unlawful detainer instituted on May 30, 1969, by plaintiffs, now petitioners, in the Municipal Court of Pasig, Rizal, against private respondent Ricardo Cipriano for the latter's alleged failure to pay rentals. The plaintiffs are the owners of the property in question, leased to the defendant since 1954; The house of the defendant was built on the property with the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff pursuant to an oral contract of lease; Before 1969 the lease of the property was on year-to-year arrangement, rentals being then payable at or before the end of the year; The following are the rates of rentals: (a) 1954 to 1957 P12.00 a year (b) 1968 to 1959 P13.20 a year (c) 1960 to 1961 P14.00 a year (d) 1962 P16.00 a year (e) 1963 to 1965 P24.70 a year (f) 1967 to 1968 P48.00 a year Effective January 1969 the lease was converted to a month-to-month basis and rental was increased to P30.00 a month by the plaintiffs; The defendant has remained in possession of the property up to the present; Since January 1969 the defendant has not paid rental at the present monthly rate; A formal notice to vacate, dated March 22, 1969, was sent by registered mail to, and received by, defendant.

On July 7, 1970, Judge Vivencio Ruiz of the Court of First Instance of Rizal issued an order giving private respondent herein seven days within which to file his motion to dismiss. Subsequently, on July 13, 1970, respondent moved to dismiss petitioner's complaint, invoking the prohibitory provision of Republic Act 6126, entitled "An Act To Regulate Rentals of Dwelling Units or of Land On Which Another's Dwelling Is Located For One Year And Penalizing Violations Thereof. Issue: Whether or not Republic Act 6126 were to be applied to the present case.

Ruling: Respondent contends that the act is remedial and may, therefore, be given retroactive effect is untenable. A close study of the provisions discloses that far from being remedial, the statute affects substantive rights and hence a strict and prospective construction thereof is in order. Article 4 of the New Civil Code ordains that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided and that where the law is clear, Our duty is equally plain. We must apply it to the facts as found. Respondent's tenacious insistence On the retroactive operation of Republic Act 6126 represents a last ditch effort on his part to hold on to the premises while at the same time escaping the obligation to pay the increased rate. We can not countenance such a situation, for to permit the same to obtain would be sanctioning a sheer absurdity and causing injustice to the petitioner herein. Well-settled is the principle that while the Legislature has the power to pass retroactive laws which do not impair the obligation of contracts, or affect injuriously vested rights, it is equally true that statutes are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent in expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the enactment.

Under the circ*mstances of this case, We, therefore, rule that Republic Act 6126 is not applicable to the case at bar. As the language of the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it plainly says. WHEREFORE, the assailed orders of August 4 and October 16, 1970, are hereby nullified and set aside. Costs against respondent.

G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010 CYNTHIA S. BOLOS,Petitioner, vs. DANILO T. BOLOS,Respondent. MENDOZA,J.: Facts: On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos(Cynthia)filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos(Danilo)under Article 36 of the Family Code. RTC granted the petition for annulment in a Decision, dated August 2, 2006, with the following disposition: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between petitioner CYNTHIA S. BOLOS and respondent DANILO T. BOLOS celebrated on February 14, 1980 as null and voidab initioon the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of both petitioner and respondent under Article 36 of the Family Code with all the legal consequences provided by law. A copy of said decision was received by Danilo on August 25, 2006. He timely filed the Notice of Appeal on September 11, 2006. Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code. According to Cynthia, the CA erroneously anchored its decision to anobiter dictumin the aforecited Enrico case, which did not even involve a marriage solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code. Issues: Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code. Ruling: The Court finds the petition devoid of merit. 84

Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this case. Her stance is unavailing. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads: Section 1. Scope – This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriagesunder the Family Codeof the Philippines. The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application. As the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule orverba legis. It is expressed in the maxim,index animi sermo, or "speech is the index of intention." Furthermore, there is the maximverba legis non est recedendum, or "from the words of a statute there should be no departure." Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State finds no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break up of families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the concern alone of the family members. WHEREFORE, the petition isDENIED.

G.R. No. L-26419 October 16, 1970 GEDEON G. QUIJANO and EUGENIA T. QUIJANO,petitioners-appellants, vs. THE DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and THEEXOFICIOSHERIFF OF MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL, respondents-appellees. BARREDO,J.:

Facts: That the petitioners filed an application for an urban estate loan with the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC), predecessor-in-interest of the herein respondent-bank, in the amount of P19,500.00; That the petitioners' urban real estate loan was approved per RFC Board Resolution No. 2533 on April 30, 1953; That the mortgage contract was executed by the petitioners in favor of the respondent-bank on March 23, 1954; That the said loan of P19,500.00 was to be received by the petitioners in several releases, subject among others. That the first release of P4,200 was made on April 29, 1954, and the other releases were made subsequent thereafter; That as of July 31, 1965, the outstanding obligation of the petitioners with the respondent-bank, including interests, was P13,983.59; That on July 27, 1965, petitioner Gedeon Quijano, as holder of Acknowledgment No. 10181, wrote the respondent-bank in Manila offering to pay in the amount of P14,000.00 for his outstanding obligation with the respondent-bank, out of the proceeds of his back pay pursuant to Republic Act No. 897;

That the respondent-bank, thru its Ozamis Branch advised the petitioners of the nonacceptance of his offer on the ground that the loan was not incurred before or subsisting on June 20, 1953 when Republic Act 897 was approved; That the respondent-bank, thru its Ozamis City Branch, filed on October 14, 1965, an application for the foreclosure of real estate mortgage executed by the petitioners, and that acting on the application of the respondent-bank, the Provincial Sheriff, thru his deputies, scheduled the public auction sale for January 18, 1966, after advising petitioner Gedeon Quijano of the application for foreclosure filed by the respondentbank; That the parties herein agree to transfer the auction sale scheduled for January 16, 1966 to February 18, 1966, without the necessity of republication of the notice of sale. Issue: Whether or not the obligation of the petitioners was subsisting at the time of the approval of Republic Act No. 897, the Amendatory Act of Julie 20, 1953 to Republic Act 304, and the original back pay law. Ruling: The appeal has no merit. It is indeed settled that under the above provisions, the Government or any of its agencies does not have any discretion in the acceptance of back pay certificates. It is true that appellants' application for an urban real estate loan was approved by appellee bank on April 80, 1953. It appears, however, that appellants did not avail of it until much later, as in fact, they executed the mortgage contract only on March 23, 1954, and furthermore, that the release of the amount of the said loan of P19,500.00 was to be made in installments and subject to compliance with certain conditions by said appellants. It may be truly said, as contended by appellants, that when their application for the loan was approved by the appellee Bank on April 30, 1953, an agreement was perfected between them and said Bank, but it should be noted that under such agreement the only enforceable obligation that was created was that of the Bank to grant the loan applied for, whereas the obligation of appellants to pay the same 87

could not have arisen until after the amount of the loan has been actually released to them. Appellants' appeal that a more liberal construction of the law would enable "many crippled or disabled veterans, or their wives and orphans, or those who had in one way or another unselfishly sacrificed or contributed to the cause of the last war" to take advantage of their back pay certificates, does deserve sympathy, for indeed, among the avowed purposes of the said law are: "First, to serve as a source of financial aid to needy veterans, like crippled or disabled veterans, and to their wives and orphans. Secondly, to give recognition to the sacrifices of those who joined the last war, and particularly to those who have given their all for the cause of the last war." (Congressional Record No. 61, 2nd Congress, 4th Regular Session, May 6, 1953, page 74, as quoted in Florentino, et al. vs. PNB, 98 Phil. 959, 961-963).têñ. £îhqwâ£On the other hand, however, We cannot see any room for interpretation or construction in the clear and unambiguous language of the above-quoted provision of law. This Court has steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is the application of the law according to its express terms, interpretation being called for only when such literal application is impossible. WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. No costs.

G.R. No. 113926 October 23, 1996 SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY,petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, BRANCH 61, MAGTANGGOL EUSEBIO and LEILA VENTURA,respondents. HERMOSISIMA,JR. J.:

Facts: On April 27, 1983, private respondent Magtanggol Eusebio executed Promissory Note No. TL/74/178/83 in favor of petitioner Security Bank and Trust Co. (SBTC) in the total amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) payable in six monthly installments with a stipulated interest of 23%per annumup to the fifth installment. On July 28, 1983, respondent Eusebio again executed Promissory Note No. TL/74/1296/83 in favor of petitioner SBTC. Respondent bound himself to pay the sum of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) in six (6) monthly installments plus 23% interestper annum. Finally, another Promissory Note No. TL74/1491/83 was executed on August 31, 1983 in the amount of Sixty Five Thousand Pesos (P65,000.00). Respondent agreed to pay this note in six (6) monthly installments plus interest at the rate of 23%per annum. On all the abovementioned promissory notes, private respondent Leila Ventura had signed as co-maker. On March 30, 1993, the courta quorendered a judgment in favor of petitioner. Upon the failure and refusal of respondent Eusebio to pay the aforestated balance payable, a collection case was filed in court by petitioner SBTC. Issues:

Whether or not the 23% rate of interestper annumagreed upon by petitioner bank and respondents is allowable and not against the Usury Law.

Ruling: From the examination of the records, it appears that indeed the agreed rate of interest as stipulated on the three (3) promissory notes is 23%per annum. The applicable provision of law is the Central Bank Circular No. 905 which took effect on December 22, 1982, particularly Sections 1 and 2 which state: CB Circular 905 was issued by the Central Bank's Monetary Board pursuant to P.D. 1684 empowering them to prescribe the maximum rates of interest for loans and certain forbearances. The court has ruled in the case ofPhilippine National Bank v.Court of Appeals that: P.D. No. 1684 and C.B. Circular No. 905 no more than allow contracting parties to stipulate freely regarding any subsequent adjustment in the interest rate that shall accrue on a loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits. In fine, they can agree to adjust, upward or downward, the interest previously stipulated. All the promissory notes were signed in 1983 and, therefore, were already covered by CB Circular No. 905. Contrary to the claim of respondent court, this circular did not repeal nor in anyway amend the Usury Law but simply suspended the latter's effectivity. Basic is the rule of statutory construction that when the law is clear and unambiguous, the court is left with no alternative but to apply the same according to its clear language. The rate of interest was agreed upon by the parties freely. Significantly, respondent did not question that rate. The promissory notes were signed by both parties voluntarily. Therefore, stipulations therein are binding between them. Respondent Eusebio, likewise, did not question any of the stipulations therein. In fact, in the Comment filed by respondent Eusebio

to this court, he chose not to question the decision and instead expressed his desire to negotiate with the petitioner bank for "terms within which to settle his obligation." IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the respondent courta quo, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the rate of interest that should be imposed be 23%per annum. SO ORDERED. RULES OF COURT: Central Bank Circular No. 905 which took effect on December 22, 1982, particularly Sections 1 and 2 which state: Sec. 1. The rate of interest, including commissions, premiums, fees and other charges, on a loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits, regardless of maturity and whether secured or unsecured, that may be charged or collected by any person, whether natural or judicial, shall not be subject to any ceiling prescribed under or pursuant to the Usury Law, as amended. Sec. 2. The rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of express contract as to such rate of interest, shall continue to be twelve per cent (12%)per annum. CB Circular 905 was issued by the Central Bank's Monetary Board pursuant to P.D. 1684 empowering them to prescribe the maximum rates of interest for loans and certain forbearances, to wit: Sec. 1. Section 1-a of Act No. 2655, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows: Sec. 1-a. The Monetary Board is hereby authorized to prescribe the maximum rate of interest for the loan or renewal thereof or the forbearance of any money, goods or credits, and to change such rate or rates whenever warranted by prevailing economic and social conditions: Provided, That changes in such rate or rates may be effected gradually on scheduled dates announced in advance. 91

In the exercise of the authority herein granted, the Monetary Board may prescribe higher maximum rates for loans of low priority, such as consumer loans or renewals thereof as well as such loans made by pawnshops, finance companies and other similar credit institutions although the rates prescribed for these institutions need not necessarily be uniform. The Monetary Board is also authorized to prescribed different maximum rate or rates for different types of borrowings, including deposits and deposit substitutes, or loans of financial intermediaries.

G.R. No. 194024 April 25, 2012 PHILIP L. GO, PACIFICO Q. LIM and ANDREW Q. LIMPetitioners, vs. DISTINCTION PROPERTIES DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION, INC.Respondent. MENDOZA,J.: FACTS: Philip L. Go, Pacifico Q. Lim and Andrew Q. Lim (petitioners) are registered individual owners of condominium units in Phoenix Heights Condominium located at H. Javier/Canley Road, Bo. Bagong Ilog, Pasig City, Metro Manila. Respondent Distinction Properties Development and Construction, Inc. (DPDCI) is a corporation existing under the laws of the Philippines with principal office at No. 1020 Soler Street, Binondo, Manila. It was incorporated as a real estate developer, engaged in the development of condominium projects, among which was the Phoenix Heights Condominium. In February 1996, petitioner Pacifico Lim, one of the incorporators and the then president of DPDCI, executed aMaster Deed and Declaration of Restrictions(MDDR)3of Phoenix Heights Condominium, which was filed with the Registry of Deeds. As the developer, DPDCI undertook, among others, the marketing aspect of the project, the sale of the units and the release of flyers and brochures. In August 2008, petitioners, as condominium unit-owners, filed a complaint before the HLURB against DPDCI for unsound business practices and violation of the MDDR. 92

In defense, DPDCI denied that it had breached its promises and representations to the public concerning the facilities in the condominium. It alleged that the brochure attached to the complaint was "a mere preparatory draft" and not the official one actually distributed to the public, and that the said brochure contained a disclaimer as to the binding effect of the supposed offers therein. Also, DPDCI questioned the petitioners’ personality to sue as the action was a derivative suit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the HLURB has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by petitioners. RULING: The petition fails. Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. Thus, it was ruled that the jurisdiction of the HLURB to hear and decide cases is determined by the nature of the cause of action, the subject matter or property involved and the parties. In this case, the complaint filed by petitioners alleged causes of action that apparently are not cognizable by the HLURB considering the nature of the action and the reliefs sought. A perusal of the complaint discloses that petitioners are actually seeking to nullify and invalidate the duly constituted acts of PHCC – the April 29, 2005 Agreement 27 entered into by PHCC with DPDCI and its Board Resolution28 which authorized the acceptance of the proposed offsetting/settlement of DPDCI’s indebtedness and approval of the conversion of certain units from saleable to common areas. All these were approved by the HLURB. 93

G.R. No. 168646 January 12, 2011 LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK,Petitioner, vs. ANGELES CATHERINE ENRIQUEZ,Respondent. DEL CASTILLO,J.: Facts: Petitioner DELTA is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of developing and selling real estate properties, particularly Delta Homes I in Cavite. DELTA is owned by Ricardo De Leon (De Leon), who is the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-637183 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Cavite, which corresponds to Lot 4 of Delta Homes I. Said Lot 4 is the subject matter of these cases. On July 3, 1995, De Leon and his spouse obtained a ₱4 million loan from the BANK for the express purpose of developing Delta Homes I. To secure the loan, the spouses De Leon executed in favor of the BANK a real estate mortgage (REM) on several of their properties,including Lot 4. Subsequently, this REM was amendedby increasing the amount of the secured loan from ₱4 million to ₱8 million. Both the REM and the amendment were annotated on TCT No. T-637183. DELTA then obtained a Certificate of Registrationand a License to Sell from the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). Issue: 1. Whether the Contract to Sell conveys ownership; 94

2. Whether the dacion en pago extinguished the loan obligation, such that DELTA has no more obligations to the BANK; 3. Whether the BANK is entitled to damages and attorney’s fees for being compelled to litigate; and 4. What is the effect of Enriquez’s failure to appeal the OP’s Decision regarding her obligation to pay the balance on the purchase price. Ruling: Contract to sell does not transfer ownership There is nothing in the provisions of the contract entered into by DELTA and Enriquez that would exempt it from the general definition of a contract to sell. The terms thereof provide for the reservation of DELTA’s ownership until full payment of the purchase price; such that DELTA even reserved the right to unilaterally void the contract should Enriquez fail to pay three successive monthly amortizations. Since the Contract to Sell did not transfer ownership of Lot 4 to Enriquez, said ownership remained with DELTA. DELTA could then validly transfer such ownership (as it did) to another person (the BANK). Dacion en pago extinguished the loan obligation The BANK then posits that, if title to Lot 4 is ordered delivered to Enriquez, DELTA has the obligation to pay the BANK the corresponding value of Lot 4. According to the BANK, the dation in payment extinguished the loan only to the extent of the value of the thing delivered. Since Lot 4 would have no value to the BANK if it will be delivered to Enriquez, DELTA would remain indebted to that extent. A dacion en pago is governed by the law of sales.Contracts of sale come with warranties, either express (if explicitly stipulated by the parties) or implied (under Article 1547 et seq. of the Civil Code). In this case, however, the BANK does not even point to any breach of warranty by DELTA in connection with the Dation in Payment. To be sure, the Dation in Payment has no express warranties relating to existing contracts to sell over the assigned properties. As to the implied warranty in case of eviction, it is waivable and cannot be invoked if the buyer knew of the risks or danger of eviction and assumed its consequences. 95

Award of damages There is nothing on record that warrants the award of exemplary damages74as well as attorney’s fees in favor of the BANK. Balance to be paid by Enriquez As already mentioned, the Contract to Sell in favor of Enriquez must be respected by the BANK.1avvphi1Upon Enriquez’s full payment of the balance of the purchase price, the BANK is bound to deliver the title over Lot 4 to her. As to the amount of the balance which Enriquez must pay, we adopt the OP’s ruling thereon which sustained the amount stipulated in the Contract to Sell. We will not review Enriquez’s initial claims about the supposed violation of the price ceiling in BP 220, since this issue was no longer pursued by the parties, not even by Enriquez, who chose not to file the required pleadings before the Court. The parties were informed in the Court’s September 5, 2007 Resolution that issues that are not included in their memoranda shall be deemed waived or abandoned. Since Enriquez did not file a memorandum in either petition, she is deemed to have waived the said issue. WHEREFORE, the Decisions of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.

MUNICIPALITY OF NUEVA ERA, ILOCOS NORTE, represented by its MunicipalMayor, CAROLINE ARZADON-GARVIDA,petitioner, vs. MUNICIPALITY OF MARCOS, ILOCOS NORTE, represented by its Municipal Mayor, SALVADOR PILLOS, APPEALS,respondents. G.R. No. 169435 February 27, 2008 REYES, R.T.,J.:

and

the

HONORABLE

COURT

FACTS: The Municipality of Nueva Era was created from the settlements of Bugayong, Cabittaoran, Garnaden, Padpadon, Padsan, Paorpatoc, Tibangran, and Uguis which were previously organized asrancherias,each of which was under the independent control of a chief. Governor General Francis Burton Harrison, acting on a resolution passed by the provincial government of Ilocos Norte, united theserancheriasand created the township of Nueva Era by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 66dated September 30, 1916. The Municipality of Marcos, on the other hand, was created on June 22, 1963 pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3753 entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Marcos in the Province of Ilocos Norte." Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753 provides: SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit in the Municipality of Dingras, Province of Ilocos Norte, are hereby separated from the said municipality and constituted into a new and separate municipality to be known as the Municipality of Marcos, with the following boundaries: 97

On the Northwest, by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going down to the barrios Capariaan-Gabon boundary consisting of foot path and feeder road; on the Northeast, by the Burnay River which is the common boundary of barrios Agunit and Naglayaan; on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary; on the South, by the Padsan River which is at the same time the boundary between the municipalities of Banna and Dingras; on the West and Southwest, by the boundary between the municipalities of Batac and Dingras. Based on the first paragraph of the said Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753, it is clear that Marcos shall be derived from the listedbarangaysof Dingras, namely: Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit. The Municipality of Nueva Era or any of itsbarangayswas not mentioned. Hence, if based only on said paragraph, it is clear that Nueva Era may not be considered as a source of territory of Marcos. 1. There is no issue insofar as the first paragraph is concerned which named only Dingras as the mother municipality of Marcos. The problem, however, lies in the description of Marcos' boundaries as stated in the second paragraph, particularly in the phrase: "on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary." 2. On the basis of the said phrase, which described Marcos' eastern boundary, Marcos claimed that the middle portion of Nueva Era, which adjoins its eastern side, formed part of its territory. Its reasoning was founded upon the fact that Nueva Era was between Marcos and the Ilocos Norte-Apayao boundary such that if Marcos was to be bounded on the east by the Ilocos Norte-Apayao boundary, part of Nueva Era would consequently be obtained by it. 3. Marcos did not claim any part of Nueva Era as its own territory until after almost 30 years,or only on March 8, 1993, when its Sangguniang Bayan passed Resolution No. 93-015.Said resolution was entitled: "Resolution Claiming an Area which is an Original Part of Nueva Era, But Now Separated Due to the Creation of Marcos Town in the Province of Ilocos Norte." 4. Marcos did not claim any part of Nueva Era as its own territory until after almost 30 years,or only on March 8, 1993, when its Sangguniang Bayan passed Resolution No. 93-015.Said resolution was entitled: "Resolution Claiming an Area which is an Original Part of Nueva Era, But Now Separated Due to the Creation of Marcos Town in the Province of Ilocos Norte."

5. On March 29, 2000, the SP of Ilocos Norte ruled in favor of Nueva Era. it hereby DISMISSES said petition for lack of merit. The disputed area consisting of 15,400 hectares, more or less, is hereby declared as part and portion of the territorial jurisdiction of respondent Nueva Era. 6. On appeal by Marcos, the RTC affirmed the decision of the SP in its decisionof March 19, 2001. The questioned decision of theSangguniang Panlalawiganof Ilocos Norte is hereby AFFIRMED. 7. Marcos filed a petition for reviewof the RTC decision before the CA.

ISSUE: WON that the Eastern boundary of Marcos extends over and covers the middle portion of Nueva Era. RULING: The boundaries of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753 read: On the Northwest, by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going down to the barrios Capariaan-Gabon boundary consisting of foot path and feeder road; on the Northeast, by the Burnay River which is the common boundary of barrios Agunit and Naglayaan;on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary; on the South, by the Padsan River which is at the same time the boundary between the municipalities of Banna and Dingras; on the West and Southwest, by the boundary between the municipalities of Batac and Dingras.

Since only thebarangaysof Dingras are enumerated as Marcos' source of territory, Nueva Era's territory is, therefore, excluded. Marcos contends that since it is "bounded on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary," a portion of Nueva Era formed part of its territory because, according to it, Nueva Era is between the Marcos and Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary. Marcos posits that in order for its eastern side to reach the Ilocos NorteMt. Province boundary, it will necessarily traverse the middle portion of Nueva Era.The court cannot accept the contentions of Marcos. 99

Only Dingras is specifically named by law as source territory of Marcos. Hence, the said description of boundaries of Marcos is descriptive only of the listedbarangaysof Dingras as a compact and contiguous territory. Considering that the description of the eastern boundary of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753 is ambiguous, the same must be interpreted in light of the legislative intent. The law must be given a reasonable interpretation, to preclude absurdity in its application. We thus uphold the legislative intent to create Marcos out of the territory of Dingras only. WHEREFORE,the petition isGRANTED.The Decision of the Court of Appeals is partlyREVERSED.The Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Ilocos Norte is Reinstated.

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BRENT SCHOOL, INC., and REV. GABRIEL DIMACHE,petitioners, vs. RONALDO ZAMORA, the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs, Office of the President, and DOROTEO R. ALEGRE,respondents. G.R. No. L-48494 February 5, 1990

Facts: Doroteo R. Alegre was engaged as athletic director by Brent School Inc.. The contract fixed a specific term for its existence, five (5) years,i.e., from July 18, 1971, the date of execution of the agreement, to July 17, 1976 director by Brent School, Inc. at a yearly compensation of P20,000.00. Three months before the expiration of the contract, Alegre was given a copy ofthe report filed by Brent School with the Department of Labor advising of the termination of his services effective on July 16, 1976. The stated ground for the termination was "completion of contract, expiration of the definite period of employment.". Alegre accepted the amount of P3,177.71 for period May 16 to July 17, 1976, and signed a receipt as full payment of the contract. However, Alegre later protested the announced termination of his employment. He argued that although his contract did stipulate that the same would terminate on July 17, 1976, sincehis services were necessary and desirable in the usual business of his employer, and his employment had lasted for five years, he had acquired the status of a regular employee and could not be removed except for valid cause. 101

The Regional Director considered Brent’s School as an application for clearance to terminate employment (and not a report on termination) and refused to give the clearance and instead required Alegre to be reinstated as a “permanent employee” to his former position. According to the Regional Director, the termination is not sanctioned by the PD 422 and prohibited by Circular no 8 of the Bureau of Private Schools. Brent school filed for motion for reconsideration to the Regional Director, Secretary of Labor, and the Office of the President who dismissed the motion for lack of merit and they too find the termination to be unjust. Brent School appeals to the Court that the employment contract between Brent School and Alegre was executed before the Labor Code was promulgated. Issue: Whether or Not the provisions of labor code as amended, have anathematized “fixed period employment” or employment for a term and Mr Alegre is entitled to reinstatement. Ruling: No. Respondent Alegre's contract of employment with Brent School having lawfully terminated with and by reason of the expiration of the agreed term of period thereof, he is declared not entitled to reinstatement and the other relief awarded and confirmed on appeal in the proceedings below. It is plain then that when the employment contract was signed between Brent School and Alegre on July 18, 1971, it was perfectly legitimate for them to include in it a stipulation fixing the duration thereof Stipulations for a term were explicitly recognized as valid by this Court, Under American lawthe principle is the same. "Where a contract specifies the period of its duration, it terminates on the expiration of such period." "A contract of employment for a definite period terminates by its own terms at the end of such period." As revised, said article, renumbered 270,23now reads: . . .Regular and Casual Employment.—The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade 102

of the employer except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be employed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. An employment shall be deemed to he casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph:provided,that, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such actually exists. G.R. No. 196231 January 28, 2014 EMILIO A. GONZALES III,Petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, ACTING THROUGH AND REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., SENIOR DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY JOSE AMOR M. AMORANDO, OFFICER-IN-CHARGE - OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, ATTY. RONALDO A. GERON, DIR. ROWENA TURINGAN-SANCHEZ, AND ATTY. CARLITO D. CATAYONG,Respondents. Facts: (a) PSI Rolando Mendoza and four policemen were investigated by the Ombudsman involving a case for alleged robbery (extortion), grave threats and physical injuries amounting to grave misconduct allegedly committed against a certain Christian Kalaw. The same case, however, was previously dismissed by the Manila City Prosecutors Office for lack of probable cause and by the PNP-NCR Internal Affairs Service for failure of the complainant (Christian Kalaw) to submit evidence and prosecute the case. On the other hand, the case which was filed much ahead by Mendoza et al. against Christian Kalaw involving the same incident, was given due course by the City Prosecutors Office. (b) The Ombudsman exercised jurisdiction over the case based on a letter issued motu proprio for Deputy Ombudsman Emilio A. Gonzalez III, directing the PNP-NCR - without citing any reason - to endorse the case against Mendoza and the arresting 103

policemen to his office for administrative adjudication, thereby showing undue interest on the case. He also caused the docketing of the case and named Atty. Clarence V. Guinto of the PNP-CIDG-NCR, who indorsed the case records, as the nominal complainant, in lieu of Christian Kalaw. During the proceedings, Christian Kalaw did not also affirm his complaint-affidavit with the Ombudsman or submit any position paper as required. (c) Subsequently, Mendoza, after serving preventive suspension, was adjudged liable for grave misconduct by Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales (duly approved on May 21, 2009) based on the sole and uncorroborated complaint-affidavit of Christian Kalaw, which was not previously sustained by the City Prosecutor's Office and the PNP Internal Affairs Service. From the said Resolution, Mendoza interposed a timely motion for reconsideration (dated and filed November 5, 2009) as well as a supplement thereto. No opposition or comment was filed thereto. (d) Despite the pending and unresolved motion for reconsideration, the judgment of dismissal was enforced, thereby abruptly ending Mendoza’s 30 years of service in the PNP with forfeiture of all his benefits. As a result, Mendoza sought urgent relief by sending several hand-written letter-requests to the Ombudsman for immediate resolution of his motion for reconsideration. But his requests fell on deaf ears. ISSUE: 1. Whether a Deputy Ombudsman may be subjected to the administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of the President is a justiciable question. 2. Whether or not Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed an administrative offense? RULING: 1. It was under the 1973 Constitution that the Office of the Ombudsman became a constitutionally-mandated office to give it political independence and adequate powers to enforce its mandate. Pursuant to the 1973 Constitution, President Ferdinand Marcos enacted Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1487, as amended by PD No. 1607 and PD No. 1630, creating the Office of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan. It was tasked principally to investigate, on complaint or motu proprio, any administrative act of any

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administrative agency, including any government-owned or controlled corporation. Given the scope of its disciplinary authority, the Office of the Ombudsman is a very powerful government constitutional agency that is considered "a notch above other grievance-handling investigative bodies."It has powers, both constitutional and statutory, that are commensurate with its daunting task of enforcing accountability of public officers. 2. Yes. Because Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable negligence and gross violation of their own rules of procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish for more than nine (9) months without any justification, in violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve motions for reconsideration in administrative disciplinary cases within five (5) days from submission. The inaction is gross, considering there is no opposition thereto. The prolonged inaction precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking. The Court finds him guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of public trust, and hereby meted out the penalty ofDISMISSALfrom service.

RULE OF LAW: Gross Neglect of Duty and/or Inefficiency in the Performance of Official Duty under Rule XIV, Section 22 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. NO. 292 and other pertinent Civil.

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G.R. No. 193978 February 28, 2012 JELBERT B. GALICTO,Petitioner, vs. H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, in his capacity as President of the Republic of the Philippines; ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary; and FLORENCIO B. ABAD, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management,Respondents. BRION,J.: Facts: On July 26, 2010, Pres. Aquino made public in his first State of the Nation Address the alleged excessive allowances, bonuses and other benefits of Officers and Members of the Board of Directors of the Manila Waterworks and Sewerage System – a government owned and controlled corporation (GOCC) which has been unable to meet its standing obligations. Based on its findings that "officials and governing boards of various [GOCCs] and [GFIs] x x x have been granting themselves unwarranted allowances, bonuses, incentives, stock options, and other benefits [as well as other] irregular and abusive practices," the Senate issued Senate Resolution No. 17 "urging the President to 106

order the immediate suspension of the unusually large and apparently excessive allowances, bonuses, incentives and other perks of members of the governing boards of [GOCCs] and [GFIs]. Heeding the call of Congress, Pres. Aquino, on September 8, 2010, issued EO 7, entitled "Directing the Rationalization of the Compensation and Position Classification System in the [GOCCs] and [GFIs], and for Other Purposes." EO 7 provided for the guiding principles and framework to establish a fixed compensation and position classification system for GOCCs and GFIs. EO 7 was published on September 10, 2010. It took effect on September 25, 2010 and precluded the Board of Directors, Trustees and/or Officers of GOCCs from granting and releasing bonuses and allowances to members of the board of directors, and from increasing salary rates of and granting new or additional benefits and allowances to their employees.

Issue: Whether or not the petition has been mooted by supervening events. Ruling: Because of the transitory nature of EO 7, it has been pointed out that the present case has already been rendered moot by these supervening events: (1) the lapse on December 31, 2010 of Section 10 of EO 7 that suspended the allowances and bonuses of the directors and trustees of GOCCs and GFIs; and (2) the enactment of R.A. No. 10149 amending the provisions in the charters of GOCCs and GFIs empowering their board of directors/trustees to determine their own compensation system, in favor of the grant of authority to the President to perform this act. A moot case is "one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value." "[A]n action is considered ‘moot’ when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead[,] or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties x

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x x. Simply stated, there is nothing for the x x x court to resolve as [its] determination x x x has been overtaken by subsequent events." This is the present situation here. Congress, thru R.A. No. 10149, has expressly empowered the President to establish the compensation systems of GOCCs and GFIs. For the Court to still rule upon the supposed unconstitutionality of EO 7 will merely be an academic exercise. Any further discussion of the constitutionality of EO 7 serves no useful purpose since such issue is moot in its face in light of the enactment of R.A. No. 10149. In the words of the eminent constitutional law expert, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., "the Court normally [will not] entertain a petition touching on an issue that has become moot because x x x there would [be] no longer x x x a ‘flesh and blood’ case for the Court to resolve." WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.

G.R. No. 164575 December 6, 2006 ROBERT P. WA-ACON,petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondent. Facts: During July 19, 1979 to September 28, 1981, accused Robert P. Wa-acon, a Special Collecting Officer at National Food Authority (NFA) willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with grave abuse of confidence, misappropriate, misapply, embezzle and convert the received and entrusted rice stocks and empty sacks to his own personal use and benefit with a total value of P114,303.00. Petitioner denied the crime and contended the rice delivered to him weighed less than that for which he signed. Petitioner explained that he could not check the weight of the sacks delivered to him as the weighing scale in their office had a maximum capacity of only twelve (12) kilograms.

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Petitioner claimed that he informed his superiors of such shortage verbally, but was unheeded. Citing the presumption under the last paragraph of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code that "the failure of the public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds which he is chargeable upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall beprima facieevidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use" and the inability of accused Wa-acon to "rebut the presumption that he had put the rice stocks and the empty sacks to personal use," the Sandiganbayan found him guilty of malversation of public funds under the Revised Penal Code Petitioner filed Motion for Reconsideration, and then denied on the ground that accused that no new substantial issues and cogent reasons raised to justify the reversal of the April 22, 2004 Decision. Hence this petition

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of malversation of public funds? Ruling: Yes. Article 217, as amended by Republic Act 1060, no longer requires proof by the State that the accused actually appropriated, took, or misappropriated public funds or property. Instead, a presumption, though disputable and rebuttable, was installed that upon demand by any duly authorized officer, the failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property should beprima facieevidence that he had put such missing funds or properties to personal use. When these circ*mstances are present, a "presumption of law" arises that there was malversation of public funds or properties as decreed by Article 217. A "presumption of law" is sanctioned by a statute prescribing that "a certain inference must be made whenever facts appear which furnish the basis of the interference." This is to be set apart from a "presumption of fact" which is a "[conclusion] drawn from particular circ*mstances, the connection between them and the sought for fact having received such a sanction in experience as to have become recognized as justifying the assumption." When there is a presumption of law, theonus probandi(burden of proof), generally imposed upon the State, is now shifted to the party against whom the interference is made to adduce satisfactory evidence to rebut the presumption and hence, to demolish theprima faciecase.

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LASTRILLA vs. GRANDA ROBERT LASTRILLA, Petitioner, vs. RAFAEL A. GRANDA, Respondent. G.R. No. 160257; Ponente: PUNO, J.; Date: January 31, 2006 Subject: Statutory Construction Topic: Effects of Presumption on Construction and Interpretation FACTS: Respondent Rafael Granda is a grandson and legal heir of the deceased spouses Rafael and Aurora Granda, who died in June 1989 and September 16, 2000, respectively. The Granda spouses had ten children including Jesse Granda, the respondent’s father, and Silvina Granda, the respondent’s aunt. 110

The deceased Granda spouses owned several parcels of land with some improvements thereon in Tacloban City which were allegedly sold by the Granda spouses, as evidenced by three (3) deeds of absolute sale, with the following amounts: Php 3.8M, Php 5M and Php200K, all dated December 7, 1985, witnessed by petitioner, Robert Lastrilla, and the deceased spouses' youngest daughter Silvina and notarized by Atty. Camilo Camenforte. On February 21, 2001 or more than five months after Aurora's death, respondent filed the instant complaint for Violation of Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner, Silvina, Atty. Camenforte, and petitioners siblings who were listed as buyers in two of the deeds of absolute sale, claiming that the signatures of his deceased grandparents were falsified and antedated. Upon verification, the examining officers of the PNP Crime Laboratory confirmed that the signatures of each of the respondent's grandparents "were not written by one and the same person” The CA found probable cause against private respondent Robert Lastrilla, and directed the Office of the Prosecutor of Tacloban City to issue a recommendation for thefiling of three (3) informations charging Robert Lastrilla of the crime of Falsification of Public Document under Article 172 (1), in relation to Article 171 (1), (2) and (5) of the Revised Penal Code. ISSUE: WON there is probable cause to engender the belief that petitioner is one of the authors of the falsification. RULING: YES. In the case at bar, there is no question that all the elements of falsification are present. Probable cause neednot be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. Article 171. x x x 1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric; 2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate; x x x 5. Altering true dates; x x x 111

Art. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents.-- The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000 shall be imposed upon: 1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next preceding article in any public or official document or letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial document; x x x From the records, there is no question that petitioner signed as an instrumental witness to the subject deeds of absolute sale. As such, he attested that the Granda spouses, as vendors, signed the said deedsin his presenceon December 7, 1985. By petitioner's own admission, however, the negotiations for the sales only started in 1998, thus, the deeds were admittedly antedated. The disputable presumption is that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act and takes ordinary care of his concerns. This presumption assumes greater significance to the case of petitioner who, as "the one tasked [by his siblings] to ensure that the signatures on the subject deeds were all authentic and genuine," is naturally expected to not have voluntarily affixed his signature in the subject deeds unless he understood the clear significance of his act.

SAMSON VS AGUIRRE G.R. No. 133076 Sept 22, 1999 FACTS: On February 23, 1998, President Fidel V. Ramos signed into law Republic Act No. 8535, creating the City of Novaliches out of 15 barangays of Quezon City. Petitioner Moises Samson asserts that RA No. 8535 failed to conform to the criteria established by the Local Government Code particularly, Sections 7, 11(a) and 450(a), as to the requirements of income, population and land area, seat of government and no adverse effect to being a city of Quezon City. In addition, he also said the law would amend the Constitution. 112

Respondents argued that petitioner failed to substantiate said allegations with convincing proof and that petitioner Samson had the burden of proof to overcome the legal presumption that Congress considered all the legal requirements under the Local Government Code of 1991 in passing R.A. 8535. Further, respondents stated that the petition itself is devoid of any pertinent document supporting petitioner's claim that R.A. 8535 is unconstitutional. ISSUE: WON petitioner was able to successfully overcome the presumption of validity accorded in R.A. No. 8535. RULING: No, the Court ruled that petitioner was not able to successfully overcome the presumption of validity accorded in R.A. No. 8535. There is a presumption of constitutionality in favor of a statute. One who attacks a statute must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt. Every law is presumed to have passed through regular congressional processes.

PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT THAT COMPLIANCE WITH REQUIREMENTS

CERTIFICATIONS

ATTESTING

Petitioner did not present any proof, only allegations, that no certifications were submitted to the House Committee on Local Government—as such certifications attesting compliance with the LGC and its IRR is required. Allegations cannot substitute for proof. The presumption stands that the law passed by Congress complied with all the requisites.

Representative from the Bureau of Local Government Finance estimated the combined average annual income of the 13 barangays for 2 years to be around P27M. Under the Local Government Code, a proposed city must have an average annual income of only at least P20M for the immediately preceding two years.

Representative from NSO estimated the population in the barangays that would comprise the proposed City of Novaliches to be around 350,000. This figure is more than the 150,000 required by the Implementing Rules. 113

There is no need to consider the land area, given these figures, since under the LGC, the proposed city must comply with requirements as regards income and population or land area. Compliance with either requirement, in addition to income, is enough.

Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP), petitioners

v. The Secretary of Budget and Management, respondent G.R. No. 164987 April 24, 2012 MENDOZA, J. FACTS: LAMP is a group of lawyers with a mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic or social monopoly in the country. They assail the constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the PDAF as provided in the GAA 2004. According to LAMP, the provision is silent and therefore, prohibits an automatic or direct allocation of lump sums to individual senators and congressmen for the funding of projects. 114

LAMP further decries the supposed flaws in the implementation of the provision, namely: 1) the DBM illegally made and directly released budgetary allocations out of PDAF in favor of individual Members of Congress; and 2) the latter do not possess the power to propose, select and identify which projects are to be actually funded by PDAF. By allowing the Members of Congress to receive direct allotment from the fund, to propose and identify projects to be funded and to perform the actual spending of the fund, the implementation of the PDAF provision becomes legally infirm and constitutionally repugnant. The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the petition miserably lacks legal and factual grounds. They said that it cannot be denied that the petition cannot stand on inconclusive media reports, assumptions and conjectures alone. That the Court should decline the petitioner’s plea to take judicial notice of the supposed iniquity of PDAF because there is no concrete proof that PDAF, in the guise of "pork barrel," is a source of "dirty money" for unscrupulous lawmakers and other officials who tend to misuse their allocations. These "facts" have no attributes of sufficient notoriety or general recognition accepted by the public without qualification, to be subjected to judicial notice. ISSUE: 1.) WON the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial review / inquiry are met in this case 2.) WON the implementation of the PDAF is unconstitutional and illegal. RULING: 1.) YES. An aspect of the "case-or-controversy" requirement is the requisite of "ripeness." And a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. LAMP contested the implementation of an alleged unconstitutional statute, as citizens and taxpayers. Undeniably, as taxpayers, LAMP would somehow be adversely affected by this. A finding of unconstitutionality would necessarily be tantamount to a misapplication of public funds which, in turn, cause injury or hardship to taxpayers. This affords "ripeness" to the present controversy.

115

The petition complains of illegal disbursem*nt of public funds derived from taxation and this is sufficient reason to say that there indeed exists a definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy before the Court. In the Locus Standi rule, “the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.” In this case, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation required in taxpayers’ suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue. In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys. Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with paramount public interest. The ramification of issues involving the unconstitutional spending of PDAF deserves the consideration of the Court, warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over the petition.

2.) NO. The implementation of the PDAF is not unconstitutional and illegal. In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does not lose sight of the presumption of validity accorded to statutory acts of Congress. To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation because to invalidate a law based on baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it. This presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and 116

only when such a conclusion is reached by the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck down. LAMP would have the Court declare the unconstitutionality of the PDAF’s enforcement based on the absence of express provision in the GAA allocating PDAF funds to the Members of Congress and the latter’s encroachment on executive power in proposing and selecting projects to be funded by PDAF. Regrettably, these allegations lack substantiation. No convincing proof was presented showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole discretion. Not even a documentation of the disbursem*nt of funds by the DBM in favor of the Members of Congress was presented by the petitioner to convince the Court to probe into the truth of their claims. Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress, the Court cannot indulge the petitioner’s request for rejection of a law which is outwardly legal and capable of lawful enforcement. In a case like this, the Court’s hands are tied in deference to the presumption of constitutionality lest the Court commits unpardonable judicial legislation. The Court is not endowed with the power of clairvoyance to divine from scanty allegations in pleadings where justice and truth lie. Again, newspaper or electronic reports showing the appalling effects of PDAF cannot be appreciated by the Court, "not because of any issue as to their truth, accuracy, or impartiality, but for the simple reason that facts must be established in accordance with the rules of evidence."

and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE,Respondents. FACTS: Pork Barrell refers to an appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative's district. The “Pork Barrel System” involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds: (a) Congressional Pork Barrel or the discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature (PDAF); and (b) Presidential Pork Barrel or certain funds of the President such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund. The Malampaya Funds was a special fund created under PD 910 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos for the development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth while the Presidential Social Fund is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR through which the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not funded under the regular budget. In July 2013, NBI began its probe into allegations that “the government has been defrauded of some P10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost projects.” The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six whistleblowers who declared that JLN Corporation (stands for Janet Lim Napoles) had facilitated the swindling of billions of pesos from the public coffers for “ghost projects” using no fewer than 20 dummy non-government organizations for an entire decade. In August 2013, the Commission on Audit released report revealing substantial irregularities in the disbursem*nt and utilization of PDAF by the Congressmen during the Arroyo administration. As for the 'Presidential Pork Barrel', whistle-blowers alleged that "at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles controversy, several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the Pork Barrel System be declared unconstitutional

ISSUE: 118

Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable controversy; RULING: A. ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity ; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.Of these requisites, case law states that the first two are the most important and, therefore, shall be discussed forthwith. By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy. This is embodied in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which pertinently states that "judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable x x x." Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which "involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. In other words, "there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence." Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. "A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action." "Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions." Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases. B. Locus Standi 119

Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizentaxpayers and accordingly, assert that they "dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury." Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to question the validity of the existing "Pork Barrel System" under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers, are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, as in these cases. Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the issues they have raised may be classified as matters "of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest." The CoA Chairperson‘s statement during the Oral Arguments that the present controversy involves "not merely a systems failure" but a "complete breakdown of controls" amplifies, in addition to the matters above-discussed, the seriousness of the issues involved herein. Indeed, of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. All told, petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instant cases.

Biraogo v Philippine Truth Commission G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010 FACTS: Prior to the historic May 2010 elections, the then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap." The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and 120

of his ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency. At the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission). The Philippine Truth Commission is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.Barely a month after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1, the petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution RULING: Yes. The clear mandate of the envisioned Truth Commission is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration" only, which is the Arroyo administration. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken. It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: 121

(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. The Court said that a revision of the executive issuance so as to include the earlier past administrations before the Aquino administration would allow it to pass the test of reasonableness and will be regarded as valid and not affront to the Constitution. WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. and JOSE MA. O. HIZON,Petitioners, vs. TOLL REGULATORY BOARD, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, MANILA NORTH TOLLWAYS CORPORATION, BENPRES HOLDINGS CORPORATION, FIRST PHILIPPINE INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, TOLLWAY MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, PNCC SKYWAY CORPORATION, CITRA METRO MANILA TOLLWAYS CORPORATION and HOPEWELL CROWN INFRASTRUCTURE, INC.,Respondents. G.R. No. 166910 October 19, 2010 122

Facts: President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1112, authorizing the establishment of toll facilities on public improvements. In order to attract private sector, P.D. 1112 allowed the collection of toll fees for the use of certain public improvements that would allow a reasonable rate of return on investments. . On the same date, P.D. 1113 was issued, granting to the Philippine National Construction Corporation ("PNCC"), then known as the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines ("CDCP"), for a period of thirty years franchise to construct, maintain and operate toll facilities in the North Luzon and South Luzon Expressways, with the right to collect toll fees. On December 22, 1983, P.D. 1894 was issued therein further granting PNCC a franchise over the Metro Manila Expressway ("MMEX"), and the expanded and delineated NLEX and SLEX. PNCC was granted the "right, privilege and authority to construct, maintain and operate any and all such extensions, linkages or stretches, together with the toll facilities appurtenant thereto, from any part of the North Luzon Expressway, South Luzon Expressway and/or Metro Manila Expressway and/or to divert the original route and change the original end-points of the North Luzon Expressway and/or South Luzon Expressway. In the agreement entered by PNCC with private sectors the supplemental Approval Operation Agreement (STOA) defines the scope of the road project coverage, the terminal date of the concession, and provisions on initial toll rate and a built-in formula for adjustment of toll rates, investment recovery clauses and contract termination in the event of the concessionaire’s. Petitioners Francisco and Hizon, as taxpayers and expressway users, seek to nullify the various STOAs adverted to above and the corresponding Toll Regulatory (TRB) resolutions. the STOAs and the toll rate-fixing resolutions violate the Constitution in that they veritably impose on the public the burden of financing tollways by way of exorbitant fees and thus depriving the public of property without due process. Petitioners also seek to nullify certain provisions of P.D. 1113 and P.D. 1894, which uniformly grant the President the power to approve the transfer or assignment of usufruct or the rights and privileges thereunder by the tollway operator to third parties, particularly the transfer effected by PNCC to MNTC. Wherein the authority to 123

approve is an exercise of legislative power under Article VI, Section 1 of the Constitution. Issue: 1. WON petitioners in the petitions havelocus standi? And the existence of actual controversy? (Ripeness) 2. WON The President is duly authorized to approve contracts, inclusive of assignment of contracts, entered into by the TRB relative to tollway operations?

Ruling: 1. Yes, petitioners being taxpayers have locus standi on the issue. The petitioner as taxpayers establish that he has a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained thus sustaining, direct injury as a result if redressed by favorable action. The case as well is in current and contains actual controversy given the adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. 2. Yes, the president has the authority to approve pertaining to the TRB resolution. The court finds the following Valid and Constitutional, DENYING petition of Petitioners. 1. the Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement dated April 30, 1998 covering the North Luzon Tollway Project and the TRB Board Resolution No. 2005-4 issued pursuant thereto; 2. the Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement dated November 27, 1995 covering the South Metro Manila Skyway and the TRB Board Resolution No. 2004-53 and previous TRB resolutions issued pursuant thereto; 3. the Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement covering the South Luzon Tollway Project or South Luzon Expressway and the TRB Board resolutions issued pursuant to the said agreement, particularly the TRB Board resolutions allowing the toll rate increases that are supposed to have been implemented on June 30, 2010; 4. Section 3, paragraph (a) of Presidential Decree No. 1112, otherwise known as the "Toll Operation Decree," in relation to Section 3, paragraph (d) thereof and Section 8, paragraph (b) of Presidential Decree No. 1894; and 124

5. Section 3, paragraph (e) 3 of P.D. No. 1112 and Section 13 of P.D. No. 1894.

GUINGONA VS CA G.R. 12553 FACTS: Sometime in the last quarter of 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted an investigation on the alleged participation and involvement of national and local government officials in "jueteng" and other forms of illegal gambling. In November 1995, one Potenciano Roque, claiming to be an eyewitness to the networking of national and local politicians and gambling lords, sought admission into the Government's "Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Program." 125

Allegedly, he gained first-hand information in his capacity as Chairman of the Task Force Anti-Gambling (Tfa*g) during the term of former President Corazon C. Aquino until his resignation. After a thorough evaluation of his qualifications, convinced of his compliance with the requirements of Republic Act No. 6981, otherwise known as the "Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act," the Department of Justice admitted Roque to the program. Roque executed a sworn statement before NBI alleging that during his stint as Chairman, several gambling lords, including private respondent Rodolfo Pineda, and certain politicians offered him money and other valuable considerations, which he accepted, upon his agreement to cease conducting raids on their respective gambling operations. ISSUE: WON THE ISSUE RAISED BY PETITIONERS DO NOT WARRANT THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER. RULING: The Court finds the petition fundamentally defective. The Constitution provides that judicial power "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable."

Judicial review, which is merely an aspect of judicial power, demands the following: (1) there must be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the question must be ripe for adjudication; and (3) the person challenging must have "standing"; that is, he has personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury. The first requisite is that there must be before a court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power. Courts have no authority to pass upon issues through advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems or friendly suits 126

collusively arranged between parties without real adverse interests. Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. As a condition precedent to the exercise of judicial power, an actual controversy between litigants must first exist. Actual Case An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal claims, which can be resolved on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. A justiciable controversy is distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute, in that the former involves a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. A justiciable controversy admits of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in character, whereas an opinion only advises what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. In the case at bar, Petitioners filed this suit out of fear that the assailed Decision would frustrate the purpose of said law, which is to encourage witnesses to come out and testify. But their apprehension is neither justified nor exemplified by this particular case. A mere apprehension does not give rise to a justiciable controversy. After finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the government prosecutors, Respondent Court allowed the admission of Roque into the Program. In fact, Roque had already testified in court against the private respondent. Thus, the propriety of Roque's admission to the Program is already a moot and academic issue that clearly does not warrant judicial review. Petitioners failed not only to present an actual controversy, but also to show a case ripe for adjudication. Hence, any resolution that this Court might make in this case would constitute an attempt at abstraction that can only lead to barren legal dialectics and sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.

127

Quiño vs. Commission on Elections G.R. No. 197466. November 13, 2012 JOEL P. QUIÑO, MARY ANTONETTE C. DANGOY,JOSEPHINE T. ABING, JOY ANN P. CABATINGAN,TESSA P. CANG, WILFREDO T. CALO, HOMER C.CANEN, JOSE L. CAGANG, ALBERTO CABATINGANand FRANCISCO T. OLIVERIO, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RITCHIE R.WAGAS, respondents. VILLARAMA, JR., J. : 128

FACTS: Two candidates for the position of Mayor, petitioner Quino and respondent Wagas Petitioner Joel P. Quiño and private respondent Ritchie R. Wagas both ran for the position of Mayor of Compostela. Results of the canvassing showed that Quiño won against Wagas. Quiño, along with the rest of the petitioners who were the winning candidates for members of the Sangguniang Bayan, were proclaimed by the MBOC on May 11, 2010. ISSUE: Whether or not Quino’s petition for certiorari has become moot and academic. RULING: MOOT AND ACADEMIC Yes, the petition for certiorari becomes moot and academic. Because there no longer exists an actual controversy between the parties and resolving the merits of this case would no longer serve any useful purpose. As we held in Ocampo v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. PROCLAMATION DONE, PETITION ALREADY MOOT AND ACADEMIC The Special Board of Canvassers of Compostela, Cebu already proclaimed the petitioners as the winning candidates for municipal mayor, vice-mayor and councilors. With this development, the reliefs prayed for in the present petition have become moot and academic. MOOT AND ACADEMIC It is a rule of universal application, almost, that courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider questions in which no actual interests are involved they decline jurisdiction of moot cases. There no longer exists an actual controversy between the parties and resolving the merits of this case would no longer serve any useful purpose. OCAMPO V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL RULING At any rate, the petition has become moot and academic.

129

The Twelfth Congress formally adjourned on June 11, 2004. And on May 17, 2004, the City Board of Canvassers proclaimed Bienvenido Abante the duly elected Congressman of the Sixth District of Manila pursuant to the May 10, 2004 elections.

ENRILE VS. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL We ruled that a case becomes moot and academic when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. GANCHO-ON VS. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT Thus: It is a rule of universal application, almost, that courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider questions in which no actual interests are involved they decline jurisdiction of moot cases. And where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari is DISMISSED on the ground of MOOTNESS. SO ORDERED.

TEOFISTO C. GANCHO-ON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT AND LAKAS NG NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA-PAFLU, respondents. G.R. No. 108033 April 14, 1997 130

BELLOSILLO, J.

Facts: On 16 January 1992 respondent Lakas ng Nagkakaisang Manggagawa-PAFLU filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a petition for certification election in a bid to exclusively represent the truck drivers of Eros Repair Shop. Petitioner Teofisto C. Gancho-on, owner of the shop, moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of absence of employer-employee relationship. He contended that the members of respondent Union who would constitute the proposed bargaining unit were not employees of his shop but of individual owners of the trucks used in the trucking and hauling business managed by his wife, Herminia. As a support of his contention, he presented certificates of registration indicating the ownership of four (4) vehicles being driven by the union members. In addition, he submitted copy of the application to operate business filed with the Mayor's Office together with an application for renewal of the certificate of registration which described his business as an automotive repair shay. Respondent Union opposed the motion and asserted that while petitioner may be the registered owner of the shop, his wife was the manager of the trucking and hauling business under the same name and style as the shop. It offered in evidence the following documents executed by petitioner's wife herself: (a) an affidavit dated 10 February 1992 alleging among others that she was the manager of Eros Repair Shop which was engaged in the trucking and hauling of sugar cane and that the truck drivers were paid on commission basis; (b) a letter dated 17 February 1992 addressed to the Assistant Regional Director of the DOLE informing the latter of the violation by one of the truck drivers of Eros Repair Shop of a memorandum issued to all truck drivers; and, (c) another letter dated 20 February 1992 addressed to the same official seeking advice concerning eleven (11) of her truck drivers who failed to report for work. On 13 May 1992, the petition for certification election was given due course with the following options: respondent union, or no union at all.Petitioner assailed the order for certification election before respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment, still insisting on the absence of employer-employee relationship. However, the latter subsequently denied it. Thus, the petitioner elevate this case before the Supreme Court. On 11 January 1993 the certification election nevertheless proceeded. 131

Respondent union thereafter submitted to the Court an original copy of the declaration of the final certification election results showing that it did not garner a single vote because out of thirty-six (36) drivers, all of the twenty (20) who cast their votes favored a "no union." This notwithstanding, petitioner argues that it is still necessary for the Court to resolve the issue of employer-employee relationship not only for the guidance of the bench and bar in general but also because the matter "hangs like the sword of Damocles over his head." Issue: Whether or not the issue of employer-employee relationship still contended by the petitioner is ripe and is the actual controversy of the case? Ruling: No. The Court held that the issue of employer-employee relationship still contended by the petitioner is not ripe and is not the actual controversy of the case.

Petitioner entirely misses the material points which have rendered the present proceeding moot and academic. First, subject resolution of respondent Secretary as aforestated decreed that the pre-election conference preparatory to the certification election be immediately conducted. The certification election thereafter became a fait accompli. Second, in a sense salutary to petitioner, the defeat suffered by respondent Union in its bid to be certified as the sole bargaining agent of the truck drivers made irrelevant the findings of both the Med-Arbiter-Designate and respondent Secretary that an employer-employee relationship existed. It should be emphasized that the issue of employer-employee relationship came into being only because petitioner denied its existence in his motion to dismiss the petition for certification election. Since the certification proceeding before the Med-Arbiter merely provided the mainspring of this petition the defeat of respondent Union in the election has stripped this case of its raison d'etre. It is a rule of universal application, almost, that courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider questions in which no actual interests are involved; they decline jurisdiction of moot cases. And where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical-use or value. There is no actual substantial relief to which petitioners would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. 132

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for being moot and academic.

PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TAÑADA III, RONALD LLAMAS, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL, GARY S. MALLARI, ROMEL REGALADO BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER F.C. BOLASTIG,Petitioners, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-INCHIEF, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, HON. AVELINO CRUZ II, 133

SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE,Respondents. G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006 SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: FACTS: On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA People Power I, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, in a move to suppress alleged plans to overthrow the government, issued Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017), declaring a state of national emergency. She cited as factual bases for the said issuance the escape of the Magdalo Group and their audacious threat of the Magdalo DDay; the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines; and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. On the same day, she issued General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5) setting the standards which the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) should follow in the suppression and prevention of acts of lawless violence. The following were considered as additional factual bases for the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5: the bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan; the raid of an army outpost in Benguet resulting in the death of three soldiers; and the directive of the Communist Party of the Philippines ordering its front organizations to join5,000 Metro Manila radicals and 25,000 more from the provinces in mass protests. Immediately, the Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th People Power I anniversary celebration. It revoked permits to hold rallies. Members of the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) and the National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU), who marched from various parts of Metro Manila to converge at the EDSA Shrine, were violently dispersed by anti-riot police.Professor Randolf David, Akbayan party-list president Ronald Llamas, and members of the KMU and NAFLUKMU were arrested without a warrant. In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and confiscated news stories, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue. Policemen were stationed inside the editorial and business offices, as well as outside the building. A few minutes after the search and seizure at the Daily Tribune offices, the police surrounded the premises of another pro-opposition paper, Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante.

134

The PNP warned that it would take over any media organization that would not follow “standards set by the government during the state of national emergency.” On March 3, 2006, exactly one week from the declaration of a state of national emergency and after all the present petitions had been filed, President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation No. 1021 (PP 1021), declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist and lifting PP1017. These consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, President Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. It is contended that respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions, are actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Hence, such issuances are void for being unconstitutional. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional? 2. Whether or not the petitioners have a legal standing in questioning the constitutionality of the proclamation? RULING: The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence whenever becomes necessary as prescribe under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. However, there were extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power. a. To issue decrees;(" Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of thePhilippineswhich shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.") b. To direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President[The absence of a law defining "acts of terrorism" may result in abuse and oppression on the part of the police or military]; and c. To impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, areultra viresandunconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of legislative legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business affected with public interest.Therefore, the PP No. 1017 is only partly unconstitutional. 135

This Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. InPeople v. Vera, it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” Therefore, the court ruled that the petitioners have alocus standi,for they suffered “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.

G.R. No. 159357 April 28, 2004 Brother MARIANO "MIKE" Z. VELARDE,petitioner, vs. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY,respondent. 136

FACTS: On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief against Velarde and his aforesaid co-respondents. SJS, a registered political party, sought the interpretation of several constitutional provisions,specifically on the separation of church and state; and a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or urging or requiring the members of their flock to vote for a specified candidate. Bro. Mike Velarde and his aforesaid co-respondents filed their Motions to Dismiss. All sought the dismissal of the Petition on the common grounds that it does not state a cause of action and that there is no justiciable controversy. The

Court

denied

the

Motions

Dismiss,

and

the

Motions

for

Reconsideration filed by Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Executive Minister Eraño Manalo, which raised no new arguments other than those already considered in the motions to dismiss. The trial court said that it had jurisdiction over the Petition, because "in praying for a determination as to whether the actions imputed to the respondents are violative of Article II, Section 6 of the Fundamental Law, the Petition has raised only a question of law."It then proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the issue raised in the Petition the separation of church and state principle. Through its discourse, the courta quoopined at some point that the endorsem*nt of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause. 

After its essay on the legal issue, however, the trial court failed to include a dispositive portion in its assailed Decision. Thus, Velarde and Soriano filed separate Motions for Reconsideration which, as mentioned earlier, were denied by the lower court.

Issue: Whether or not: 137

(a) Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise a justiciable controversy? (b) Did it state a cause of action? (c) Did respondent have any legal standing to file the Petition for Declaratory Relief? Ruling: No (a) Based on the foregoing, an action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The purpose of the remedy is to interpret or to determine the validity of the written instrument and to seek a judicial declaration of the parties’ rights or duties thereunder. The essential requisites of the action are as follows: (1) there is a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue is ripe for judicial determination. A justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory. The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief fell short of this test. It miserably failed to allege an existing controversy or dispute between the petitioner and the named respondents therein. Further, the Petition did not sufficiently state what specific legal right of the petitioner was violated by the respondents therein; and what particular act or acts of the latter were in breach of its rights, the law or the Constitution. There is no factual allegation that SJS’ rights are being subjected to any threatened, imminent and inevitable violation that should be prevented by the declaratory relief sought. The judicial power and duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights that are legally demandable and enforceable cannot be exercised when there is no actual or threatened violation of a legal right. (b) A cause of action is an act or an omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of another, causing injury to the latter. Its essential elements are the following: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; 138

(2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) such defendant’s act or omission that is violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the former to the latter. The Court finds in the Petition for Declaratory Relief no single allegation of fact upon which SJS could base a right of relief from the named respondents. In any event, even granting that it sufficiently asserted a legal right it sought to protect, there was neverthelessno certaintythat such right would be invaded by the said respondents. Not even the alleged proximity of the elections to the time the Petition was filed below (January 28, 2003) would have provided the certainty that it had a legal right that would be jeopardized or violated by any of those respondents.

(c) Legal standing orlocus standihas been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged act.Interestmeans a material interest in issue that is affected by the questioned act or instrument, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the question involved. Parties bringing suits challenging the constitutionality of a law, an act or a statute must show "not only that the law or act is invalid, but also that they have sustained or are in immediate or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that they suffer thereby in some indefinite way." They must demonstrate that they have been, or are about to be, denied some right or privilege to which they are lawfully entitled, or that they are about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. First,parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove that they have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation. A taxpayer’s action may be properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. In the present case, there is no allegation, whether 139

express or implied, that taxpayers’ money is being illegally disbursed. Second,there was no showing in the Petition for Declaratory Relief that SJS as a political party or its members as registered voters would be adversely affected by the alleged acts of the respondents below, if the question at issue was not resolved. There was no allegation that SJS had suffered or would be deprived of votes due to the acts imputed to the said respondents. Neither did it allege that any of its members would be denied the right of suffrage or the privilege to be voted for a public office they are seeking. Finally,the allegedly keen interest of its "thousands of members who are citizens-taxpayers-registered voters" is too generaland beyond the contemplation of the standards set by our jurisprudence. Not only is the presumed interest impersonal in character; it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review of Brother Mike Velarde isGRANTED. The assailed June 12, 2003 Decision and July 29, 2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 49) are herebyDECLARED NULL AND VOIDand thusSET ASIDE. The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief isDISMISSEDfor failure to state a cause of action.

140

G.R. No. 187883 June 16, 2009 ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO and ATTY. EVANGELINE J. LOZANOENDRIANO,Petitioners, vs. SPEAKER PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, Representative, Majority, House of Representatives,Respondent. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 187910 June 16, 2009 LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO,Petitioner, vs. SPEAKER PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Congress of the Philippines,Respondent. FACTS: The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as concerned citizens and taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of House Resolution No. 1109 entitled "A Resolution Calling upon the Members of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of Congress." Both petitions seek to trigger a justiciable controversy that would warrant a definitive interpretation by the Court of Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for the procedure for amending or revising the Constitution. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the case filed by the petitioners contains an actual controversy that would compel the court to exercise its power of judicial review over the validity of House Resolution No. 1109 2. Whether or not the petitioners, as taxpayers and concerned citizens, have the locus standi to institute this case RULINGS: 1. NO. The Court’s power of review may be awesome, but it is limited to actual cases and controversies dealing with parties having adversely legal claims, to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the verylis motapresented. The "case-or-controversy" requirement bans this court from deciding "abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions," lest the court give opinions in the nature 141

of advice concerning legislative or executive action. An aspect of the "case-orcontroversy" requirement is the requisite of "ripeness."In our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. In the present case, the fitness of petitioners’ case for the exercise of judicial review is grossly lacking. In the first place, petitioners have not sufficiently proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act complained of. In the second place, House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of Representatives shall convene at a future time for the purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to the Constitution. No actual convention has yet transpired and no rules of procedure have yet been adopted. More importantly, no proposal has yet been made, and hence, no usurpation of power or gross abuse of discretion has yet taken place. In short, House Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential example of an uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. The House has not yet performed a positive act that would warrant an intervention from this Court. 2. NO. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when he can demonstrate that (1) he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by the remedy being sought. In the cases at bar, petitioners have not shown the elemental injury in fact that would endow them with the standing to sue. Locus standi requires a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy for significant reasons. It assures adverseness and sharpens the presentation of issues for the illumination of the Court in resolving difficult constitutional questions. The lack of petitioners’ personal stake in this case is no more evident than in Lozano’s three-page petition that is devoid of any legal or jurisprudential basis. Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the claim of petitioners that they are instituting the cases at bar as taxpayers and concerned citizens. A taxpayer’s suit requires that the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursem*nt of public funds derived from taxation. It is undisputed that there has been no allocation or disbursem*nt of public funds in this case as of yet. 142

To be sure, standing as a citizen has been upheld by this Court in cases where a petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental importance or when paramount public interest is involved.While the Court recognizes the potential far-reaching implications of the issue at hand, the possible consequence of House Resolution No. 1109 is yet unrealized and does not infuse petitioners with locus standi under the "transcendental importance" doctrine.

143

SERGIO I. CARBONILLA, ET. AL vs. BOARD OF AIRLINES REPRESENTATIVES (BAR) G.R. No. 193247, September 14, 2011 x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ET. AL vs. BOARD OF AIRLINES REPRESENTATIVES (BAR) G.R. No. 194276, September 14, 2011 FACTS: The Bureau of Customsissued Customs Administrative Order No. 1-2005 (CAO 12005) amending CAO 7-92. On 9 February 2006 the Department of Financeapproved CAO 1-2005. CAO 7-92 and CAO 1-2005 were promulgated pursuant to Section 3506in relation to Section 608of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP). Prior to the amendment of CAO 7-92, the BOC created on 23 April 2002 a committee to review the overtime pay of Customs personnel in Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and to propose its adjustment from the exchange rate of ₱25 to US$1 to the then exchange rate of ₱55 to US$1. Furthermore, for more than two years from the creation of the committee, several meetings were conducted with the agencies concerned, including respondent Board of Airlines Representatives (BAR), to discuss the proposed rate adjustment that would be embodied in an Amendatory Customs Administrative Order. However, the Board of Airline Representatives (BAR) alleged that it learned of the proposed increase in the overtime rates only sometime in 2004 and only through unofficial reports. BAR wrote a letter addressed to Edgardo L. De Leon, Chief, Bonded Warehouse Division, BOC-NAIA, informing the latter of its objection to the proposed increase in the overtime rates. They also sent a letter to the Department of Finance reiterating its concerns against the issuance of CAO 1-2005. However, they were not able find a valid ground to disturb the validity of CAO 1-2005, much less to suspend its implementation or effectivity. They wrote in the letter that the implementation effective 16 March 2005 is legally proper. Cruz requested the Office of the President and the Office of the Executive Secretary to review the decision of Usec. Mendoza. Deputy Executive Secretary Manuel B. Gaite (Deputy Exec. Sec. Gaite) issued an Orderrequiring BAR to pay its appeal fee and submit an appeal memorandum within 15 days from notice. BAR paid the appeal fee and submitted its appeal memorandum on 19 January 2007. 144

The Office of the President denied the appeal of BAR and affirmed the Decision of the Department of Finance. Still, BAR filed a motion for reconsideration but it was also denied. Then they filed a petition for review under Rule 45 before the Court of Appeals. Furthermore, Petitioners Carbonilla, et al. filed an Omnibus Motion to Intervene before the Court of Appeals on the ground that as customs personnel, they would be directly affected by the outcome of the case. Petitioners Carbonilla, et al. also adopted the Comment filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). The Court of Appeals denied the motion for intervention filed by Carbonilla, et al. They held that the intervenors’ case was for collection of their unpaid overtime services and their interests could not be protected or addressed in the resolution of the case. They filed a motion for reconsideration. On the other hand, without resolving Carbonilla, et al.’s motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed Resolution of the Office of the President and declared Section 3506 of the TCCP, CAO 7-92 and CAO 1-2005 unenforceable against BAR. In its 5 August 2010 Resolution, the Court of Appeals, among others, denied Carbonilla, et al.’s motion for reconsideration. The Office of the President, et al. also filed a motion for reconsideration, however, the Court of Appeals granted BAR’s motion for reconsideration and denied the Office of the President, et. al motion for reconsideration. Thus, a petition was filed in the Supreme Court. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not CAO 7-92, CAO 1-2005 and Section 3506 of the TCCP is unconstitutional. RULING: No, the Court ruled that CAO 7-92, CAO 1-2005 and Section 3506 of the TCCP is constitutional. When an administrative regulation is attacked for being unconstitutional or invalid, a party may raise its unconstitutionality or invalidity on every occasion that the regulation is being enforced. For the Court to exercise its power of judicial review, the party assailing the regulation must show that the question of constitutionality has been raised at the earliest opportunity. Section 3506 of the TCCP provides that Customs employees may be assigned by a Collector to do overtime work at rates fixed by the Commissioner of Customs when the service rendered is to be paid by the importers, shippers or other persons served. The rates to be fixed shall not be less than that prescribed by law to be paid to employees of private enterprise. 145

To test whether Section 3506 of the TCCP is enforceable, it must comply the completeness and sufficient standard tests. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it.The second test requires adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. In this case, Section 3506 of the TCCP complied with the requirements. The law is complete in itself that it leaves nothing more for the BOC to do: it gives authority to the Collector to assign customs employees to do overtime work; the Commissioner of Customs fixes the rates; and it provides that the payments shall be made by the importers, shippers or other persons served. Section 3506 also fixed the standard to be followed by the Commissioner of Customs when it provides that the rates shall not be less than that prescribed by law to be paid to employees of private enterprise. Furthermore, employees rendering overtime services are not receiving double compensation for the overtime pay, travel and meal allowances provided for under CAO 7-92 and CAO 1-2005. Section 3506 provides that the rates shall not be less than that prescribed by law to be paid to employees of private enterprise. The overtime pay, travel and meal allowances are payment for additional work rendered after regular office hours and do not constitute double compensation prohibited under Section 8, Article IX(B) of the 1987 Constitutionas they are in fact authorized by law or Section 3506 of the TCCP. Therefore, the CAO 1-2005 is constitutional and is enforceable. The Court directed Petitioner Bureau of Customs to implement CAO 1-2005 immediately. However, the petition filed by the carbonilla, et. al., was denied.

146

G.R. No. 171101 July 5, 2011 HACIENDA LUISITA, INCORPORATED,Petitioner, LUISITA INDUSTRIAL PARK CORPORATION and RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION,Petitioners-in-Intervention, vs. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL; SECRETARY NASSER PANGANDAMAN OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM; ALYANSA NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG BUKID NG HACIENDA LUISITA, RENE GALANG, NOEL MALLARI, and JULIO SUNIGA1and his SUPERVISORY GROUP OF THE HACIENDA LUISITA, INC. and WINDSOR ANDAYA,Respondents. FACTS: Hacienda Luisita de Tarlac (Hacienda Luisita) was a 6,443-hectare mixed agricultural-industrial-residential expanse straddling several municipalities of Tarlac and owned by Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas (Tabacalera). In 1957, the Spanish owners of Tabacalera offered to sell Hacienda Luisita as well as their controlling interest in the sugar mill within the hacienda, the Central Azucarera de Tarlac (CAT), as an indivisible transaction. The Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), then owned and/or controlled by the Jose Cojuangco, Sr. Group, agreed to buy and undertook to pay the purchase price for Hacienda Luisita in pesos, while that for the controlling interest in CAT, in US dollars. The Philippine government, through the then Central Bank of the Philippines, assisted the buyer (Tadeco) to obtain a dollar loan from a US bank. Also, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) Board of Trustees extended a PhP 5.911 million loan in favor of Tadeco to pay the peso price component of the sale. One of the conditions contained in the approving GSIS Resolution No. 3203, as later amended by Resolution No. 356, Series of 1958, was that “the lots comprising the Hacienda Luisita shall be subdivided by [Tadeco] and sold at cost to the tenants, should there be any, and whenever conditions should exist warranting such action under the provisions of the Land Tenure Act.” As of March 31, 1958, Tadeco had fully paid the purchase price for Hacienda Luisita and Tabacalera’s interest in CAT. In 1980, the martial law administration filed a suit before the RTC against Tadeco, et al. for them to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the [now] Department of Agrarian 147

Reform (DAR) so that the land can be distributed to farmers at cost. Responding, Tadeco alleged that Hacienda Luisita does not have tenants, and sugar lands are not covered by existing agrarian reform legislations. The RTC rendered judgment ordering Tadeco to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the MAR. Tadeco appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). However, in 1988, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved to withdraw the government’s case against Tadeco. The CA dismissed the case, but subject to the condition that Tadeco obtain the approval of the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) of a stock distribution plan (SDP). Pursuant thereto, Tadeco organized a spin-off corporation, Hacienda Luisita, Inc. (HLI), as vehicle to facilitate stock acquisition by the farmworkers. For this purpose, Tadeco assigned and conveyed to HLI the agricultural land portion (4,915.75 hectares) and other farm-related properties of Hacienda Luisita in exchange for HLI shares of stock. To accommodate the assets transfer from Tadeco to HLI, the latter, with the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s) approval, increased its capital stock from PhP 1.5 million to PhP 400 Million divided into 400 million shares with par value of PhP 1/share. 150 million of the shares were to be issued only to qualified and registered beneficiaries of the CARP, and the remaining 250 million to any stockholder of the corporation. On May 9, 1989, some 93% of the then farmworker-beneficiaries (FWBs) complement of Hacienda Luisita signified in a referendum their acceptance of the proposed HLI’s Stock Distribution Option Plan. The Stock Distribution Option Agreement (SDOA), styled as a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), was entered into by Tadeco, HLI, and the 5,848 qualified FWBs and attested to by then DAR Secretary Philip Juico. Under the SDOA, included as part of the distribution plan are: (a) production-sharing equivalent to three percent (3%) of gross sales from the production of the agricultural land payable to the FWBs in cash dividends or incentive bonus; and (b) distribution of free homelots of not more than 240 square meters each to family-beneficiaries. The production-sharing, as the SDP indicated, is payable“irrespective of whether [HLI] makes money or not,”implying that the benefits do not partake the nature of dividends, as the term is ordinarily understood under corporation law.

148

In a follow-up referendum the DAR conducted, 5,117 FWBs opted to receive shares in HLI. 132 chose actual land distribution. The PARC, by Resolution No. 89-12-2, approved the SDP of Tadeco/HLI. In 1995, HLI applied for the conversion of 500 hectares of land of the hacienda from agricultural to industrial use, pursuant to Sec. 65 of Republic Act No. 6657. The DAR approved the application per DAR Conversion Order No. 030601074-764-(95), subject to payment of 3% of the gross selling price to the FWBs and to HLI’s continued compliance with its undertakings under the SDP, among other conditions. In 1996, HLI, in exchange for subscription of 12 million shares of stocks of Centennary Holdings, Inc., ceded 300 hectares of the converted area to the latter. Consequently, TCT No. 292091 was issued in the name of Centennary. Centennary is wholly-owned by HLI. HLI transferred the remaining 200 hectares covered by TCT No. 287909 to Luisita Realty Corporation (LRC) in two separate transactions, both uniformly involving 100 hectares for PhP 250 million each. Subsequently, Centennary sold the entire 300 hectares to Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO) for PhP 750 million. The latter acquired it for the purpose of developing an industrial complex. The land was subdivided by LIPCO into two titles, covering 180 and four hectares. Later, LIPCO transferred the land to the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) by way ofdacion en pagoin payment of LIPCO’s PhP 431,695,732.10 loan obligations. Apart from the 500 hectares, another 80.51 hectares were later detached from the area coverage of Hacienda Luisita which had been acquired by the government as part of the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway (SCTEX) complex. Hence, 4,335.75 hectares remained of the original 4,915 hectares Tadeco ceded to HLI. Two separate petitions were filed by respondents (naming themselves the Supervisory Group and AMBALA group) with the DAR to revoke the SDOA, alleging that HLI had failed to give them their dividends and the one percent (1%) share in gross sales, as well as the thirty-three percent (33%) share in the proceeds of the sale of the converted 500 hectares of land. They further claimed that their lives have not improved contrary to the promise and rationale for the adoption of the SDOA. They prayed for a renegotiation of the SDOA, or, in the alternative, its revocation. Subsequently, DAR Sec. Pangandaman recommended to the PARC Executive Committee (Excom) (a) the recall/revocation of PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 149

approving HLI’s SDP; and (b) the acquisition of Hacienda Luisita through the compulsory acquisition scheme. PARC issued the assailed Resolution No. 2005-32-01 directing that the lands subject of the revoked SDO plan be placed under the compulsory coverage or mandated land acquisition scheme of the CARP. ISSUE:

II. III.

WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENTS PARC AND SECRETARY PANGANDAMAN HAVE JURISDICTION, POWER AND/OR AUTHORITY TO NULLIFY, RECALL, REVOKE OR RESCIND THE SDOA. WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 31 OF RA 6657 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. WHETHER OR NOT OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE IS APPLICABLE IN THE CASE.

RULING:

YES. Under Sec. 31 of RA 6657, as implemented by DAO 10, the authority to approve the plan for stock distribution of the corporate landowner belongs to PARC. However, contrary to petitioner HLI’s posture, PARC also has the power to revoke the SDP which it previously approved. It may be, as urged, that RA 6657 or other executive issuances on agrarian reform do not explicitly vest the PARC with the power to revoke/recall an approved SDP. Such power or authority, however, is deemed possessed by PARC under the principle of necessary implication, a basic postulate that what is implied in a statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed.94 We have explained that "every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms."95Further, "every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege.96 Following the doctrine of necessary implication, it may be stated that the conferment of express power to approve a plan for stock distribution of the 150

agricultural land of corporate owners necessarily includes the power to revoke or recall the approval of the plan. As public respondents aptly observe, to deny PARC such revocatory power would reduce it into a toothless agency of CARP, because the very same agency tasked to ensure compliance by the corporate landowner with the approved SDP would be without authority to impose sanctions for non-compliance with it.98With the view We take of the case, only PARC can effect such revocation.

NO. SECTION 31 OF RA 6657 IS CONSTITUTIONAL. Farmworkers Agrarian Reform Movement (FARM) asks for the invalidation of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, insofar as it affords the corporation, as a mode of CARP compliance, to resort to stock distribution, an arrangement which, to FARM, impairs the fundamental right of farmers and farmworkers under Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution.106 To a more specific, but direct point, FARM argues that Sec. 31 of RA 6657 permits stock transfer in lieu of outright agricultural land transfer; in fine, there is stock certificate ownership of the farmers or farmworkers instead of them owning the land, as envisaged in the Constitution. For FARM, this modality of distribution is an anomaly to be annulled for being inconsistent with the basic concept of agrarian reform ingrained in Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution.107 Reacting, HLI insists that agrarian reform is not only about transfer of land ownership to farmers and other qualified beneficiaries. It draws attention in this regard to Sec. 3(a) of RA 6657 on the concept and scope of the term "agrarian reform." The constitutionality of a law, HLI added, cannot, as here, be attacked collaterally. Not all the requisites for judicial review are present. When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review over, and pass upon the constitutionality of, acts of the executive or legislative departments, it does so only when the following essential requirements are first met, to wit: (1) there is an actual case or controversy; (2) that the constitutional question is raised at the earliest possible opportunity 151

(3) the action is brought by a proper party or one with locus standi; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. It took the Farmworkers Agrarian Reform Movement (FARM) some eighteen (18) years from November 21, 1989 before it challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657. The question of constitutionality will not be passed upon by the Court unless it is properly raised and presented in an appropriate case at the first opportunity. FARM is, therefore, remiss in belatedly questioning the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657. The second requirement that the constitutional question should be raised at the earliest possible opportunity is clearly wanting. The last but the most important requisite that the constitutional issue must be the very lis mota of the case does not likewise obtain. Thelis motaaspect is not present, the constitutional issue tendered not being critical to the resolution of the case. The unyielding rule has been to avoid, whenever plausible, an issue assailing the constitutionality of a statute or governmental act. If some other grounds exist by which judgment can be made without touching the constitutionality of a law, such recourse is favored.111Garcia v. Executive Secretary explains why: Lis Mota — the fourth requirement to satisfy before this Court will undertake judicial review — means that the Court will not pass upon a question of unconstitutionality, although properly presented, if the case can be disposed of on some other ground, such as the application of the statute or the general law. The petitioner must be able to show that the case cannot be legally resolved unless the constitutional question raised is determined. This requirement is based on the rule that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality; to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative. Constitutional issue has been rendered moot and academic (stock distribution scheme under Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is no longer an available option under existing law)

Sec. 5 of RA 9700, amending Sec. 7 of RA 6657, has all but superseded Sec. 31 of RA 6657 vis-a-vis the stock distribution component of said Sec. 31. In its pertinent part, Sec. 5 of RA 9700 provides:“[T]hat after June 30, 2009, themodes of 152

acquisition shall belimited to voluntary offer to sell and compulsory acquisition.” Thus, for all intents and purposes, thestock distribution scheme under Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is no longer an available option under existing law. The question of whether or not it is unconstitutional should be a moot issue. The Court, in some cases, has proceeded to resolve constitutional issues otherwise already moot and academic provided the following requisites are present: (i) there is a grave violation of the Constitution (ii) the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved (iii) when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public (iv) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is constitutional as it simply implements Sec. 4 of Art. XIII of the Constitution that land can be owned collectively by farmers Sec. 4, Article XIII of the Constitution reads, in part: “The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of the farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, toOWN directly or COLLECTIVELYTHE LANDS THEY TILL or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof....” TheConstitution allows two (2) modes of land distribution—direct and indirect ownership.Direct transferto individual farmers is the most commonly used method by DAR and widely accepted.Indirect transferthrough collective ownershipof the agricultural land is the alternative to direct ownership of agricultural land by individual farmers. The aforequoted Sec. 4 expressly authorizes collective ownership by farmers. No language can be found in the 1987 Constitution that disqualifies or prohibits corporations or cooperatives of farmers from being the legal entity through which collective ownership can be exercised. By using the word“collectively,” the Constitution allows for indirect ownership of land and not just outright agricultural land transfer.This is in recognition of the fact that land reform may become successful even if it is done through the medium of juridical entities composed of farmers. 153

Collective ownership is permitted in two (2) provisions of RA 6657. Its Sec. 29 allows workers’ cooperatives or associations to collectively own the land, while the second paragraph of Sec. 31 allows corporations or associations to own agricultural land with the farmers becoming stockholders or members.Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is constitutional as it simply implements Sec. 4 of Art. XIII of the Constitution that land can be owned COLLECTIVELY by farmers. The wisdom of Congress in allowing a stock distribution plan through a corporation as an alternative mode of implementing agrarian reform is not for judicial determination. Established jurisprudence tells us that it is not within the province of the Court to inquire into the wisdom of the law, for, indeed, We are bound by words of the statute. Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution is not self-executory Likewise,Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitutionmakes mention of a commitment on the part of the State topursue,by law,an agrarian reform program...but subject to such priorities as Congress may prescribe. This necessarily implies that the above constitutional provision isnot self-executoryand that legislation is needed to implement the urgently needed program of agrarian reform. And RA 6657 has been enacted precisely pursuant to and as a mechanism to carry out the constitutional directives. DAR and PARC must ensure that the farmers should always own majority of the common shares entitled to elect the members of the board of directors to ensure that the farmers retain control over the agricultural land FARM contends that the farmers in the stock distribution scheme under Sec. 31 of RA 6657 do not own the agricultural land but are merely given stock certificates. Thus, the farmers lose control over the land to the board of directors and executive officials of the corporation who actually manage the land. They conclude that such arrangement runs counter to the mandate of the Constitution that any agrarian reform must preserve the control over the land in the hands of the tiller. While it is true that the farmer is issued stock certificates and does not directly own the land, still, the Corporation Code is clear that theFWB becomes a stockholder who acquires an equitable interest in the assets of the corporation, which include the 154

agricultural lands. It was explained that the “equitable interest of the shareholder in the property of the corporation is represented by the term stock, and the extent of his interest is described by the term shares. The expression shares of stock when qualified by words indicating number and ownership expresses the extent of the owner’s interest in the corporate property. Ashare of stock typifies an aliquot part of the corporation’s property, or the right to share in its proceeds to that extent when distributed according to law and equity and that its holder is not the owner of any part of the capital of the corporation. TheFWBs will ultimately own the agricultural lands owned by the corporation when the corporation is eventually dissolved and liquidated. There is nothing unconstitutional in the formula prescribed by RA 6657. Thepolicy on agrarian reform is that control over the agricultural land must always be in the hands of the farmers. Then it falls on the shoulders of DAR and PARC to see to it the farmers should always own majority of the common shares entitled to elect the members of the board of directors to ensure that the farmers will have a clear majority in the board. Before the SDP is approved, strict scrutiny of the proposed SDP must always be undertaken by the DAR and PARC, such that thevalue of the agricultural land contributed to the corporation must always be more than 50% of the total assets of the corporation to ensure that the majority of the members of the board of directors are composed of the farmers.The PARC composed of the President of the Philippines and cabinet secretaries must see to it that control over the board of directors rests with the farmers by rejecting the inclusion of nonagricultural assets which will yield the majority in the board of directors to nonfarmers. Any deviation, however, by PARC or DAR from the correct application of the formula prescribed by the second paragraph of Sec. 31 of RA 6675 does not make said provision constitutionally infirm. Rather, it is the application of said provision that can be challenged. Ergo, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 does not trench on the constitutional policy of ensuring control by the farmers. YES. The operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case. The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made by the President or the administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and consequences that must be respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that 155

resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the application of the operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed to retain the benefits and homelots they received under the stock distribution scheme, they were also given the option to choose for themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. PARC Resolution No. 2005-32-01 dated December 22, 2005 and Resolution No. 2006-34-01 dated May 3, 2006, placing the lands subject of HLI’s SDP under compulsory coverage on mandated land acquisition scheme of the CARP, are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the original 6,296 qualified FWBs shall have the option to remain as stockholders of HLI. DAR shall immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.

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Tropical Homes, Inc. vs. NHA G.R. No. L-48672 July 31, 1987 Gutierrez, Jr., J..

FACTS In 1972, Tropical Homes, Inc. (THI) entered into a contract with private respondent Arturo Cordova for the sale of a lot at Better Living Subdivision in Parañaque. The Contract price was P32,108.00. There was a 10% downpayment upon the execution of the contract, and the balance is payable at a monthly amortization of P318.16 beginning May 17, 1972 for 20 years. Section 14 of the contract provided that the contract will be automatically cancelled upon default in payment of any installment within 90 days from its due date. In 1973, Cordova was informed that the contract was cancelled due to nonpayment of installments for a period of seven (7) months. He filed a letter-complaint at the Department of Trade asking for a refund of the total payments he made amounting to P8,627.86. The case was referred to NHA as they had jurisdiction over the case pursuant to PD 957. On February 21, 1978, the NHA issued the resolution including a decision favoring Cordova which states that the complainant was entitled to the refund of his payments on the first contract totalling P8,627.86 and was recommended that THI be ordered to refund to Arturo Cordova the amount of P8,627.86 with 12% interest per annum from 1 October 1976, until fully paid. On April 1978, PD No. 1344 was passed which provided the following: 157

Section 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature: a) Unsound real estate business practices; b) Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by sub-division lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and c) Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. Section 2. The decision of the National Housing Authority shall become final and executory after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from the date of its receipt. It is appealable only to the President of the Philippines and in the event the appeal is filed and the decision is not reversed and/or amended within a period of thirty (30) days, the decision is deemed affirmed. Proof of the appeal of the decision must be furnished the National Housing Authority.

Tropical Homes, Inc. questioned the constitutionality of PD No. 1344 because a) it deprives them access to courts of law and b) the manner of appeal provided for therein is violative of due process.

ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutional issue is the lis mota of the case.

RULING: No. The Court does not decide questions of a constitutional nature unless that question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case i.e. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented. In this case, the petitioner has not clearly shown how a ruling upon the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1344 will in any way affect the correctness of the decision rendered against him. The resolution promulgated by respondent NHA, was issued before the passage of the questioned decree. Moreover, The writ of execution 158

of NHA did not rely upon P.D. No. 1344. The issue of constitutionality is poorly discussed.

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS)*OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN R. SANDOVAL,petitioners, vs. HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his Capacity as Commissioner of Bureau of Customs,respondents.||| G.R. No. 166715, [August 14, 2008]

FACTS: RA 9355 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and Bureau of Customs (BOC), encouraging their officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). Petitioners, invoking their rights as taxpayers, challenges the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation, on the following grounds: Establishing a system of rewards and incentives transforms the BIR and BOC officials and employees into mercenaries and bounty hunters that are driven to attain these rewards. They find that this will only invite corruption and sacrificing the duty of the officials and employees to serve the people.

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Limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection as there is no valid classification as to why such system should not apply to all employees and officials of other government agencies. The law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President as it lacks a sufficient standard on the matter, making the President free to fix an unrealistic and unattainable targets that may cause the dismissal of officials and employees; and The creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. ISSUE: WON RA 9335 is unconstitutional? RULING: The Court held that the petition was PARTIALLY GRANTED. A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of theConstitution, not a doubtful and equivocal one. To invalidateRA 9335based on petitioners' baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it. Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless, public officers may by law be rewarded for exemplary and exceptional performance. A system of incentives for exceeding the set expectations of a public office is not anathema to the concept of public accountability. In fact, it recognizes and reinforces dedication to duty, industry, efficiency and loyalty to public service of deserving government personnel.||| Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect. Such rules and regulations partake of the nature of a statuteand are just as binding as if they have been written in the statute itself. As such, they have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent court.

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Section 12 of RA 9335 is Unconstitutional Section 12 provides for the creation of a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee, which violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires Congress or its members to approve the implementing rules of a law after it has already taken effect shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress or its members to overturn any directive or ruling made by the members of the executive branch charged with the implementation of the law.||| Effect of the unconstitutionality of Sec 12 of RA 9335 Sec. 13 of RA 9335 provides the separability clause which states, “If any provision of this Act is declared invalid by a competent court, the remainder of this Act or any provision not affected by such declaration of invalidity shall remain in force and effect. Thegeneral ruleis that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to theConstitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. The presence of a separability clause in a statute creates the presumption that the legislature intended separability, rather than complete nullity of the statute. The separability clause ofRA 9335reveals the intention of the legislature to isolate and detach any invalid provision from the other provisions so that the latter may continue in force and effect. The valid portions can stand independently of the invalid section. Without Section 12, the remaining provisions still constitute a complete, intelligible and valid law which carries out the legislative intent to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC by providing for a system of rewards and sanctions through the Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board. Petition is PARTIALY GRANTED.

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FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, respondents. Tatad vs. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 281 SCRA 330, G.R. No. 124360, G.R. No. 127867 November 5, 1997 Puno J:, FACTS: The petitions at bar challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 entitled “An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes.” R.A. No. 8180 ends (26) years of government regulation of the downstream oil industry. Few cases carry a surpassing importance on the life of every Filipino as these petitions for the upswing and downswing of our economy materially depend on the oscillation of oil. Tatad vs. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 281 SCRA 330, G.R. No. 124360, G.R. No. 127867 November 5, 1997 The petition is anchored on three arguments: First, that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products violates the equal protection clause. Petitioner contends that the 3%-7% tariff differential unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and discriminates against prospective investors in the downstream oil industry who do

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not have their own refineries and will have to source refined petroleum products from abroad. Second, that the imposition of different tariff rates does not deregulate the downstream oil industry but instead controls the oil industry, contrary to the avowed policy of the law. Petitioner avers that the tariff differential between imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products bars the entry of other players in the oil industry because it effectively protects the interest of oil companies with existing refineries. Thus, it runs counter to the objective of the law "to foster a truly competitive market." Third, that the inclusion of the tariff provision in section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 violates Section 26(1) Article VI of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which shall be expressed in its title. Petitioner contends that the imposition of tariff rates in section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 is foreign to the subject of the law which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 8180 is unconstitutional. RULING: Yes In G.R. No. 124360 where the petitioner is Senator Tatad, it is contended that section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 on tariff differential violates the provision of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title. We do not concur with this contention. As a policy, this Court has adopted a liberal construction of the one title—one-subject rule. We have consistently ruled that the title need not mirror, fully index or catalogue all contents and minute details of a law. A law having a single general subject indicated in the title may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject. We hold that section 5(b) providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of R.A. No. 8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. The section is supposed to sway prospective investors to put up refineries in our country and make them rely less on imported petroleum. 163

TWO ACCEPTED TESTS TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS A VALID DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.—“There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.” SECTION 15 CAN HURDLE BOTH THE COMPLETENESS TEST AND THE SUFFICIENT STANDARD TEST.—Given the groove of the Court’s rulings, the attempt of petitioners to strike down section 15 on the ground of undue delegation of legislative power cannot prosper. Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. It will be noted that Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation. THE COURTS, AS GUARDIANS OF THE CONSTITUTION, HAVE THE INHERENT AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE WHETHER A STATUTE ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE TRANSCENDS THE LIMIT IMPOSED BY THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW.—Judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. The courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. Where a statute violates the Constitution, it is not only the right but the duty of the judiciary to declare such act as unconstitutional and void. LIBERAL STANCE ON A PETITIONER’S LOCUS STANDI WHERE THE PETITIONER IS ABLE TO CRAFT AN ISSUE OF TRANSCENDENTAL 164

SIGNIFICANCE TO THE PEOPLE.—The effort of respondents to question the locus standi of petitioners must also fall on barren ground. In language too lucid to be misunderstood, this Court has brightlined its liberal stance on a petitioner’s locus standi where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people. In Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, we stressed: “x x x Objections to taxpayers’ suit for lack of sufficient personality, standing or interest are, however, in the main procedural matters. Considering the importance to the public of the cases at bar, and in keeping with the Court’s duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of these petitions.”

DEUTSCHE BANK AG MANILA BRANCH,PETITIONER, vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,RESPONDENT. G.R. No. 188550 August 19, 2013 Sereno, CJ.: FACTS: Petitioner withheld and remitted to respondent the amount of P67,688,553.51, in accordance with National Internal Revenue Code of 1997. It represented the fifteen percent (15%)branch profit remittance tax (BPRT)on itsregular banking unitnet income remitted toDeutsche Bank Germany (DB Germany)for 2002 and prior taxable years. Believing that petitioner made an overpayment of BPRT, petitioner filed with the BIR an administrative claim for refund or issuance of its tax credit certificate in the total amount of P22,562,851.17, the alleged excess BPRT paid on branch profits remittance to DB Germany. Petitioner requested from the International Tax Affairs Division (ITAD) a confirmation of its entitlement to the preferential tax rate of 10%, a tax treaty relief, under the RPGermany Tax Treaty. Due to the inaction of the BIR on its administrative claim, petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the CTA. CTA Second Division denied the petition on the ground that application of tax treaty relief should be filed first from International Tax Affairs Division (ITAD) of the BIR prior to the payment by the 165

former of its BPRT and actual remittance of its branch profits to DB Germany, or prior to the availment of a preferential tax rate of 10% under a tax treaty. The court likewise ruled that the 15-day rule for tax treaty relief application under RMO No. 12000 cannot be relaxed for petitioner. CTA En Banc affirmed the CTA Second Division’s decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can avail the tax treaty relief in accordance with Article II, Section 2 (1987 Constitution of the Philippines) the adoption of international laws? RULING: YES, the petitioner can avail the tax treaty relief. According to Article II, Section 2 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “The Philippines adopts the generally-accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land.” In the case at bar, the Supreme Court held that, our Constitution provides for adherence to the general principles of international law as part of the law of the land.The timehonoredinternational principle of pacta suntservandademands the performance in good faith of treaty obligations on the part of the states that enter into the agreement. Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties, and obligations under the treaty must be performed by them in good faith.More importantly, treaties have the force and effect of law in this jurisdiction. A state that has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations those modifications that may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken. Thus, laws and issuances must ensure that the reliefs granted under tax treaties are accorded to the parties entitled thereto. The BIR must not impose additional requirements that would negate theavailmentof the reliefs provided for under international agreements. The obligation to comply with a tax treaty must take precedence over the objective of RMO No. 1-2000. More so, when the RP-Germany Tax Treaty does not provide for any pre-requisite for theavailmentof the benefits under said agreement. Bearing in mind the rationale of tax treaties, the period of application for theavailmentof tax treaty relief as required by RMO No. 1-2000 should not operate to divest entitlement to the relief as it would constitute a violation of the duty required by good faith in complying with a tax treaty. Logically, noncompliance with tax treaties has negative implications on international relations.

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KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., father and Natural Guardian, and Spouses FEDERICO N. SALVACION, JR., and EVELINA E. SALVACION vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI y NORTHCOTT G.R. No. 94723 August 21, 1997 FACTS: Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing four counts of rape and serious illegal detention against Karen Salvacion. Police recovered from him several dollar checks and a dollar account in the China Banking Corp. He was, however, able to escape from prison. In a civil case filed against him, the trial court awarded Salvacion moral, exemplary and attorney’s fees amounting to almost P1,000,000.00. Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli with the China Banking Corp. but the latter refused arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 exempts foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever. Salvacion therefore filed this action for declaratory relief in the Supreme Court. 167

ISSUE: Whether or not should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient? RULING: NO. The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circ*mstances. Respondents are hereby required to comply with the writ of execution issued in the civil case and to release to petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in such amount as would satisfy the judgment. Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the favorable judgment and award of damages that Salvacion and her parents fully deserve. It then proceeded to show that the economic basis for the enactment of RA No. 6426 is not anymore present; and even if it still exists, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the law may be good when enacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as the case before us. The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor General who argued that the Offshore Banking System and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw deposits from foreign lenders and investors and, subsequently, to give the latter protection. However, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and protection by said laws because such depositor stays only for a few days in the country and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short time. Considering that Bartelli is just a tourist or a transient, he is not entitled to the protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against attachment, garnishment or other court processes.

Further the SC said: “In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially 168

to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that “in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.”

G.R. No. 176579 October 9, 2012 HEIRS OF WILSON P. GAMBOA,*Petitioners, vs. FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO B. TEVES, et al. FACTS: In his petition, Gamboa prays, among others: For the Honorable Court to issue a declaratory relief that ownership of common or voting shares is the sole basis in determining foreign equity in a public utility and that any other government rulings, opinions, and regulations inconsistent with this declaratory relief be declared unconstitutional and a violation of the intent and spirit of the 1987 Constitution; For the Honorable Court to declare null and void all sales of common stocks to foreigners in excess of 40 percent of the total subscribed common shareholdings; and For the Honorable Courtto direct the Securities and Exchange Commissionand Philippine Stock Exchangeto require PLDT to make a public disclosure of all of its foreign shareholdings and their actual and real beneficial owners. 169

Other relief(s) just and equitable are likewise prayed for. (Emphasis supplied) As can be gleaned from his prayer, Gamboa clearly asks this Court to compel the SEC to perform its statutory duty to investigate whether "the required percentage of ownership of the capital stock to be owned by citizens of the Philippines has been complied with [by PLDT] as required by x x x the Constitution."51Such plea clearly negates SEC’s argument that it was not impleaded. There is no dispute, and respondents do not claim the contrary, that (1) foreigners own 64.27% of the common shares of PLDT, which class of shares exercises thesoleright to vote in the election of directors, and thus foreigners control PLDT; (2) Filipinos own only 35.73% of PLDT’s common shares, constituting a minority of the voting stock, and thus Filipinos do not control PLDT; (3) preferred shares, 99.44% owned by Filipinos, have no voting rights; (4) preferred shares earn only 1/70 of the dividends that common shares earn;50(5) preferred shares have twice the par value of common shares; and (6) preferred shares constitute 77.85% of the authorized capital stock of PLDT and common shares only 22.15%.

ISSUES: Whether or not the PLDT violated the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. RULING: Yes. The last sentence of Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution reads:The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or association must be citizens of the Philippines. This a reiteration of the last sentence of Section 5, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution,49signifying its importance in reserving ownership and control of public utilities to Filipino citizens. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions have the same 60 percent Filipino ownership and control requirement for public utilities like PLOT. Any deviation from this requirement necessitates an amendment to the Constitution as exemplified by the Parity Amendment. This Court has no power to amend the Constitution for its power and duty is only to faithfully apply and interpret the Constitution. 170

While they had differing views on the percentage of Filipino ownership of capital, it is clear that the framers of the Constitution intended public utilities to bemajorityFilipino-owned and controlled. To ensure that Filipinos control public utilities, the framers of the Constitution approved, as additional safeguard, the inclusion of the last sentence of Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution commanding that "[t]he participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or association must be citizens of the Philippines. The Constitution expressly declares as State policy the development of an economy "effectively controlled" by Filipinos. Consistent with such State policy, the Constitution explicitly reserves the ownership and operation of public utilities to Philippine nationals, who are defined in the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 as Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least 60 percent of whose capitalwith voting rightsbelongs to Filipinos. The FIA’s implementing rules explain that "[f]or stocks to be deemed owned and held by Philippine citizens or Philippine nationals, mere legal title is not enough to meet the required Filipino equity.Full beneficial ownership of the stocks, coupled with appropriate voting rights is essential." In effect, the FIA clarifies, reiterates and confirms the interpretation that the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution refers toshares with voting rights, as well as with full beneficial ownership. This is precisely because the right to vote in the election of directors, coupled with full beneficial ownership of stocks, translates to effective control of a corporation. The Court, by treating the petition as one for mandamus,56merely directed the SEC to apply the Court’s definition of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution in determining whether PLDT committed any violation of the said constitutional provision.The dispositive portion of the Court’s ruling is addressed not to PLDT but solely to the SEC, which is the administrative agency tasked to enforce the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. To do this the 1935 Constitution, which contained the same 60 percent Filipino ownership and control requirement as the present 1987 Constitution, had to be amended to give Americans parity rights with Filipinos. There was bitter opposition to the Parity Amendment62and many Filipinos eagerly awaited its expiration. In late 1968, PLDT was one of the American-controlled public utilities that became Filipinocontrolled when the controlling American stockholders divested in anticipation of the expiration of the Parity Amendment on 3 July 1974.63No economic suicide happened 171

when control of public utilities and mining corporations passed to Filipinos’ hands upon expiration of the Parity Amendment.

PRIVATIZATION and MANAGEMENT OFFICE, Petitioner, vs. STRATEGIC ALLIANCE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and/or PHILIPPINE ESTATE CORPORATION, Respondents. G.R. No. 200402 June 18, 2014 FACTS: PMO, then operating as the Asset Privatization Trust (APT), held a public bidding to sell the PNCC properties in order to generate maximum cash recovery for the government. The Asset Specific Bidding Rules (ASBR) governed the bidding process, which had the following pertinent rules: (1) the indicative price of the PNCC properties shall be announced on the day of the bidding; (2) the winning bidder is the one that submits the highest total bid and that complies with all the terms of the ASBR;

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(3) PMO reserves the right to reject any or all bids, including the highest bid; and (4) the delivery of financial information regarding the PNCC properties shall not give rise to a warranty with respect to the said data or information. Strategic Alliance Development Corporation, as a participant in the bidding process,14 signified its acceptance under these terms On the day of the bidding, the indicative price was announced at ₱7,000,000,000. None of the bidders met the threshold. Strategic Alliance Development Corporation, despite giving the highest offer, only gave ₱1,228,888,800 as its bid offer. Consequently, PMO rejected all the bids. As a result, Strategic Alliance Development Corporation protested the rejection of its bid and insisted that a notice of award of the PNCC properties be issued in its favor. PMO refused. Subsequently, the former filed a Complaint for Declaration of Right to a Notice of Award and/or Damages before the RTC. Ruling in the bidder’s favor, the trial court held that the failure to explain the basis of the indicative price of ₱7 billion constituted a grave abuse of discretion and a violation of the public’s right to information, warranting the issuance of a notice of award of the PNCC properties to Strategic Alliance Development Corporation. On appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC so PMO questioned the aforesaid ruling before this Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari. Meanwhile, PMO’s copetitioner, PNCC, moved for reconsideration. In resolving the Motion for Reconsideration filed by PNCC, the CA totally reversed itself in its Amended Decision. The CA held that PMO and PNCC cannot be compelled to accept the bidder’s meager offer, which was grossly disadvantageous to the Filipino people. The CA also considered that PMO had the right under the ASBR to reject any or all bids; and that its exercise of discretion to reject the bid of Strategic Alliance Development Corporation had not been attended by unfairness, arbitrariness or grave abuse. ISSUE: WON the announcement of the indicative price after the submission of the sealed bids constituted an act of fraud on the part of PMO and WON the evaluation of the indicative price was erroneous, and that the public’s right to information was violated by the failure of PMO to explain the high indicative price thus the need for issuance 173

of a notice of award of the PNCC properties to Strategic Alliance Development Corporation. RULING: The court denied the entreaties of Strategic Alliance Development Corporation (PHES) The late announcement of the indicative price does not amount to fraud. PMO timely announced the indicative price on the day of the bidding pursuant to the ASBR. Therefore, absent a clear and convincing evidence of fraud, and given that PMO followed the protocol, fraud on its part cannot be presumed. To justify the acceptance of its bid for the PNCC properties, PHES reiterates that PMO erred in computing and explaining the indicative price of 7 billion, in violation of the public’s right to due process. However, its allegations are irrelevant considering that the Civil Code and the ASBR pertinently provide that bids are mere offers, which may be rightfully rejected by PMO. Moreover, PHES unsuccessfully anchors its claim on a violation of the public’s right to information because the said right merely gives access to public records, and does not precipitate a positive right to obtain an award of the PNCC properties. Therefore, the Court denies the prayer for the issuance of a notice of award to Strategic Alliance Development Corporation.

LETICIA B. AGBAYANI,Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE and LOIDA MARCELINA J. GENABE,Respondents G.R. No. 183623 June 25, 2012

FACTS: Agbayani and Genabe were both employees of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 275 of Las Piñas City, working as Court Stenographer and Legal Researcher II. On December 29, 2006, Agbayani filed a criminal complaint for grave oral 174

defamation against Genabe. City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City found probable cause for grave oral defamation, upon petition for review by Genabe. DOJ undersecretary Ernesto Pineda found only for slight oral defamation as it was uttered in the heat of anger. DOJ also moved for dismissal of the complaint for failure to comply with RA 7160, Sec. 408 and 409 (d). Motion for Reconsideration of Agbayani was denied. Petition for review on certiorari was filed with CA and dismissed. ISSUE: WON, DOJ abuse its discretion when it set aside the findings of the City Prosecutor of Las Pinas. RULINGS: No, the rules of procedure, in this case DOJ circular No. 70, Section 5 and Section 6 should be viewed as instruments to facilitate the attainment of justice and are not to be applied with severity and rigidity. Indeed, there was substantial compliance with said DOJ rules as respondent Genabe actually mentioned the name of petitioner as private complainant. CA also found there was proper service of petition as petitioner was able to file his comment. In addition, in Guy vs. Asia United Bank, a motion for reconsideration from the resolution of the secretary of justice filed four days beyond the non-extendible period of 10 days under sec. 13 NPS Rules on Appeal in instances where he finds absence of Prima Facie evidence is not time barred but subject to the approval of the court. In Villanueva vs. People oral defamation or slander is the speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood. It is grave when it is of a serious or insulting nature. The gravity depends upon (1) expression used, (2) personal relations of the parties involved, (3) special circ*mstances of the case, the antecedents or relationships between the offended party and the offender, which may prove the intention of the offender at the time. In case at bar, Genabe was about to punch her time card on December 27, 2006 when she was informed she had been suspended for failing to meet her deadline in a case, which was done by Agbayani to the presiding judge. This event precipitated the words uttered by Genabe, hence being under “heat of anger and obfuscation”, clearly a slight oral defamation only.

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MAKATI SHANGRI-LA HOTEL AND RESORT, INC., petitioner, vs. ELLEN JOHANNE HARPER, JONATHAN CHRISTOPHER HARPER, and RIGOBERTO GILLERA, respondents. [G.R. No. 189998. August 29, 2012.] FACTS: November 1999, Christian Harper came to Manila on a business trip as the Business Development Manager for Asia of ALSTOM Power Norway AS, an engineering firm with worldwide operations. He checked in at the Shangri-La Hotel. He was due to check out on November 6, 1999. In the early morning of that date, however, he was murdered inside his hotel room by still unidentified malefactors. 176

It appears that at around 11:00 am of November 6, 1999, a Caucasian male entered the Alexis Jewelry Store in Glorietta and expressed interest in purchasing a Cartier lady's watch valued at P320,000.00 with the use of two Mastercard credit cards and an American Express credit card issued in the name of Harper. But the customer's difficulty in answering the queries phoned in by a credit card representative sufficiently aroused the suspicion of saleslady Anna Liza Lumba (Lumba), who asked for the customer's passport upon suggestion of the credit card representative to put the credit cards on hold. Probably sensing trouble for himself, the customer hurriedly left the store, and left the three credit cards and the passport behind. In the meanwhile, Harper's family in Norway must have called him at his hotel room to inform him about the attempt to use his American Express card. Not getting any response from the room, his family requested Raymond Alarcon, the Duty Manager of the Shangri-La Hotel, to check on Harper's room. Alarcon and security personnel went to Room 1428 at 11:27 a.m., and were shocked to discover Harper's lifeless body on the bed. Criminal Investigation showed that Harper’s passport, credit cards, laptop and an undetermined amount of cash had been missing from the crime scene; Respondents commenced this suit in the RTC to recover various damages from petitioner pertinently alleging: “The murderer succeeded to trespass into the area of the hotel's private rooms area and into the room of the said deceased on account of the hotel's gross negligence in providing the most basic security system of its guests, the lack of which owing to the acts or omissions of its employees was the immediate cause of the tragic death of said deceased.” RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. CA affirmed. Respondents were granted a total amount of 52, 078, 702.50 as actual and compensatory damages, and 200,00 as attorney’s fees. Petitioners appealed that there is error in granting this for the lack of negligence on their part. Petitioner argues that respondents failed to prove its negligence; that Harper's own negligence in allowing the killers into his hotel room was the proximate cause of his own death; and that hotels were not insurers of the safety of their guests. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE THERE WAS NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONERS AND ITS SAID NEGLIGENCE WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE DEATH OF MR. CHRISTIAN HARPER. 177

RULING: Yes, The Supreme Court ruled that Shangri-la is liable due to its own negligence. As the action is predicated on negligence, the relevant law is Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which states that – "Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there was no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter." In determining whether or not there is negligence on the part of the parties in a given situation, jurisprudence has laid down the following test: Did defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act, use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, the person is guilty of negligence. The law, in effect, adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet pater familias of the Roman law. A review of the testimony of Col. De Guzman reveals that on direct examination he testified that at the time he assumed his position as Chief Security Officer of defendant-appellant, during the early part of 1999 to the early part of 2000, he noticed that some of the floors of the hotel were being guarded by a few guards, for instance, 3 or 4 floors by one guard only on a roving manner. He then made a recommendation that the ideal-set up for an effective security should be one guard for every floor, considering that the hotel is L-shaped and the ends of the hallways cannot be seen. He also qualified that as to his direct testimony on "ideal-set up", he was referring to one guard for every floor if the hotel is fully booked. At the time he made his recommendation in the early part of 1999, it was disapproved as the hotel was not doing well and it was not fully booked so the existing security was adequate enough. He further explained that his advice was observed only in the late November 1999 or the early part of December 1999. It could be inferred from the foregoing declarations of the former Chief Security Officer of defendant-appellant that the latter was negligent in providing adequate security due its guests. With confidence, it was repeatedly claimed by defendantappellant that it is a five-star hotel. Unfortunately, the record failed to show that at the time of the death of Christian Harper, it was exercising reasonable care to protect its guests from harm and danger by providing sufficient security commensurate to it being one of the finest hotels in the country. In so concluding, WE are reminded of the Supreme Court’s enunciation that the hotel business like the common carrier’s business is imbued with public interest. Catering to the public, hotelkeepers are 178

bound to provide not only lodging for hotel guests but also security to their persons and belongings. The twin duty constitutes the essence of the business. The apparent security lapses of defendant-appellant were further shown when the male culprit who entered Christian Harper’s room was never checked by any of the guards when he came inside the hotel. As per interview conducted by the initial investigator, PO3 Cornelio Valiente to the guards, they admitted that nobody know that said man entered the hotel and it was only through the monitor that they became aware of his entry. It was even evidenced by the CCTV that before he walked to the room of the late Christian Harper, said male suspect even looked at the monitoring camera. Such act of the man showing wariness, added to the fact that his entry to the hotel was unnoticed, at an unholy hour, should have aroused suspicion on the part of the roving guard in the said floor, had there been any. Unluckily for Christian Harper, there was none at that time. Unfortunately, the record failed to show that at the time of the death of Christian Harper, it was exercising reasonable care to protect its guests from harm and danger by providing sufficient security commensurate to it being one of the finest hotels in the country. In so concluding, WE are reminded of the Supreme Court's enunciation that the hotel business like the common carrier's business is imbued with public interest. Catering to the public, hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging for hotel guests but also security to their persons and belongings. The twin duty constitutes the essence of the business

Ursua vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No: 112170 10 April 1996 FACTS: Petitioner Cesario Ursua was a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer assigned in Kidapawan, Cotabato. On May 9, 1989 the Provincial Governor of Cotabato requested the Office of the Ombudsman in Manila to conduct an investigation on a complaint for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority and giving of unwarranted benefits by petitioner and other officials of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. The complaint was initiated by the 179

Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cotabato through a resolution advising the Governor to report the involvement of petitioner and others in the illegal cutting of mahogany trees and hauling of illegally-cut logs in the area. On 1 August 1989, Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner, wrote the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City requesting that he be furnished copy of the complaint against petitioner. Atty. Palmones then asked his client Ursua to take his letter-request to the Office of the Ombudsman because his law firm's messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend to some personal matters. Before proceeding to the Office of the Ombudsman petitioner talked to Oscar Perez and told him that he was reluctant to personally ask for the document since he was one of the respondents before the Ombudsman. However, Perez advised him not to worry as he could just sign his (Perez) name if ever he would be required to acknowledge receipt of the complaint. When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City, he was instructed by the security officer to register in the visitors' logbook. Instead of writing down his name petitioner wrote the name "Oscar Perez" after which he was told to proceed to the Administrative Division for the copy of the complaint he needed. He handed the letter of Atty. Palmones to the Chief of the Administrative Division, Ms. Loida Kahulugan, who then gave him a copy of the complaint, receipt of which he acknowledged by writing the name "Oscar Perez." On December 18, 1990, after the prosecution had completed the presentation of its evidence, petitioner without leave of court filed a demurrer to evidence alleging that the failure of the prosecution to prove that his supposedaliaswas different from his registered name in the local civil registry was fatal to its cause. Petitioner argued that no document from the local civil registry was presented to show the registered name of accused which according to him was a conditionsine qua nonfor the validity of his conviction. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner Ursua violated the Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 for using an alias name? RULING: No, because such act does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in business transactions which theanti-alias lawand its related statutes seek to 180

prevent are not present here as the circ*mstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences. Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused. The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited. WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and petitioner CESARIO URSUA is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

The above law was subsequently amended by R.A. No. 6085, approved on 4 August 1969. As amended, C.A. No. 142 now reads: Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he was registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry or with which he was baptized for the first time, or in case of all alien, with which he was registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court:Provided, That persons whose births have not been registered in any local civil registry and who have not been baptized, have one year from the approval of this act within which to register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames. Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use analiasshall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name and no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial authority for more than onealias. The petition for analiasshall set forth the person's baptismal and family name and the name recorded in the civil registry, if different, his immigrant's name, if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such names other than his original or real 181

name, specifying the reason or reasons for the desiredalias. The judicial authority for the use ofalias, the Christian name and the alien immigrant's name shall be recorded in the proper local civil registry, and no person shall use any name or names other than his original or real name unless the same is or are duly recorded in the proper local civil registry.

ANTONIO A. MECANO,petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT,respondent. FACTS: Petitioner requested reimbursem*nt for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917(RAC). Commission on Audit (COA) Chairman, in his 7th Indorsem*nt, denied petitioner’s claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by 182

the Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec. Order No. 292), solely for the reason that the same section was not restated nor re-enacted in the latter.Petitioner also anchored his claim on Department of Justice Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 by Secretary Drilonstating that “the issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abrogate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code.The COA, on the other hand, strongly maintains that the enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 operated to revoke or supplant in its entirety the RAC. ISSUE: Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. RULING: NO. Petition granted. Respondent ordered to give due course on petitioner’s claim for benefits. RATIO: Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect. Hence, before there can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the same from the time of the first enactment. It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. The two Codes should be read in pari materia.

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Penera vs. COMELEC and Andanar G.R. No. 181613 September 11, 2009 FACTS: Penera and private respondent Edgar T. Andanar were mayoralty candidates in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte during the 14 May 2007 elections. On 2 April 2007, Andanar filed before the Office of the Regional Election Director (ORED), Caraga Region (Region XIII), a Petition for Disqualification against Penera, as well 184

as the candidates for Vice-Mayor andSangguniang Bayanwho belonged to her political party, for unlawfully engaging in election campaigning and partisan political activity prior to the commencement of the campaign period. Andanar claimed that on 29 March 2007 – a day before the start of the authorized campaign period on 30 March 2007 – Penera and her partymates went around the differentbarangaysin Sta. Monica, announcing their candidacies and requesting the people to vote for them on the day of the elections. Penera alone filed an Answer denying the charges but admitted that a motorcade did take place and that it was simply in accordance with the usual practice in nearby cities and provinces, where the filing of certificates of candidacy (COCs) was preceded by a motorcade, which dispersed soon after the completion of such filing. The COMELEC disqualified Penera but absolved the other candidates from Penera’s party from violation of section 80 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. ISSUE: Whether or not the new definition of the term “candidate” in Section 15 of RA 8436 as amended by RA 9369 is in conflict with Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code such that premature campaigning may no longer be committed RULING: In denying Penera’s petition, the Supreme Court, through Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario, found that Penera and her witnesses admitted that the vehicles, consisting of two jeepneys and ten motorcycles, were festooned with multi-colored balloons; the motorcade went around three barangays in Sta. Monica; and Penera and her partymates waved their hands and threw sweet candies to the crowd. Thus, for violating Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, proscribing election campaign or partisan political activity outside the campaign period, Penera was disqualified from holding the office of Mayor of Sta. Monica. The Court declared that “there isno absolute and irreconcilable incompatibilitybetween Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, and Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, which defines the prohibited act of premature campaigning. It is possible to harmonize and reconcile these two provisions and, thus, give effect to both.” The Court held, further, that:

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“True, that pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, even after the filing of the COC but before the start of the campaign period, a person is not yet officially considered a candidate. Nevertheless, a person, upon the filing of his/her COC, already explicitly declares his/her intention to run as a candidate in the coming elections. The commission by such a person of any of the acts enumerated under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code (i.e., holding rallies or parades, making speeches, etc.) can, thus, be logically and reasonably construed as for the purpose of promoting his/her intended candidacy. When the campaign period starts and said person proceeds with his/her candidacy, his/her intent turning into actuality, we can already consider his/her acts, after the filing of his/her COC and prior to the campaign period, as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate, hence, constituting premature campaigning, for which he/she may be disqualified. Also, conversely, if said person, for any reason, withdraws his/her COC before the campaign period, then there is no point to view his/her acts prior to said period as acts for the promotion of his/her election as a candidate. In the latter case, there can be no premature campaigning as there is no candidate, whose disqualification may be sought, to begin with. Third, in connection with the preceding discussion, the line in Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, which provides that “any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period,” does not mean that the acts constituting premature campaigning can only be committed, for which the offender may be disqualified, during the campaign period. Contrary to the pronouncement in the dissent, nowhere in the said proviso was it stated that campaigning before the start of the campaign period is lawful, such that the offender may freely carry out the same with impunity. As previously established, a person, after filing his/her COC but prior to his/her becoming a candidate (thus, prior to the start of the campaign period), can already commit the acts described under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code as election campaign or partisan political activity. However, only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the beginning of the campaign period, can said acts be given effect as premature campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the start of the campaign period, can his/her disqualification be sought for acts constituting premature campaigning. Obviously, it is only at the start of the campaign period, 186

when the person officially becomes a candidate, that the undue and iniquitous advantages of his/her prior acts, constituting premature campaigning, shall accrue to his/her benefit. Compared to the other candidates who are only about to begin their election campaign, a candidate who had previously engaged in premature campaigning already enjoys an unfair headstart in promoting his/her candidacy. As can be gleaned from the foregoing disquisition, harmony in the provisions of Sections 80 and 79 of the Omnibus Election Code, as well as Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, is not only very possible, but in fact desirable, necessary and consistent with the legislative intent and policy of the law.

LLEDO vs LLEDO CARMELITA LLEDO, Complainant, vs ATTY. CESAR V. LLEDO, Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon City, Respondent A.M. No. P-95-1167 February 9, 2010 187

FACTS: On December 21, 1998, Atty. Cesar V. Lledo, former branch clerk of court of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 94 was dismissed from service via a court decision on a case where his wife, Carmelita, had filed an administrative case against him, charging the latter with immorality, abandonment, and conduct unbecoming a public official because he left his family to live with another woman with whom he also begot children. He failed to provide support for his family. The Court, in its December 21, 1998 Decision, DISMISSED him from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and leave credits and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including any government-owned or controlled corporation. On April 3, 2006, Cesar L. Lledo, Jr., Cesar's son, wrote a letter to then Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban. He related that his father had been bedridden after suffering a severe stroke and acute renal failure. He had been abandoned by his mistress and had been under Cesar Jr.'s care since 2001. The latter appealed to the Court to reconsider its December 21, 1998 Decision, specifically the forfeiture of leave credits, which money would be used to pay for his father's medical expenses. Treating the letter as a motion for reconsideration, the Court, on May 3, 2006, granted the same, specifically on the forfeiture of accrued leave credits. Cesar Jr. wrote the Court again expressing his gratitude for the Court's consideration of his request for his father's leave credits. He again asked for judicial clemency in connection with his father's claim for refund of the latter's personal contributions to GSIS.

In a letter dated April 16, 2009, Jason C. Teng, Regional Manager of the GSIS Quezon City Regional Office, explained that a request for a refund of retirement premiums is disallowed. He explained that “if those that were expected to have no future claim (e.g. those with forfeited retirement benefits) were suddenly allowed to receive claims for payment of benefits, this would have a negative impact on the financial viability of the GSIS.”

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In its Comment, the GSIS Board said that Cesar is not entitled to the refund of his personal contributions of the retirement premiums because "it is the policy of the GSIS that an employee/member who had been dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits cannot recover the retirement premiums he has paid unless the dismissal provides otherwise." The GSIS Board pointed out that the Court's Decision did not provide that Cesar is entitled to a refund of his retirement premiums. Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 186 states: Section 9. Effect of dismissal or separation from service. - Upon dismissal for cause of a member of the System, the benefits under his membership policy shall be automatically forfeited to the System, except one-half of the cash or surrender value, which amount shall be paid to such member, or in case of death, to his beneficiary. Section 11(d) of Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended states that “Upon dismissal for cause or on voluntary separation, he shall be entitled only to his own premiums and voluntary deposits, if any, plus interest of three per centum per annum, compounded monthly.” ISSUE: WON COMMONWEALTH ACT NO 186 HAS BEEN IMPLIEDLY REPEALED. RULING: NO. It is noteworthy that none of the subsequent laws expressly repealed Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended. In fact, none of the subsequent laws expressly repealed the earlier laws. As a general rule, repeals by implication are not favored. When statutes are in pari materia, they should be construed together. A law cannot be deemed repealed unless it is clearly manifested that the legislature so intended it. For the latter law to be deemed as having repealed the earlier law, it is necessary to show that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the same subject matter and that the latter be inconsistent with the former. There must be a showing of repugnance, clear and convincing in character. The language used in the later statute must be such as to render it irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that standard does not suffice. Finally, it should be remembered that the GSIS laws are in the nature of social legislation, to be liberally construed in favor of the government employees. To allow forfeiture of these personal contributions in favor of the GSIS would condone undue enrichment. 189

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Government Service Insurance System is hereby DIRECTED to return to Atty. Cesar Lledo his own premiums and voluntary deposits, if any, plus interest of three per centum per annum, compounded monthly.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ET. AL. VS FORERUNNER MULTIRESOURCES INC. G.R. NO. 199324 January 7, 2013 FACTS: On December 12, 2002, then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 156 which imposes a partial ban on the importation of used motor 190

vehicles. The ban is part of several measures EO 156 adopts to "accelerate the sound development of the motor vehicle industry in the Philippines.” In Executive Secretary v. Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc. and two related petitions, EO 156 was found to be a valid executive issuance enforceable throughout the Philippine customs territory, except in the Subic Special Economic and Freeport Zone in Zambales (Subic Freeport) by virtue of its status as a "separate customs territory" under Republic Act No. 7227. Respondent Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc sued the government in the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan to declare invalid EO 156. Respondent attacked EO 156 for (1) having been issued by President Arroyo ultra vires, (2) trenching the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution and (3) having been superseded by Executive Order No. 418, modifying the tariff rates of imported used motor vehicles. Respondent sought a preliminary injunctive writ to enjoin, litis pendentia, the enforcement of EO 156. Trial court granted relief, initially by issuing a Temporary Restraining Order followed by a writ of preliminary injunction. On petitioners’ motion, the trial court reconsidered its Order and lifted the injunctive writ. On appeal, CA set aside the trial court’s order and held that RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in lifting the preliminary injunctive writ it earlier issued. Moreover, CA held that the implementation of EO 156 would put petitioner in a financial crisis. ISSUE: WON Executive Order No. 418 impliedly repealed Executive Order No. 156

RULING: No, the Court ruled that Executive Order No. 418 did not impliedly repeal Executive Order No. 156. This question was already settled in a Resolution dated 22 August 2006 denying reconsideration of the ruling in Southwing. The respondents in those cases, importers of used motor vehicles via the Subic Freeport, had espoused the theory presently advanced by respondent. 191

The subsequent issuance of E.O. No. 418 increasing the import duties on used motor vehicles did not alter the policy of the executive department to prohibit the importation of said vehicle. There is nothing in the text of E.O. No. 418 which expressly repeals E.O. No. 156. The Congress, or the Office of the President in this case, is presumed to know the existing laws, such that whenever it intends to repeal a particular or specific provision of law, it does so expressly. The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal previous administrative issuances. E.O. No. 156 is very explicit in its prohibition on the importation of used motor vehicles. On the other hand, E.O. No. 418 merely modifies the tariff and nomenclature rates of import duty on used motor vehicles. Nothing therein expressly revokes the importation ban. Petition is thereby granted, and CA’s decision is set aside.

ARLIN B. OBIASCA, Petitioner, BASALLOTE,Respondent.

vs.

G.R. No. 176707 February 17, 2010 FACTS: 192

JEANE O.

On May 26, 2003, the City Schools Division Superintendent Beloso appointed respondent Basallote to the position of AO II of DepEd, Tabaco National High School in Albay. The new City Schools Division Superintendent Oyardo, through a letter dated June 4, 2003, advised the School Principal Gonzales to return the papers for the said position and that a school ranking should be submitted for review. During the assumption of the respondent to the position on June 19, 2003, she received a letter form the HRMO informing her that her appointment could not be forwarded to the CSC because of her failure to submit the position description form (PDF) duly signed by Gonzales. Respondent ed for the signature of Gonzales but the latter refuses and because of this, Respondent informed Oyardo. Instead of helping her, she was advised to return to her former teaching position (Teacher I) which she then followed. Come August 25, 2003, Oyardo appointed Petitioner Obiasca to the same position (AO II) and such appointment was sent to and properly attested by the CSC. Upon knowledge, respondent filed a complaint with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon against Oyardo, Gonzales and Diaz. The office found Oyardo and Gonzales administratively liable for withholding information from respondent regarding the status of her appointment but Diaz was absolved of any wrongdoing. Respondent also filed a protest with the CSC Regional Office V but it was dismissed on the ground that it should first be submitted to the Grievance Committee of the DepEd for appropriate action. Respondent elevated the matter to the CSC and in its November 29, 2005 resolution, the CSC granted the appeal, approved respondent’s appointment and recalled the approval of petitioner’s appointment. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the CA claiming that the CSC acted without factual and legal bases in recalling his appointment. In its September 26, 2006 decision, CA denied the petition and upheld respondent’s appointment. The CA found that the respondent was no doubt, qualified for the position. The CA opined that Diaz unreasonably refused to affix her signature on respondent’s PDF and to submit respondent’s appointment to the CSC on the ground of non193

submission of respondent’s PDF. The CA ruled that the PDF was not even required to be submitted and forwarded to the CSC. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but his motion was denied on February 8, 2007. Hence, this petition. Issue: WON the deliberate failure of the appointing authority to submit respondent’s appointment to the CSC within 30 days from its issuance made her appointment ineffective and incomplete. Ruling: No. The appointment of the respondent shall be deemed valid and effective rendering the subsequent appointment of the petitioner void. Section 9(h) of PD 807 Already Amended by Section 12 Book V of EO 292 It is important to also note that Section 9(h) of PD 807 cannot be interpreted as requiring that an appointment must be submitted by the appointing authority to the CSC within 30 days from issuance, otherwise, the appointment would become ineffective. Such interpretation fails to appreciate the relevant part of Section 9(h) which states that "an appointment shall take effect immediately upon issue by the appointing authority if the appointee assumes his duties immediately and shall remain effective until it is disapproved by the CSC. Section 12, Book V of EO 292 amended Section 9(h) of PD 807 by deleting the requirement that all appointments subject to CSC approval be submitted to it within 30 days. Under the facts in this case, respondent promptly assumed her duties as Administrative Officer II when her appointment was issued by the appointing authority. Thus, her appointment took effect immediately and remained effective until disapproved by the CSC. Respondent’s appointment was never disapproved by the CSC. In fact, the CSC was deprived of the opportunity to act promptly as it was wrongly prevented from doing so. More importantly, the CSC subsequently approved respondent’s appointment and recalled that of petitioner, which recall has already become final and immutable. The law on the matter is clear. There is no requirement in EO 292 that appointments should be submitted to the CSC for attestation within 30 days from the issuance. It certainly cannot restore what EO 292 itself already and deliberately removed. At the very least, that requirement cannot be used as basis to unjustly prejudice 194

respondent. The problem is petitioner’s insistence that the law be applied in a manner that is unjust and unreasonable. Also, in appointing petitioner, the appointing authority effectively revoked the previous appointment already accepted by the respondent. It is the CSC, not the appointing authority, which has this power. Accordingly, petitioner’s subsequent appointment was void. There can be no appointment to a non-vacant position. The incumbent must first be legally removed, or her appointment validly terminated, before another can be appointed to succeed her. In sum, the appointment of petitioner was inconsistent with the law and wellestablished jurisprudence. It not only disregarded the doctrine of immutability of final judgments but also unduly concentrated on a narrow portion of the provision of law, overlooking the greater part of the provision and other related rules and using a legal doctrine rigidly and out of context. Its effect was to perpetuate an injustice. “When the law is clear, there is no other recourse but to apply it regardless of its perceived harshness. Dura lex sed lex. Nonetheless, the law should never be applied or interpreted to oppress one in order to favor another. As a court of law and of justice, this Court has the duty to adjudicate conflicting claims based not only on the cold provision of the law but also according to the higher principles of right and justice.”

G.R. No. 193960 January 7, 2013 KARLO ANGELO DABALOS y SAN DIEGO,Petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,BRANCH 59, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA), REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDING JUDGE MA. ANGELICA T. PARAS195

QUIAMBAO; THE OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA); AND ABC,Respondents. Facts: Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9262 before the RTC of Angeles City, Branch 59. Petitioner filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause with motion to quash the information. Petitioner averred that at the time of the alleged incident on July 13, 2009, he was no longer in dating relationship with private respondent; hence, RA. NO. 9262 was inapplicable. In her affidavit, private respondent admitted that her relationship with petitioner had ended prior to the subject incident. She narrated that on July 13, 2009, she sought payment of the money she had lent to petitioner but the latter could not pay. She then inquired from petitioner if he was responsible for spreading rumors about her which he admitted. Thereupon, private respondent slapped petitioner causing the latter to inflict on her the physical injuries alleged in the Information. The RTC denied the petitioner’s motion. It did not consider material the fact that the parties’ dating relationship had ceased prior to the incident, ratiocinating that since the parties had admitted a prior dating relationship, the infliction of slight physical injuries constituted an act of violence against women and their children as defined in Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262. Issue: Whether or not the offender and the offended woman should be in a dating relationship at the time of the infliction of the violence? Ruling: No. The Court is not persuaded. RA 9262 is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or series of acts to be considered as a crime of violence against women through physical harm, namely: 1) it is committed against a woman or her child and the woman is the offender’s wife, former wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or dating relationship or with whom he has a common child; and 2) it results in or is likely to result in physical harm or suffering. Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of violence be a consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such limitation be inferred. Hence, applying the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the courts, then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts of violence against women with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship. 196

As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence of such relationship between the offender and the victim when the physical harm was committed. Consequently, the Court cannot depart from the parallelism in Ang and give credence to petitioner's assertion that the act of violence should be due to the sexual or dating relationship.

SPOUSES ROMEO LL. PLOPENIO vs DAR and LBP G.R. No. 161090 and EDUARDO PLOPENIO vs DAR and LBP G.R. No. 161092 197

Facts: Petitioner-spouses own 11.8643 hectares of coconut land in Caramoan, Camarines Sur, while petitioner Eduardo owns 22.8349 hectares of coconut land in the same locality. In 2000, the land of their brother Gavino Plopenio, likewise located in Caramoan, Camarines Sur, was valued by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) at P51,125.60 per hectare. On this basis, petitioners offered their entire landholdings to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for acquisition and distribution pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. On October 26, 2001, public respondent Land Bank sent a Notice of Valuation and Adjudication valuing the land of petitioner-spouses at P23,485.00 per hectare and that of petitioner Eduardo at P22,856.62 per hectare. Dissatisfied with Land Bank’s offer, petitioners rejected the Notice of Valuation and Acquisition and referred the matter to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Camarines Sur for summary administrative proceedings. The PARAD affirmed the valuation made by Land Bank in a Decision dated 5 September 2002, a copy of which petitioners received on 27 September 2002. On 11 October 2002, or 14 days thereafter, petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration. The PARAD denied their Motion in an Order dated 20 November 2002, which petitioners received on 21 December 2002. Petitioners then filed separate Petitions before the SAC-RTC on 6 January 2003, or 16 days after their receipt of the PARAD’s Order. They explained that they were allowed to file their appeal 15 days from the receipt of the Order of denial of their Motion for Reconsideration. Since the 15th day fell on a Sunday, they reasoned that they should be allowed to file their appeal until 6 January 2003. In its Answer, Land Bank alleged that the Decision of the PARAD had already attained finality after the lapse of the 15-day period, counted from petitioners’ receipt of the PARAD’s Decision. Thus, it argued that the SAC-RTC should no longer entertain the Petitions. In its assailed Decisions, the SAC-RTC ruled that the Decision of the PARAD had already attained finality because petitioners failed to file their Petitions on time. The petitions therefore are hereby ordered dismissed for lack of valid cause of action. From the Decisions and Orders of the SAC-RTC, petitioners then filed the instant Petitions for Review directly before the Court. 198

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners resorted to a wrongful mode of appeal by filing the instant Rule 45 Petitions with the Supreme Court. RULING: The consolidated Petitions for Review are DENIED. While the general rule is that appeals raising pure questions of law from decisions of RTCs are taken to this Court via a Rule 45 petition, decisions of trial courts designated as SACs are only appealable to the Court of Appeals. It is a settled rule that the right to appeal is a remedy of statutory origin. As such, this right must be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law authorizing its exercise.The special jurisdiction of the SAC-RTC is conferred and regulated by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, and appeals therefrom are governed by Section 60 which provides: Section 60. Appeals. – An appeal may be taken from the decision of the Special Agrarian Courts by filing a petition for review with the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of the decision; otherwise, the decision shall become final. That law expressly states that appeals from SACs must be taken to the Court of Appeals without making a distinction between appeals raising questions of fact and those dealing purely with questions of law. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. Where the law does not distinguish, neither should we. Consequently, the Court rules that the only mode of appeal from decisions of the SAC-RTC is via a Rule 42 petition for review to the Court of Appeals, without any distinction as to whether the appeal raises questions of fact, questions of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. Furthermore, even if the appeals were allowed to prosper, the Petitions before the SAC-RTC were filed out of time. In the event of a denial of the motion for reconsideration, the 1994 DARAB Rules provide: SECTION 12. x x x. The filing of a motion for reconsideration shall suspend the running of the period within which the appeal must be perfected. If a motion for 199

reconsideration is denied, the movant shall have the right to perfect his appeal during the remainder of the period for appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial. If the decision is reversed on reconsideration, the aggrieved party shall have fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution of reversal within which to perfect his appeal. In this case, the petitioners only filed their Petitions on 6 January 2001, or 16 days after they received the Order denying their Motion for Reconsideration. Clearly, the Petitions before the SAC-RTC were filed out of time.

GR No. 193459, 2011-02-15 Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez vs. House of Representative Facts: 200

OnJuly 22, 2010, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim, and spouses Felipe and Evelyn Pestaño (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaintagainst Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez (Petitioner) upon the endorsem*nt of Party-List Representatives Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Bello. Private respondents Renato Reyes, Jr., Mother Mary John Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon (Reyes group) filed another impeachment complaint against petitioner with a resolution of endorsem*nt by Party-List Representatives Neri Javier Colmenares, Teodoro Casiño, Rafael Mariano, Luzviminda Ilagan, Antonio Tinio and Emerenciana de Jesus. ( complaints were merged) Transmitted the report to Atty. Marilyn Barua-Yap, Secretary General of the House of Representatives, transmitted the impeachment complaint to House Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. who, by Memorandum of August 2, 2010, directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business. Rules on Impeachment of the 14th Congress, were adapted in the said 15th impeachment proceeding to meet the exigency in such situation, in keeping with the "effective" implementation of the "purpose" of the impeachment provisions. The provisional adoption of the previous Congress’ Impeachment Rules is within the power of the House to promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out purpose. The Petitioner filed a complaint on the violation of the Constitution with regards to court proceedings and due process clause. Petitioner anchored its petition on the grounds that the Rules of Impeachment proceedings were not promulgated in line with the constitutional requirement of publication. Issue: Whether or not the promulgation of the Impeachment Rules requires Publication requirement for it to have it’s effectivity? Ruling: No, in the case of Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations which held that the Constitution categorically requires publication of the rules of procedurein legislative inquiries explains that the Impeachment Rules is 201

intended to merelyenable Congressto effectively carry outthe purpose of Section 3(8), Art. XI of Constitution. Wherein the unpublished rules of legislative inquiries were not considered null and void in its entirety. In such case the word promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally understood--that is, to make known. (Generalia verba sunt generaliter inteligencia.) The formal act of announcing a rule of court is within the discretion of Congress on how to promulgate Impeachment rules. Hence, the petitioner’s contention on the Publication requirement needed for the promulgation of Rules of Impeachment does not hold grounds.

PEOPLE VS SANDIGANBAYAN AND AMANTE G.R. NO: 167304 August 25, 2009 FACTS: 202

Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Province of Cebu at the time pertinent to this case. She was able to get hold of a cash advance in the amount of ₱71,095.00 under a disbursem*nt voucher in order to defray seminar expenses of the Committee on Health and Environmental Protection, which she headed. Almost two years since she obtained the said cash advance, no liquidation was made. Toledo City Auditor Manolo V. Tulibao issued a demand letter to respondent Amante asking the latter to settle her unliquidated cash advance within seventy-two hours from receipt. Thereafter, the OMB-Visayas, on September 30, 1999, issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for Malversation of Public Funds against respondent Amante. On May 21, 2004, the OSP filed an Information with the Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria Amante of violating Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445. Amante filed with the said court a MOTION TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT AND MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION stating that the Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman made an incomplete proceeding in so far that respondent Amante had already liquidated and/or refunded the unexpected balance of her cash advance. And that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the said criminal case because respondent Amante was then a local official who was occupying a position of salary grade 26. The OSP contended that the said court has jurisdiction over respondent Amante since at the time relevant to the case, she was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, therefore, falling under those enumerated under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249. According to the OSP, the language of the law is too plain and unambiguous that it did not make any distinction as to the salary grade of city local officials/heads. The Sandiganbayan dismissed the case against Amante for lack of jurisdiction. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT A MEMBER OF THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD UNDER SALARY GRADE 26 WHO WAS CHARGED WITH VIOLATION OF THE AUDITING CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES FALLS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN. RULING:

203

Yes. The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 which took effect on May 16, 1995, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. The exception contained in R.A. 7975, as well as R.A. 8249, where it expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable in the present case as the offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines. The last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of the said two provisions states: Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving: A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; (b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads. (c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher; (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; (e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor; (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations; (2)

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Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office. C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. By simple analogy, applying the provisions of the pertinent law, respondent Amante, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time of the alleged commission of an offense in relation to her office, falls within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. In the case at bar, the accused is a Sangguniang Panlungsod member, a position with salary grade '26'. Her office is included in the enumerated public officials in Section 4(a) (1) (a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975. However, she is charged with violation of Section 89 of The Auditing Code of the Philippines which is not a case falling under Section 4(a) but under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended.

Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters. In other words, the express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. Expressio unius ext exlusio alterius. Elsewise stated, expressium facit cessare tacitum- what is expressed puts an end to what is implied. The legislative body would not have made specific enumerations in the statute, if it had the intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.

Gatchalian vs. Commission on Elections 205

Nos. L-32560–61. October 22, 1970 ESMERALDO M. GATCHALIAN, petitioner on his behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,respondent. MAKASIAR, J.: FACTS The Commission on Elections promulgated on August 13, 1970, Comelec Resolution No. RR-707 holding that “donations of billboards to the Commission by foreigners or companies or corporations owned and controlled partially or wholly by foreigners are not covered by the provision of Sec. 56 of the Revised Election Code.” RESOLUTION LIFTING THE BAN CONTRIBUTIONS FROM FOREIGNERS Upon the request of the Advertising Council of the Philippines, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. RR-731 to the effect that the ban in Sec. 46 of the Revised Election Code, as amended, does not cover the projected campaign for funds and other contributions by the Advertising Council of the Philippines and others similarly situated, during the 120 days immediately preceding a regular or special election; and “that in line with the ruling in its resolution numbered RR-707, donations and contributions for the above campaign may be received from foreigners, companies or corporations owned and/or controlled wholly or partially by foreigners. PETITION BY GATCHALIAN Petitioner Esmeraldo M. Gatchalian, a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention for the first district of Rizal. filed a petition impugning the validity of said Resolutions Nos. RR-707 and 731 as violative of Sec. 56 of the Revised Election Code. COMELEC DENIED THE PETITION COMELEC denied the petition, claiming that contributions by foreigners to the Comelec Billboards Committee are not made in aid or support of any particular candidate in a particular district nor would it in any way influence the result of the election.

SEC. 56, REVISED ELECTION CODE 206

Sec. 56 of the Revised Election Code, as amended, provides that “No foreigner shall aid any candidate, directly or indirectly, or to take part in or to influence in any manner any elections.” The prohibited active intervention of foreigners thereunder may consist of: (1) aiding any candidate, directly or indirectly, in any election; (2) taking part in any election; and (3) influencing in any manner any election. ISSUE Whether or not the term “any candidate” in Sec. 56 comprehends “some candidates” or “all candidates.” RULING It was held that the term “any candidate” should be construed also to mean some or all candidates. The term “any candidate” should be construed also to mean some or all candidates. It has been held that the term “any candidate” voted for at any election refers to “candidates"; and that the term “any person” is not limited to “any person” in the singular, but is applicable as well to two or more persons. “When the context so indicates, the word may be construed to mean, and indeed it has been frequently used in its enlarged and plural sense, as meaning “all,” “all or every,” “each,” “each one of all,” “every,” without limitation; indefinite number or quantity, an indeterminate unit or the number of units out of many or all, one or more as the case may be, several, some.

207

City of Manila v. Laguio G.R. No. 118127 April 12, 2005 Facts: Sometime in March 1993, the City of Manila passed a local ordinance which prohibits establishments from operating business which provide certain forms of amusem*nt, entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community. Operating motels is among the prohibited businesses. Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC), one of the affected corporations being engaged in the motel industry, filed a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order against the execution of the ordinance before the RTC. MTDC contends among other constitutional infirmities, that the ordinance is unconstitutional because the City Council has no power to prohibit the operation of motels as Section 458 (a) 4 (iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (the Code) grants to the City Council only the power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments. City of Manila answers that they had the power to "prohibit certain forms of entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community" as provided for in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Local Government Code, which reads, thus: Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (vii) Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any entertainment or amusem*nt facilities, including theatrical performances, circuses, billiard pools, public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusem*nt; regulate such other events or activities for amusem*nt or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants, or require the suspension or suppression of the same; or, prohibit certain forms of amusem*nt or entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community. RTC favored MTDC and declared the ordinance unconstitutional. Thus, this case elevated before the Supreme Court. Issue: 208

Whether or not the ordinance is constitutional? Ruling: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the ordinance is unconstitutional. The Congress unequivocably specified the establishments and forms of amusem*nt or entertainment subject to regulation among which are beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments (Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)), public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusem*nt (Section 458 (a) 4 (vii)). This enumeration therefore cannot be included as among "other events or activities for amusem*nt or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants" or "certain forms of amusem*nt or entertainment" which the City Council may suspend, suppress or prohibit. The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as are expressly granted to it and those which are necessarily implied or incidental to the exercise thereof. By reason of its limited powers and the nature thereof, said powers are to be construed strictissimi juris and any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the terms used in granting said powers must be construed against the City Council. It is a general rule in statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence is tantamount to an express exclusion of all others. Expressio unius est exclusio alterium. This maxim is based upon the rules of logic and the natural workings of human mind. It is particularly applicable in the construction of such statutes as create new rights or remedies, impose penalties or punishments, or otherwise come under the rule of strict construction. It is well to recall the maxim reddendo singula singulis which means that words in different parts of a statute must be referred to their appropriate connection, giving to each in its place, its proper force and effect, and, if possible, rendering none of them useless or superfluous, even if strict grammatical construction demands otherwise. Likewise, where words under consideration appear in different sections or are widely dispersed throughout an act the same principle applies.

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WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring the Ordinance void is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners

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JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA JR., NORMA A. YLAYA PANTALEON A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA III, LUCY A. AMADORA, ROSALINDA A. AMADORA, PERFECTO A. AMADORA, SERREC A. AMADORA, VICENTE A. AMADORA and MARIA TISCALINA A. AMADORA,petitioners vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS, VICTOR LLUCH SERGIO P. DLMASO JR., CELESTINO DICON, ANIANO ABELLANA, PABLITO DAFFON thru his parents and natural guardians, MR. and MRS. NICANOR GUMBAN, and ROLANDO VALENCIA, thru his guardian, A. FRANCISCO ALONSO,respondents. G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988 FACTS: Pablito Daffon, a student of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos fired a gun while he was at the auditorium of the school with some of the students. The stray bullet hit Alfredo Amadora which caused immediately death of Alfredo. The parents of the deceased filed a petition against Daffon before the RTC. The trial court convicted the accused for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The parents also sued the school for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code because of the school’s negligence. The RTC ruled in favor of Amadora, wherein, the principal, the dean of boys and the teacher-in-charge are all civilly liable. The Institution appealed and claimed that when the incident happened the school year has already ended. Amadora argued that even though the semester has already ended, his son was there in school to complete a school requirement in his Physics subject. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the school on the basis that under the last paragraph of Article 2180, only schools of arts and trades (vocational schools) are liable not academic schools like Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos.

ISSUE: Whether or not Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos can be held civilly liable for the negligence which caused to the death of Amadora.

RULING: 211

No. The Court ruled that all schools may not be held directly liable. Its liability is only subsidiary. Moreover, for non-academic schools, it would be the principal or head of school who should be directly liable for the tortuous act of its students. For academic schools, it would be the teacher-in-charge who would be directly liable for the tortuous act of the students and not the dean or the head of school. It also ruled that such liability does not cease when the school year ends or when the semester ends. Liability applies whenever the student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises. Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates and friends enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the school, he is still within the custody and subject to the discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Article 2180. However, a teacher can avoid direct liability, and for the school, to avoid subsidiary liability, is to show proof that he, the teacher, exercised the necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of, and the school exercised the diligence of abonus pater familias. In this case, the Physics teacher in charge was not properly named and there was no sufficient evidence presented to make the said teacher-in-charge liable and the school. Therefore, Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held subsidiarily liable.

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G.R. No. 136351 July 28, 1999 JOEL G. MIRANDA,petitioner, vs. ANTONIO M. ABAYA and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,respondents. Facts: On March 24, 1998, Jose "Pempe" C. Miranda, then incumbent city mayor of Santiago, Isabela, filed his certificate of candidacy for the same mayoralty post in view of the synchronized elections of May 11, 1998. In March 27, 1998, private respondent Antonio M. Abaya filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy. The petition was GRANTED by the Comelec in its resolution dated May 5, 1998. The Comelec further ruled to DISQUALIFY Jose "Pempe" Miranda. On May 6, 1998, way beyond the deadline for filing a certificate of candidacy, petitioner Joel G. Miranda filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty post, supposedly as a substitute for his father, Jose "Pempe" Miranda. During the May 11, 1998 elections; petitioner and private respondent vied for the mayoralty seat, with petitioner garnering 22,002 votes, 1,666 more votes than private respondent who got only 20,336 votes. On May 13, 1998, private respondent filed a Petition to Declare Null and Void Substitution with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, which was docketed as SPA No. 98-288. He prayed for the nullification of petitioner's certificate of candidacy for being voidab initiobecause the certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda, whom petitioner was supposed to substitute, had already been cancelled and denied due course. On December 8, 1998, the ComelecEn Bancrendered nullifying the substitution by petitioner Joel G. Miranda of his father as candidate for the mayoralty post of Santiago City. Petitioner sought the Court's intercession via a petition forcertiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Issue: 213

Whether or not the annulment of petitioner's substitution and proclamation is proper and legally sound.

Ruling: Yes, while there is no dispute as to whether or not a nominee of a

registered or accredited political party may substitute for a candidate of the same party who had been disqualified for any cause, this does not include those cases where the certificate of candidacy of the person to be substituted had been denied due course and cancelled under Section 78 of the Code. The court explains the difference between the "disqualification" of a candidate and the "cancellation" of his certificate of candidacy. The majority holds that, under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code, there are only three instances in which a candidate may be "substituted," and these are "death, withdrawal or disqualification" of such candidate. Inasmuch as the certificate of candidacy of petitioner's father, Jose "Pempe" Miranda, was merely "cancelled," he could not be legally substituted by reason of the rule on statutory construction,expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. While the law enumerated the occasions where a candidate may be validly substituted, there is no mention of the case where a candidate is excluded not only by disqualification but also by denial and cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. Under the foregoing rule, there can be no valid substitution for the latter case, much in the same way that a nuisance candidate whose certificate of candidacy is denied due course and/or cancelled may not be substituted. If the intent of the lawmakers were otherwise, they could have so easily and conveniently included those persons whose certificates of candidacy have been denied due course and/or cancelled.

A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considereda candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed any certificate of candidacy at all cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be a candidate at all. Underejusdem generisrule, where a general word or phrase (such as "disqualification for any cause" in this case) follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class (such as the words "dies" and "withdraws" in the 214

instant case) or where the latter follow the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be restricted to persons, things or cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. A deceased candidate is required to have duly filed a valid certificate of candidacy, otherwise his political party would not be allowed to field a substitute candidate in his stead under Section 77 of the Code. In the case of withdrawal of candidacy, the withdrawing candidate is required to have duly filed a valid certificate of candidacy in order to allow his political party to field a substitute candidate in his stead. Most reasonable it is then, under the foregoing rule, to hold that a valid certificate of candidacy is likewise an indispensable requisite in the case of a substitution of a disqualified candidate under the provisions of Section 77 of the Code, just as it is in the two previous instances. Furthermore,interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper freinda est,ut euiatur inconveniens et absurdum, meaning, where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity shall in all cases be adopted. To include those disqualified candidates whose certificate of candidacy had likewise been denied due course and/or cancelled among those who may be substituted under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code, leads to the absurdity where a substitute is allowed to take the place of somebody who had not been a candidate in the first place. WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Certificate of Candidacy filed by respondent for the position of Mayor for the City of Santiago be not given due course and/or cancelled.

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NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. ANGAS G.R. Nos. 60225-26 May 8, 1992 FACTS: The petitioner National Power Corporation filed two complaints for eminent domain against private respondents. The complaint which sought to expropriate certain specified lots situated at Limogao, Saguiaran, Lanao del Sur was for the purpose of the development of hydro-electric power and production of electricity. The lower court declared and confirmed that the lots mentioned in the complaints have entirely been lawfully condemned and expropriated by the petitioner, and ordered the latter to pay the private respondents just compensation for their lands expropriated "with legal interest thereon until fully paid." On May 16, 1980, one of the private respondents (Sittie Sohra Batara) filed anexpartemotion praying that petitioner be directed to pay her the unpaid balance for the lands expropriated from her, including legal interest at 6%per annum. It was granted by the lower court and directed the petitioner to deposit the sums of money as adjudged. Petitioner complied with said order and deposited the sums of money with interest computed at 6%per annum. On February 10, 1981, one of the private respondents (Pangonatan Cosna Tagol), filed with the trial court anex-partemotion praying for the first time that the legal interest on the just compensation awarded to her by the court be computed at 12%per annumas allegedly "authorized by Circular No. 416 of the Central Bank issued pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 116 and in a decision of the Supreme Court that legal interest allowed in the judgment of the courts, in the absence of express contract, shall be computed at 12%per annum." The lower court granted the said motion allowing 12% interestper annum. Subsequently, the other private respondents filed motions also praying that the legal interest on the just compensation awarded to them be computed at 12%per annum. 216

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the lower court's last order alleging that the main decision had already become final and executory with its compliance of depositing the sums of money as just compensation for the lands condemned, with legal interest at 6%per annum and that Presidential Decree No. 116 is not applicable to this case because it is Art. 2209 of the Civil Code which applies.

ISSUE: Whether or not in the computation of the legal rate of interest on just compensation for expropriated lands, the law applicable is the Central Bank Circular No. 416 which fixed the legal interest rate at 12%per annum. RULINGS: NO. The Central Bank circular applies only to loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits. The term "judgments" as used in Section 1 of the Usury Law, as well as in Central Bank Circular No. 416, should be interpreted to mean only judgments involving loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits, following the principle ofejusdem generis. Under this doctrine, where general terms follow the designation of particular things or classes of persons or subjects, the general term will be construed to comprehend those things or persons of the same class or of the same nature as those specifically enumerated. Applying the said rule on statutory construction to Central Bank Circular No. 416, the general term "judgments" can refer only to judgments in cases involving loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits. On the other hand, Art. 2209 of the Civil Code applies to transactions requiring the payment of indemnities as damages, in connection with any delay in the performance of the obligation arising therefrom other than those covering loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits. In the case at bar, the transaction involved is clearly not a loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits but expropriation of certain parcels of land for a public purpose, the payment of which is without stipulation regarding interest, and the interest adjudged by the trial court is in the nature of indemnity for damages. The legal interest required to be paid on the amount of just compensation for the properties expropriated is manifestly in the form of indemnity for damages for the delay in the payment thereof. Therefore, since the kind of interest involved in the joint judgment of the lower court sought to be enforced in this case is interest by way of damages, and not by way of earnings from loans, etc. Art. 2209 of the Civil Code shall apply. 217

Central Bank Circular No. 416 By virtue of the authority granted to it under Section 1 of Act No. 2655, as amended, otherwise known as the "Usury Law," the Monetary Board, in its Resolution No. 1622 dated July 29, 1974, has prescribed that the rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of express contract as to such rate of interest, shall be twelve per cent (12%)per annum. Art. 2209 of the Civil Code Art. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs a delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six percentper annum. The purpose of the rule onejusdem generisis to give effect to both the particular and general words, by treating the particular words as indicating the class and the general words as including all that is embraced in said class, although not specifically named by the particular words. This is justified on the ground that if the lawmaking body intended the general terms to be used in their unrestricted sense, it would have not made an enumeration of particular subjects but would have used only general terms.

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PELIZLOY REALTY CORPORATION, represented herein by its President, GREGORY K. LOY, Petitioner, vs. THE PROVINCE OF BENGUET, Respondent. G.R. No. 183137 April 10, 2013 FACTS: Pelizloy Realty Corporation ("Pelizloy") owner of Palm Grove Resort, is a resort designed for recreation and has facilities like swimming pools, a spa and function halls. It is located at the Municipality of Tuba, Province of Benguet. The Provincial Board of the Province of Benguet approved Provincial Tax Ordinance No. 05107, otherwise known as the Benguet Revenue Code of 2005 ("Tax Ordinance"). Section 59, Article X of the Tax Ordinance levied a ten percent (10%) amusem*nt tax on gross receipts from admissions to "resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots. Pelizloy's assailed that the Tax Ordinance's imposition of a 10% amusem*nt tax on gross receipts from admission fees for resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots is an ultra vires act on the part of the Province of Benguet. However, the province of Benguet argued that provinces can validly impose amusem*nt taxes on resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourists’ spots. For it is classified as “amusem*nt places.” The validity of the Tax Ordinance was anchored in Section 140 of the Local Government Code. The Province of Benguet asserts that the enumeration in the Tax Ordinace is encompassed bu the phrase “other places of amusem*nt.”

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Pelizloy, then filed a petition for declaratory relief and injunction before the RTC. However, it was denied. They also filed for a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, the case was elevated and the instant petition in the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the Province of Benguet is authorized to impose amusem*nt taxes on admission fees to resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots for being “amusem*nt places” under Section 140 of the Local Government Code. RULING: No, the Court ruled that the Province of Benguet is not authorized to impose amusem*nt taxes on admission fees to resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots. Section 140 of the Local Government Code provides that a province may levy an amusem*nt tax to be collected from the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other places of amusem*nt at a rate of not more than thirty percent (30%) of the gross receipts from admission fees. What is expressly stated in Section 140 is the amusem*nt tax to be collected from the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, and boxing stadia. The resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots are not among those places expressly mentioned. Thus, the issue of determining where the enumerations of resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots is encompassed in the phrase “other places of amusem*nt.” Under the principle of ejusdem generis, "where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class or where the latter follow the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be restricted to persons, things or cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. Section 131 (c) of the Local Government Code provides a clear definition of amusem*nt places. It defined amusem*nt places to include theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses and other places of amusem*nt where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances. Indeed, theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, and boxing stadia are bound by a common typifying characteristic in that they are all venues primarily for the 220

staging of spectacles or the holding of public shows, exhibitions, performances, and other events meant to be viewed by an audience. Accordingly, ‘other places of amusem*nt’ must be interpreted in light of the typifying characteristic of being venues "where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances" or being venues primarily used to stage spectacles or hold public shows, exhibitions, performances, and other events meant to be viewed by an audience.

In this case, it is clear that resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots cannot be considered venues primarily "where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances". While it is true that they may be venues where people are visually engaged, they are not primarily venues for their proprietors or operators to actively display, stage or present shows and/or performances. The ejusdem generis rule will not apply in this case. Ejusdem generis rule will not apply where the specific things in the enumeration have no distinguishable common characteristics and they greatly differ from each other. In this case, the enumeration of the Province of Benguet do not have the common factor for it to be considered as in the “other places of amusem*nt.” The resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots do not belong to the same category or class as theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, and boxing stadia. It follows that they cannot be considered as among the ‘other places of amusem*nt’ contemplated by Section 140 of the LGC and which may properly be subject to amusem*nt taxes.

The petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The second paragraph of Section 59, Article X of the Benguet Provincial Revenue Code of 2005, that imposes amusem*nt taxes on admission fees to resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots, is declared null and void. Province of Benguet is permanently enjoined from enforcing the second paragraph of Section 59, Article X of the Benguet Provincial Revenue Code of 2005 with respect to resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots.

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People vs. Bello 166948-59 August 29, 2012 FACTS: In 1998 the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (the Committee) inquired into alleged anomalies at the AFP-RSBS. After investigation, the Committee found that when acquiring lands, the AFP-RSBS would execute two sets of deeds of sale: one, an unnotarized bilateral deed of sale that showed a higher price and the other, a unilateral deed of sale that showed a discounted purchase price. The first would be kept by the AFP-RSBS Legal Department while the second would be held by the vendors. The latter would then use these unilateral deeds of sale in securing titles in the name of AFP-RSBS. This was done, according to the Committee, to enable the AFP-RSBS to draw more money from its funds and to enable the vendors to pay lesser taxes.

The Committee recommended to the Ombudsman (OMB) the prosecution of General Jose Ramiscal, Jr. (Ret.), former AFP-RSBS president, who signed the unregistered deeds of sale covering acquisitions of lands in General Santos, Tanauan, Calamba, and Iloilo for falsification of public documents or violation of Article 172, paragraph 1, in relation to Article 171, paragraphs 4 to 6 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and violation of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019,1 Sections 3(e) and 3(g).

Acting on the Committee’s recommendation, the OMB filed with respect to the acquisition of lands in Iloilo City information before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases 26770-75 and 26826-31 against respondents Meinrado Enrique A. Bello, 222

Manuel S. Satuito, Rosario Barbasa-Perlas, Hermie Barbasa, Minviluz Camina, Joelita Trabuco, Rosalinda Tropel, Felipe Villarosa, Abelio Juaneza, and Raul Aposaga for six counts of violation of R.A. 3019, Section 3(e), and six counts of falsification of public documents under Article 171, RPC.

Satuito and Bello filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to quash the information on the ground that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case. On February 12, 2004 the Sandiganbayan granted the motions and ordered the remand of the records to the proper courts, hence, this petition by the People of the Philippines, represented by the OMB, which challenges such order. ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in holding that it has no jurisdiction over offenses involving the heads of the legal departments of government-owned and controlled corporations? RULING: No. In clarifying the meaning of the term "manager" as used in Section 4(a)(1)(g), the Sandiganbayan also invoked the doctrine of noscitur a sociis. Under this doctrine, a proper construction may be had by considering the company of words in which the term or phrase in question is founded or with which it is associated.6 Given that the word "manager" was in the company of the words "presidents, directors or trustees," the clear intent, according to the Sandiganbayan, is to limit the meaning of the term "manager" to officers who have overall control and supervision of government-owned and controlled corporations. The directors or trustees of government-owned and controlled corporations do not, for example, exercise overall supervision and control; when they act collectively as a board, the directors or trustees merely lay down policies for the operating officers to implement. Since "managers" definitely do not have the same responsibilities as directors and trustees or as presidents, they belong to a distinct class of corporate officers that, under the definition above, has charge of a corporation’s "divisions or departments." This brings Bello’s position within the definition. In its February 12, 2004 decision, the Sandiganbayan held that, not being a stock or non-stock corporation, AFP-RSBS cannot be regarded as a government-owned and controlled corporation. Consequently, respondent AFP-RSBS legal department officers did not fall under Section 4(a)(1)(g) of R.A. 8249 that defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. On motion for reconsideration by the prosecution, however, the Sandiganbayan changed its 223

position and ruled that AFP-RSBS is after all a government-owned and controlled corporation, having been created by special law to perform a public function. Still, the Sandiganbayan held that Section 4(a)(1)(g) cannot apply to the accused since Bello, who held the highest rank among those who allegedly conspired to commit the crime charged, did not hold any of the government positions enumerated under that section, the pertinent portion of which reads: Sec. 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows: Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of governmentowned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. (Emphasis ours) WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, REVERSES the Sandiganbayan decision dated February 12, 2004 and resolution dated February 2, 2005 in Criminal Cases 26770-75 and 26826-31, and DIRECTS the Sandiganbayan to REINSTATE these cases, immediately ARRAIGN all the accused, and resolve accused Raul Aposaga’s motion for reinvestigation.

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GSIS vs. Commission on Audit G.R. No. 162372 October 19, 2011 Leonardo-De Castro, J. FACTS: On May 30, 1997, RA 8291 or the GSIS Act was enacted expanding and increasing the coverage and benefits of the GSIS and instituting reforms. Pursuant to the powers granted to it under Section 41() of the said law, the GSIS Board of Trustees approved a Resolution that adopted the GSIS Employees Loyalty Incentive Plan (ELIP) which was later renamed to GSIS Retirement/Financial Plan (RFP). Its objective was to motivate and reward employees for meritorious, faithful and satisfactory service. To be entitled to the plan, the employee must be qualified to retire with 5 year lump sum under RA 660 or RA 8291 or had previously retired under applicable retirement laws. Dimagiba, the corporate auditor of GSIS communicated to the President and General Manager of GSIS that the GSIS RFP was contrary to law. After her request was denied by the president and gen manager, Dimagiba sought the assistance of COA in determining the legality of the said plan. The COA’s General Counsel issued a memorandum stating that the GSIS RFP is a supplementary retirement plan, which is prohibited under the Teves Retirement Law. Since there is no provision in RA 8291 expressly repealing the Teves Retirement Law, the two laws must be harmonized absent an irreconcilable inconsistency. It also 225

violates Section 41(n) of RA 8291 which speaks of an early retirement plan or financial assistance. However, Garcia, the President and Gen. Manager of GSIS, asserted the legality of the plan and stated that it is in line with the powers granted to its Board of Trustees.

Dimagiba did not respond to Garcia, but she issued Notice of Disallowance on the grounds that GSIS RFP is null and void for contradicting the prohibition in creating supplemental retirement schemes and violating Section 41 (n) of RA 8291 which speaks of an early retirement plan or financial assistance.

Issue: Whether or not the GSIS Retirement/ Financial Plan is null and void. Ruling: Yes. RA 8291 provides for the following: Section 41. Powers and Functions of the GSIS. — The GSIS shall exercise the following powers and functions: (n) to design and adopt an Early Retirement Incentive Plan (ERIP) and/or financial assistance for the purpose of retirement for its own personnel; x x x. GSIS is granted the power to adopt a retirement plan and/or financial assistance for its employees, but its must be noted that it is qualified by the words “early”, “incentive”, and “for the purpose of retirement”. What Section 41(n) contemplates is a situation wherein GSIS, due to circ*mstances which calls for termination of some of its employees, must design a plan to encourage, induce, or motivate these employees, who are not yet qualified for either optional or compulsory retirement under our laws, to instead voluntarily retire. This means that the retirement plan is actually an incentive scheme to encourage employees to retire. This is also the interpretation to the phrase “financial assistance” found in Section 41(n). Under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, the construction of a particular word or phrase, which is in itself ambiguous, or is equally susceptible of various meanings, may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or with which it is associated. Hence, the financial assistance is also an incentive scheme to induce the employees to retire early. 226

This is not the case with GSIS RFP. Its objective is to motivate and reward employees for meritorious, faithful and satisfactory service. It does not pertain to an early retirement incentive or financial assistance plan, but a mere retirement benefit which is a form of reward for an employee’s loyalty. Moreover, to avail of this plan, one must be qualified to retire under RA 660 or RA 8291 o must previously retired under existing retirement laws. This means that GSIS RFP covers employees who were already eligible to retire or had already retired. this is not included in the scope of "an early retirement incentive plan or financial assistance for the purpose of retirement. Its purpose is not to encourage GSIS’s employees to retire before their retirement age, but to augment the retirement benefits they would receive under our present laws. Thus, the GSIS RFP is a supplementary retirement plan, which is prohibited by the Teves Retirement Law. Since the Teves Retirement Law was not repealed by RA 8291 because there has been no showing of any irreconcilable inconsistency between the two laws, the former is still a good law. Hence, GSIS RFP is null and void for violating the provision against supplementary retirement plans as provided by the Teves Retirement Law.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,appellee, vs. SIMPLICIO DELANTAR,appellant.||| G.R. No. 169143 [Formerly G.R. No. 138328], [February 2, 2007] FACTS: Sometime and during the period from 1994 to August 1996, accused Simplicio Delantar, through coercion and influence, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously promote, facilitate and induce [AAA],4a female child below 12 years of age, to indulge in sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct for money, profit and other consideration. AAA was brought by the accused to her first client, an Arab national named Mr. Hammond at least 11 times to a hotel where he stayed. Delantar would tell AAA that they had to go to the client so they can pay of their bills, settle something, or they had to ask for money for AAA’s tuition fees. Once they are left alone, Mr. Hammond would proceed on kissing AAA, her breasts, embracing her, and inserting his finger inside her vagin*. Every single time the trip to the client ended, AAA would tell Delantar that she doesn’t want to go back as the client was “bastos”. Delantar would promise that it wouldn’t happen again, but it did. Only then when Mr. Hammond refused to pay Php 5,000 that they stopped visiting him.

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The second client was former Governor Jalosjos. As with the first client, Jalosjos would tell AAA that they needed the money. The second client, unlike he first, was successful on having sexual intercourse with AAA (as he was found guilty of two counts of rape and 6 counts of acts of lasciviousness in People v. Jalosjos). The RTC found Delantar guily beyond reasonable doubt when he delivered and pimped AAA to the clients and sentenced him to Reclusion Perpetua. The CA affirmed and modified the RTC’s ruling; the modification being sentencing Delantar to pay complainant [AAA] the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

ISSUE: WON the lower courts erred in sentencing Delantar to the maximum penalty of Reclusion Perpetua? RULING: The Court held YES. The penalty prescribed by Section 5 ofR.A. No. 7610isreclusion temporalin its medium period toreclusion perpetua. However, it was not proven that appellant is the parent or guardian of AAA. The establishment of either relationship would have justified the imposition of the penalty provided in the law in its maximum. In the case at bar, the only evidence presented to establish AAA's alleged relationship to appellant is her birth certificate76which mentions appellant as the father. However, said document does not bear appellant's signature. In fact, appellant, in his testimony, denied that he is AAA's father. At best, appellant is AAA'sde factoguardian. According to the maximnoscitur a sociis, the correct construction of a word or phrase susceptible of various meanings may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or with which it is associated. Section 31 (c), Article XII ofR.A. No. 7610states: (c)The penalty provided herein shall be imposed in its maximum period when the perpetrator is anascendant, parent, guardian, stepparent or collateral relative within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity,or a manager or owner of an 229

establishment which has no license to operate or its license has expired or has been revoked. It should be noted that the words with which "guardian" is associated in the provision all denote a legal relationship. From this description we may safely deduce that the guardian envisioned by law is a person who has a legal relationship with a ward. This relationship may be established either by being the ward's biological parent (natural guardian) or by adoption (legal guardian). Appellant is neither AAA's biological parent nor is he AAA's adoptive father. Clearly, appellant is not the "guardian" contemplated by law. He is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate sentence of fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day ofreclusion temporal, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day ofreclusion temporal, as maximum, and to pay a fine in the sum of P20,000.00 to be administered as a cash fund by the Department of Social Welfare and Development and disbursed for the rehabilitation of AAA,and P50,000.00 as moral damages.|||

Canet vs. Decena G.R. No. 155344 January 20, 2004 FACTS: On July 27, 1998, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula, Camarines Sur, passed Resolution No. 049 Series of 1998, authorizing petitioner Rolando N. Canet to establish, operate and maintain a co*ckpit in Sitio, Cabaya, San Roque, Bula, Camarines Sur. Canet, relying on Resolution No. 049, Series of 1998, filed an application for mayor’s permit. Mayor Julieta Decena denied the application since under the Local Government Code of 1991, the authority to give licences for such business is vested in the Sanguniang Bayan. Moreover, Mayor Decena could not issue the permit as well because there was no ordinance passed by the Sanguniang Bayan to authorize it. On July 26, 1999, Canet filed a complaint against Decena for mandamus and damages with application for preliminary mandatory injunction in RTC of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch XXXI. Decena’s move to dismiss the complaint was denied. The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued on Feb. 1, 2000.

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Decena, on the other hand, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. On April 3, 2000, the CA issued a temporary restraining order instructing Canet and the presiding judge to temporarily cease and desist from enforcing the writ of preliminary injunction issued on Feb. 1, 2000. ISSUE: Whether or not Decena, in her capacity as Municipal Mayor, can be compelled to issue the necessary business permit to petitioner absent a municipal ordinance which would empower her to do so. RULING: NO. Since there was no ordinance allowing the operation of co*ckpit, it cannot be implemented. It is a basic precept of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others, as expressed in the maxim expression unius est exlusio alterius and expressium facit cessare tacitum what is expressed puts an end to what is implied. The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by respondent Judge are ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE while the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued by the Court of Appeals on July 10, 2002 is made permanent.

Ramon M. Atienza, petitioner vs. Jose T. Villarosa, Respondent G.R. No. 161081 May 10, 2005 FACTS: On June 25, 2002, Occidental Mindoro Governor Jose VILLAROSA issued a memorandum concerning the authority to sign purchase orders of supplies, materials, equipment, and repairs needed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The memo stated that all such purchase orders must be signed by the Governor, citing as basis DILG Opinion 148, s. 1993. Occidental Mindoro Vice Governor Ramon ATIENZA responded on the bases of the DILG Opinion 96, s. 1995, as affirmed by COA Opinions of Jun. 28, Apr. 11, and 231

Feb. 9, 1994. He also cited LGC 466 and 468 as bases for the separation of the legislative and executive powers at the provincial level. On July 1, 2002, Villarosa responded by issuing a memorandum terminating the casual and job order employees recommended or hired by Atienza. These employees included 28 plus clerks, 30 utility workers, and an x-ray technician. Villarosa claims that the employees were redundant and that they bloated the bureaucracy. On July 3, 2002, Villarosa issued another memorandum regarding the “Enforcibility of previous memoranda Issued on June 20, 26 and July 1, 2002 to be adhered to for strict compliance. July 9, 2002 – Atienza raised his objections to the 2 memoranda, invoking the separation of powers at a provincial level, where the legislature is headed by the Vice Governor and the executive is headed by the Governor. Atienza thus filed a petition for prohibition before the CA, assailing the 2 memoranda as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. The petitioner claimed that the memoranda excluded him from the use and enjoyment of his office in violation of the pertinent provision of the LGC. He prayed that Villarosa be enjoined from implementing the 2 memoranda. The CA dismissed the petition for prohibition. Atienza and Villarosa’s terms have ceased on June 30, 2004. Atienza did not seek re-election, while Villarosa lost his re-election bid, so the case has become moot. ISSUE: 1. WON the vice-governor is authorized to approve purchase orders issued in connection with the procurement of supplies, materials, equipment, including fuel, repairs and maintenance of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. 2. WON the Governor has the authority to terminate or cancel the appointments of casual/job order employees of theSangguniang Panlalawiganand the Office of the Vice-Governor.. RULING: Yes. The vice-governor is authorized to approve purchase orders. 232

The doctrine of necessary implication states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed. Every statute is understood by implication to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its purpose or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction. In this case, the authority granted to the Vice-Governor to sign all warrants draw on on the provincial treasury for all expenditures appropriated for the operation of theSangguniang Panlalawiganas well as to approve disbursem*nt vouchers which includes the authority to approve purchase orders covering the same applying the doctrine of necessary implication. Hence, the Vice-Governor shall be the presiding officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and can sign all warrants drawn on the provincial treasury for all expenditures appropriated for the operation of the sangguniang panlalawigan. No. The Governor has no authority to terminate or cancel the appointments. According to Rep. Act No. 716, Sec. 465 (b), for efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the province and its inhabitants, the provincial governor shall appoint all officials and employees whose salaries and wages are wholly or mainly paid out of provincial funds and whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in this Code, as well as those he may be authorized by law to appoint. In here, the Vice-Governor, as stated in Sec. 466 of the Local Government Code where subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, appoint all officials and employees of the sangguniang panlalawigan, except those whose manner of appointment is specifically provided in this Code. Thus, while the Governor has the authority to appoint officials and employees whose salaries are paid out of the provincial funds, this does not extend to the officials and employees of theSangguniang Panlalawiganbecause such authority is lodged with the Vice-Governor. In the same manner, the authority to appoint casual and job order employees of theSangguniang Panlalawiganbelongs to the Vice-Governor.

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G.R. No. 177456 September 4, 2009 BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,Petitioner, vs. DOMINGO R. DANDO,Respondent. FACTS: The instant Petition stemmed from a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages filed on 13 March 2003 by BPI against Dando before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-281. The Complaint alleged that on or about 12 August 1994, Dando availed of a loan in the amount of ₱750,000.00 from Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC), under a Privilege Cheque Credit Line Agreement. 234

The parties agreed that Dando would pay FEBTC the principal amount of the loan, in lump sum, at the end of 90 days; and interest thereon every 30 days, the periods reckoned from the time of availment of the loan. Dando defaulted in the payment of the principal amount of the loan, as well as the interest and penalties thereon. Despite repeated demands, Dando refused and/or failed to pay his just and valid obligation.4In 2000, BPI and FEBTC merged, with the former as the surviving entity,5thus, absorbing the rights and obligations of the latter. After Dando filed with the RTC his Answer with Counterclaim,7BPI filed its Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial. Acting on the said Motion, the RTC, through Acting Presiding Judge Oscar B. Pimentel (Judge Pimentel), issued an Order8on 11 June 2003 setting Civil Case No. 03-281 for pre-trial conference on 18 August 2003. Judge Pimentel subsequently issued, on 16 June 2003, a Notice of Pre-Trial Conference,9which directed the parties to submit their respective pre-trial briefs at least three days before the scheduled date of pre-trial. Dando submitted his Pre-trial Brief10to the RTC on 11 August 2003. BPI, on the other hand, filed its Pre-trial Brief11with the RTC, and furnished Dando with a copy thereof, only on 18 August 2003, the very day of the scheduled Pre-Trial Conference. When the parties appeared before the RTC on 18 August 2003 for the scheduled Pre-Trial Conference, Dando orally moved for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 03281, citing Sections 5 and 6, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. The RTC, through an Order issued on the same day, required Dando to file a written motion within five days from the receipt of the said Order and BPI to file its comment and/or opposition thereto. On 25 August 2003, Dando filed with the RTC his written Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 03-281, for violation of the mandatory rule on filing of pre-trial briefs.13BPI filed an Opposition14to Dando’s Motion, arguing that its filing with the RTC of the Pre-Trial Brief on 18 August 2003 should be considered as compliance with the rules of procedure given that the Pre-Trial Conference did not proceed as scheduled on said date. In an Order dated 10 October 2003, the RTC granted Dando’s Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 03-281. BPI filed a Motion for Reconsideration17of the 10 October 2003 Order of the RTC, praying for the liberal interpretation of the rules. Expectedly, Dando filed his Comment/Opposition thereto. On 13 January 2004, the RTC, now presided by Judge Cesar O. Untalan (Judge Untalan), issued an Order resolving the Motion for Reconsideration of BPI as follows: 235

The Court finds merit in plaintiff’s motion. ISSUE: Whether or not that RTC Judge Untalan committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing its Order dated 13 January 2004. RULING: No. Relevant herein are the following provisions of the Rules of Court on pre-trial: Rule 18 PRE-TRIAL SEC. 6. Pre-trial brief. – The parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party, in such manner as shall ensure their receipt thereof at least three (3) days before the date of the pre-trial, their respective pre-trial briefs which shall contain, among others: xxxx Failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial. SEC. 5. Effect of failure to appear. – The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof. (Emphases ours.) It is a basic legal construction that where words of command such as "shall," "must," or "ought" are employed, they are generally and ordinarily regarded as mandatory. Thus, where, as in Rule 18, Sections 5 and 6 of the Rules of Court, the word "shall" is used, a mandatory duty is imposed, which the courts ought to enforce. The Court is fully aware that procedural rules are not to be belittled or simply disregarded for these prescribed procedures insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. However, it is equally true that litigation is not merely a game of technicalities. Law and jurisprudence grant to courts the prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, 236

mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to put an end to litigation speedily and the parties’ right to an opportunity to be heard. This is not to say that adherence to the Rules could be dispensed with. However, exigencies and situations might occasionally demand flexibility in their application. In not a few instances, the Court relaxed the rigid application of the rules of procedure to afford the parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the merit. This is in line with the time-honored principle that cases should be decided only after giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses. Technicality and procedural imperfection should, thus, not serve as basis of decisions. In that way, the ends of justice would be better served. For, indeed, the general objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to promote the administration of justice. Accordingly, the ends of justice and fairness would be best served if the parties to Civil Case No. 03-281 are given the full opportunity to thresh out the real issues and litigate their claims in a full-blown trial. Besides, Dando would not be prejudiced should the RTC proceed with the hearing of Civil Case No. 03-281, as he is not stripped of any affirmative defenses nor deprived of due process of law.

DIOKNO VS REHABILITATION FINANCE CORPORATION G.R. NO. L-4712, JULY 11, 1952 FACTS: Plaintiff, Ramon Diokno, is the holder of a back-pay certificate of indebtedness issued by the Treasurer of the Philippines under the provisions of Republic Act No. 304. When this action was brought, he had an outstanding loan with the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation amounting to P50,000, of which P47,355.28was still unpaid. 237

In this action he seeks to compel the defendant corporation to accept payment of the balance of his indebtedness with his back pay certificate. The defendant resists the suit on the ground that plaintiff's demand is not only not authorized by Section 2 of Republic Act No. 304 but contrary to the provisions thereof, and furthermore because plaintiff's loan was obtained on January 27, 1950, much after the passage of Republic Act No. 304, and because the law permits only "acceptance or discount of backpay certificates," not the repayment of loans. The courta quoheld that Section 2 of Republic Act No. 304 is permissive merely, and that even if it were mandatory, plaintiff's case cannot fall thereunder because he is not acquiring property for a home or constructing a residential house, but compelling the acceptance of his backpay certificate to pay a debt he contracted after the enactment of Republic Act No. 304. It, therefore, dismissed the complaint with costs. ISSUE: WON Diokno can use his back pay certificate to pay for his loan? RULING: No. While it is true that its ordinary signification the word "shall" is imperative, the rule is not absolute. In common or ordinary parlance, and in its ordinary signification, the term "shall" is a word of command, and one which has always or which must be given compulsory meaning; as denoting obligation. It has a preemptory meaning, and it is generally imperative or mandatory. However, it may be construed as "many", when so required by the context or by the intention of the statute. In the ordinary signification, "shall" is imperative, and not permissive, though it may have the latter meaning when required by the context. The word "shall" is generally regarded as imperative, but in some context it is given a permissive meaning, the intended meaning being determined by what is intended by the statute. In the provision subject controversy, it is to be noted that the verb-phrase "shall accept or discount" has two modifiers, namely, "subject to availability of loanable funds" and "at not more than two per centum per annum for ten years."

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As to the second modifier, the interest to be charged, there seems to be no question that the verb phrase is mandatory, because not only does the law use "at not more" but the legislative purpose and intent, to conserve the value of the backpay certificate for the benefit of the holders, for whose benefit the same have been issued, can be carried out by fixing a maximum limit for discounts. But as to when the discounting or acceptance shall be made, the context and the sense demand a contrary interpretation. The phrase "subject" means "being under the contingency of" (Webster's Int. Dict.) a condition. If the acceptance or discount of the certificates to be "subject" to the condition of the availability of a loanable funds, it is evident that the Legislature intended that the acceptance shall be allowed on the condition that there are "available loanable funds." In other words, acceptance or discount is to be permitted only if there are loanable funds. Thus, Diokno cannot use his backpay certificate to pay for his loan to RFC.

VICTORIA G. GACHON and ALEX GUEVARA,petitioners, vs. HON. NORBERTO C. DEVERA, JR., Presiding Judge, Branch XXIV, RTC, Iloilo City; HON. JOSE R. ASTORGA, Presiding Judge, Branch I, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Iloilo City; and SUSANA GUEVARA, represented by her attorney-in-fact, ROSALIE GUEVARA,respondents. 239

G.R. No. 116695 June 20, 1997

FACTS: A complaint for forcible entry was filed by private respondent Susana Guevara against Patricio Guevara and petitioners Victoria Gachon and Alex Guevara before the Municipal Trial Court for Cities of Iloilo City. Summons was served on and received by petitioners on August 25, 1993, directing them to file an answer within the reglementary period of 10 days. Patricio Guevara was abroad at that time; hence, the MTCC did not acquire jurisdiction over him. On September 4, 1993, petitioners filed with the MTCC an urgent motion for extension of time to file an answer. On September 7, 1993, the MTCC denied the motion on the ground that it was a prohibited pleading under the rule on summary procedure. On September 8, 1993, or more than 10 days from their receipt of the summons, petitioner submitted an urgent motion praying for the admission of their answer, which was attached thereto. Two days later, petitioners filed another motion pleading for the admission of an amended answer. On September 23, 1993, the MTCC denied the motions and considered the case submitted for resolution. ISSUE: WON Section 6, of the rule on summary procedure, Mandatory or directory statutes, such that an answer filed beyond the time stated be accepted RULING: Section 6, of the rule on summary procedure is a mandatory Statute, thus answers must be filed within the reglementary period. It is clear that the use of the word “shall” in the rule on summary procedure underscores the mandatory character of the challenge provisions. Giving the provisions a directory application would subvert the nature of the rule on summary procedure and defeat its objective and expediting the adjudication of suits. WHEREFORE, the petition is denied, and the assailed decision is affirmed in toto. Double costs against petitioners. 240

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., Respondents. G.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013 MENDOZA, J.: 241

FACTS: In 1994, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC - one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, curiously, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that the petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase “a representative of Congress.” It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of “Congress,” such that the absence of either divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of “a representative from Congress,” it should mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress. Respondents further argue that petitioner has no “real interest” in questioning the constitutionality of the JBC’s current composition. The respondents also question the petitioner's belated filing of the petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the action for declaratory relief is not among those within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. RULING: YES, The Constitution as the subject matter, and the validity and construction of Section 8 (1), Article VIII as the issue raised, the petition should properly be considered as that which would result in the adjudication of rights sans the execution process because the only relief to be granted is the very declaration of the rights under the document sought to be construed. It being so, the original jurisdiction over 242

the petition lies with the appropriate Regional Trial Court (RTC). Notwithstanding the fact that only questions of law are raised in the petition, an action for declaratory relief is not among those within the original jurisdiction of this Court as provided in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. UNDER THE MAXIM NOSCITUR A SOCIIS, WHERE A PARTICULAR WORD OR PHRASE IS AMBIGUOUS IN ITSELF OR IS EQUALLY SUSCEPTIBLE OF VARIOUS MEANINGS, ITS CORRECT CONSTRUCTION MAY BE MADE CLEAR AND SPECIFIC BY CONSIDERING THE COMPANY OF WORDS IN WHICH IT IS FOUNDED OR WITH WHICH IT IS ASSOCIATED.―Under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated. This is because a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases, and its meaning may, thus, be modified or restricted by the latter. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible. In short, every meaning to be given to each word or phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body of the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases and its meaning may be modified or restricted by the latter.

LOYOLA GRAND VILLAS HOMEOWNERS (SOUTH) ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HOME INSURANCE AND GUARANTY CORPORATION, EMDEN ENCARNACION and HORATIO AYCARDO, respondents. 243

Facts: Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association (LGVHA) was organized on February 8, 1983. They are the sole homeowners' association in Loyola Grand Villas, a duly registered subdivision in Quezon City and Marikina City that was owned and developed by Solid Homes, Inc. It was registered with the Home Financing Corporation, the predecessor of herein respondent HIGC, as the sole homeowners' organization in the said subdivision under Certificate of Registration No. 04-197. For unknown reasons, however, LGVHAI did not file its corporate by-laws. Sometime in 1988, the officers of the LGVHAI tried to register its by-laws. They failed to do so. To the officers' consternation, they discovered that there were two other organizations within the subdivision — the North Association and the South Association. According to private respondents, a non-resident and Soliven himself (the developer), respectively headed these associations. They also discovered that these associations had five (5) registered homeowners each who were also the incorporators, directors and officers thereof. None of the members of the LGVHAI was listed as member of the North Association while three (3) members of LGVHAI were listed as members of the South Association. In July, 1989, when Soliven inquired about the status of LGVHAI, Atty. Joaquin A. Bautista, the head of the legal department of the HIGC, informed him that LGVHAI had been automatically dissolved for two reasons. First, it did not submit its by-laws within the period required by the Corporation Code and, second, there was non-user of corporate charter because HIGC had not received any report on the association's activities. Apparently, this information resulted in the registration of the South Association with the HIGC. These developments prompted the officers of the LGVHAI to lodge a complaint with the HIGC. They questioned the revocation of LGVHAI's certificate of registration without due notice and hearing and concomitantly prayed for the cancellation of the certificates of registration of the North and South Associations by reason of the earlier issuance of a certificate of registration in favor of LGVHAI. On January 26, 1993, after due notice and hearing, private respondents obtained a favorable ruling from HIGC Hearing Officer who disposed of HIGC Case No. RRM-589 as follows:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered recognizing the Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association, Inc., as the duly registered and existing 244

homeowners association for Loyola Grand Villas homeowners. South Association appealed to the Appeals Board of the HIGC, but this was dismissed for lack of merit.

Issue: whether or not the LGVHAI's failure to file its by-laws within the period prescribed by Section 46 of the Corporation Code had the effect of automatically dissolving the said corporation. Ruling: Taken as a whole and under the principle that the best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself (optima statuli interpretatix est ipsum statutum), Section 46 aforequoted reveals the legislative intent to attach a directory, and not mandatory, meaning for the word "must" in the first sentence thereof. Note should be taken of the second paragraph of the law which allows the filing of the by-laws even prior to incorporation. This provision in the same section of the Code rules out mandatory compliance with the requirement of filing the by-laws "within one (1) month after receipt of official notice of the issuance of its certificate of incorporation by the Securities and Exchange Commission." It necessarily follows that failure to file the by-laws within that period does not imply the "demise" of the corporation. By-laws may be necessary for the "government" of the corporation but these are subordinate to the articles of incorporation as well as to the Corporation Code and related statutes.There are in fact cases where by-laws are unnecessary to corporate existence or to the valid exercise of corporate powers, thus: In the absence of charter or statutory provisions to the contrary, by-laws are not necessary either to the existence of a corporation or to the valid exercise of the powers conferred upon it, certainly in all cases where the charter sufficiently provides for the government of the body; and even where the governing statute in express terms confers upon the corporation the power to adopt by-laws, the failure to exercise the power will be ascribed to mere nonaction which will not render void any acts of the corporation which would otherwise be valid. (Emphasis supplied.) As correctly postulated by the petitioner, interpretation of this provision of law begins with the determination of the meaning and import of the word "must" in this section Ordinarily, the word "must" connotes an imperative act or operates to impose a duty which may be enforced. It is synonymous with "ought" which connotes compulsion or mandatoriness. However, the word "must" in a statute, like "shall," is not always imperative. It may be consistent with an exercise of discretion. In this jurisdiction, the tendency has been to interpret "shall" as the context or a reasonable construction of 245

the statute in which it is used demands or requires. This is equally true as regards the word "must." Thus, if the languages of a statute considered as a whole and with due regard to its nature and object reveals that the legislature intended to use the words "shall" and "must" to be directory, they should be given that meaning.

G.R. No. 98382 May 17, 1993 PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK,petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and EPIFANIO DE LA CRUZ,respondents. Facts: 246

Two lots, located at Bunlo, Bocaue, Bulacan, the second a residential-commercial building were mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank. The lots were under the common names of (Epifanio dela Cruz), his brother (Delfin) and his sister (Maria). The lots were mortgaged to guarantee the following promissory notes: (1) a promissory note for Pl2,000.00, dated September 2, 1958, and payable within 69 days (date of maturity — Nov. l0, 1958); (2) a promissory note for P4,000.00, dated September 22, 1958, and payable within 49 days (date of maturity — Nov. 10, 1958); (3) a promissory note for P4,000.00, dated June 30, 1.9581and payable within 120 days (date of maturity — Nov. 10, 1958)See alsoAnnex C of the complaint itself). This date of June 30, 1958 is disputed by the Epifanio who claims that the correct date is June 30, 1961, which is the date actually mentioned in the promissory note. The 3rd mentioned promissory note states that the maturity date isNov. 10, 1958. Now then, how could the loan have been contracted on June 30, 1961? It will be observed that in the bank records, the third mentioned promissory note was really executed on June 30, 1958 The Court is inclined to believe that the date "June 30, 1961" was amere clerical errorand hat the true and correct date is June 1958. Even assuming this, the fact still remains that the first two promissory notes had been guaranteed by the mortgage of the two lots, and therefore, it waslegalandproperto foreclose on the lots for failure to pay said two promissory notes. PNB presented under Act no 3135 a foreclosure petition of the mortgaged lots. The lots were sold or auctioned off with PNB as the highest bidder. The final Deed of Sale was registered in the Bulacan Registry of Property on March 19, 1963. Inasmuch as the plaintiff did not volunteer to buy back from the PNB the two lots, the PNB sold on June 4, 1970 the same to spouses Conrado de Vera and Marina de Vera in a "Deed of Conditional Sale". Respondent brought a complaint for the reconveyance of the lands, which the petitioner allegedly unlawfully foreclosed. The petitioner defended that all were all valid. CFI ruled the dissmisal of of the complaint. Unsatisfied, respondent appeal that the lower court erred in holding that there was a valid complaince in regard to the publication sec 3 of Act 3135Respondent court reversed the judgement appealed from by declaring void, inter alia, the acution sale 247

of the foreclosed pieces of realty, the finald deed of sale, and the consolidation of ownership. Issue: WON The required publication of the Notices of Sale on the foreclosed properties under sec 3 of Act 3135 was complied Ruling: No, The first date falls on Friday while the second and third dates are on Friday and Saturday, respectively. Sec 3 of Act 3135 requires the notice of auction sale shalle be “published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks”. Evidently, petitioner bank failed to comply with this legal requiremnet. The SC held that: The rule is that statutory provisions governing publication of notice of mortgage foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with, and that even slight deviations therefrom will invalidate the notice and render the sale at least voidable (Jalandoni vs. Ledesma, 64 Phil. l058. G.R. No. 42589, August 1937 and October 29, 1937). It has been held that failure to advertise a mortgage foreclosure sale in compliance with statutory requirements constitutes a jurisdictional defect invalidating the sale and that a substantial error or omission in a notice of sale will render the notice insufticient and vitiate the sale (59 C.J.S. 1314). In view of the admission of defendant-appellee in its pleading showing that there was no compliance of the notice prescribed in Section 3 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act 4118, with respect to the notice of sale of the foreclosed real properties in this case, we have no choice but to declare the auction sale as absolutely void in view of the fact that the highest bidder and purchaser in said auction sale was defendantappellee bank. Consequently, the Certificate of Sale, the Final Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Consolidation are likewise of no legal efffect Art 13 of the New Civil Code is completely silent as to the definition of “week”. It is interpreted as a period of time consisting of seven consecutive days. Further clarifies that where the word is used simply as a measure of duration of time and without reference to the calendar, it means a period of seven consecutive days without regard to the day of the week on which it begins (1Tolentino, supraat p. 467citing Derby). WHEREFORE, the petitions forcertiorariand intervention are hereby dismissed and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 17, 1991 is hereby affirmedin toto. 248

ANDRES BORROMEO, plaintiff, vs. FERMIN MARIANO, defendant. G.R. No. 16808 | 1921-01-03 FACTS: 249

Andres Borromeo was appointed, commissioned and took office as a Judge of the Twenty-fourth (24th) Judicial District, effective July 1, 1914. However, on February, 25, 1920, he was appointed Judge of the Twenty-first (21 st) Judicial District, while Fermin Mariano was appointed Judge of the Twenty-fourth (24th) Judicial District.After the appointments were made, Judge Borromeo consistently refused to accept appointment to the Twenty-first (21st) Judicial District. ISSUE: WHETHER Judge Borromeo may validly refuse to accept the Appointment as Judge of the Twenty-first (21st) Judicial District RULING: YES. The cardinal rule of statutory construction requires the court to give effect to the general legislative intent if that can be discovered within the four corners of the Act. When the object intended to be accomplished by the statute is once clearly ascertained, general words may be restrained to it and those of narrower import may be expanded to embrace it, to effectuate the intent. Along with this fundamental principle is another, equally well-established, that such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted, as will give effect to all provisions of the statute. (2 Lewis Sutherland, Statutory Construction, pp. 662, et seq.; In re Allen [1903], 2 Phil., 630; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 287.) The concluding portion of section 155 of the Administrative Code, although not beginning with the usual introductory word, "provided," is nevertheless, in the nature of a proviso, and should be construed as such. The office of a proviso is to limit the application of the law. It is contrary to the nature of a proviso to enlarge the operation of the law. It should not be construed so as to repeal or destroy the main provisions of the statute. Returning again to the principle of statutory construction that a proviso should not be given a meaning which would tend to render abortive the main portions of the law, it should further be recalled that judges of first instance are removable only through a fixed procedure. The effect to be given to the word "appoint" is corroborated by the principles of the law of public officers. Appointment and qualification to office are separate and distinct things. Appointment is the sole act of those vested with the power to make it. 250

Acceptance is the sole act of the appointee. Persons may be chosen for office at pleasure; there is no power in these Islands which can compel a man to accept the office. (22 R. C. L., 423.) If, therefore, anyone could refuse appointment as a judge of first instance to a particular district, when once appointment to this district is accepted, he has exactly the same right to refuse an appointment to another district. For the reasons given, we are of opinion that the reasonable force of the language used in the proviso to section 155 of the Administrative Code taken in connection with the whole of the Judiciary Law, and the accepted canons of interpretation, and the principles of the law of public officers, leave room for no other construction than that a Judge of First Instance may be made a judge of another district only with his consent. It is our holding that the plaintiff Andres Borromeo is lawfully entitled to the possession of the office of Judge of the Court of First Instance of the TwentyFourth Judicial District. It is our judgment that the defendant Fermin Mariano shall be ousted from the office of Judge of the Twenty fourth Judicial District, and the plaintiff placed in possession of the same. The motion for reconsideration filed by the Attorney-General is denied. No costs shall be allowed. Let this be entered as the order of the court. So ordered.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE N. MEDIADO G.R. No. 169871 February 2, 2011 FACTS: 251

On March 20, 1997, Jimmy was having a conversation with Rodolfo Mediado at the dancing hall located in Balatan, Camarines Sur. At that moment, his wife Lilia, witnessed accused Jose emerge from behind Jimmy and hacked him twice on the head with a bolo and continued hacking him although he had fallen to the ground.Accused fled from the scene but was eventually caught by former-kagawad Clorado and brought him to the PNP station. Lilia believed that Jose assaulted Jimmy for fear that he would report to the police authorities that he attacked one Vicente Parañal during the town fiesta two days earlier. Jose confessed killing Jimmy but claimed that he did so only to defend himself and his father from Jimmy who hit them with a stone. Accused then raised the justifying circ*mstance of self-defense. Both RTC and the CA rejected Jose’s claim of self-defense and defense of a relative and found that treachery was employed by Jose when he attacked Jimmy from behind. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: WON THE PROVISO OF SELF DEFENSE OR DEFENSE OF RELATIVES IS PRESENT IN THE CASE AT BAR RULING: No, the proviso of self-defense or defense of relatives is not present in the instant case. The RTC and the CA correctly rejected Jose’s claim of self-defense and defense of a relative because he did not substantiate it with clear and convincing proof. The requisites for the justifying circ*mstance of self-defense are as follows: (1) unlawful aggression, (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. It should be noted that unlawful aggression is the condition sine qua non for the justifying circ*mstances of self-defense and defense of a relative. In the instant case, Jose did not support his claim that Jimmy had committed aggression by punching Rodolfo and by throwing stones at him and his father. In fact, he and his father were not able to identify any weapon used by Jimmy aside 252

from the stone that he supposedly picked up from the ground. Plainly, he did not establish with clear and convincing proof that Jimmy had assaulted him or his father as to pose to either of them an imminent threat of great harm before he mounted his own attack on Jimmy. Moreover, the nature, number and gravity of Jimmy’s wounds spoke not of defense on the part of Jose but of a criminal intent to kill Jimmy. They indicated beyond doubt the treacherous manner of the assault, that is, that Jose thereby ensured that the killing would be without risk and would deny Jimmy any opportunity to defend himself.

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Apolonio G.R. No. 165483. September 12, 2006 OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner, vs. NELLIE R. APOLONIO, respondent. BRION, J.: 253

FACTS: The respondent, Executive Officer of the NBDB National Book Development Board approved the cash advance for the purchase of gift cheques, that was not authorized by the NBDB’s governing board. The Ombudsman found the respondent guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty, and ordered her removal. The CA annulled and set aside the decision of the Ombudsman. The respondent cited section 13, article 11 of the constitution and the deliberations of the constitutional commission, arguing that the Constitution only grants the Ombudsman “RECOMMENDATORY POWERS” for the removal of a public official. Furthermore, respondent claims the RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1999) which grants the Ombudsman actual powers to directly impose the penalty of removal, is unconstitutional. ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to directly impose the penalty of removal from office against public officials. RULING: The Court ruled in the affirmative and rejected the respondent’s interpretation. What is more, the Court cited the ruling in the case of Ledesma v. CA where the same interpretation was first rejected on the basis of a “PROVISO” vis-a-vis constitutional deliberations. LEDESMA RULING: The Court in the Ledesma case held that: Section 15 of RA 6770 provides for the powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman. The Court draws attention to subparagraph 3: Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties: (3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at fault or who neglect to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or 254

prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act: provided, that the refusal by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer; PROVISO: The Court notes that the proviso above qualifies the “ORDER” for the removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of an officer or employee similar to the questioned issuances in the instant case. The refusal without just cause of any officer to comply with such an order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action is a strong indication that the Ombudsman’s “RECOMMENDATION” is not merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law. CONGRESS MAY EMPOWER THE OMBUDSMAN WITH PROSECUTORIAL FUNCTIONS RA 6770 is proof that the legislature vested in the Ombudsman with prosecutorial functions, and with broad powers to enable him to implement his own actions. LEDESMA RULING IS CLEAR OF THE OMBUDSMAN’S RIGHT The conclusion in the Ledesma case is clear, that the Ombudsman has been statutorily granted the right to impose administrative penalties on erring public officials. THE WORD “RECOMMENDATORY” POWER The word “recommendatory” power in the text of Section 15 paragraph 3 of RA 6770 does not deprive the Congress of its plenary legislative power to vest the Ombudsman powers beyond those stated. TUNA PROCESSING, INC.,Petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE KINGFORD, INC.,Respondent. G.R. No. 185582 255

February 29, 2012 FACTS: On January 14, 2003, Kanemitsu Yamaoka, referred to as the “licensor” and a copatentee of various patents and 5 Philippine tuna processors referred to as the “sponsors”/”licensees”, which includes the respondent Kingford, entered into a MOA. The MOA provides that the Licensor wishes to form an alliance with Sponsors to enforce his 3 patents (US, Philippine & Indonesian), granting licenses, and collecting royalties.Parties wish to be licensed under the patents in order to practice the processes claimed in those patents, enforce the said patents and collect royalties in conjunction with the Licensor. Tuna Processors, Inc. was established in California in order to implement the objectives of the said agreement. It shall open and maintain bank accounts in the US. It shall be owned by the Sponsors and Licensor with their corresponding shares. Due to a series of events, the licensees withdrew from petitioner TPI and correspondingly reneged on their obligations.Petitioner submitted the dispute for arbitration (Breach of MOA by not paying past due assessments, failing to cooperate with Claimant TPI in fulfilling objectives of the MOA and violation of “The Lanham Act”) before the International Centre for Dispute Resolution in the State of California, US and won the case against respondent. To enforce the award, petitioner filed a Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award before the RTC of Makati.Respondent Kingford filed a Motion to Dismiss. After the court denied it for lack of merit, respondent sought for inhibition of Judge Almeda and moved for the reconsideration of the order denying the motion. Judge Almeda inhibited himself. The case was again re-raffled to Branch 61 where Judge Ruiz granted the respondent's motion and dismissed the petition on the ground that the petitioner lacked legal capacity to sue in the Philippines. Petitioner now seeks to nullify the order of the trial court dismissing its Petition.

ISSUE: WON a foreign arbitral award can be enforced even if the corporation is not licensed to do business in the Philippines.

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RULING: YES. The foreign arbitral award can be enforced. Applying the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 in this case where the Act, as its title - An Act to Institutionalize the Use of an Alternative Dispute Resolution System in the Philippines and to Establish the Office for Alternative Dispute Resolution, and for Other Purposes - would suggest, is a law especially enacted "to actively promote party autonomy in the resolution of disputes or the freedom of the party to make their own arrangements to resolve their disputes." It specifically provides exclusive grounds available to the party opposing an application for recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award. (Title forms part of a statute and may be used to construe it) Also, SEC. 45. Rejection of a Foreign Arbitral Award. - A party to a foreign arbitration proceeding may oppose an application for recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award in accordance with the procedural rules to be promulgated by the Supreme Court only on those grounds enumerated under Article V of the New York Convention. Any other ground raised shall be disregarded by the regional trial court. Not one of these exclusive grounds touched on the capacity to sue of the party seeking the recognition and enforcement of the award. Also, Rule 13.1 of the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution provides that "any party to a foreign arbitration may petition the court to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award.” All considered, petitioner TPI, although a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines, is not, for that reason alone, precluded from filing the Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award before a Philippine court.

G.R. No. 194024 April 25, 2012 PHILIP L. GO, PACIFICO Q. LIM and ANDREW Q. LIMPetitioners, vs. DISTINCTION PROPERTIES DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION, INC.Respondent. 257

Facts: Philip L. Go, Pacifico Q. Lim and Andrew Q. Lim (petitioners) are registered individual owners of condominium units in Phoenix Heights Condominium located at H. Javier/Canley Road, Bo. Bagong Ilog, Pasig City, Metro Manila. In August 2008, petitioners, as condominium unit-owners, filed a complaint before the HLURB against DPDCI(Distinction Properties Development and Construction, Inc.) for unsound business practices and violation of the MDDR. The case was docketed as REM- 080508-13906. They alleged that DPDCI committed misrepresentation in their circulated flyers and brochures as to the facilities or amenities that would be available in the condominium and failed to perform its obligation to comply with the MDDR. In defense, DPDCI denied that it had breached its promises and representations to the public concerning the facilities in the condominium. It alleged that the brochure attached to the complaint was “a mere preparatory draft” and not the official one actually distributed to the public, and that the said brochure contained a disclaimer as to the binding effect of the supposed offers therein. Also, DPDCI questioned the petitioners’ personality to sue as the action was a derivative suit. After due hearing, the HLURB rendered its decision in favor of petitioners. The CA ruled that the HLURB(Housing and land use regulatory board) had no jurisdiction over the complaint filed by petitioners as the controversy did not fall within the scope of the administrative agency’s authority under P.D. No. 957. The HLURB not only relied heavily on the brochures which, according to the CA, did not set out an enforceable obligation on the part of DPDCI, but also erroneously cited Section 13 of the MDDR to support its finding of contractual violation. ISSUE: Whether or not the HLURB has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by petitioners. RULING: The petition fails. In this case, the complaint filed by petitioners alleged causes of action that apparently are not cognizable by the HLURB considering the nature of the action and the reliefs sought. A perusal of the complaint discloses that petitioners are actually seeking to nullify and invalidate the duly constituted acts of PHCC – the April 29, 2005 Agreement entered into by PHCC with DPDCI and its Board Resolution28 which authorized the acceptance of the proposed offsetting/settlement of DPDCI’s 258

indebtedness and approval of the conversion of certain units from saleable to common areas. All these were approved by the HLURB. Generally, the extent to which an administrative agency may exercise its powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency. With respect to the HLURB, to determine if said agency has jurisdiction over petitioners’ cause of action, an examination of the laws defining the HLURB’s jurisdiction and authority becomes imperative. P.D. No. 957, specifically Section 3, granted the National Housing Authority (NHA) the “exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business.” Then came P.D. No. 1344 expanding the jurisdiction of the NHA (now HLURB), as follows: “SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature: (a) Unsound real estate business practices; (b) Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and (c) Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.” This provision must be read in light of the law’s preamble, which explains the reasons for enactment of the law or the contextual basis for its interpretation. Statute derives its vitality from the purpose for which it is enacted, and to construe it in a manner that disregards or defeats such purpose is to nullify or destroy the law. P.D. No. 957, as amended, aims to protect innocent subdivision lot and condominium unit buyers against fraudulent real estate practices. The HLURB is given a wide latitude in characterizing or categorizing acts which may constitute unsound business practice or breach of contractual obligations in the real estate trade. This grant of expansive jurisdiction to the HLURB does not mean, however, that all cases involving subdivision lots or condominium units automatically fall under its jurisdiction.

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PEOPLE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and ROLANDO PLAZA G.R. No. 169004 September 15, 2010

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FACTS: On or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at Toledo City, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused ROLANDO PLAZA, a high-ranking public officer, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, and committing the offense, in relation to office, having obtained cash advances from the City Government of Toledo in the total amount of THIRTY THREE THOUSAND PESOS (₱33,000.00), Philippine Currency, which he received by reason of his office, for which he is duly bound to liquidate the same within the period required by law, with deliberate intent and intent to gain, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to liquidate said cash advances of ₱33,000.00, Philippine Currency, despite demands to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount. Thereafter, respondent Plaza filed a Motion to Dismiss dated April 7, 2005 with the Sandiganbayan, to which the latter issued an Order dated April 12, 2005 directing petitioner to submit its comment. Petitioner filed its Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss on April 19, 2005. Eventually, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its Resolution on July 20, 2005 dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice to its filing before the proper court.Thus, the present petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines RULING: This Court has already resolved the above issue in the affirmative. People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante is a case with uncanny similarities to the present one. In fact, the respondent in the earlier case, Victoria Amante and herein respondent Plaza were both members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu at the time pertinent to this case. The only difference is that, respondent Amante failed to liquidate the amount of Seventy-One Thousand Ninety-Five Pesos (₱71,095.00) while respondent Plaza failed to liquidate the amount of Thirty-Three Thousand Pesos (₱33,000.00). In ruling that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and charged with violation of The 261

Auditing Code of the Philippines, this Court cited the case of Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al. as a background on the conferment of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, thus: x x x The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people. The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense. The exception contained in R. A. 7975, as well as R. A. 8249, where it expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of R. A. No. 3019, as amended, R. A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable in the present case as the offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines. The last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of the said two provisions states: Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: x x x. Like in the earlier case, the present case definitely falls under Section 4 (b) where other offenses and felonies committed by public officials or employees in relation to their office are involved where the said provision, contains no exception. Therefore, what applies in the present case is the general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense. The 262

present case having been instituted on March 25, 2004, the provisions of R.A. 8249 shall govern. Again, the earlier case interpreted the above provisions, thus: The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4 (a), the following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter must be committed by, among others, officials of the executive branch occupying positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus enumerated by the same law. Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial governors, vice-govenors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position as consul and higher; Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. In connection therewith, Section 4 (b) of the same law provides that other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, as decided in the earlier case and by simple application of the pertinent provisions of the law, respondent Plaza, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod during the alleged commission of an offense in relation to his office, necessarily falls within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

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November 16, 1918 G.R. No. L-12767

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In the matter of the estate of EMIL H. JOHNSON. EBBA INGEBORG JOHNSON,applicant-appellant, Vs. Hartigan & Welch for applicant and appellant. Hartford Beaumont for Victor Johnson and others as appellees. Chas. E. Tenney for Alejandra Ibañez de Johnson, personally and as guardian,and for Simeona Ibañez, appellees. FACTS: Emil H. Johnson (Johnson - testator), a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the State of Illinois, United States, died in the city of Manila. Johnson left a will by which he disposed of his estate (The will was written in an holographic instrument, written in the testator's own handwriting) Prior to his death Johnson was married to Rosalie Ackeson (Rosalie) they had a daughter named EBBA INGEBORG JOHNSON (Ebba). Johnson later embarked for the Philippine Islands as a soldier in the Army of the United States and continued to live in the Philippine Island even after his military discharge. As a result Rosalie filed for a decree of divorced from him in Cook County Illinois. While Johnson was in the Philippines he had marital relations with Alejandra Ibañez, by whom he had three children: Mercedes, Encarnacion and Victor. Johnson also had two other children: Eleonor and Alberto to a certain Simeona Ibanez. Johnson’s will were to be disposed as follow: 100 shares of the corporate stock in the Johnson-Pickett Rope Company to be given to his brother Victor; to his father and mother in Sweden, the sum of P20,000; to his daughter Ebba Ingeborg, the sum of P5,000; to his wife, Alejandra Ibañez, the sum of P75 per month, if she remains single; to Simeona Ibañez, spinster, P65 per month, if she remains single. The rest of the property is left to the testator's five children — Mercedes, Encarnacion, Victor, Eleonor and Alberto. The Court of First Instance of the city of Manila granted the probate of this will, on the ground that Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of the State of Illinois, United States of America; that the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of that State; and hence could properly be probated here pursuant to section 265

636 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (Excerpt on the provision: “Will made here by alien. — A will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own state or country, may be proved, allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of these Islands.”) Ebba, filed a petition to annul the decree of probate of will to put the estate to intestate administration making her the sole legitimate heir of his father in accordance to Philippine proceedings. Ebba’s petition were grounded on the following: (1) Emil H. Johnson was a resident of the city of Manila and not a resident of the State of Illinois at the time the will in question was executed; (2) The will is invalid and inadequate to pass real and personal property in the State of Illinois; (3) The order admitting the will to probate was made without notice to the petitioner; and (4) The order in question was beyond the jurisdiction of the court. ISSUE: Whether or not the order of probate can be set aside on the ground that the testator was not a resident of the State of Illinois but a resident of Manila? RULING: No, section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure stated that a will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own state or country, may be proved, allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of these Islands. As in the case, the court found that the testator (Johnson) was a citizen of State of Illinois therefore the intrinsic validity of the provisions of this will must be determined by the law of Illinois to which he is a citizen. The court ruled that the legal and testamentary successions, with regard to the order of succession, as well as to the amount of the successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the laws of the nation of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property and the country where it may be 266

situated. Therefore, the probate of the will of the testator is valid and should not be set aside.

DE VILLA VS CA 267

G.R. No. 87416

FACTS: On October 5, 1987, petitioner Cecilio S. de Villa was charged before the Regional Trial Court with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. That on or about the 3rd day of April 1987, in the municipality of Makati, Metro Manila accused, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to ROBERTO Z. LORAYEZ, to apply on account or for value a Depositors Trust Company Check No. 3371 antedated March 31, 1987, payable to herein complainant in the total amount of U.S. $2,500.00 equivalent to P50,000.00. The accused knew that at the time of issue he had no sufficient funds in or credit with drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment which check when presented to the drawee bank within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was subsequently dishonored for the reason "INSUFFICIENT FUNDS" and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor said accused failed to pay said ROBERTO Z. LORAYEZ the amount of P50,000.00 of said check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice. Petitioner moved to dismiss the Information on the following grounds: (a) Respondent court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (b) That no offense was committed since the check involved was payable in dollars, hence, the obligation created is null and void pursuant to Republic Act No. 529 (An Act to Assure Uniform Value of Philippine Coin and Currency). Makati RTC Judge cited in its decision that the Bouncing Checks Law is applicable to checks drawn against current accounts in foreign currency. A petition for certiorari was filed wherein he contended:

That since the questioned check was drawn against the dollar account of petitioner with a foreign bank, respondent court has no jurisdiction over the same or with accounts outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 could have not contemplated extending its coverage over dollar accounts; 268

That assuming that the subject check was issued in connection with a private transaction between petitioner and private respondent, the payment could not be legally paid in dollars as it would violate Republic Act No. 529; and That the obligation arising from the issuance of the questioned check is null and void and is not enforceable with the Philippines either in a civil or criminal suit. Upon such premises, petitioner concludes that the dishonor of the questioned check cannot be said to have violated the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. ISSUE: WON THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE. WON THE CHECK IN QUESTION, DRAWN AGAINST THE DOLLAR ACCOUNT OF PETITIONER WITH A FOREIGN BANK, IS COVERED BY THE BOUNCING CHECKS LAW (B.P. Blg. 22). RULING: Yes. The trial court's jurisdiction over the case, subject of this review, can not be questioned. Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice, that is, for hearing and deciding cases. Jurisdiction in general, is either over the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over the person of the defendant, or over the issues framed in the pleadings. Sections 10 and 15(a), Rule 110 of the Rules of Court specifically provide that: Sec. 10. Place of the commission of the offense. The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood therefrom that the offense was committed or some of the essential ingredients thereof occured at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place wherein it was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense or is necessary for identifying the offense charged. Sec. 15. Place where action is to be instituted. (a) Subject to existing laws, in all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or any of the essential ingredients thereof took place. The information under consideration specifically alleged that the offense was committed in Makati, Metro Manila and therefore, the same is controlling and 269

sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or information in court which initiates a criminal action. Moreover, it has been held in the case of Que v. People of the Philippines (154 SCRA 160 [1987] cited in the case of People vs. Grospe, 157 SCRA 154 [1988]) that "the determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check."

It will be noted that the law does not distinguish the currency involved in the case. As the trial court correctly ruled in its order dated July 5, 1988: Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks, provided they are either drawn and issued in the Philippines though payable outside thereof . . . are within the coverage of said law. It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish courts should not distinguish. Parenthetically, the rule is that where the law does not make any exception, courts may not except something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it. Thus, where there is doubts as to what a provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative deliberation or discussion on the bill may be adopted. The records of the Batasan, Vol. III, unmistakably show that the intention of the lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever currency may be the subject thereof.

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Gonzales III vs. Office of the President of the Philippines G.R. No. 196231-196232 September 4, 2012 EMILIO A. GONZALES III, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OFTHE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES PERLAS-BERNABE, J. : FACTS: FORMAL CHARGE AGAINST ROLANDO MENDOZA In 2008, a formal charge for Grave Misconduct against Manila Police District Senior Inspector (P/S Insp.) Rolando Mendoza, and four others. They were found guilty of Grave Misconduct approved by the Ombudsman. They were dismissed from service. HOSTAGE TAKER A FORMER POLICE OFFICER In an attempt to secure his reinstatement in the police force and to restore the benefits service, Former Police Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza hijacked a bus and held hostage some of the passengers. However, he was shot dead by a sniper at past 9 p.m. AFTERMATH: OMBUDSMAN FOUND TO BE NEGLIGENT After the incident, the IIRC found that Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable negligence and gross violation of their own rules of procedure by his prolonged inaction which precipitated the desperate resort of Rolando Mendoza to hostage-taking. SERIOUS DISREGARD OF DUE PROCESS In addition, Ombudsman Gutierrez and Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious disregard of due process, manifest injustice, and oppression in failing to provisionally suspend the further implementation of the judgment of dismissal against Mendoza pending disposition of his unresolved motion for reconsideration. CONSOLIDATED PETITIONS These petitions raise issues relating to the President’s exercise of the power to remove from office herein petitioners who belong to the Office of the Ombudsman. DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN DISMISSED

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The Office of the President finds Deputy Ombudsman Emilio A. Gonzales III guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of public trust and hereby meted out the penalty of DISMISSAL from service. G.R. No. 196231, is a Petition for Certiorari which assails on jurisdictional grounds the Decision rendered by the Office of the President dismissing petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III, Deputy Ombudsman.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor.

RULING: YES, the Congress intended the Office of the President and the Ombudsman to exercise concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. CONGRESS INTENDED THE OP TO EXERCISE DISCIPLINARY JURISDICTION Congress had intended the Ombudsman and the President to exercise concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, respectively. This sharing of authority goes into the wisdom of the legislature, which prerogative falls beyond the pale of judicial inquiry. CONGRESSIONAL DELIBERATIONS The Congressional deliberations on this matter are quite insightful, viz.: Senator Angara explained that the phrase was added to highlight the fact that the Deputy Tanodbayan may only be removed for cause and after due process. He added that the President alone has the power to remove the Deputy Tanodbayan. Reacting thereto, Senator Guingona observed that this might impair the independence of the Tanodbayan and suggested that the procedural removal of the Deputy Tanodbayan...; and that he can be removed not by the President but by the Ombudsman.

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However, the Chair expressed apprehension that the Ombudsman and the Deputy Ombudsman may try to protect one another. The Chair suggested the substitution of the phrase “after due process” with the words after due notice and hearing with the President as the ultimate authority. Senator Guingona contended, however, that the Constitution provides for an independent Office of the [T]anodbayan[,] and to allow the Executive to have disciplinary powers over the Tanodbayan Deputies would be an encroachment on the independence of the Tanodbayan. Replying thereto, Senator Angara stated that originally, he was not averse to the proposal, however, considering the Chair’s observation that vesting such authority upon the Tanodbayan itself could result in mutual protection, it is necessary that an outside official should be vested with such authority to effect a check and balance.

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SAMAR II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (SAMELCO II), et. al., v. SELUDO, JR. G.R. No. 173840 April 25, 2012 FACTS: As members of the Board of Directors (BOD) of the petitioner Samar II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (SAMELCO II), an electric cooperative providing electric service to all members-consumers in all municipalities within the Second Congressional District of the Province of Samar, individual petitioners passed Resolution No. 5 [Series] of 2005 on January 22, 2005. The said resolution disallowed the private respondent to attend succeeding meetings of the BOD effective February 2005 until the end of his term as director. The same resolution also disqualified him for one (1) term to run as a candidate for director in the upcoming district elections. Convinced that his rights as a director of petitioner SAMELCO II had been curtailed by the subject board resolution, private respondent filed an Urgent Petition for Prohibition against petitioner SAMELCO II, impleading individual petitioners as directors thereof, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Calbiga, Samar. In their answer to the petition for prohibition, individual petitioners raised the affirmative defense of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the case. Individual petitioners assert that, since the matter involved an electric cooperative, SAMELCO II, primary jurisdiction is vested on the National Electrification Administration (NEA). The RTC granted the petition and sustained the jurisdiction of the court over the petition for prohibition and barred the petitioners and/or their representatives from enforcing Resolution No. 5 [Series] of 2005.Thereafter, the CA affirms the RTC’s decision. Hence, this case elevated before the Supreme Court. 274

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA was correct in affirming the RTC’s decision in which the latter ruled that it has the primary jurisdiction over the question of the validity of the Board Resolution issued by SAMELCO II? RULING: No. The Court held that the CA was not correct. Section 10, Chapter II of P.D. No. 269, as amended by Section 5 of P.D. No. 1645, provides: Section 10. Enforcement Powers and Remedies. − In the exercise of its power of supervision and control over electric cooperatives and other borrower, supervised or controlled entities, the NEA is empowered to issue orders, rules and regulations and motu proprio or upon petition of third parties, to conduct investigations, referenda and other similar actions in all matters affecting said electric cooperatives and other borrower, or supervised or controlled entities. In addition, Subsection (a), Section 24, Chapter III of P.D. No. 269, as amended by Section 7 of P.D. No. 1645, states: Section 24. Board of Directors. − (a) The Management of a Cooperative shall be vested in its Board, subject to the supervision and control of NEA which shall have the right to be represented and to participate in all Board meetings and deliberations and to approve all policies and resolutions. A comparison of the original provisions of Sections 10 and 24 of P.D. No. 269 and the amendatory provisions under Sections 5 and 7 of P.D. No. 1645 would readily show that the intention of the framers of the amendatory law is to broaden the powers of the NEA. A clear proof of such expanded powers is that, unlike P.D. No. 269, P.D. No. 1645 expressly provides for the authority of the NEA to exercise supervision and control over electric cooperatives. Certainly, the matter as to the validity of the resolution issued by the Board of Directors of SAMELCO II, which practically removed respondent from his position as a member of the Board of Directors and further disqualified him to run as such in the ensuing election, is a matter which affects the said electric cooperative and, thus, 275

comes within the ambit of the powers of the NEA as expressed in Sections 5 and 7 of P.D. No. 1645. In this regard, the Court agrees with petitioners' argument that to sustain the petition for prohibition filed by respondent with the RTC would constitute an unnecessary intrusion into the NEA's power of supervision and control over electric cooperatives. Therefore, the Court held that the NEA, in the exercise of its power of supervision and control, has primary jurisdiction to determine the issue of the validity of the subject resolution.

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CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,respondent. G.R. No. 83892 February 22, 1991 FACTS: Petitioners: Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83896 and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83815. Both petitions were consolidated and are being resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of EO No. 284 issued by President Corazon Aquino on July 25, 1987.

EO No. 284, according to the petitioners allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other than government offices or position in addition to their primary positions. The pertinent provisions of EO 284 are as follows: Sec 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may in addition to his primary position, hold not more than 2 positions in the government and government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation thereof. Sec 2: If they hold more positions more than what is required in section 1, they must relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than two positions other than his primary positions. Sec 3: At least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a secretary or undersecretary, or assistant secretary. 277

The petitioners are challenging EO 284’s constitutionality because it adds exemptions to Section 13 of Article VII other than those provided in the constitution. According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in the government are those provided in the constitution namely: 1. The Vice President may be appointed as members of the cabinet under Section 3 par. 2 of Article VII. 2. The Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 of Article VIII ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional. RULING: Yes. In light of the construction given to Sec 13 of Article VII, EO No. 284 is unconstitutional. By restricting the number of positions that Cabinet Members, undersecretaries and assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than two positions in the government and government corporations, EO No. 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13 of Article 7 of the 1987 constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 constitution itself. The phrase “unless otherwise provided in this constitution” must be given literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the constitution itself: Sec 3 Art. VII and Sec 8 Art VIII.

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Ursua vs. CA G.R. No. 112170 April 10, 1996 Facts: Cesario Ursua was a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer assigned in Kidapawan, Cotabato. A complaint initiated by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cotabato through a resolution advising the Governor to report the involvement of petitioner and others in the illegal cutting of mahogany trees and hauling of illegally-cut logs in the area. Atty. Palmones, counsel for petitioner, wrote the Office of the Ombudsman requesting that he be furnished copy of the complaint against petitioner. Atty. Palmones then asked his client Ursua to take his letter-request to the Office of the Ombudsman because his law firm's messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend to some personal matters. Before proceeding to the Office of the Ombudsman petitioner talked to Oscar Perez and told him that he was reluctant to personally ask for the document since he was one of the respondents before the Ombudsman. However, Perez advised him not to worry as he could just sign his (Perez) name if ever he would be required to acknowledge receipt of the complaint. When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman he was instructed by the security officer to register in the visitors' logbook. Instead of writing down his name petitioner wrote the name "Oscar Perez" after which he was told to proceed to the Administrative Division for the copy of the complaint he needed. He handed the letter of Atty. Palmones to the Chief of the Administrative Division, Ms. Loida Kahulugan, who then gave him a copy of the complaint, receipt of which he acknowledged by writing the name "Oscar Perez. 279

When Loida learned that the person who introduced himself as "Oscar Perez" was actually petitioner Cesario Ursua, a customer of Josefa Amparo. Loida reported the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be accordingly charged. The trial court found him guilty of violating Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085.The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner. Petitioner now comes for review of his conviction as he reasserts his innocence. He contends that he has not violated C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 as he never used anyaliasname; neither is "Oscar Perez" hisalias. Analias, according to him, is a term which connotes the habitual use of another name by which a person is also known. He claims that he has never been known as "Oscar Perez" and that he only used such name on one occasion and it was with the express consent of Oscar Perez himself. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner violates Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085. Ruling: No, aliasis a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A man's name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known asaliases. Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as "Oscar Perez," which was the name of the messenger of his lawyer. He did so while merely serving the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which petitioner was a respondent. There is no question then that "Oscar Perez" is not analiasname of petitioner. There is no evidence showing that he had used or was intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his real name. The use of the name "Oscar Perez" was made by petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally required to expose his real identity. For, even if he 280

had identified himself properly at the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to get a copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the Ombudsman could not refuse him because the complaint was part of public records hence open to inspection and examination by anyone under the proper circ*mstances.

A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC October 15, 2010 IN THE MATTER OF THE CHARGES OF PLAGIARISM, ETC., AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO. FACTS: Petitioners Isabelita C. Vinuya and about 70 other elderly women filed with the Court a special civil action ofcertiorariagainst the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of Justice, and the Office of the Solicitor General. They claimed that the Japanese army systematically raped them and a number of other women, seizing them and holding them in houses or cells where soldiers repeatedly ravished and abused them. On April 28, 2010, the Court dismissed petitioners’ action. Justice Mariano C. del Castillo wrote the decision who essentially gave two reasons for its decision: it cannot grant the petition because,first, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative under the Constitution and the law to determine whether to espouse petitioners’ claim against Japan; and,second, the Philippines is not under any obligation in international law to espouse their claims. On July 19, 2010, petitioners filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration which counsel for petitioners, Atty. Herminio Harry Roque, Jr., announced in his online blog "detailing plagiarism committed by the court" under the second reason it gave for dismissing the petition and that "these stolen passages were also twisted to support the court’s erroneous conclusions that the Filipino comfort women of World War Two have no further legal remedies." It accused Justice Del Castillo of "manifest intellectual theft and outright plagiarism”.

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Justice Del Castillo then circulated a letter to his colleagues stating that when he wrote the decision for the Court he had the intent to attribute all sources used in it. On August 26, 2010, the Committee heard the parties’ submissions in the summary manner of administrative investigations. Counsels for Justice Del Castillo requested the Committee to hear the Justice’s court researcher to explain the research work that went into the making of the decision in theVinuyacase. The researcher demonstrated how the attribution of the lifted passages to the writings of Criddle-Descent and Ellis, found in the beginning drafts of her report to Justice Del Castillo, were unintentionally deleted. She expressed remorse at her "grievous mistake" and grief for having "caused an enormous amount of suffering for Justice Del Castillo and his family." On the other hand, counsel for petitioners insisted that lack of intent is not a defense in plagiarism since all that is required is for a writer to acknowledge that certain words or language in his work were taken from another’s work.

ISSUE: Whether or not, in writing the opinion for the Court in the Vinuya case, Justice Del Castillo plagiarized the published works of authors Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis. RULINGS: NO. To plagiarize, says Webster, is "to steal and pass off as one’s own" the ideas or words of another. Stealing implies malicious taking. Black’s Law Dictionary defines plagiarism as the "deliberate and knowing presentation of another person's original ideas or creative expressions as one’s own." In this case, while it is true that Justice Del Castillo failed to attribute to the foreign authors materials that he lifted from their works and used in writing the decision for the Court in the Vinuya case, but the evidence as found by its Ethics Committee shows that the attribution to these authors appeared in the beginning drafts of the decision. Unfortunately, as testified to by the court-employed researcher, she accidentally deleted the same at the time she was cleaning up the final draft. The Court believed her since, among other reasons, she had no motive for omitting the attribution. Notably, although the ponencia of Justice Del Castillo accidentally deleted the attribution to them, there remained in the final draft of the decision attributions of the same passages to the earlier writings from which those authors 282

borrowed their ideas in the first place. In short, with the remaining attributions after the erroneous clean-up, the passages as it finally appeared in the Vinuya decision still showed on their face that the lifted ideas did not belong to Justice Del Castillo but to others. He did not pass them off as his own. Furthermore, there is a basic reason for individual judges of whatever level of courts, including the Supreme Court, not to use original or unique language when reinstating the laws involved in the cases they decide. Their duty is to apply the laws as these are written. But laws include, under the doctrine of stare decisis, judicial interpretations of such laws as are applied to specific situations. Under this doctrine, Courts are "to stand by precedent and not to disturb settled point." Once the Court has "laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the same; regardless of whether the parties or property are the same." And because judicial precedents are not always clearly delineated, they are quite often entangled in apparent inconsistencies or even in contradictions, prompting experts in the law to build up a large body of commentaries or annotations that often become part of legal writings upon which lawyers and judges draw materials for their theories or solutions in particular cases. And, because of the need to be precise and correct, judges and practitioners alike usually lift passages from such precedents and writings, at times omitting, without malicious intent, attributions to the originators. If the Court were to inquire into the issue of plagiarism respecting its past decisions from the time of Chief Justice Cayetano S. Arellano to the present, it is likely to discover that it has not on occasion acknowledged the originators of passages and views found in its decisions. These omissions are true for many of the decisions that have been penned and are being penned daily by magistrates from the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts nationwide and with them, the municipal trial courts and other first level courts. Never in the judiciary’s more than 100 years of history has the lack of attribution been regarded and demeaned as plagiarism.

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PELIZLOY REALTY CORPORATION, represented herein by its President, GREGORY K. LOY,Petitioner, vs. THE PROVINCE OF BENGUET,Respondent. FACTS: Petitioner Pelizloy Realty Corporation ("Pelizloy") owns Palm Grove Resort, which is designed for recreation and which has facilities like swimming pools, a spa and function halls. It is located at Asin, Angalisan, Municipality of Tuba, Province of Benguet. Provincial Board of the Province of Benguet approved Provincial Tax Ordinance No. 05-107, otherwise known as the Benguet Revenue Code of 2005 ("Tax Ordinance"). Section 59, Article X of the Tax Ordinance levied a ten percent (10%) amusem*nt tax on gross receipts from admissions to "resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots." It was Pelizloy's position that the Tax Ordinance's imposition of a 10% amusem*nt tax on gross receipts from admission fees for resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots is an ultra vires act on the part of the Province of Benguet. Thus, it filed an appeal/petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunction before RTC Benguet. Respondent argued that provinces can validly impose amusem*nt taxes on resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots – these being “amusem*nt places.” RTC ruled in favor if the respondent.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent can impose amusem*nt taxes on admission fees to resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots for being “amusem*nt places” under the LGC. RULING No, they cannot impose amusem*nt taxes. Section 140 of the LGC provides: SECTION 140. Amusem*nt Tax - (a) The province may levy an amusem*nt tax to be collected from the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other places of amusem*nt at a rate of not more than thirty percent (30%) of the gross receipts from admission fees. (b) In the case of theaters of cinemas, the tax shall first be deducted and withheld by their proprietors, lessees, or operators and paid to the provincial treasurer before the gross receipts are divided between said proprietors, lessees, or operators and the distributors of the cinematographic films. (c) The holding of operas, concerts, dramas, recitals, painting and art exhibitions, flower shows, musical programs, literary and oratorical presentations, except pop, rock, or similar concerts shall be exempt from the payment of the tax herein imposed. (d) The Sangguniang Panlalawigan may prescribe the time, manner, terms and conditions for the payment of tax. In case of fraud or failure to pay the tax, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan may impose such surcharges, interests and penalties. (e) The proceeds from the amusem*nt tax shall be shared equally by the province and the municipality where such amusem*nt places are located. [Underscoring supplied] Evidently, Section 140 of the LGC carves a clear exception to the general rule in Section 133 (i). Section 140 expressly allows for the imposition by provinces of amusem*nt taxes on "the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other places of amusem*nt." However, resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots are not among those places expressly mentioned by Section 140 of the LGC as being subject to amusem*nt taxes. Thus, the determination of whether amusem*nt taxes may be levied on admissions to resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, 285

and tourist spots hinges on whether the phrase ‘other places of amusem*nt’ encompasses resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots.

Under the principle of ejusdem generis, "where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class or where the latter follow the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be restricted to persons, things or cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned."17

The purpose and rationale of the principle was explained by the Court in National Power Corporation v. Angas18as follows: The purpose of the rule on ejusdem generis is to give effect to both the particular and general words, by treating the particular words as indicating the class and the general words as including all that is embraced in said class, although not specifically named by the particular words. This is justified on the ground that if the lawmaking body intended the general terms to be used in their unrestricted sense, it would have not made an enumeration of particular subjects but would have used only general terms. [2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd ed., pp. 395-400].19 In the present case, the Court need not embark on a laborious effort at statutory construction. Section 131 (c) of the LGC already provides a clear definition of ‘amusem*nt places’: Section 131. Definition of Terms. - When used in this Title, the term: xxx (c) "Amusem*nt Places" include theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses and other places of amusem*nt where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances [Underscoring supplied] Indeed, theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, and boxing stadia are bound by a common typifying characteristic in that they are all venues primarily for the staging of spectacles or the holding of public shows, exhibitions, performances, and other events meant to be viewed by an audience. Accordingly, ‘other places of amusem*nt’ must be interpreted in light of the typifying characteristic of being venues "where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances" or being venues primarily used to stage spectacles or hold

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public shows, exhibitions, performances, and other events meant to be viewed by an audience. As defined in The New Oxford American Dictionary,22‘show’ means "a spectacle or display of something, typically an impressive one";23while ‘performance’ means "an act of staging or presenting a play, a concert, or other form of entertainment."24As such, the ordinary definitions of the words ‘show’ and ‘performance’ denote not only visual engagement (i.e., the seeing or viewing of things) but also active doing (e.g., displaying, staging or presenting) such that actions are manifested to, and (correspondingly) perceived by an audience. Considering these, it is clear that resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots cannot be considered venues primarily "where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances". While it is true that they may be venues where people are visually engaged, they are not primarily venues for their proprietors or operators to actively display, stage or present shows and/or performances. Thus, resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots do not belong to the same category or class as theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, and boxing stadia. It follows that they cannot be considered as among the ‘other places of amusem*nt’ contemplated by Section 140 of the LGC and which may properly be subject to amusem*nt taxes.

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JOSE R. MORENO, JR., Petitioner, vs. Private Management Office (formerly, ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST), Respondent G.R. No. 159373 November 16, 2006 FACTS: Jose R. Moreno Jr. is the owner of the Ground Floor, the 7th Floor and the Penthouse of the J. Moreno Building and the lot on which it stands. On the other hand, Private Management Office (PMO) is the owner of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th floors of the same building. PMO called for a conference discussing Moreno’s right of first refusal over the floors of the building owned by the former. They informed Moreno of the proposed purchase price of TWENTY-ONE MILLION PESOS for the said floors. PMO informed Moreno thru Atty. Jose Feria, Jr., that the Board of Trustees (BOT) of APT "is in agreement that Mr. Jose Moreno, Jr. has the right of first refusal" and requested Moreno to deposit 10% of the "suggested indicative price" of ₱21.0 million on or before February 26, 1993. Moreno then paid the ₱2.1 million and was given a copy of the Official Receipt issued by defendant.

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PMO wrote to Moreno that its Legal Department has questioned the basis for the computation of the indicative price for the said floors and that the APT BOT has later tentatively agreed on a settlement price of ₱42,274,702.17. This led to the complaint of whether there was a perfected contract of sale over the said floors for the amount of ₱21.0 million, and whether PMO is bound by the price of ₱21.0 million. The RTC ruled in favor of Moreno. PMO filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. They elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. On the other hand, Moreno filed for a motion to dismiss which was granted by the appellate court. This led to PMO’s petition for review on certiorari to reverse the dismissal of the appeal which led to the reversal of the resolution dismissing the appeal on the ground that the appeal raises substantial issues justifying a review of the case on the merits. On January 30, 2003, the appellate court found that there was no perfected contract of sale over the subject floors and reversed the ruling of the trial court. Hence, this current petition. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a perfected contract of sale between Moreno and PMO. RULING: No. The Court ruled that there was no perfected contract of sale between Moreno and PMO.A contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price.13 Consent is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract. The offer must be certain and the acceptance absolute. Contract formation undergoes three distinct stages – preparation or negotiation, perfection or birth, and consummation. Negotiation begins from the time the prospective contracting parties manifest their interest in the contract and ends at the moment of agreement of the parties. The perfection or birth of the contract takes place when the parties agree upon all the essential elements thereof. The last stage is the consummation of the contract wherein the parties fulfill or perform the terms agreed upon, culminating in its extinguishment. Once there is concurrence of the offer and acceptance of the object and cause, the stage of negotiation is finished. In this case, the surrounding circ*mstances clearly show that the parties are not past the stage of negotiation. In a letter written by PMO to Moreno, it is clearly stated that 289

₱21.0 million is merely a "suggested indicative price" of the subject floors as it was yet to be approved by the Board of Trustees. Before the Board could confirm the suggested indicative price, the Committee on Privatization must first approve the terms of the sale or disposition. The imposition of this suspensive condition finds basis under Proclamation No. 5022 which vests in the Committee the power to approve the sale of government assets. Hence, there was no perfected contract of sale between Moreno and PMO. Furthermore, Moreno relied on the Webster Comprehensive Dictionary’s definition of the meaning of indicative which is "to indicate" is to point out, direct attention. "Indicative" is merely the adjective of the verb to indicate. When the price of ₱21 million was indicated – then it becomes the "indicative" price – the correct price, no ifs, no buts. However, Moreno’s reliance of the meaning of indicative – in the phrase “suggested indicative price” – in the Webster Comprehensive Dictionary is misplaced. Where the transaction involves the sale of an asset under a privatization scheme which attaches a peculiar meaning or signification to the term indicative, indicative price is referred to as ball-park figure with the seller supplying the figure purely to define the ball-park.

Since indicative price is referred to as a ballpark figure or a rough numerical estimate or approximation of value, then the contract between Moreno and PMO was not perfected. The Court finding no reason to reverse the ruling, affirmed the decision rendered by the appellate court.

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De Castro vs. JBC G.R. No. 191002 March 17, 2010 FACTS: The then Chief Justice Reynato Puno was subject to compulsory retirement by May 17, 2010, days after the coming May 10, 2010 elections. Petitioner compelled the Judicial Bar Council to submit to the incumbent President the list of nominees for the position of the next Chief Justice. Legal luminaries expressed conflicting opinions regarding the issue. One side holds that the incumbent President cannot make appointments within 2 months prior the coming presidential elections and until the end of her term (Art. VII Sec. 15), while others hold that such prohibition only applies to appointments to executive positions that may influence the election. On January 18, 2010, the JBC passed a resolution unanimously agreeing to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice. The JBC had already come up with a list of nominations but has not yet decided on when to submit it to the President due to the controversy. 291

In response to the Court’s order directing the JBC and OSG to comment on the petition, the JBC has yet to take a position on when to submit the shortlist to the President in light of Section 4 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution, which provides that vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled within ninety (90) days from the occurrence thereof, Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution concerning the ban on Presidential appointments "two (2) months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term".

The OSG submitted its comment stating that the JBC can submit the list of nominees as it is a ministerial act of the JBC. The OSG further asserts that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice because the prohibition under Article VII Sec. 5 does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court.

Intervenors oppose the petition of De Castro because Section 15 of Article VII prohibits the outgoing president from making any appointments from March 10, 2010 until June 30, 2010. They also cited In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively (Valenzuela), where the Court held that Art. VII Sec 15 of the Constitution also prohibited appointments by the President to the judicial positions during the period therein fixed. ISSUE: Whether or not the incumbent President has the power and authority to appoint during the election ban the successor of Chief Justice Puno when he vacates the position of Chief Justice on his retirement on May 17, 2010.

RULING: Yes, the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice. The two constitutional provisions in conflict are Section 15 Article VII (Executive Dept):

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Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. and Section 4 (1) Article VIII (Judicial Dept): Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. The Court agrees with the petitioner that Sec 15 Art. VII does not extend to appointments in the Judiciary. As mentioned above, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Dept. The presidential power of appointments is dealt with in Sections 14,15, and 16. While Art. VIII is dedicated to the Judicial Dept. which in Section 4(1) mandates the president to fill the vacancy of Supreme Court Justices within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could have written the prohibition Sec 15 Art VII as equally applicable to the appointment of Supreme Court members as provided in Article VIII. Since such specification was not done by the framers, the prohibition of appointing within 2 months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the incumbent president does not apply to appointments of Supreme Court members. According to the journal of the Constitutional Commission, the original proposal was to have an 11 member Supreme Court. Commissioner Eulogio Lerum wanted to increase the number of Justices to fifteen. He also wished to ensure that that number would not be reduced for any appreciable length of time (even only temporarily), and to this end proposed that any vacancy "must be filled within two months from the date that the vacancy occurs." He later agreed to suggestions to make the period three, instead of two, months. As thus amended, the proposal was approved. The Commission agreed on a fifteen-member Court. Thus, it was that the section fixing the composition of the Supreme Court came to include a command to fill up any vacancy therein within 90 days from its occurrence. Thereby, Sec 4(1) Art. VIII imposes on the President the imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member

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of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. The failure by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the Constitution The Court reverses the Valenzuela decision. The purpose of Sec 15 Art. VII was to avoid vote-buying and “midnight appointments.” With this, there is no doubt that the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments only in the Executive Dept. The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to the Judiciary because the establishment of the JBC and the process of nomination and screening ensures no midnight appointments in the Judiciary. The non-applicability was confirmed by then Senior Associate Justice Regalado. He assured that "on the basis of the (Constitutional) Commission's records, the election ban had no application to appointments to the Court of Appeals.

Floresca v. Philex Mining Corp. G.R. No. L-30642, [April 30, 1985] FACTS: On June 28, 1967, in Tuba, Benguet, employees of Philex Mining Corporation were working on its copper mines underground operations when the mines collapsed, resulting on a cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine; 5 were able to escape, 22 were rescued within the next 7 days, and 21, including the relatives of the petitioners, were left entombed in the tunnels, and though still alive, were not rescued due to PHILEX’s decision to abandon rescue operations. Heirs of the deceased employees were then compensated under the Workmen’s Compensation act as ruled by the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. Thereafter, petitioners filed a civil complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila (CFI) against Philex upon knowing that the latter was negligent and failed to provide 294

adequate safety protection for its workers. Philex move to dismiss the complaint, arguing that CFI has no jurisdiction over compensation cases. Floresca, et al contend that CFI ha jurisdiction as their complaint is based on the Civil Code provisions on damages arising out of negligence and not based on the Workmen’s Compensation Act. ISSUE: Won CFI have jurisdiction over the complaint? RULING: The Court held YES. Generally, petitioners can only choose between claiming benefits or suing, not both. Claiming the benefits under WCA would have naturally estopped them from suing a civil case before the regular courts. Section 5 of WCA, providing right of exclusive compensation, states that: The rights andremedies granted by thisAct to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation. Shall excludeall other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer. Under theCivil Codeand other laws, because of said injury. However, the Court decided to give the petitioners leeway given the peculiarities of this instance, where the latter already claimed the benefits under WCA before learning the true cause of the accident, that resulted to the untimely demise of their loved ones, was the negligence of Philex. Only then did they file a civil case. Article 10 of theNew Civil Codestates: "In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail." More specifically, Article 1702 of theNew Civil Codelikewise directs that. "In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living of the laborer." The court reasoned that had the petitioners learned of the cause much sooner, petitioners would have filed for a civil suit instead. This then creates an exception to Section 5 of WCA. Hence, court remanded the case to lower court for proper judgment. (1) CFI now has jurisdiction because of the court’s making an exception 295

of the case. The Court heavily emphasize that strict application of the law, without taking into consideration the peculiarity of the instance, ultimately defeats the purpose of the law.

BENJAMIN G. TING, Petitioner, vs. CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING, Respondent. G.R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009 FACTS: Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen Velez-Ting (Carmen) were wed in Cebu City when the respondent was already pregnant with their first child. They have been married for more than 18 years and have a total of 6 children. After being married for more than 18 years, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however, only came to manifest thereafter. 296

Carmen was already aware that Benjamin used to drink and gamble occasionally with his friends. But after they were married, petitioner continued to drink regularly and would go home at about midnight or sometimes in the wee hours of the morning drunk and violent. He would confront and insult respondent, physically assault her and force her to have sex with him. He refused to give financial support to their family and would even get angry at Carmen whenever she asked for money for their children. Instead of providing support, Benjamin would spend his money on drinking and gambling and would even buy expensive equipment for his hobby. Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. The lower court rendered its Decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr. Oñate’s findings and the admissions made by Benjamin in the course of his deposition, and found him to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Specifically, the trial court found Benjamin an excessive drinker, a compulsive gambler, someone who prefers his extra-curricular activities to his family, and a person with violent tendencies, which character traits find root in a personality defect existing even before his marriage to Carmen. Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. The CA rendered a Decision reversing the trial court’s ruling. Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied for having been filed beyond the prescribed period. Undaunted, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with this Court. The Court granted the petition and directed the CA to resolve Carmen’s motion for reconsideration. The CA decided to reconsider its previous ruling. Reversing its first ruling and sustaining the trial court’s decision. A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by Benjamin, but the same was denied by the CA. Thus, the petition is elevated to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Benjamin and Carmen can be declared null and void based on Article 36 of the Family Code. RULING: No, the Court ruled that the marriage of Benjamin and Carmen cannot be declared null and void based on Article 36 of the Family Code.

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The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. The psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume. CONSTITUTIONAL STARE DECISIS AND SATUTORY STARE DECISIS. Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of the Constitution while statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction is important for courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice Brandeis' view on the binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional litigations still holds sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated: "Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and inexorable command. The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from, is a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is again called upon to consider a question once decided."

Commissioner of Internal Revenue, petitioner vs. Bicolandia Drug Corporation (Formerly known as Elmas Drug Co.) G.R. No. 148083 July 21, 2006 Facts: In 1992, R.A. No. 7432, known as “An Act to Maximize the Contribution of Senior Citizens to Nation Building, Grant Benefits and Special Privileges and For other purposes”, granted senior citizens several privileges, including the 20% discount from private establishments, relative to the use of transportation services, hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers and purchase of 298

medicines anywhere in the country. The law also provides that these private establishments may claim the discount given as tax credit. In compliance with the law, the BIR issued R.R. No. 2-94, defining tax credit as a “deduction from their gross income for income tax purposes and from their gross sales for VAT or other percentage tax purposes”. In 1995, respondent, a corporation engaged in pharmaceutical products, granted 20% sales discount to senior citizens and treated it as a deduction from its gross income in compliance with RR No. 2-94. Respondent filed a claim for tax refund or credit (P259,659) because its net losses for the year 1995 prevented it from benefiting from the treatment of sales discounts as a deduction from gross sales. Court of Tax Appeals granted the respondents claim for refund, reducing it to P236,321.52. The Cour of Appeals modified the decision of CTA as “tax credit” is different from “tax refund”. Respondent alleged that RR No. 2-94 is inconsistent with Section 4 of RA No. 7432 which the latter defines discounts be claimed as tax credit. Petitioner maintained that RR No. 2-94 is valid since the law tasked the DoF with the issuance of the necessary rules and regulations to carry out the objectives of the law. Issue: Whether or not the 20% sales discount granted to qualified senior citizens by respondent may be claimed as “tax credit” under R.A. No. 7432?

Ruling: Yes. The 20% sales discount granted to qualified senior citizens by respondent may be claimed as “tax credit” under RA No. 7432. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law. In this case, RR No. 2-94 is null and void for failing to conform to the law it sought to implement. RR No. 2-94 defining “tax credit” as a “deduction from the gross income for income tax purposes and from gross sales for VAT and other percentage tax purposes” is a whole lot different from the definition of “tax credit” under RA No. 7432 (Tax credit as a 299

deduction from the total income tax liability). The lawmakers intended the grant of a tax credit to complying private establishments like the respondent. It is well-settled that a regulation should not conflict with the law it implements, for regulations are always subordinate to law. Thus, the 20% sales discount granted to qualified senior citizens by respondent may be claimed as “tax credit” under RA No. 7432. Petition DENIED.

G.R. No. 174674 : October 20, 2010 NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC. and NESTLE WATERS PHILIPPINES, INC. (formerly HIDDEN SPRINGS & PERRIER, INC.),Petitioners,v. UNIWIDE SALES, INC., UNIWIDE HOLDINGS, INC., NAIC RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, UNIWIDE SALES REALTY AND RESOURCES CLUB, INC., FIRST PARAGON CORPORATION, and UNIWIDE SALES WAREHOUSE CLUB, INC., Respondents. CARPIO, J.: 300

FACTS: Respondents filed in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a petition for declaration of suspension of payment, formation and appointment of rehabilitation receiver, and approval of rehabilitation plan. The newly appointed Interim Receivership Committee filed a rehabilitation plan in the SEC. The plan was anchored on return to core business of retailing; debt reduction via cash settlement and dacion en pago; loan restructuring; waiver of penalties and charges; freezing of interest payments; and restructuring of credit of suppliers, contractors, and private lenders. The Interim Receivership Committee filed in the SEC an Amended Rehabilitation Plan (ARP). The ARP took into account the planned entry of Casino Guichard Perrachon, envisioned to infuse P3.57 billion in fresh capital. SEC approved the ARP. The Interim Receivership Committee filed in the SEC a Second Amendment to the Rehabilitation Plan (SARP) in view of Casino Guichard Perrachon's withdrawal. SEC approved the SARP. Petitioners, as unsecured creditors of respondents, appealed to the SEC praying that the Order approving the SARP be set aside and a new one be issued directing the Interim Receivership Committee, in consultation with all the unsecured creditors, to improve the terms and conditions of the SARP.

SEC denied petitioners' appeal for lack of merit. Court of Appeals denied for lack of merit the petition for review filed by petitioners. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which was also denied. ISSUE: Whether or not the SARP should be revoked and the rehabilitation proceedings terminated? RULING: Court of Appeals decision is sustained. In light of supervening events that have emerged from the time the SEC approved 301

the SARP on 23 December 2002 and from the time the present petition was filed on 3 November 2006, any determination by this Court as to whether the SARP should be revoked and the rehabilitation proceedings terminated, would be premature. Undeniably, supervening events have substantially changed the factual backdrop of this case. The Court thus defers to the competence and expertise of the SEC to determine whether, given the supervening events in this case, the SARP is no longer capable of implementation and whether the rehabilitation case should be terminated as a consequence.

Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts will not determine a controversy where the issues for resolution demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. In other words, if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized training, and knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before resort to the court is had even if the matter may well be within the latter's proper jurisdiction. The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court. Petition for review is DISMISSED. G.R. No. 171763 June 5, 2009 MARIA LUISA PARK ASSOCIATION, INC.,Petitioner, vs. SAMANTHA MARIE T. ALMENDRAS and PIA ANGELA T. ALMENDRAS,Respondents. FACTS: On February 6, 2002, respondents Samantha Marie T. Almendras and Pia Angela T. Almendras purchased from MRO Development Corporation a residential lot located in Maria Luisa Estate Park, Banilad, Cebu City. After some time, respondents filed 302

with petitioner Maria Luisa Park Association, Incorporated (MLPAI) an application to construct a residential house, which was approved in February 10, 2002. Thus, respondents commenced the construction of their house. Upon ocular inspection of the house, MLPAI found out that respondents violated the prohibition against multi-dwelling3stated in MLPAI’s Deed of Restriction. Consequently, on April 28, 2003, MLPAI sent a letter to the respondents, demanding that they rectify the structure; otherwise, it will be constrained to forfeit respondents’ construction bond and impose stiffer penalties. In a Letter4dated April 29, 2003, respondents, as represented by their father Ruben D. Almendras denied having violated MLPAI’s Deed of Restriction. On May 5, 2003, MLPAI, in its reply, pointed out respondents’ specific violations of the subdivision rules, to wit: (a) installation of a second water meter and tapping the subdivision’s main water pipeline, and (b) construction of "two separate entrances that are mutually exclusive of each other." It likewise reiterated its warning that failure to comply with its demand will result in its exercise of more stringent measures. In view of these, respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 7, a Complaint5on June 2, 2003 for Injunction, Declaratory Relief, Annulment of Provisions of Articles and By-Laws with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)/Preliminary Injunction. MLPAI moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and failure to comply with the arbitration clause6provided for in MLPAI’s by-laws. In an Order7dated July 31, 2003, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, holding that it was the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) that has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case. Respondents moved for reconsideration but their motion was denied. Aggrieved, the respondents questioned the dismissal of their complaint in a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted the petition in its Decision dated August 31, 2005, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition isGRANTEDand the assailed orders of the respondent trial court are declaredNULL AND VOID, andSET ASIDE. Respondent RTC is hereby ordered to take jurisdiction of Civil Case No. CEB-29002. 303

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that it was the trial court and not the HLURB that has jurisdiction over the case.

RULING: Yes. Pursuant to Executive Order No. 535,12the HIGC assumed the regulatory and adjudicative functions of the SEC over homeowners’ associations. Section 2 of E.O. No. 535 provides: 2. In addition to the powers and functions vested under the Home Financing Act, the Corporation, shall have among others, the following additional powers: (a) . . . and exercise all the powers, authorities and responsibilities that are vested on the Securities and Exchange Commission with respect to homeowners associations, the provision of Act 1459, as amended by P.D. 902-A, to the contrary notwithstanding; (b) To regulate and supervise the activities and operations of all houseowners associations registered in accordance therewith; Moreover, under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy where the issues for resolution demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.29 In the instant case, the HLURB has the expertise to resolve the basic technical issue of whether the house built by the respondents violated the Deed of Restriction, specifically the prohibition against multi-dwelling. The terms of Article XII of the MLPAI by-laws clearly express the intention of the parties to bring first to the arbitration process all disputes between them before a party can file the appropriate action. The agreement to submit all disputes to arbitration is a contract. As such, the arbitration agreement binds the parties thereto, as well as their assigns and heirs.32Respondents, being members of MLPAI, are bound by its by-laws, and are expected to abide by it in good faith.33 In the instant case, both parties exchanged correspondence pertaining to the alleged violation of the Deed of Restriction, they, however, made no earnest effort to resolve 304

their differences in accordance with the arbitration clause provided for in their bylaws. Mere exchange of correspondence will not suffice much less satisfy the requirement of arbitration. Arbitration being the mode of settlement between the parties expressly provided for in their by-laws, the same should be respected. Unless an arbitration agreement is such as absolutely to close the doors of the courts against the parties, the courts should look with favor upon such amicable arrangements.34 Arbitration is one of the alternative methods of dispute resolution that is now rightfully vaunted as "the wave of the future" in international relations, and is recognized worldwide. To brush aside a contractual agreement calling for arbitration in case of disagreement between the parties would therefore be a step backward.

ESTATE OF NELSON R. DULAY, represented by his wife MERRIDY JANE P. DULAY, Petitioner, vs. ABOITIZ JEBSEN MARITIME, INC. and GENERAL CHARTERERS, INC., Respondents G.R. No. 172642 June 13, 2012 FACTS: 305

Nelson R. Dulay (Nelson, for brevity) was employed by General Charterers Inc. (GCI), a subsidiary of co-petitioner Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime Inc. since 1986. He initially worked as an ordinary seaman and later as bosun on a contractual basis. From September 3, 1999 up to July 19, 2000, Nelson was detailed in petitioners’ vessel, the MV Kickapoo Belle. 25 days after the completion of his employment contract, Nelson died due to acute renal failure secondary to septicemia. At the time of his death, Nelson was a bona fide member of the Associated Marine Officers and Seaman’s Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP), GCI’s collective bargaining agent. Nelson’s widow, Merridy Jane, thereafter claimed for death benefits through the grievance procedure of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between AMOSUP and GCI. However, on January 29, 2001, the grievance procedure was "declared deadlocked" as petitioners refused to grant the benefits sought by the widow. On March 5, 2001, Merridy Jane filed a complaint with the NLRC Sub-Regional Arbitration Board in General Santos City against GCI for death and medical benefits and damages. On March 8, 2001, Joven Mar, Nelson’s brother, received ₱20,000.00 from respondents pursuant to article 20(A)2 of the CBA and signed a "Certification" acknowledging receipt of the amount and releasing AMOSUP from further liability. Merridy Jane contended that she is entitled to the aggregate sum of Ninety Thousand Dollars ($90,000.00) pursuant to Article 20 (A)1 of the CBA x x x Herein respondents, on the other hand, asserted that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the action on account of the absence of employer-employee relationship between GCI and Nelson at the time of the latter’s death. Nelson also had no claims against petitioners for sick leave allowance/medical benefit by reason of the completion of his contract with GCI and that he is not entitled to death benefits because petitioners are only liable for such "in case of death of the seafarer during the term of his contract pursuant to the POEA contract" and the cause of his death is not work-related. Petitioners admitted liability only with respect to article 20(A)2 [of the CBA]. However, as petitioners stressed, the same was already discharged. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of private respondent. It took cognizance of the case by virtue of Article 217 (a), paragraph 6 of the Labor Code and the existence of a 306

reasonable causal connection between the employer-employee relationship and the claim asserted. It ordered the petitioner to pay ₱4,621,300.00, the equivalent of US$90,000.00 less ₱20,000.00, at the time of judgment x x x Respondents then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA contending that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the jurisdiction of the NLRC over the case; in ruling that a different provision of the CBA covers the death claim; in reversing the findings of the Labor Arbiter that the cause of death is not work-related; and, in setting aside the release and quitclaim executed by the attorney-in-fact and not considering the P20,000.00 already received by Merridy Jane through her attorney-in-fact. The CA ruled that while the suit filed by Merridy Jane is a money claim, the same basically involves the interpretation and application of the provisions in the subject CBA. As such, jurisdiction belongs to the voluntary arbitrator and not the labor arbiter. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the CA denied it in its Resolution of April 18, 2006. Petitioner contends that Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, vests jurisdiction on the appropriate branches of the NLRC to entertain disputes regarding the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement involving migrant or overseas Filipino workers. Petitioner argues that the abovementioned Section amended Article 217 (c) of the Labor Code which, in turn, confers jurisdiction upon voluntary arbitrators over interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements and interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies. ISSUE: WON whether or not the CA committed error in ruling that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the case. RULING: No, the Court finds no error in the ruling of the CA that the voluntary arbitrator has jurisdiction over the instant case. It is true that R.A. 8042 is a special law governing overseas Filipino workers. However, a careful reading of this special law would readily show that there is no specific provision thereunder which provides for jurisdiction over disputes or unresolved grievances regarding the interpretation or implementation of a CBA. 307

Section 10 of R.A. 8042, which is cited by petitioner, simply speaks, in general, of "claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages." On the other hand, Articles 217(c) and 261 of the Labor Code are very specific in stating that voluntary arbitrators have jurisdiction over cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements. Stated differently, the instant case involves a situation where the special statute (R.A. 8042) refers to a subject in general, which the general statute (Labor Code) treats in particular. In the present case, the basic issue raised by Merridy Jane in her complaint filed with the NLRC is: which provision of the subject CBA applies insofar as death benefits due to the heirs of Nelson are concerned. The Court agrees with the CA in holding that this issue clearly involves the interpretation or implementation of the said CBA. Thus, the specific or special provisions of the Labor Code govern.

RUFINO O. ESLAO, in his capacity as President of Pangasinan State University,petitioner,

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vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT,respondent. G.R. No. 108310 September 1, 1994 FACTS: On 9 December 1988, PSU entered into a Memorandum of Agreement ("MOA")1with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR") for the evaluation of eleven (11) government reforestation operations in Pangasinan.2The evaluation project was part of the commitment of the Asian Development Bank ("ADB") under the ADB/OECF Forestry Sector Program Loan to the Republic of the Philippines and was one among identical project agreements entered into by the DENR with sixteen (16) other state universities. On 16 January 1989, per advice of the PSU Auditor-in-Charge with respect to the payment ofhonorariaandper diemsof PSU personnel engaged in the review and evaluation project, PSU Vice President for Research and Extension and Assistant Project Director Victorino P. Espero requested the Office of the President, PSU, to have the University's Board of Regents ("BOR") confirm the appointments or designations of involved PSU personnel including the rates ofhonorariaandper diemscorresponding to their specific roles and functions. The BOR approved the MOA on 30 January 19895and on 1 February 1989, PSU issued Voucher No. 89020076representing the amount of P70,375.00 for payment ofhonorariato PSU personnel engaged in the project. Later, however, the approvedhonorariarates were found to be somewhat higher than the rates provided for in the guidelines of National Compensation Circular ("NCC") No. 53. Accordingly, the amounts were adjusted downwards to conform to NCC No. 53. Adjustments were made by deducting amounts from subsequent disbursem*nts ofhonoraria. By June 1989, NCC No. 53 was being complied with. On 6 July 1989, Bonifacio Icu, COA resident auditor at PSU, alleging that there were excess payments ofhonoraria, issued a "Notice of Disallowance"8disallowing P64,925.00 from the amount of P70,375.00 stated in Voucher No. 8902007, mentioned earlier. The resident auditor based his action on the premise that Compensation Policy Guidelines ("CPG") No. 80-4, dated 7 August 1980, issued by the Department of Budget and Management which provided for lower rates than NCC No. 53 dated 21 June 1988, also issued by the Department of Budget and 309

Management, was the schedule forhonorariaandper diemsapplicable to work done under the MOA of 9 December 1988 between the PSU and the DENR. ISSUE: WON evaluation project is in fact a “special project” and that there were excess of payments of honoraria. RULINGS: The instant evaluation project being a Foreign-Assisted Project, the PSU personnels involve in the project shall be paid according to the Budget Estimate schedule of the MOA. COA, under its constitutional mandate, is not authorized to substitute its own judgement for any applicable law or administrative regulation with the wisdom or propriety of which, however, it does not agree, at least not before such law or regulation is set aside by the authorized agency of government – i.e., the courts – as unconstitutional or illegal and void. The COA, like all other government agencies, must respect the presumption of legality and constitutionality to which statutes and administrative regulations are entitled until such statute or regulation is repealed or amended, or until set aside in appropriate case by a competent court and ultimately the Supreme Court.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, 310

vs. SAN ROQUE POWER CORPORATION, Respondent. G.R. No: 187485 February 12, 2013 Facts: Commissioner of Internal Revenue [CIR], empowered, act upon and approve claims for refund or tax credit, with office at the Bureau of Internal Revenue ("BIR") National Office Building, Diliman, Quezon City. San Roque is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines with principal office at Barangay San Roque, San Manuel, Pangasinan. As a seller of services, [San Roque] is duly registered with the BIR with TIN/VAT No. 005-017-501. It is likewise registered with the Board of Investments ("BOI") on a preferred pioneer status, to engage in the design, construction, erection, assembly, as well as to own, commission, and operate electric power-generating plants and related activities, for which it was issued Certificate of Registration No. 97-356 on February 11, 1998. On October 11, 1997, [San Roque] entered into a Power Purchase Agreement ("PPA") with the National Power Corporation ("NPC") to develop hydro-potential of the Lower Agno River and generate additional power and energy for the Luzon Power Grid, by building the San Roque Multi-Purpose Project located in San Manuel, Pangasinan. The PPA provides, among others, that [San Roque] shall be responsible for the design, construction, installation, completion, testing and commissioning of the Power Station and shall operate and maintain the same, subject to NPC instructions. During the cooperation period of twenty-five (25) years commencing from the completion date of the Power Station, NPC will take and pay for all electricity available from the Power Station. On the construction and development of the San Roque Multi- Purpose Project which comprises of the dam, spillway and power plant, [San Roque] allegedly incurred, excess input VAT in the amount of ₱559,709,337.54 for taxable year 2001 which it declared in its Quarterly VAT Returns filed for the same year. [San Roque] duly filed with the BIR separate claims for refund, in the total amount of ₱559,709,337.54, representing unutilized input taxes as declared in its VAT returns for taxable year 2001. 311

However, on March 28, 2003, [San Roque] filed amended Quarterly VAT Returns for the year 2001 since it increased its unutilized input VAT to the amount of ₱560,200,283.14. Consequently, [San Roque] filed with the BIR on even date, separate amended claims for refund in the aggregate amount of ₱560,200,283.14. [CIR’s] inaction on the subject claims led to the filing by [San Roque] of the Petition for Review with the Court [of Tax Appeals] in Division on April 10, 2003. ISSUE: Whether or not the judicial claims for tax refund or credit were filed within the mandatory period prescribed by law? RULING: No. San Roque failed to comply with the 120-day waiting period, the time expressly given by law to the Commissioner to decide whether to grant or deny San Roque's application for tax refund or credit. It is indisputable that compliance with the 120-day waiting period is mandatory and jurisdictional. The waiting period, originally fixed at 60 days only, was part of the provisions of the first VAT law, Executive Order No. 273, which took effect on 1 January 1988. The waiting period was extended to 120 days effective 1 January 1998 under RA 8424 or the Tax Reform Act of 1997. Thus, the waiting period has been in the statute books for more than fifteen (15) years before San Roque filed its judicial claim.

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HEIRS OF WILSON P. GAMBOA v FINANCE SECRETARYMARGARITO B. TEVES supra G.R. No. 176579 October 9, 2012 Facts: On 28 November 1928, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 3436 which granted PLDT a franchise and the right to engage in telecommunications business. In 1969, General Telephone and Electronics Corporation (GTE), an American company and a major PLDT stockholder, sold 26 percent of the outstanding common shares of PLDT to PTIC. In 1977, Prime Holdings, Inc. (PHI) was incorporated by several persons. Subsequently, PHI became the owner of 111,415 shares of stock of PTIC. In 1986, the 111,415 shares of stock of PTIC held by PHI were sequestered by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). The 111,415 PTIC shares, which represent about 46.125 percent of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC, were later declared by this Court to be owned by the Republic of the Philippines. In 1999, First Pacific, a Bermuda-registered, Hong Kong-based investment firm, acquired the remaining 54 percent of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC. On 20 November 2006, the Inter-Agency Privatization Council (IPC) of the Philippine Government announced that it would sell the 111,415 PTIC shares, or 46.125 percent of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC, through a public bidding. Parallax won the bid.Initially, First Pacific refused and insisted to match the bid price of Parallex, but eventually First Pacific managed to buy these 111, 415 shares. With the sale, First Pacific’s common shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby increasing the common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47 percent. This violates Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which limits foreign ownership of the capital of a public utility to not more than 40 percent. On February 28 2007, petitioner filed in the petition for prohibition, injunction and declaration of nuliity if sale of the 111, 415 PTC shares. Petitioner claims that the sale of 111, 415 PTIC shares would result in an increase in First Pacific’s common shareholdings in PLDT from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, and this combined with a 313

Japanese company’s shareholdings in PLDT would result to a total foreign common shareholdings in PLDT of 51.56 percent which is over the 40% constitutional limit. Issue: Whether the sale of common shares to foreigners in excess of 40 percent of the entire subscribed common capital stock violates the constitutional limit on foreign ownership of a public utility Ruling: Court PARTLY GRANT the petition and rule that the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors, and thus in the present case only to common shares, and not to the total outstanding capital stock (common and non-voting preferred shares). Section 11, Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) of the 1987 Constitution mandates the Filipinization of public utilities, to wit: “Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens; nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general public. The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or association must be citizens of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)” Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to control, as opposed to preferred shares which usually have no voting rights, the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to common shares. However, if the preferred shares also have the right to vote in the election of directors, then the term "capital" shall include such preferred shares because the right to participate in the control or management of the corporation is exercised through the right to vote in the election of directors. In short, the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of directors.

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This interpretation is consistent with the intent of the framers of the Constitution to place in the hands of Filipino citizens the control and management of public utilities. As revealed in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, "capital" refers to the voting stock or controlling interest of a corporation It must be stressed, that foreigners hold a majority of the common shares of PLDT. In fact, based on PLDT’s 2010 General Information Sheet (GIS), which is a document required to be submitted annually to the Securities and Exchange Commission, foreigners hold 120,046,690 common shares of PLDT whereas Filipinos hold only 66,750,622 common shares. In other words, foreigners hold 64.27% of the total number of PLDT’s common shares, while Filipinos hold only 35.73%. Since holding a majority of the common shares equates to control, it is clear that foreigners exercise control over PLDT. Such amount of control unmistakably exceeds the allowable 40 percent limit on foreign ownership of public utilities expressly mandated in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. The legal and beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock must rest in the hands of Filipinos in accordance with the constitutional mandate. Full beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock, coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights, is constitutionally required for the State’s grant of authority to operate a public utility. The undisputed fact that the PLDT preferred shares, 99.44% owned by Filipinos, are non-voting and earn only 1/70 of the dividends that PLDT common shares earn, grossly violates the constitutional requirement of 60 percent Filipino control and Filipino beneficial ownership of a public utility. In short, Filipinos hold less than 60 percent of the voting stock, and earn less than 60 percent of the dividends, of PLDT. This directly contravenes the express command in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution that "[n]o franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to x x x corporations x x x organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens x x x (1) foreigners own 64.27% of the common shares of PLDT, which class of shares exercises the sole right to vote in the election of directors, and thus exercise control over PLDT; (2) Filipinos own only 35.73% of PLDT’s common shares, constituting a minority of the voting stock, and thus do not exercise control over PLDT; (3) preferred shares, 99.44% owned by Filipinos, have no voting rights; (4) preferred shares earn only 1/70 of the dividends that common shares earn; (5) preferred 63

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shares have twice the par value of common shares; and (6) preferred shares constitute 77.85% of the authorized capital stock of PLDT and common shares only 22.15%. This kind of ownership and control of a public utility is a mockery of the Constitution. Indisputably, construing the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution to include both voting and non-voting shares will result in the abject surrender of our telecommunications industry to foreigners, amounting to a clear abdication of the State’s constitutional duty to limit control of public utilities to Filipino citizens. Such an interpretation certainly runs counter to the constitutional provision reserving certain areas of investment to Filipino citizens, such as the exploitation of natural resources as well as the ownership of land, educational institutions and advertising businesses. The Court should never open to foreign control what the Constitution has expressly reserved to Filipinos for that would be a betrayal of the Constitution and of the national interest. The Court must perform its solemn duty to defend and uphold the intent and letter of the Constitution to ensure, in the words of the Constitution, "a selfreliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos."

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PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (PDIC) V. STOCKHOLDER OF INTERCITY SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK G.R. NO. 181556, DECEMBER 14, 2009 FACTS: The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas filed on June 17, 1987 with the RTC of Makati for the assistance in the Liquidation of Intercity Saving and Loan Bank, Inc. alleging that said bank was already insolvent and its continuance in business would involve probable loss to depositors, creditors and the general public. RTC gave due course to the petition. Petitioner PDIC was eventually substituted as the therein petitioner, liquidator of Intercity Bank. In the meantime RA no. 9302 was enacted which provides that “after the payment of all liabilities and claims against the closed bank, the corporation shall pay any surplus dividends at the legal rate of rate interest form date of takeover to date of distribution to creditors and claimants of the closed bank in accordance with legal priority before distribution to the shareholders of the closed bank. Relying on R.A. no 9302 PDIC file a motion for approval of the final distribution of Assets and termination of the Liquidation Proceedings. RTC Granted the prayer except for the final project of distribution and for authority of PDIC to hold as trustee the liquidating and surplus dividends allocated for creditors of intercity bank. With regards to the issue of the retroactive application, the court a quo rule in negative. It said that to do so would run counter to the prevailing jurisprudence and unduly prejudice Intercity bank shareholder, the creditors having been paid their principal claim in 2002 or before the passage of RA 9302 in 2004. PDIC appeal to the CA but respondent move to dismiss the appeal arguing that the proper recourse should be to the Supreme Court through a petition for 317

Review on certiorari. CA dismissed the appeal, sustaining the main position of the respondent. PDIC files the MR but then denied. Hence this present petition. ISSUE: WON Sec 12 of RA No. 9302 should be applied retroactively in order to entitle Intercity Bank Creditors to surplus dividend. RULING: The SC held that statute is prospective and not retroactive in their operation, they being the formulation of the rules for the future not the past. Hence the legal maxim lex de futuro, judex de praeterito (the law provide for the future, the judge for the past), which is articulated in Art 4 of the Civil Code: Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless contrary is provided. The reason for the rule is the tendency of retroactive legislation to unjust and oppressive on account of its liabilities to unsettle vested rights or disturb the legal effect of prior transaction. Further, a perusal of RA 9302 shows that nothing indeed therein authorizes its retroactive application. In fact its effectivity clause indicate a clear legislative intent to contrary. The petition is denied.

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G.R. No. 173473, December 17, 2008 People of the Philippines vs Beth Temporada Facts: Accused Rosemarie Robles, Bernadette Miranda, Nenita Catacotan, Jojo Resco and Beth Temporada are all employees of ATTC, a Travel and Tour Company, recruited and promised overseas employment for a fee to Rogelio Legaspis Jr, as a technician in Singapore, and other overseas workers. The accused were holding office in Makati but eventually transferred to Manila. After paying placements fees, none of the overseas recruits was able to leave or recover what they have paid, thus they filed separate criminal complaints against accused in Manila. The accused were then sentenced to life imprisonment for illegal recruitment and estafa. Then the case was referred to the CA for intermediate review, CA affirmed with modification on the penalty. The penalty was lowered for the lower court due to insufficiency of evidence. Issue: Whether the accused were guilty of 5 counts of estafa and illegal recruitment, and be charged of the penalty of life imprisonment. Ruling: The Court affirms the modification of the CA, except for the penalty on the 5 counts of estafa. Although Temporada is saying that she is not a principal to the illegal recruitment and estafa because she is a mere employee of ATTC and that she was just echoing the 319

requirement of her employer, the Court believes that Temporada actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment. The Court agrees with the lower court that the accused were guilty of illegal recruitment by a syndicate with the penalty of life imprisonment. The accused were convicted separately also for 5 counts of estafa.

G.R. No. 193960 January 7, 2013 KARLO ANGELO DABALOS y SAN DIEGO,Petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,BRANCH 59, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA), REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDING JUDGE MA. ANGELICA T. PARASQUIAMBAO; THE OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA); AND ABC,Respondents. Facts: Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9262 before the RTC of Angeles City, Branch 59. Petitioner filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause with motion to quash the information. Petitioner averred that at the time of the alleged incident on July 13, 2009, he was no longer in dating relationship with private respondent; hence, RA. NO. 9262 was inapplicable. In her affidavit, private respondent admitted that her relationship with petitioner had ended prior to the subject incident. She narrated that on July 13, 2009, she sought payment of the money she had lent to petitioner but the latter could not pay. She then inquired from petitioner if he was responsible for spreading rumors about her which he admitted. Thereupon, private respondent slapped petitioner causing the latter to inflict on her the physical injuries alleged in the Information. The RTC denied the petitioner’s motion. It did not consider material the fact that the parties’ dating relationship had ceased prior to the incident, ratiocinating that since the parties had admitted a prior dating relationship, the infliction of slight physical injuries constituted an act of violence against women and their children as defined in Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262. 320

Issue: Whether or not the offender and the offended woman should be in a dating relationship at the time of the infliction of the violence? Ruling: No. The Court is not persuaded. RA 9262 is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or series of acts to be considered as a crime of violence against women through physical harm, namely: 1) it is committed against a woman or her child and the woman is the offender’s wife, former wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or dating relationship or with whom he has a common child; and 2) it results in or is likely to result in physical harm or suffering. Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of violence be a consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such limitation be inferred. Hence, applying the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the courts, then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts of violence against women with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship. As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence of such relationship between the offender and the victim when the physical harm was committed. Consequently, the Court cannot depart from the parallelism in Ang and give credence to petitioner's assertion that the act of violence should be due to the sexual or dating relationship.

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CARMELITA L. LLEDO, Complainant, vs. ATTY. CESAR V. LLEDO, Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon City, Respondent. AM No. P-95-1167, February 9, 2010 612 SCRA 54 FACTS: On April 3, 2006, Cesar L. Lledo, Jr., Cesar's son, wrote a letter to then Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban. He related that his father had been bedridden after suffering a severe stroke and acute renal failure. He had been abandoned by his mistress and had been under Cesar Jr.'s care since 2001. The latter appealed to the Court to reconsider its December 21, 1998 decision, specifically the forfeiture of leave credits, which money would be used to pay for his father's medical expenses. Cesar Jr. asked the Court for retroactive application of the Court's ruling subsequent to his father's dismissal, wherein the Court ruled that despite being dismissed from the service, government employees are entitled to the monetary equivalent of their leave credits since these were earned prior to dismissal. Treating the letter as a motion for reconsideration, the Court, on May 3, 2006, granted the same, specifically on the forfeiture of accrued leave credits. Cesar Jr. wrote the Court again on November 27, 2006, expressing his gratitude for the Court's consideration of his request for his father's leave credits. He again asked

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for judicial clemency in connection with his father's claim for refund of the latter's personal contributions to GSIS. In its Comment, the GSIS Board said that Cesar is not entitled to the refund of his personal contributions of the retirement premiums because "it is the policy of the GSIS that an employee/member who had been dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits cannot recover the retirement premiums he has paid unless the dismissal provides otherwise." The GSIS Board pointed out that the Court's Decision did not provide that Cesar is entitled to a refund of his retirement premiums. ISSUE: WON a government employee, like Cesar, dismissed from the service for cause, be allowed to recover the personal contributions he paid to the GSIS?

RULING: Yes, the Court ruled that it should be remembered that the GSIS laws are in the nature of social legislation, to be liberally construed in favor of the government employees. The money subject of the instant request consists of personal contributions made by the employee, premiums paid in anticipation of benefits expected upon retirement. The occurrence of a contingency, i.e. his dismissal form the service prior to reaching retirement age, should not deprive him of the money that belongs to him from the outset. To allow forfeiture of these personal contributions in favor of the GSIS would condone undue enrichment. The GSIS is directed to return to Atty. Cesar Lledo his own premiums and voluntary deposits, if any, plus internet of three percentum per annum, and compounded monthly.

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CONSTANCIO D. PACANAN, JR.,Petitioner,v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FRANCISCO M. LANGI, SR.,Respondents. G.R. NO. 186224 August 25, 2009 FACTS: Petitioner Pacanan, Jr. and private respondent Langi, Sr. were candidates for mayor in the municipality of Motiong, Samar during the May 14, 2007 elections. After the canvassing of votes, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) of Motiong, Samar proclaimed petitioner as the duly elected mayor, having garnered a total of 3,069 votes against private respondent's 3,066 votes. Private respond filed with the RTC a Protest on May 25, 2007, contesting the results of the elections in ten (10) of the forty-nine (49) precincts in Motiong, Samar, and alleging acts of violence and intimidation and other election irregularities in the appreciation of the votes by the MBC. Petitioner filed his Verified Answer, asserting that private respondent's allegations of threat and intimidation, fraud and other irregularities in the conduct of elections were mere allegations unsupported by any documentary evidence. RTC rendered a 324

decision on January 7, 2008 declaring private respondent as the winner in the May 14, 2007 mayoralty race for Motiong, Samar. On January 10, 2008, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal before the RTC of Catbalogan, Samar. He also appealed the RTC decision. On March 17, 2008, the Comelec First Division issued an Order dismissing the appeal for the protesteeappellants failed to pay the correct appeal fee as prescribed by the Comelec Ruled of Procedure withing the 5 day reglementary period. On March 28, 2008, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the Comelec En Banc denied in its previous resolution. They held that the Comelec did not acquire jurisdiction over the appeal because of the non-payment of the appeal fee on time. Thus, the CFD correctly dismissed the appeal. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari. Petitioner in this case invokes liberality in the application of the election law. He asserts that the popular will of the people expressed in the election of public officers should not be defeated by reason of technicalities. Petitioner argues that the true will of the people of Motiong in the May 2007 elections should be determined by ordering the Comelec to give due course to his appeal and to resolve the same on the merits.

ISSUE: WON the dismissal of petitioner’s appeal should be set aside, applying the mandated liberal construction of election laws with regards to non-payment or the insufficient payment of appeal fees. RULING: Yes. The dismissal of petitioner’s appeal should be set aside. Section 3, Rule 22 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure mandates that the notice of appeal must be filed within 5 days after promulgation of the decision. Moreover, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 40 of the Comelec rules require the payment of appeal fees in appealed election protest cases, the amended amount of which was set at P3,200.00 in Comelec Minute Resolution No. 02-0130. The CFD should have been more cautious in dismissing petitioners appeal on the mere technicality of non-payment of the additional P3,200.00 appeal fee given the 325

public interest involved in election cases. This is especially true in this case where only one vote separates the contending parties. The Court stresses once more that election law and rules are to be interpreted and applied in a liberal manner so as to give effect, not to frustrate, the will of the electorate. Applying the mandated liberal construction of election laws, the Comelec should have initially directed the petitioner to pay the correct appeal fee with the Comelec Cash Division, and should not have dismissed outright petitioner’s appeal. This would have been more in consonance with the intent of the said resolution which sought to clarify the rules on compliance with the required appeal fees. Moreover, the Comelec Rules of Procedure are subject to a liberal construction. This liberality is for the purpose of promoting the effective and efficient implementation of the objectives of ensuring that holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections and for achieving just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Comelec.

G.R. No. 138218 March 17, 2000 CLAUDIUS C. BARROSO,petitioner, vs. HONORABLE FRANCISCO S. AMPIG, JR., in his capacity as Acting Judge of the RTC, Br. 24, 11th Judicial Region, Koronadal, South Cotabato, and DR. EMERICO V. ESCOBILLO,respondents. Facts: Petitioner Claudius G. Barroso and private respondent Emerico V. Escobilio were candidates for mayor of the municipality of Tampakan, Cotabato in May 11, 1998 elections. Private respondent and filed with the Commission on Elections (Comelec) several cases against petitioner. He filed SPC 98-009, a pre-proclamation protest under Section 234 of the Omnibus Election Code alleging massive votebuying, bribery, terrorism by petitioner and opening of ballot boxes outside the precincts in at least thirteen (13) of the sixty-three (63) precincts in the municipality. Private respondent also filed SPC 98-124, another pre-proclamation case under Section 241 of the Omnibus Election Code. In addition, he filed SPA 98-359 for petitioner's disqualification alleging election offenses committed by the latter. He likewise filed two (2) criminal complaints against petitioner with the Law Department 326

of the Comelec: Election Offense Case No. 161 for illegal possession of firearm and violation of the gun ban, and Election Offense Case. No. 177 for massive votebuying. On July 27, 1998, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial court, Branch 24, Koronadal, South Cotabato a petition contesting petitioner's election. The election contest was docketed as E.C. Case No. 15-24. Private respondent certified in his petition that SPA 98-359 and Election Offense Cases Nos. 161 and 177 were then pending. Petitioner raised several affirmative defense in his answer, particularly, private respondent's failure to disclose to the court the pendency of the two (2) preproclamation controversies — SPC 98-009 and SPC 98-124. Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion for Preliminary Hearing on his affirmative defenses and sought the dismissal of the petition for non-compliance with Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 and Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. The motion was granted and the parties were required to submit their respective memoranda. Issue: Whether or not the Comelec Rules of Procedure are subject to a liberal construction. Ruling: Yes. The strict application of non-forum shopping rule in the case at bar would not work to the best interest of the parties and the electorate. An election contest, unlike an ordinary civil action, is clothed with a public interest. The purpose of an election protest ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed by the board of canvassers is the lawful choice of the people. What is sought is the correction of the canvass of votes, which was the basis of proclamation of the winning candidate. An election contest therefore involves not only the adjudication of private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates but paramount to their claims is the deep public concern involved and the need of dispelling the uncertainty over the real choice of the electorate. And the court has the corresponding duty to ascertain by all means within its command who is the real candidate elected by the people. The certification against forum shopping is required under Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, viz: Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. — The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for 327

relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. This liberality is for the purpose of promoting the effective and efficient implementation of the objectives of ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections and for achieving just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Comelec.

VIOLAGO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 194143 October 4, 2011 FACTS: Herein petitioner and private respondent were candidates for the mayoralty race during the May 10, 2010 elections in the City of Meycauayan, Bulacan. Private respondent was proclaimed the winner. On May 21, 2010, petitioner filed a Petition with the COMELEC questioning the proclamation of private respondent on the following grounds: (1) massive votebuying; (2) intimidation and harassment; (3) election fraud; (4) non-appreciation by the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines of valid votes cast during the said election; and, (5) irregularities due to non-observance of the guidelines set by the COMELEC. Thereafter, the COMELEC 2nd Division issued an Order setting the preliminary conference on August 12, 2010 and directing the parties to file their Preliminary Conference Briefs at least one (1) day before the scheduled conference. Private 328

respondent filed her Brief on the day before the schedule. Petitioner, on the other hand, filed his Brief on the day of the scheduled preliminary conference. Petitioner, likewise, filed an Urgent Motion to Reset Preliminary Conference on the ground that he did not receive any notice and only came to know of it when he inquired with the COMELEC a day before the scheduled conference. The COMELEC 2nd Division dismissed petitioner’s protest. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc contending that it was only on August 16, 2010 that he received a copy of the Order of the COMELEC which set the preliminary conference on August 12, 2010. COMELEC en banc denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that petitioner failed to file a verified motion in violation of Section 3, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's MR.

RULING: Yes. With respect to the COMELEC en banc’s denial of petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, it is true that Section 3, Rule 20 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure on Disputes in an Automated Election System, as well as Section 3, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, clearly require that a motion for reconsideration should be verified. However, the settled rule is that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal construction. In Quintos v. Commission on Elections, this Court held that "the alleged lack of verification of private respondent’s Manifestation and Motion for Partial Reconsideration is merely a technicality that should not defeat the will of the electorate. The COMELEC may liberally construe or even suspend its rules of procedure in the interest of justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition of all matters pending before the COMELEC." Moreover, the Comelec Rules of Procedure are subject to a liberal construction. This liberality is for the purpose of promoting the effective and efficient implementation of the objectives of ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections and for achieving just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and 329

disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Comelec. Thus, we have declared: It has been frequently decided, and it may be stated as a general rule recognized by all courts, that statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical objections. An election contest, unlike an ordinary action, is imbued with public interest since it involves not only the adjudication of the private interests of rival candidates but also the paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds the real choice of the electorate with respect to who shall discharge the prerogatives of the office within their gift. Moreover, it is neither fair nor just to keep in office for an uncertain period one who’s right to it is under suspicion. It is imperative that his claim be immediately cleared not only for the benefit of the winner but for the sake of public interest, which can only be achieved by brushing aside technicalities of procedure which protract and delay the trial of an ordinary action.

G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013 CASAN MACODE MAQUILING,Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA,Respondents. Facts: Respondent Arnado (Arnado) is a natural born Filipino citizen. Arnado was subsequently naturalizaed as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado then applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008 and an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. Respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a 330

resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American." As well as Arnado’s use of his American Passport. Arnado was the declared the Mayor of Kauswagan Lanao Del Norte Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnado’s Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First Division correctly disqualified Arnado, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation makes him the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful votes, thus should be proclaimed as the winner. Issue: Whether or not the Respondent Arnado be disqualified to run for the Mayoralty position? Whether or not Petitioner, Maquiling is legitimate candidate to be declared as Mayor in lieu of Arnado’s disqualification? Ruling: Yes, the court held that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using his US passport. The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position Yes, Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Wherefore the courts declared that CASAN MACODE MAQUILING 331

having garnered the second highest votes is the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10 May 2010 elections.

G.R. No. 177711 : September 5, 2012 SUICO INDUSTRIAL CORP., and SPOUSES ESMERALDO and ELIZABETH SUICO,Petitioners,v.HON. MARILYN LAGURA-YAP, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28; PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT CORP. OF THE PHILIS. (PDCP now First E-Bank); and ANTONIO AGRODEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,Respondents. REYES,J.: FACTS: In 1993, respondent Private Development Corporation of the Philippines (PDCP Bank), later renamed as First E-Bank and now Prime Media Holdings, Inc., foreclosed the mortgage constituted on two real estate properties in Mandaue City then owned by petitioners and mortgagor-spouses Esmeraldo and Elizabeth Suico, following petitioner Suico Industrial Corporations failure to pay the balance of two secured loans it obtained from the bank in 1987 and 1991. PDCP Bank emerged as

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the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale of the properties, as evidenced by a Certificate of Sale dated February 29, 1993 issued by the Sheriff of Mandaue City. The mortgagors failure to redeem the foreclosed properties within the period allowed by law resulted in the consolidation of ownership in favor of PDCP Bank and the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 34987 and 34988 in the banks name. The enforcement of a writ of possession obtained by PDCP Bank from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Mandaue City, Branch 28, was however enjoined by an injunctive writ obtained by the petitioners on January 17, 1995 from the RTC, Mandaue City, Branch 56, where they filed on December 9, 1994 an action for specific performance, injunction and damages to prevent PDCP Bank from selling and taking possession of the foreclosed properties. Petitioners alleged in said action for specific performance that they had an agreement with PDCP Bank to intentionally default in their payments so that the mortgaged properties could be foreclosed and purchased during public auction by the bank. After consolidation of title in the banks name, PDCP Bank, allegedly, was to allow the petitioners to purchase the properties forP5,000,000.00 through a recommended buyer. Petitioners then claimed that PDCP Bank increased the properties selling price, thereby preventing their recommended buyers from purchasing them.

ISSUE: Whether or not a review of the records of the case shows that the Order dismissing the Complaint was received by plaintiffs through counsel RULING: This Court finds the petition dismissible. Given the antecedents that led to the filing of this petition, and the fact that the timeliness of an appeal from the RTCs dismissal of the action for specific performance is a crucial issue that will determine whether or not the other issues resolved by the RTC can still be validly questioned at this time, we find it proper to first resolve the question on the RTCs ruling that the petitioners notice of appeal was filed out of time. A party is given a "fresh period" of fifteen (15) days from receipt of the courts resolution on a motion for 333

reconsideration within which to file a notice of appeal. Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court prescribes the period to appeal from judgments or final orders of RTCs, as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Sec. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order. x x x. The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. In Neypes v. Court of Appeals decided by this Court on September 14, 2005, we ruled that to standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules of Court and to afford litigants a fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of fifteen (15) days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Said "fresh period rule" also aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform. It eradicates the confusion as to when the fifteen (15)-day appeal period should be counted from receipt of notice of judgment or from receipt of notice of final order appealed from. Thus, in similar cases decided by this Court after Neypes, the fresh period rule was applied, thereby allowing appellants who had filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration the full fifteen (15)-day period from receipt of the resolution resolving the motion within which to file a notice of appeal. Among these cases is Sumiran v. Damaso, wherein we reiterated our ruling in Makati Insurance Co., Inc. v. Reyes and De Los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat to explain that the rule can be applied to actions pending upon its effectivity:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary As early as 2005, the Court categorically declared in Neypes v. Court of Appeals that by virtue of the power of the Supreme Court to amend, repeal and create new procedural rules in all courts, the Court is allowing a fresh period of 15 days within which to file a notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing or denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. This would

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standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. x x x

Tomas vs. Santos G.R. No. 190448. July 26, 2010 FEDERICO D. TOMAS, petitioner, vs. ANN G. SANTOS, respondent. NACHURA, J.: FACTS: COMPLAINT AGAINST PETITIONERS (Santos) filed a complaint for reconveyance of title, declaration of nullity of assignment and deed of sale, breach of contract, and damages against petitioners (Tomas) and others.

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The subject of the complaint was a real property located in Del Nacia Ville, Sauyo Road, Novaliches, Quezon City. At the time of the filing of the complaint, the property was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 81965 in the name of Tomas. DISMISSED COUNTERCLAIM, LACKS CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING Regional Trial Court (RTC) declared Tomas in default and dismissed his counterclaim on the ground that his answer lacked a certification of non-forum shopping, proof of service, and an explanation why personal service was not resorted to in furnishing a copy of his answer to Santos. DISMISSED DUE TO TECHNICAL GROUNDS After several of Tomas’s motions for reconsideration is denied by the RTC, he filed his appeal with the Court of Appeals which he denominated “Petition for Review” which was dismissed due to technical grounds. Hence, this petition anchored both on procedural and substantial grounds, i.e. assailing the outright dismissal of the appeal by the Court of Appeals, as well as the judgment of the RTC on the merits of the case. There was no allegation whatsoever of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC, but rather merely a recitation of what Tomas perceived as a reversible error committed by the RTC based on the issues raised and the discussions made in his appeal.

ISSUE Whether or not technicality and procedural imperfection should serve as bases of decisions in the case of Tomas. RULING No. Courts are not enslaved by technicalities, and they have the prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules of even the most mandatory character. The Court is fully aware that procedural rules are not to be simply disregarded as they ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. 336

However, it is equally true that courts are not enslaved by technicalities, and they have the prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put an end to litigation and the parties’ right to an opportunity to be heard. This is in line with the time-honored principle that cases should be decided only after giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses. Technicality and procedural imperfection should, thus, not serve as bases of decisions. In that way, the ends of justice would be served. WHEREFORE¸ the assailed Resolutions dated July 29, 2009 and November 26, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 109646 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The appeal of Federico D. Tomas before the Court of Appeals is REINSTATED. No costs.

BPI v. Dando G.R. No. 177456 September 4, 2009 CHICO-NAZARIO, J. FACTS: On or about 12 August 1994, Dando availed of a loan in the amount of ₱750,000.00 from Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC), under a Privilege Cheque Credit Line Agreement.

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Dando defaulted in the payment of the principal amount of the loan, as well as the interest and penalties thereon. Despite repeated demands, Dando refused and/or failed to pay his just and valid obligation. In 2000, BPI and FEBTC merged, with the former as the surviving entity, thus, absorbing the rights and obligations of the latter. On 13 March 2003, BPI filed before the RTC a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages against Dando. After Dando filed with the RTC his Answer with Counterclaim, BPI filed its Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial. When the parties appeared before the RTC on 18 August 2003 for the scheduled Pre-Trial Conference, Dando orally moved for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 03-281, citing Sections 5 and 6, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. On calling this case for the pre-trial conference, counsel for both parties appeared and even [respondent] Domingo R. Dando appeared. The attention of the Court was called by the counsel for the [respondent Dando] that the counsel for the [petitioner BPI] only filed her Pre-Trial Brief today at 9:00 o’clock in the morning instead of at least three days before the pre-trial conference, as required by the Rules. This prompted the counsel for the [respondent Dando] to ask for the dismissal of the case for violation of Rule 18 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. In this case, the BPI stated in its motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing its action that the delay in the filing of the pre-trial brief was solely due to the heavy load of paper work of its counsel, not to mention the daily hearings the latter had to attend. Initially, the RTC, through Acting Presiding Judge Pimentel favored Dando and dismissed the civil case. However, later on, the RTC, now presided by Judge Untalan reversed its previous ruling and finds merit in BPI’s motion. Thereafter, the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration of BPI for lack of merit. Thus, this case appeared before the SC. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA is correct when it strictly applied the Rules of Procedure? RULING: No. The Court held that the CA is not correct when it strictly applied the Rules of Procedure.

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In Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, the Court restated the reasons that may provide justification for a court to suspend a strict adherence to procedural rules, such as: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circ*mstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) the fact that the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. Herein, BPI instituted a Civil Case before the RTC to recover the amount it had lent to Dando, plus interest and penalties thereon, clearly, a matter of property. The substantive right of BPI to recover a due and demandable obligation cannot be denied or diminished by a rule of procedure, more so, since Dando admits that he did avail himself of the credit line extended by FEBTC, the predecessor-in-interest of BPI, and disputes only the amount of his outstanding liability to BPI. To dismiss Civil Case with prejudice and, thus, bar BPI from recovering the amount it had lent to Dando would be to unjustly enrich Dando at the expense of BPI. The counsel of BPI invokes "heavy pressures of work" to explain his failure to file the Pre-Trial Brief with the RTC and to serve a copy thereof to Dando at least three days prior to the scheduled Pre-Trial Conference. True, in Olave v. Mistas, we did not find "heavy pressures of work" as sufficient justification for the failure of therein respondents’ counsel to timely move for pre-trial. However, unlike the respondents in Olave, the failure of BPI to file its Pre-Trial Brief with the RTC and provide Dando with a copy thereof within the prescribed period under Section 1, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, was the first and, so far, only procedural lapse committed by the bank in the Civil Case. BPI did not manifest an evident pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe a mandatory requirement of the Rules. In fact, BPI, for the most part, exhibited diligence and reasonable dispatch in prosecuting its claim against Dando by immediately moving to set Civil Case for Pre-Trial Conference after its receipt of Dando’s Answer to the Complaint; and in instantaneously filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the 10 October 2003 Order of the RTC dismissing Civil Case. Wherefore, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The CA’s decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

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SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, DIRECTOR NONNATUS R. ROJAS and DEPUTY DIRECTOR REYNALDO 0. ESMERALDA,Petitioners, vs. MAGTANGGOL B. GATDULA,Respondent. G.R. No. 204528 February 19, 2013 Facts: 340

Respondent Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed aPetition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparoin the Regional Trial Court of Manila. TheAmparowas directed against petitioners Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda of the National Bureau of Investigation (DE LIMA, ET AL. for brevity). Gatdula wanted De Lima, et al. "to cease and desist from framing up Petitioner [Gatdula] for the fake ambush incident by filing bogus charges of Frustrated Murder against Petitioner [Gatdula] in relation to the alleged ambush incident." Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ ofAmparo, the judge issued summons and ordered De Lima, et al. to file an Answer.He also set the case for hearing on 1 March 2012. The hearing was held allegedly for determining whether a temporary protection order may be issued. During that hearing, counsel for De Lima, et al. manifested that a Return, not an Answer, is appropriate forAmparocases. Judge Pampilo insisted that "[s]ince no writ has been issued, return is not the required pleading but answer". The judge noted that the Rules of Court apply suppletorily inAmparocases. He opined that the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure applied and thus required an Answer. Judge Pampilo proceeded to conduct a hearing on the main case on 7 March 2012. Even without a Return nor an Answer, he ordered the parties to file their respective memoranda within five (5) working days after that hearing. Since the period to file an Answer had not yet lapsed by then, the judge also decided that the memorandum of De Lima, et al. would be filed in lieu of their Answer. The RTC rendered a "Decision"granting the issuance of the Writ ofAmparo.The RTC also granted the interim reliefs prayed for, namely: temporary protection, production and inspection orders. The production and inspection orders were in relation to the evidence and reports involving an on-going investigation of the attempted assassination of Deputy Director Esmeralda. It is not clear from the records how these pieces of evidence may be related to the alleged threat to the life, liberty or security of the respondent Gatdula. The RTC denied theMotion for Reconsiderationdated 23 March 2012 filed by De Lima, et al. ISSUE:

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Whether or not the “Decision” dated March 20, 2012 could be a judgement or final order that is appealable via Rule 45 enunciated under Section 19 of the Rule of Writ of Amparo. RULING: No. The “Decision” dated 20 March 2012 is an interlocutory order since it pertained to the issuance of the writ under Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, not the judgement under Section 18. The “decision” being interlocutory order is suggested by the fact that temporary protection, production and inspection orders were given together with the decision. The temporary protection, production and inspection orders are interim reliefs that may be granted by the court upon filing of the petition but before final judgement is rendered. Hence, a Petition for Review under Rule 45 may not yet be the proper remedy at this time since such remedy can only be availed for the final order such as a judgement under Section 18 of the Rule on Amparo.

G.R. No. 163653 July 19, 2011

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COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,Petitioner, vs. FILINVEST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,Respondent. Facts: On various dates during the years 1996 and 1997, in the meantime, FDC also extended advances in favor of its affiliates, namely, FAI, FLI, Davao Sugar Central Corporation (DSCC) and Filinvest Capital, Inc. (FCI). Duly evidenced by instructional letters as well as cash and journal vouchers, said cash advances amounted to ₱2,557,213,942.60 in 1996and ₱3,360,889,677.48 in 1997. On 3 January 2000, FDC received from the BIR a Formal Notice of Demand to pay deficiency income and documentary stamp taxes, plus interests and compromise penalties. The foregoing deficiency taxes were assessed on the taxable gain supposedly realized by FDC from the Deed of Exchange it executed with FAI and FLI, on the dilution resulting from the Shareholders’ Agreement FDC executed with RHPL as well as the "arm’s-length" interest rate and documentary stamp taxes imposable on the advances FDC extended to its affiliates. On 26 January 2000 or within the reglementary period of thirty (30) days from notice of the assessment, both FDC and FAI filed their respective requests for reconsideration/protest, on the ground that the deficiency income and documentary stamp taxes assessed by the BIR were bereft of factual and legal basis. CTA went on to render the Decision dated 10 September 2002 which, with the exception of the deficiency income tax on the interest income FDC supposedly realized from the advances it extended in favor of its affiliates, cancelled the rest of deficiency income and documentary stamp taxes assessed against FDC and FAI for the years 1996 and 1997. Dissatisfied with the foregoing decision, FDC filed on 5 November 2002 the petition for review docketed before the CA as CA-G.R. No. 72992, pursuant to Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Calling attention to the fact that the cash advances it extended to its affiliates were interest-free in the absence of the express stipulation on interest required under Article 1956 of the Civil Code, FDC questioned the imposition of an arm's-length interest rate thereon on the ground, among others, that the CIR's authority under Section 43 of the NIRC: (a) does not include the power to impute imaginary interest on said transactions; (b) is directed only against controlled 343

taxpayers and not against mother or holding corporations; and, (c) can only be invoked in cases of understatement of taxable net income or evident tax evasion. Upholding FDC's position, the CA's then Special Fifth Division granted the petition. The CIR's petitions for review on certiorari. Issue: Whether or not can the CIR impute theoretical interest on the advances made by Filinvest to its affiliates. Ruling: NO. Despite the seemingly broad power of the CIR to distribute, apportion and allocate gross income under (now) Section 50 of the Tax Code, the same does not include the power to impute theoretical interests even with regard to controlled taxpayers’ transactions. This is true even if the CIR is able to prove that interest expense (on its own loans) was in fact claimed by the lending entity. The term in the definition of gross income that even those income “from whatever source derived” is covered still requires that there must be actual or at least probable receipt or realization of the item of gross income sought to be apportioned, distributed, or allocated. Pursuant to Article 1956 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, no interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing. Considering that taxes, being burdens, are not to be presumed beyond what the applicable statute expressly and clearly declares, the rule is likewise settled that tax statutes must be construed strictly against the government and liberally in favor of the taxpayer.Accordingly, the general rule of requiring adherence to the letter in construing statutes applies with peculiar strictness to tax laws and the provisions of a taxing act are not to be extended by implication.While it is true that taxes are the lifeblood of the government, it has been held that their assessment and collection should be in accordance with law as any arbitrariness will negate the very reason for government itself.

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G.R. No. 120082 September 11, 1996 MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY vs. HON. FERDINAND J. MARCOS FACTS: Petitioner Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) was created by virtue of Republic Act No. 6958, mandated to "principally undertake the economical, efficient and effective control, management and supervision of the Mactan International Airport in the Province of Cebu and the Lahug Airport in Cebu City. Since the time of its creation, petitioner MCIAA enjoyed the privilege of exemption from payment of realty taxes in accordance with Section 14 of its Charter. On October 11, 1994, Mr. Eustaquio B. Cesa, Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Treasurer of the City of Cebu, demanded payment for realty taxes on several parcels of land belonging to the petitioner located in Cebu City, in the total amount of P2,229,078.79. Petitioner objected claiming in its favor Section 14 of RA 6958 which exempt it from payment of realty taxes. It was also asserted that it is an instrumentality of the government performing governmental functions, citing section 133 of the Local Government Code of 1991 which puts limitations on the taxing powers of local government units. Respondent City then argued that the MCIAA is a government-controlled corporation whose tax exemption privilege has been withdrawn by virtue of Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Governmental Code that took effect on January 1, 1992. The trial court dismissed the petition and ruled that with the repealing clause in RA 7160, it is safe to infer and state that the tax exemption provided for in Section 14 of RA 6958 had been expressly repealed by the provisions of the New Local Government Code of 1991. So that petitioner in this case has to pay the assessed realty tax of its properties effective after January 1, 1992 until the present. ISSUE: Whether or not MCIAA can still avail the tax exemption granted to it by Section 14 of RA 6958 in view of the provisions of Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code RULING: 345

NO. The MCIAA cannot avail tax exemption. Tax statutes must be construed strictly against the government and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. But since taxes are what we pay for civilized society, or are the lifeblood of the nation, the law frowns against exemptions from taxation and statutes granting tax exemptions are thus construedstrictissimi jurisagainst the taxpayers and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. A claim of exemption from tax payment must be clearly shown and based on language in the law too plain to be mistaken.Elsewise stated, taxation is the rule, exemption therefrom is the exception. Under Section 14 of R.A. No. 6958 the petitioner is exempt from the payment of realty taxes imposed by the National Government or any of its political subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities. Nevertheless, since taxation is the rule and exemption therefrom the exception, the exemption may thus be withdrawn at the pleasure of the taxing authority. The only exception to this rule is where the exemption was granted to private parties based on material consideration of a mutual nature, which then becomes contractual and is thus covered by the nonimpairment clause of the Constitution. Section 234 of LGC provides for the exemptions from payment of real property taxes and withdraws previous exemptions therefrom granted to natural and juridical persons, including government owned and controlled corporations, except as provided therein. Likewise, Section 193 of the LGC provides that tax exemptions or incentives granted to or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical, including government-owned, or controlled corporations, except local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A. 6938, non stock and non profit hospitals and educational constitutions, are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code. Since the last paragraph of Section 234 unequivocally withdrew, upon the effectivity of the LGC, exemptions from real property taxes granted to natural or juridical persons, including government-owned or controlled corporations, except as provided in the said section, and the petitioner is, undoubtedly, a government-owned corporation, it necessarily follows that its exemption from such tax granted it in Section 14 of its charter, R.A. No. 6958, has been withdrawn. In short, the petitioner can no longer invoke the general rule in Section 133 that the taxing powers of the local government units cannot extend to the levy of: (o) taxes, fees, or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies, or instrumentalities, and local government units. 346

G.R. No. L-69344 April 26, 1991 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and SPOUSES ANTONIO and CLARA PASTOR,respondents. FACTS: Republic of the Philippines, through the BIR, filed in the Court of First Instance, to collect from the spouses Antonio Pastor and Clara Reyes-Pastor deficiency income taxes for the years 1955 to 1959 with surcharge and monthly interest, and costs.The Pastors filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, but the motion was denied. They filed an answer admitting there was an assessment against them for income tax deficiency but denying liability therefor. They contended that they had availed of the tax amnesty under P.D.’s Nos. 23, 213 and 370 and had paid the corresponding amnesty taxes amounting of their reported untaxed income under P.D. 23, and a final payment on October 26, 1973 under P.D. 370 evidenced by the Government’s Official Receipt. The trial court heldthat the respondents had settled their income tax deficiency for the years 1955 to 1959, not under P.D. 23 or P.D. 370, but under P.D. 213. The Government appealed to the Intermediate Appellant Court, alleging that the private respondents were not qualified to avail of the tax amnesty under P.D. 213 for the benefits of that decree are available only to persons who had no pending assessment for unpaid taxes, as provided in Revenue Regulations Nos. 8-72 and 773. Since the Pastors did in fact have a pending assessment against them, they were precluded from availing of the amnesty granted in P.D.’s Nos. 23 and 213. The Government further argued that “tax exemptions should be interpretedstrictissimi jurisagainst the taxpayer. The Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) rendered a decision dismissing the Government’s appeal and holding that the payment of deficiency income taxes by the Pastors under PD. No. 213, and the acceptance thereof by the Government, operated to divest the latter of its right to further recover deficiency income taxes from the private respondents pursuant to the existing deficiency tax assessment against them ISSUES:

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Whether or not the tax amnesty payments made by the private respondents bar an action for recovery of deficient income taxes under P.D.’s Nos. 23, 213 and 370. RULING: YES. It would bar an action to recover deficient income taxes. [T]he Government is estopped from collecting the difference between the deficiency tax assessment and the amount already paid by them as amnesty tax. The finding of the appellate court that the deficiency income taxes were paid by the Pastors, and accepted by the Government, under P.D. 213, granting amnesty to persons who are required by law to file income tax returns but who failed to do so, is entitled to the highest respect and may not be disturbed except under exceptional circ*mstances The rule is that in case of doubt, tax statutes are to be construed strictly against the Government and liberally in favor of the taxpayerstrictisimi jurisfor taxes, being burdens, are not to be presumed beyond what the applicable statute (in this case P.D. 213) expressly and clearly declares.

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LINCOLN PHILIPPINE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. (now JARDINE-CMG LIFE INSURANCE CO. INC.),petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,respondents. G.R. No. 118043 July 23, 1998

FACTS: Lincoln Philippine Life Insurance Company, Inc. (Lincoln), now Jardine-CMG Life Insurance Company, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the life insurance business. In 1984, it issued 50,000 shares of stock as stock dividends, with a par value of P100 or a total of P5 million. Lincoln paid documentary stamp taxes on each certificate on the basis of its par value. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue took the view that the book value of the shares should be used as basis for determining the amount of the documentary stamp tax. This led to the Internal Revenue Commissioner to issue a deficiency documentary stamp tax assessment in excess of the par value of the stock dividends. However, the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) rendered its decision holding that the amount of the documentary stamp tax should be based on the par value stated on each certificate of stock. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue was ordered to desist from collecting said deficiency documentary stamp taxes for the same are considered withdrawn.

In turn, Commissioner of Internal Revenue appealed to the Court of Appeals which held that in assessing the tax in question, the basis should be the actual value represented by the subject shares on the assumption that stock dividends, being a distinct class of shares, are not subject to the qualification in the law as 349

to the type of certificate of stock used (with or without par value). The CA ordered Lincoln to pay the Commissioner of Internal Revenue the deficiency of documentary stamp tax on the stock dividends it issued. Hence, this instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not stock dividends involving shares with par value are subject to documentary stamp tax based on the actual value represented by each share. RULING: The Court ruled that yes, the stock dividends involving shares with par value are subject to documentary tax based on the actual value represented by each share. It is a settled rule that, in case of doubt, tax laws must be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. This is because taxes, as burdens which must be endured by the taxpayer, should not be presumed to go beyond what the law expressly and clearly declares. That such strict construction is necessary in this case is evidenced by the change in the subject provision as presently worded, which now expressly levies the said tax on shares of stock as against the privilege of issuing certificates of stock as formerly provided: Sec. 175.Stamp Tax on Original Issue of Shares of Stock. — On every original issue, whether on organization, reorganization or for any lawful purpose, ofshares of stockby any association, company or corporation, there shall be collected a documentary stamp tax of Two pesos (P2.00) on each Two hundred pesos (P200), or fractional part thereof, of the par value, of such shares of stock:Provided, That in the case of the original issue of shares of stock without par value the amount of the documentary stamp tax herein prescribed shall be based upon the actual consideration for the issuance of such shares of stock:Provided, further, That in the case of stock dividends, on the actual value represented by each share.

In this case, it is clearly stated in Sec. 175 that in the case of stock dividend, the amount to be collected for a documentary stamp shall be based on the actual value represented by each share. Lincoln who paid documentary stamp taxes on each certificate on the basis of its par value is correct. The CIR cannot oblige Lincoln to pay the deficiency documentary stamp tax assessments for their basis of computation of such was incorrect. It was clearly provided by Section 175 of the Tax Code that the computation must be based on the actual value presented by each 350

share. Thus, the Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as the deficiency tax assessment on stock dividends is concerned and the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals was reinstated.

Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation, Petitioner, Vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent G.R. No. 159471 January 26, 2011 Peralta, J. FACTS: Petitioner is a zero-rated Value Added Tax (VAT) person for being an exportr of copper concentrates. On January, 20, 1994, it filed its VAT return for the fourth quarter of 1993 showing a total input tax of P863,556,963.74 and an excess VAT credit of P842,336,291.60. On January 25, 1996, it applied for a tax refund or a tax credit certificate for the latter amount with CIR (respondent). On the same date, petitioner filed the same claim for refund with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), claiming that the two-year prescriptive period provided for under Section 230 of the Tax Code for claiming a refund was about to expire. The CTA denied the petitioner’s claim for refund due to failure to comply with the required documents. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the CTA. The Petitioner argued that the CA erred in upholding the court of tax appeals' finding in its decision dated 24 August 1998 that petitioner, in not submitting its export documents, failed to present adequate proof that its input taxes are directly attributable to its export sales. Petitioner is basically asking the Court to review the factual findings of the CTA and the CA. Petitioner insists that it had presented the necessary documents or copies thereof with the CTA that would prove that it is entitled to a tax refund. 351

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was able to show adequate evidence that it is entitled to a tax refund. RULING: No. The Court noted that when claiming a tax refund/ credit, the VAT registered taxpayer must be able to establish that it does not have refundable or creditable input VAT and the same has not been applied against its output VAT liabilities information which are supposed to be reflected in the taxpayer's VAT returns. Thus, the application must be included with copies of the taxpayer’s VAT returns for the taxable quarters concerned. In this case, the petitioners failed to submit a copy of their 1994 first quarter VAT return, which is necessary for purposes determining whether or not the claimed input taxes were applied to any of its output tax liability in the first quarter or in the succeeding quarters of 1994. “The formal offer of evidence of the petitioner failed to include photocopy of its export documents, as required. There is no way therefore, in determining the kind of goods and actual amount of export sales it allegedly made during the quarter involved. This finding is very crucial when we try to relate it with the requirement of the aforementioned regulations that the input tax being claimed for refund or tax credit must be shown to be entirely attributable to the zero-rated transaction, in this case, export sales of goods. Without the export documents, the purchase invoice/receipts submitted by the petitioner as proof of its input taxes cannot be verified as being directly attributable to the goods so exported.”

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ACCENTURE, INC.,petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,respondent. G.R. No. 190102, July 11, 2012 FACTS: Accenture Inc. (Accenture) s a corporation engaged in the business of providing management consulting, business strategies development, and selling and/or licensing of software that is registered with the BIR as a VAT taxpayer in accordance with Section 236 of the National Internal Revenue Code. The monthly and quarterly VAT returns of Accenture show that, notwithstanding its application of the input VAT credits earned from its zero-rated transactions against its output VAT liabilities, it still had excess or unutilized input VAT credits in the amount of P37,038,269.18.Thus, Accenture filed with the Department of Finance(DoF) an administrative claim for the refund or the issuance of a Tax Credit Certificate (TCC). When the DoF did not act on the claim,Accenture fileda Petition for Review with CTA praying for the issuance of a TCC in itsfavor. The CIR ruled that Accenture’s sales of goods and services to its clients are not zero-rated transactions and that it failed to prove that it is entitled to a refund due to lack of documentation. The CIR emphasized that to qualify for the zero-rating under the 1997 Tax Code, it should be proven that the recipient of the services was doing business outside of the Philippines. Since Accenture failed to prove that their foreign clients who rendered the former services were conducting business outside Philippines, it is not entitled to refund. The CTA affirmed the CIR’s decision. ISSUE:

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Whether or not Accenture is entitled to tax refund. RULING: The Court held NO. The fact that the clients are foreign does not automatically mean that they were conducting business outside the Philippines. Section 22 of the Tax Code provides: x x x (H) The term “resident foreign corporation” applies to a foreign corporation engaged in trade or business within the Philippines; (I) The term “nonresident foreign corporation” applies to a foreign corporation not engaged in trade or business within the Philippines”. Consequently, to come within the purview of Section 108 (B) (2), it is not enough that the recipient of the service be proven to be a foreign corporation; rather, it must be specifically proven to be a nonresident foreign corporation. There is no specific criterion as to what constitutes "doing" or "engaging in" or "transacting" business. here is no specific criterion as to what constitutes "doing" or "engaging in" or "transacting" business. A taxpayer claiming a tax credit or refund has the burden of proof to establish the factual basis of that claim. Tax refunds, like tax exemptions, are construed strictly against the taxpayer.54 Accenturefailed to discharge this burden. It alleged and presented evidence to proveonlythat its clients were foreign entities. However, as found by both the CTA Division and the CTAEn Banc,no evidence was presented byAccentureto prove the fact that the foreign clients to whom petitioner rendered its services were clients doing business outside the Philippines. As ruled by the CTAEn Banc,the Official Receipts, Intercompany Payment Requests, Billing Statements, Memo Invoices-Receivable, Memo Invoices-Payable, and Bank Statements presented byAccenturemerely substantiated the existence of sales, receipt of foreign currency payments, and inward remittance of the proceeds of such sales duly accounted for in accordance with BSP rules, all of these were devoid of any evidence that the clients were doing business outside of the Philippines.55 WHEREFORE, the instant Petition isDENIED. The 22 September 2009Decisionand the 23 October 2009 Resolution of the Court of Tax AppealsEn Bancin C.T.A. EB No. 477, dismissing the Petition for the refund of the excess or unutilized input VAT credits ofAccenture, Inc., areAFFIRMED. 354

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. S.C. JOHNSON AND SON, INC., and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. G.R. No. 127105 June 25, 1999 GONZAGA-REYES, J.: FACTS JOHNSON AND SON, INC a domestic corporation, entered into a license agreement with SC Johnson and Son, United States of America (USA), a non-resident foreign corporation based in the U.S.A. pursuant to which the [respondent] was granted the right to use the trademark, patents and technology owned by the latter including the right to manufacture, package and distribute the products covered by the Agreement and secure assistance in management, marketing and production from SC Johnson and Son, U. S. A. The said License Agreement was duly registered with the Technology Transfer Board of the Bureau of Patents, Trade Marks and Technology Transfer under Certificate of Registration No. 8064 . For the use of the trademark or technology, SC JOHNSON AND SON, INC was obliged to pay SC Johnson and Son, USA royalties based on a percentage of net sales and subjected the same to 25% withholding tax on royalty payments which respondent paid for the period covering July 1992 to May 1993. On October 29, 1993, SC JOHNSON AND SON, USA filed with the International Tax Affairs Division (ITAD) of the BIR a claim for refund of overpaid withholding tax on 355

royalties arguing that, since the agreement was approved by the Technology Transfer Board, the preferential tax rate of 10% should apply to the respondent. Respondent submits that royalties paid to SC Johnson and Son, USA is only subject to 10% withholding tax pursuant to the most-favored nation clause of the RP-US Tax Treaty in relation to the RP-West Germany Tax Treaty. The Internal Tax Affairs Division of the BIR ruled against SC Johnson and Son, Inc. and an appeal was filed by the former to the Court of tax appeals. The CTA ruled against CIR and ordered that a tax credit be issued in favor of SC Johnson and Son, Inc. Unpleased with the decision, the CIR filed an appeal to the CA which subsequently affirmed in toto the decision of the CTA. Hence, an appeal on certiorari was filed to the SC.

ISSUE: WON SC JOHNSON AND SON,USA IS ENTITLED TO THE MOST FAVORED NATION TAX RATE OF 10% ON ROYALTIES AS PROVIDED IN THE RP-US TAX TREATY IN RELATION TO THE RP-WEST GERMANY TAX TREATY. RULING: NO, The concessional tax rate of 10 percent provided for in the RP-Germany Tax Treaty could not apply to taxes imposed upon royalties in the RP-US Tax Treaty since the two taxes imposed under the two tax treaties are not paid under similar circ*mstances, they are not containing similar provisions on tax crediting. The United States is the state of residence since the taxpayer, S. C. Johnson and Son, U. S. A., is based there. Under the RP-US Tax Treaty, the state of residence and the state of source are both permitted to tax the royalties, with a restraint on the tax that may be collected by the state of source. Furthermore, the method employed to give relief from double taxation is the allowance of a tax credit to citizens or residents of the United States against the United States tax, but such amount shall not exceed the limitations provided by United States law for the taxable year. The Philippines may impose one of three rates- 25 percent of the gross amount of the royalties; 15 percent when the royalties are paid by a corporation registered with the Philippine Board of Investments and engaged in preferred areas of activities; or the lowest rate of Philippine tax that may be imposed on royalties of the same kind paid under similar circ*mstances to a resident of a third state.

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Given the purpose underlying tax treaties and the rationale for the most favored nation clause, the Tax Treaty should apply only if the taxes imposed upon royalties in the RP-US Tax Treaty and in the RP-Germany Tax Treaty are paid under similar circ*mstances. This would mean that private respondent must prove that the RP-US Tax Treaty grants similar tax reliefs to residents of the United States in respect of the taxes imposable upon royalties earned from sources within the Philippines as those allowed to their German counterparts under the RPGermany Tax Treaty. The RP-US and the RP-West Germany Tax Treaties do not contain similar provisions on tax crediting. Article 24 of the RP-Germany Tax Treaty, supra, expressly allows crediting against German income and corporation tax of 20% of the gross amount of royalties paid under the law of the Philippines. On the other hand, Article 23 of the RP-US Tax Treaty, which is the counterpart provision with respect to relief for double taxation, does not provide for similar crediting of 20% of the gross amount of royalties paid. At the same time, the intention behind the adoption of the provision on relief from double taxation in the two tax treaties in question should be considered in light of the purpose behind the most favored nation clause. TAX REFUNDS ARE IN THE NATURE OF TAX EXEMPTIONS, AND AS SUCH THEY ARE REGARDED AS IN DEROGATION OF SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY AND TO BE CONSTRUED STRICTISSIMI JURIS AGAINST THE PERSON OR ENTITY CLAIMING THE EXEMPTION. It bears stress that tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions. As such they are regarded as in derogation of sovereign authority and to be construed strictissimi juris against the person or entity claiming the exemption. The burden of proof is upon him who claims the exemption in his favor and he must be able to justify his claim by the clearest grant of organic or statute law. Private respondent is claiming for a refund of the alleged overpayment of tax on royalties; however, there is nothing on record to support a claim that the tax on royalties under the RP-US Tax Treaty is paid under similar circ*mstances as the tax on royalties under the RP-West Germany Tax Treaty. Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. S.C. Johnson and Son, Inc., 309 SCRA 87, G.R. No. 127105 June 25, 1999

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Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Eastern Telecommunications Philippines G.R. No. 163835 July 7, 2010 Brion, J. Facts: Eastern filed with the CIR a written application for refund or credit of unapplied input taxes it paid on the imported equipment purchased during 1995 and 1996 amounting to P22,013,134.00. To toll the running of the two-year prescriptive period under the same provision, Eastern filed an appeal with the CTA. The CTA found that Eastern has a valid claim for the refund/credit of the unapplied input taxes, declaring it entitled to a tax refund of P16,229,100.00. The CIR filed a motion for reconsideration of the CTA’s decision. Subsequently, it filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration. The CTA denied the CIR’s motion for reconsideration. The CIR then elevated the case to the CA, who affirmed the CTA ruling and likewise denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present petition. The CIR posits that, applying Section 104(A) of the Tax Code on apportionment of tax credits, Eastern is entitled to a tax refund of only a portion of the amount claimed. Since the VAT returns clearly reflected income from exempt sales, the CIR asserts that this constitutes as an admission on Eastern’s part that it engaged in transactions 358

not subject to VAT. Hence, the proportionate allocation of the tax credit to VAT and non-VAT transactions provided in Section 104(A) of the Tax Code should apply. Eastern objects to the arguments raised in the petition, alleging that these have not been raised in the Answer filed by the CIR before the CTA and was only raised. In fact, the CIR only raised the applicability of Section 104(A) of the Tax Code in his supplemental motion for reconsideration of the CTA’s ruling. Eastern claims that for the CIR to raise such an issue now would constitute a violation of its right to due process; following settled rules of procedure and fair play, the CIR should not be allowed at the appeal level to change his theory of the case. Eastern further argues that there is no evidence on record that would evidently show that respondent is also engaged in other transactions that are not subject to VAT.

Issue: Whether or not the rule in Section 104(A) of the Tax Code on the apportionment of tax credits can be applied in appreciating Eastern’s claim for tax refund, considering that the matter was raised by the CIR only when he sought reconsideration of the CTA ruling Ruling: Yes. The question of the applicability of Section 104(A) of the Tax Code was already raised but the tax court did not rule on it. This failure should not be taken against the CIR. The mere declaration of exempt sales in the VAT returns, whether based on Section 103 of the Tax Code or some other special law, should have prompted for the application of Section 104 (A) of the Tax Code to Eastern’s claim. The general rule is that appeals can only raise questions of law or fact that (a) were raised in the court below, and (b) are within the issues framed by the parties therein. An issue which was neither averred in the pleadings nor raised during trial in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. The rule against raising new issues on appeal is not without exceptions; it is a procedural rule that the Court may relax when compelling reasons so warrant or when justice requires it. What constitutes good and sufficient cause that would merit suspension of the rules is discretionary upon the courts (CIR v. Mirant Pagbilao 359

Corporation, G.R. No. 159593). Another exception is when the question involves matters of public importance. “Taxes are the lifeblood of the government.” For this reason, the right of taxation cannot easily be surrendered; statutes granting tax exemptions are considered as a derogation of the sovereign authority and are strictly construed against the person or entity claiming the exemption. Claims for tax refunds, when based on statutes granting tax exemption or tax refund, partake of the nature of an exemption; thus, the rule of strict interpretation against the taxpayer-claimant similarly applies. The taxpayer is charged with the heavy burden of proving that he has complied with and satisfied all the statutory and administrative requirements to be entitled to the tax refund. This burden cannot be offset by the non-observance of procedural technicalities by the government’s tax agents when the non-observance of the remedial measure addressing it does not in any manner prejudice the taxpayer’s due process rights. CIR VS. PROCTER AND GAMBLE PHILIPPINES G.R NO: 66838 2 DECEMBER 1991 FACTS: Procter and Gamble Philippines declared dividends payable to its parent company and sole stockholder, P&G USA. Such dividends amounted to Php 24.1M. P&G Phil paid a 35% dividend withholding tax to the BIR which amounted to Php 8.3M It subsequently filed a claim with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for a refund or tax credit, claiming that pursuant to Section 24(b)(1) of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 369, the applicable rate of withholding tax on the dividends remitted was only 15%. ISSUE: Whether or not P&G Philippines is entitled to the refund or tax credit. RULING: YES. P&G Philippines is entitled. Sec 24 (b) (1) of the NIRC states that an ordinary 35% tax rate will be applied to dividend remittances to non-resident corporate stockholders of a Philippine corporation. This rate goes down to 15% ONLY IF he country of domicile of the 360

foreign stockholder corporation “shall allow” such foreign corporation a tax credit for “taxes deemed paid in the Philippines,” applicable against the tax payable to the domiciliary country by the foreign stockholder corporation. However, such tax credit for “taxes deemed paid in the Philippines” MUST, as a minimum, reach an amount equivalent to 20 percentage points which represents the difference between the regular 35% dividend tax rate and the reduced 15% tax rate. Thus, the test is if USA “shall allow” P&G USA a tax credit for ”taxes deemed paid in the Philippines” applicable against the US taxes of P&G USA, and such tax credit must reach at least 20 percentage points. Requirements were met.

REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES v. KERRY LAO ONG (DIGEST) 18 June 2012 GR No. 175430 Facts: The respondent, Kerry Lao Ong, filed for a petition for naturalization in 1996. Ong was born in Cebu City to Chinese parents. He was raised and educated in the Philippines, having studied in the Sacred Heart School for Boys in Cebu, and the Ateneo de Manila University. In 1981, he married Grezilda Yap, also a Chinese citizen, and fathered four children, which upon filing of petition were all of school age, and were enrolled in exclusive schools in Cebu. In his petition, he alleged that he is a “businessman/business manager,” and has been since 1989. However, when he testified, he alleged that he has been a businessman since after he graduated from college in 1978. He made no mention of the nature of his “business.” He also alleged that he earns an average annual income of P150,000.00, and presented four tax returns as “proof” of said income (amounting to P60,000.00, P118,000.00, P118,000.00 and P128,000.00). In 2001, the trial court granted his petition, and was admitted as a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines. 361

In 2003, The Republic, through the Solicitor General appealed the decision to the CA, which was then denied. ISSUE: Whether or not Ong has proved that he has some lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation in accordance with Section 2, Paragraph 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law. RULING: The Court held thatNaturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. The burden of proof rests upon the applicant to show full and complete compliance with the requirements of law. Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of “some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation” means “not only that the person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life.It must be shown that the employment gives one an income such that there is an appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid one’s becoming the object of charity or a public charge.It has been held that in determining the existence of a lucrative income,the courts should consider only the applicant’s income; his or her spouse’s income should not be included in the assessment. The applicant provided no documentary evidence, like business permits, registration, official receipts, or other business records to demonstrate his proprietorship or participation in a business. Instead,Ong relied on his general assertions to prove his possession of “some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation.”Bare, general assertions cannot discharge the burden of proof that is required of an applicant for naturalization.

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Clearly, therefore, respondentOng failed to prove that he possesses the qualification of a known lucrative trade provided in Section 2, fourth paragraph, of the Revised Naturalization Law. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition of the Republic of the Philippines isGRANTED. The Petition for Naturalization of Kerry Lao Ong isDENIEDfor failure to comply with Section 2, fourth paragraph, of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, and MA. MARGARITA M. GALON,Petitioners, vs. PHIL PHARMA WEALTH, INC.,Respondent. DEL CASTILLO,J.: G.R. No. 182358, February 20, 2013 FACTS: On August 28, 2000, the DOH issued Memorandum No. 171-Cwhich provided for a list and category of sanctions to be imposed on accredited government suppliers of pharmaceutical products in case of adverse findings regarding their products (e.g.substandard, fake, or misbranded) or violations committed by them during their accreditation. DOH, through former Undersecretary Ma. Margarita M. Galon, issued Memorandum No. 209 series of 2000,inviting representatives of 24 accredited drug companies, including herein respondent Phil Pharmawealth, Inc. (PPI) to a meeting.

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Undersecretary Galon handed them copies of a document entitled "Report on Violative Products" issued by the Bureau of Food and Drugs(BFAD), which detailed violations or adverse findings relative to these accredited drug companies’ products. Specifically, the BFAD found that PPI’s products which were being sold to the public were unfit for human consumption. During the meeting, the 24 drug companies were directed to submit within 10 days, or until November 6, 2000, their respective explanations on the adverse findings covering their respective products contained in the Report on Violative Products. Instead of submitting its written explanation within the 10-day period as required, PPI belatedly sent a letterdated November 13, 2000 addressed to Undersecretary Galon, informing her that PPI has referred the Report on Violative Products to its lawyers with instructions to prepare the corresponding reply. Undersecretary Galon found PPI’s letter "untenable" PPI’s, therein informed PPI that, effective immediately, its accreditation has been suspended for two years pursuant to AO 10 and Memorandum No. 171-C. PPI filed before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City a Complaintseeking to declare null and void certain DOH administrative issuances, with prayer for damages and injunction against the DOH, former Secretary Romualdez and DOH Undersecretary Galon, docketed as Civil Case No. 68200. The trial court dismissed Civil Case No. 68200, declaring the case to be one instituted against the State, in which case the principle of state immunity from suit is applicable.PPI moved for reconsideration,but the trial court remained steadfast. PPI appealed to the CA. The CA reversed the trial court ruling and ordered the remand of the case for the conduct of further proceedings. The CA concluded that it was premature for the trial court to have dismissed the Complaint. ISSUE: WON Civil Case No. 68200 be dismissed for being a suit against the state? RULING: The petition is granted.

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As a general rule, a state may not be sued. However, if it consents, either expressly or impliedly, then it may be the subject of a suitThere is express consent when a law, either special or general, so provides. On the other hand, there is implied consent when the state "enters into a contract or it itself commences litigation."However, it must be clarified that when a state enters into a contract, it does not automatically mean that it has waived its non-suability.The State "will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability [only] if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. [However,] when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity [,] x x x no such waiver may be implied." "Statutory provisions waiving [s]tate immunity are construedin strictissimi juris. For, waiver of immunity is in derogation of sovereignty.” The DOH can validly invoke state immunity. The DOH, being an "unincorporated agency of the government"can validly invoke the defense of immunity from suit because it has not consented, either expressly or impliedly, to be sued. Significantly, the DOH is an unincorporated agency which performs functions of governmental character. The mantle of non-suability extends to complaints filed against public officials for acts done in the performance of their official functions. As regards the other petitioners, to wit, Secretaries Romualdez and Dayrit, and Undersecretary Galon, it must be stressed that the doctrine of state immunity extends its protective mantle also to complaints filed against state officials for acts done in the discharge and performance of their duties." The suability of a government official depends on whether the official concerned was acting within his official or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts done in the performance of official functions will result in a charge or financial liability against the government."Otherwise stated, "public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they have actedultra viresor where there is showing of bad faith.” Thus, Civil Case No. 68200 is dismissed.

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Salvacion vs. Central Bank G.R. No: 94723 August 21, 1997 FACTS: On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and lured petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his apartment. Therein, Greg Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four days, or up to February 7, 1989 and was able to rape the child once on February 4, and three times each day on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989. On February 7, 1989, after policemen and people living nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was arrested and detained at the Makati Municipal Jail. The 366

policemen recovered from Bartelli the following items: 1.) Dollar Check No. 368, 2.) COCOBANK Bank Book No. 104-108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account — China Banking Corp., 4.) VALID ID; 5.) Philippine Money (P234.00) cash; 6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear) used in seducing the complainant. On February 16, 1989, Makati Investigating Fiscal Edwin G. Condaya filed against Greg Bartelli, Criminal Case No. 801 for Serious Illegal Detention and Criminal Cases for four (4) counts of Rape. On the same day, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati Civil Case No. 89-3214 for damages with preliminary attachment against Greg Bartelli. On February 24, 1989, the day there was a scheduled hearing for Bartelli's petition for bail the latter escaped from jail. The Deputy Sheriff of Makati served a Notice of Garnishment on China Banking Corporation. In a letter dated March 13, 1989 to the Deputy Sheriff of Makati, China Banking Corporation invoked Republic Act No. 1405 as its answer to the notice of garnishment served on it. On March 15, 1989, Deputy Sheriff of Makati Armando de Guzman sent his reply to China Banking Corporation saying that the garnishment did not violate the secrecy of bank deposits since the disclosure is merely incidental to a garnishment properly and legally made by virtue of a court order which has placed the subject deposits in custodia legis. In answer to this letter of the Deputy Sheriff of Makati, China Banking Corporation, in a letter dated March 20, 1989, invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 to the effect that the dollar deposits or defendant Greg Bartelli are exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body, whatsoever. This prompted the counsel for petitioners to make an inquiry with the Central Bank in a letter dated April 25, 1989 on whether Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 has any exception or whether said section has been repealed or amended since said section has rendered nugatory the substantive right of the plaintiff to have the claim sought to be enforced by the civil action secured by way of the writ of preliminary attachment as granted to the plaintiff under Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court. ISSUE: Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient? RULING: NO. Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the favorable judgment and award of damages that Salvacion and her parents fully 367

deserve. It then proceeded to show that the economic basis for the enactment of RA No. 6426 is not anymore present; and even if it still exists, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circ*mstances. Respondents are hereby required to comply with the writ of execution issued in the civil case and to release to petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in such amount as would satisfy the judgment. The intention of the law may be good when enacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as the case before us. Adjudging Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 as contrary to the provisions of the Constitution, hence void; because its provision that "Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever has taken away the right of petitioners to have the bank deposit of defendant Greg Bartelli Northcott garnished to satisfy the judgment rendered in petitioners' favor in violation of substantive due process guaranteed by the Constitution; has given foreign currency depositors an undue favor or a class privilege in violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution; has provided a safe haven for criminals like the herein respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott since criminals could escape civil liability for their wrongful acts by merely converting their money to a foreign currency and depositing it in a foreign currency deposit account with an authorized bank.

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HON. JUAN M. HAGAD, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, petitioner, vs. HON. MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE, Presiding Judge, Branch XXVIII, Regional Trial Court, Mandaue City, Mandaue City Mayor ALFREDO M. OUANO, Mandaue City Vice-Mayor PATERNO CAÑETE and Mandaue City Sangguniang Panlungsod Member RAFAEL MAYOL, respondents. G.R. No. 108072 December 12, 1995 Facts:

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On 22 July 1992, Mandaue City Councilors Magno B. Dionson and Gaudiosa O. Bercede with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas filed criminal and administrative complaints against respondents (mayor, vice mayor, sangguniang panglungsod and all other public officials of Mandaue City) for having violated R.A. No. 3019, as amended, Articles 170 and 171 of the Revised Penal Code; and R.A. No. 6713. Councilors Dionson and Bercede averred that respondent officials, acting in conspiracy, had caused the alteration and/or falsification of Ordinance No. 018/92 by increasing the allocated appropriation therein from P3,494,364.57 to P7,000,000.00 without authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue City. Aside from opposing the motion for preventive suspension, respondent officials, on 05 August 1992, prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Ombudsman supposedly was bereft of jurisdiction to try, hear and decide the administrative case filed against them since, under Section 63 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the power to investigate and impose administrative sanctions against said local officials, as well as to effect their preventive suspension, had now been vested with the Office of the President. In his memorandum, Mayor Ouano reiterated that, under Sections 61 and 63 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the Office of the President, not the Office of the Ombudsman, could lawfully take cognizance of administrative complaints against any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city or an independent component city and to impose disciplinary sanctions, including preventive suspensions, and that there was nothing in the provision of the Constitution giving to the Office of the Ombudsman superior powers than those of the President over elective officials of local governments. Respondent officials were formally placed under preventive suspension by the Deputy Ombudsman pursuant to an Order. On 25 September 1992, a petition for prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, was filed by respondent officials with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City. Acting favorably on the pleas of petitioning officials, respondent Judge issued, on even date, a restraining order directed at petitioner, enjoining him ". . . from enforcing and/or implementing the questioned order of preventive suspension issued in OMB-VIS-ADM-92-015." 370

RTC ruled that Since the investigatory power of the Ombudsman is so general, broad and vague and gives wider discretion to disciplining authority to impose administrative sanctions against a responsible public official or employee while that of Section 60 of the New Local Government Code provides for more well defined and specific grounds upon which a local elective official can be subjected to administrative disciplinary action, that it Could be considered that the latter law could be an exception to the authority and administrative power of the Ombudsman to conduct an investigation against local elective officials and as such, the jurisdiction now to conduct administrative investigation against local elective officials is already lodged before the offices concerned under Section 61 of Republic Act No. 7160. Issue: Whether the Ombudsman under Republic Act ("R.A.") No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, has been divested of his authority to conduct administrative investigations over local elective officials by virtue of the subsequent enactment of R.A. Ruling: The general investigatory power of the Ombudsman is decreed by Section 13 (1,) Article XI, of the 1987 Constitution, The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government… Taken in conjunction with Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, petitioner thus contends that the Office of the Ombudsman correspondingly has the authority to decree preventive suspension on any public officer or employee under investigation by it. The Solicitor-General has viewed the Local Government Code of 1991 as having conferred, but not on an exclusive basis, on the Office of the President (and the various Sanggunians) disciplinary authority over local elective officials. He posits the stand that the Code did not withdraw the power of the Ombudsman theretofore vested under R.A. 6770 conformably with a constitutional mandate Indeed, there is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other . 371

Well settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication are not favored, and that courts must generally assume their congruent application. The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject. Likewise noteworthy is Section 27 of the law which prescribes a direct recourse to this Court on matters involving orders arising from administrative disciplinary cases originating from the Office of the Ombudsman; thus: Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. — . . .In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS ) et al. vs. HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila G.R. No. 156052 March 7, 2007 Facts: Ordinance No. 8027 enacted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Manila reclassified the area from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called “Pandacan Terminals” of the oil companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation. 372

However, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which they agreed that “the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option.” In the MOU, the oil companies were required to remove 28 tanks starting with the LPG spheres and to commence work for the creation of safety buffer and green zones surrounding the Pandacan Terminals. In exchange, the City Mayor and the DOE will enable the oil companies to continuously operate within the limited area resulting from joint operations and the scale down program. The Sangguniang Panlungosod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97. Petitioners pray for a mandamus to be issued against Mayor Atienza to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies. Issue: Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals. Ruling: Yes. The mayor has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 because the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to “enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city.” One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunianor annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so. In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., it provides that officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional.

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Koruga v. Arcenas, Jr., G.R. No. 168332 19 June 2009 Facts: Koruga is a minority stockholder of Banco Filipino

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On August 20, 2003, she filed a complaint before the Makati RTC Koruga's complaint alleged: 1 Violation of Sections 31 to 34 of the Corporation Code ("Code") which prohibit selfdealing and conflicts of interest of directors and officers 10.2 Right of a stockholder to inspect the records of a corporation (including financial statements) under Sections 74 and 75 of the Code 10.3 Receivership and Creation of a Management Committee On September 12, 2003, Arcenas, et al. filed their Answer raising, among others, the trial court's lack of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case. They also filed a Manifestation and Motion seeking the dismissal of the case In an Order dated October 18, 2004, the trial court denied the Manifestation and Motion On February 9, 2005, the CA issued a 60-day TRO enjoining Judge Marella from conducting further proceedings in the case. On February 22, 2005, the RTC issued a Notice of Pre-trial[9] setting the case for pre-trial on June 2 and 9, 2005. Arcenas, et al. filed a Manifestation and Motion[10] before the CA, reiterating their application for a writ of... preliminary injunction. Thus, on April 18, 2005, the CA issued the assailed Resolution, which reads in part: (C)onsidering that the Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on February 9, 2005 expired on April 10, 2005, it is necessary that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued in order not to render ineffectual whatever final resolution this Court may render... in this case, after the petitioners shall have posted a bond Dissatisfied, Koruga filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Koruga alleged that the CA effectively gave due course to Arcenas, et al.'s petition when it issued a writ of preliminary injunction without factual or legal basis Meanwhile, on March 13, 2006, this Court issued a Resolution granting the prayer for a TRO and enjoining the Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 138, from proceeding with the hearing of the case upon the filing by Arcenas, et al. of a P50,000.00 bond. G.R. No. 169053

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In their Petition, Arcenas, et al. asked the Court to set aside the Decision[14] dated July 20, 2005 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 88422, which denied their petition, having found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Makati RTC. The CA said that... the RTC Orders were interlocutory in nature and, thus, may be assailed by certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Issue: Whether or not which body has jurisdiction over the Koruga Complaint, the RTC or the BSP? Ruling: We hold that it is the BSP that has jurisdiction over the case. the acts complained of pertain to the conduct of Banco Filipino's banking business. The law vests in the BSP the supervision over operations and activities of banks. Specifically, the BSP's supervisory and regulatory powers include:... conduct of examination to determine compliance with laws and regulations if the circ*mstances so warrant as determined by the Monetary Board; Overseeing to ascertain that laws and Regulations are complied with; Regular investigation which shall not be oftener than once a year from the last date of examination to determine whether an institution is conducting its business on a safe or sound basis Inquiring into the solvency and liquidity of the institution Correlatively, the General Banking Law of 2000 specifically deals with loans contracted by bank directors or officers, thus: SECTION 36. Restriction on Bank Exposure to Directors, Officers, Stockholders and Their Related Interests. The Monetary Board may regulate the amount of loans, credit accommodations and guarantees that may be extended, directly or indirectly, by a bank to its directors, officers, stockholders and their related interests, as well as investments of such bank in enterprises owned or... controlled by said directors, officers, stockholders and their related interests.

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Furthermore, the authority to determine whether a bank is conducting business in an unsafe or unsound manner is also vested in the Monetary Board. Finally, the New Central Bank Act grants the Monetary Board the power to impose administrative sanctions on the erring bank: Section 37. the Monetary Board may, at its discretion, impose upon... any bank or quasi-bank, their directors and/or officers... or any commission of irregularities, and/or conducting business in an unsafe or unsound manner as may be determined by the Monetary Board Koruga's invocation of the provisions of the Corporation Code is misplaced. In an earlier case with similar antecedents, we ruled that: The Corporation Code, however, is a general law applying to all types of corporations, while the New Central Bank Act regulates specifically banks and other financial institutions, including the dissolution and liquidation thereof. As between a general and special... law, the latter shall prevail - generalia specialibus non derogant. Consequently, it is not the Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-Corporate Controversies,[32] or Rule 59 of the Rules of Civil Procedure on Receivership, that would apply to this case. Instead, Sections 29 and 30 of the New Central Bank Act should be... followed , viz.: Section 30. the Monetary Board may summarily and without need for prior... hearing forbid the institution from doing business in the Philippines and designate the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver of the banking institution. actions of the Monetary Board taken under this section or under Section 29 of this Act shall be final and executory, and may not be restrained or set aside by the court except on petition for certiorari on the ground that the action taken was in excess of... jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. the appointment of a receiver under this section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board. 377

On the strength of these provisions, it is the Monetary Board that exercises exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings for receivership of banks. From the foregoing disquisition, there is no doubt that the RTC has no jurisdiction to hear and decide a suit that seeks to place Banco Filipino under receivership. the court's jurisdiction could only have been invoked after the Monetary Board had taken action on the matter and only on the ground that the action taken was in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of... jurisdiction.

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Hacienda Luisita, Inc. (HLI) vs. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), et al. GR No. 171101 FACTS: On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLI’s Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government. The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to “immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.” The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision. ISSUE: (1) Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case? (2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional? (3) Can’t the Court order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP? (4) Is the date of the “taking” (for purposes of determining the just compensation payable to HLI) November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP? 379

(5) Has the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 lapsed on May 10, 1999 (since Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP coverage through the SDOA scheme on May 11, 1989), and thus the qualified FWBs should now be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties, whether they have fully paid for the lands or not? (6) THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI be reconsidered? RULING: [The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of respondents PARC, et al. with respect to the option granted to the original farmworkersbeneficiaries (FWBs) of Hacienda Luisita to remain with petitioner HLI, which option the Court thereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE. It reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, and UNANIMOUSLY directed immediate land distribution to the qualified FWBs.] 1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case. [The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made by the President or the administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and consequences that must be respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the application of the operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed to retain the benefits and homelots they received under the stock distribution scheme, they were also given the option to choose for themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.] 2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional. [The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the 380

constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that may justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.] 3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP. [Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the SDP, which only involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then the Court is constrained to rule only as regards the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land. Nonetheless, this should not prevent the DAR, under its mandate under the agrarian reform law, from subsequently subjecting to agrarian reform other agricultural lands originally held by Tadeco that were allegedly not transferred to HLI but were supposedly covered by RA 6657. However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision appears too restrictive – considering that there are roads, irrigation canals, and other portions of the land that are considered commonly-owned by farmworkers, and these may necessarily result in the decrease of the area size that may be awarded per FWB – the Court reconsiders its Decision and resolves to give the DAR leeway in adjusting the area that may be awarded per FWB in case the number of actual qualified FWBs decreases. In order to ensure the proper distribution of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per qualified FWB, and considering that matters involving strictly the administrative implementation and enforcement of agrarian reform laws are within the jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the latter which shall determine the area with which each qualified FWB will be awarded. On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-hectare portion of Hacienda Luisita that have been validly converted to industrial use and have been acquired by intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the separate 80.51hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government, should be excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution. The Court however ordered that the 381

unused balance of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and of the 80.51-hectare land used for the SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs.] 4. YES, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP. [For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989 (the date when PARC approved HLI’s SDP) since this is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, on November 21, 1989. Such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. On the contention of the minority (Justice Sereno) that the date of the notice of coverage [after PARC’s revocation of the SDP], that is, January 2, 2006, is determinative of the just compensation that HLI is entitled to receive, the Court majority noted that none of the cases cited to justify this position involved the stock distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do not squarely apply to the instant case. The foregoing notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an original action with the RTC acting as a special agrarian court to determine just compensation. The court has the right to review with finality the determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.] 5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 has NOT lapsed on May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified FWBs should NOT yet be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties. [Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed after 10 years from the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of land ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year prohibitive period has not even started. Significantly, the reckoning point is the issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not the placing of the agricultural lands under CARP coverage. Moreover, should the FWBs be immediately allowed the option to sell or convey their interest in the subject lands, then all efforts at agrarian reform would be rendered nugatory, since, at the end of the day, these lands will just be transferred to persons not entitled to land distribution under CARP.] 6. YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an 382

option to remain as stockholders of HLI should be reconsidered. [The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain control [over the subject lands] given the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI. The Court noted that the share of the FWBs in the HLI capital stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this 33.296% unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be in the hands of the FWBs. Control means the majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share of the common shares and other voting shares. Applying the formula to the HLI stockholdings, the number of shares that will constitute the majority is 295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital shares divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI share). The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially fall short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control over HLI.]

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TUNA PROCESSING INC VS PHILIPPINE KINGFORD, INC G.R. NO. 185582 February 29, 2012 FACTS: On January 14, 2003, Kanemitsu Yamaoka and five (5) Philippine tuna processors, namely, Angel Seafood Corporation, East Asia Fish Co., Inc., Mommy Gina Tuna Resources, Santa Cruz Seafoods, Inc., and respondent Kingford entered into a Memorandum of Agreement. The parties likewise executed a Supplemental Memorandum of Agreement dated January 15, 2003 and an Agreement to Amend Memorandum of Agreement dated July 14, 2003. Due to a series of events, the five Philippine tuna processors and respondent Kingford withdrew from petitioner TPI and correspondingly backed out on their obligations. Petitioner submitted the dispute for arbitration before the International Center for Dispute Resolution in California, United States and won the case against respondent. To enforce the award, petitioner TPI filed a Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award before the RTC of Makati City. In the RTC of Makati City, respondent Kingford filed a Motion to Dismiss. After the court denied the motion for lack of merit, respondent sought for the inhibition of Judge Alameda and moved for the reconsideration of the order denying the motion. Judge Alameda inhibited himself, to which the case was re-raffled to Judge Ruiz, who granted respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration and dismissed the petition on the ground that the petitioner lacked legal capacity to sue in the Philippines. Petitioner TPI now seeks to nullify, in this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, the order of the trial court dismissing its Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award. ISSUE: WON a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines have the legal capacity to sue under the provisions of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004. 384

RULING: Yes, a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines have the legal capacity to sue under the provisions of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004. The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 shall apply in this case as the Act, as its title - An Act to Institutionalize the Use of an Alternative Dispute Resolution System in the Philippines and to Establish the Office for Alternative Dispute Resolution, and for Other Purposes - would suggest, is a law especially enacted to actively promote party autonomy in the resolution of disputes or the freedom of the party to make their own arrangements to resolve their disputes. It specifically provides exclusive grounds available to the party opposing an application for recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award. The Corporation Code is the general law providing for the formation, organization, and regulation of private corporations. As between a general and special law, the latter shall prevail - generalia specialibus non derogant.

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MARIA VIRGINIA V. REMO,Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,Respondent G.R. No. 169202 March 5, 2010

FACTS: The petitioner, Maria Virginia V. Remo, is a Filipino citizen married to Francisco R. Rallonza. Her passport had entries of the following: “Maria Virginia” as her given name; “Remo” as her middle name; and “Rallonza” as her surname. Before the expiry of the validity of her passport, applied for renewal of her passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) office in the USA. Upon application, petitioner requested to revert her surname to her maiden name while her marriage is still subsisting. It was denied by the DFA stating that, “Use of maiden name is allowed in passport application only if the married name has not been used in previous application.” Petitioner filed an appeal with the Office of the President. She contended that since her marriage to her husband is still subsisting, Section 5(d) of RA No. 8239 (instances when a married woman may revert to the use of her maiden name) does not apply in her case. She further contended that this prohibition, conflicts with and, thus, operates as an implied repeal of Article 370 of the Civil Code. The Office of the President ruled that, Section 5(d) of RA No. 8239 or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996 “offers no leeway for any other interpretation than that only in case of divorce, annulment, or declaration (of nullity) of marriage may a married woman revert to her maiden name for passport purposes.” It held that, when there is a conflict between a general and special law, the latter will control the former regardless of the respective dates of passage. Since the Civil Code is the general law, RA No. 8239 shall be upheld. The Court of Appeals denied the petition for review and affirmed the ruling of the office of the President. Hence, the present petition.

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ISSUE: WON the petitioner can revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport.

RULING: No. The petitioner cannot revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport. Both provisions in Article 370 of the Civil Code and in RA No. 8239 does not prohibit a married woman from using her maiden name in her passport. However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in her assport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA No. 8239 which are: death of husband, divorce, annulment, or nullity of marriage. Since the petitioner’s case does not fall in any of the mentioned circ*mstances, she may not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport. A married woman’s reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based only on the severance of the marriage. Assuming RA No. 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the provisions of RA No. 8239 specifically dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of the Civil Ccode which is the general law on the use of surnames. A basic tenet in statutory construction is that a special law prevails over a general law, thus: “It is a familiar rule of statutory construction that to the extent of any necessary repugnancy between a general and a special law or provision, the latter will control the former without regard to the respective dates of passage.”

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G.R. No. 172642 June 13, 2012 ESTATE OF NELSON R. DULAY, represented by his wife MERRIDY JANE P. DULAY,Petitioner, vs. ABOITIZ JEBSEN MARITIME, INC. and GENERAL CHARTERERS, INC.,Respondents. Facts: Nelson Dulay was employed by General Charterers Inc, a subsidiary of copetitioner Aboitiz Jebsen Inc. since 1986. He initially worked as an ordinary seaman and later as bosun on a contractual basis. From September 3, 1999 up to July 19, 2000, Nelson was detained in petitioner’s vessel, the MV Kickapoo Belle. After the completion of his employment contact, Nelson died due to acute renal failure. At this time of his death, Nelson was a bona fide member of the Associated Marine Officers, GCI’s collective bargaining agent. Nelson’s widow, Merridy Jane, thereafter claimed for death benefits through the grievance procedure of the Collective Bargaining Agent. However, the grievance procedure was “declared deadlocked” as petitioners refused to grant the benefits sought by the widow. Merridy Jane filed a complaint with the NLRC against GCI for death and medical benefits and damages. Respondent on the other hand refused to award the same on the ground that there is no employer-employee relation between GC and Nelson at the time of his death. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner, ordering respondents to pay the money. Issue: Whether or not the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the case. Ruling: Yes. The voluntary Arbitrator must take cognizance of this case. The specific or special provisions of the Labor Code govern. Articles 217 par. C and 261 of the Labor Code in stating that voluntary arbitrators have jurisdiction over cases from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements. Section 29 of the prevailing Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino

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on Board Ocean Going Vessels, promulgated by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), provides as follows: Section 29. Dispute Settlement Procedures – In cases of claims and disputes arising from this employment, the parties covered by a collective bargaining agreement shall submit the claim or dispute to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators. The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) shall exercise original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide disciplinary action on cases, which are administrative in character, involving or arising out of violations of recruitment laws, rules and regulations involving employers, principals, contracting partners and Filipino seafarers. It is clear from the above that the interpretation of the DOLE, in consultation with their counterparts in the respective committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives, as well as the DFA and the POEA is that with respect to disputes involving claims of Filipino seafarers wherein the parties are covered by a collective bargaining agreement, the dispute or claim should be submitted to the jurisdiction of a voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators.

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Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation vs. Stockholders of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, supra. Facts: The Central Bank of the Philippines, now known as Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, filed on June 17, 1987 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati a Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (Intercity Bank)... alleging that, inter alia, said bank was already insolvent and its continuance in business would involve probable loss to depositors, creditors and the general public.[1] Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court gave it due course.[2] Petitioner Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) was eventually substituted as the therein petitioner, liquidator of Intercity Bank.[3] In the meantime, Republic Act No. 9302 (RA 9302)[4] was enacted, Section 12 of which provides: SECTION 12. Before any distribution of the assets of the closed bank in accordance with the preferences established by law, the Corporation shall periodically charge against said assets reasonable receivership expenses and subject to approval by the proper court,... reasonable liquidation expenses, it has incurred as part of the cost of receivership/liquidation proceedings and collect payment therefor from available assets. PDIC filed on August 8, 2005 a Motion for Approval of the Final Distribution of Assets and Termination of the Liquidation Proceedings The reimbursem*nt of the liquidation fees and expenses P3,795,096.05; The provision of P700,000.00 for future expenses in the implementation of this distribution and the winding-up of the liquidation of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. 390

The write-off of assets in the total amount of P8,270,789.99,... The write-off of liabilities in the total amount of P1,562,185.35,... The Final Project of Distribution of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank... to hold as trustee the liquidating and surplus dividends allocated in the project of distribution for creditors who shall have a period of three (3) years from date of last notice within which to claim payment therefor. Authorizing the disposal of all the pertinent bank records in accordance with applicable laws, rules and regulations By Order of July 5, 2006,[6] Branch 134 of the Makati RTC granted the motion except the above-quoted paragraphs 5 and 6 of its prayer, Issues: whether Section 12 of RA 9302 should be applied retroactively in order to entitle Intercity Bank creditors to surplus dividends, Ruling: it otherwise holding that to so resolve would run counter to... prevailing jurisprudence and unduly prejudice Intercity Bank shareholders, the creditors having been paid their principal claim in 2002 or before the passage of RA 9302 in 2004. PDIC appealed to the Court of Appeals[7] before which respondent Stockholders of Intercity Bank (the Stockholders) moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing principally that the proper recourse should be to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari... since the question involved was purely one of law.[8] By Resolution of October 17, 2007,[9] the appellate court dismissed the appeal, sustaining in the main the position of the Stockholders. Its Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution dated January 24, 2008,[10] PDIC... filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

391

SPOUSES MARIAN B. LINTAG and ANGELO T. ARRASTIA, represented herein by Attorney-in-Fact REMEDIOS BERENGUER LINTAG,Petitioners,v.NATIONAL POWERCORPORATION,Respondent. G.R. NO. 158609 : July 27, 2007 Facts: Petitioners-spouses Marian Berenguer-Lintag and Angelo T. Arrastia (petitioners) are the registered owners of a property with an area of 80,001 square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-24855 and located at Barangay Bibincahan, Sorsogon, Sorsogon. On December 4, 1996, respondent National Power Corporation (NPC) filed a Complaint4for Eminent Domain against petitioners in order to acquire an easem*nt of a right of way over a portion of the said property, consisting of 8,050 square meters (subject property) with an initial assessed value atP2,468.09. NPC averred that such acquisition was necessary and urgent for the construction and maintenance of NPC's 350 KV Leyte-Luzon HVDC Power Transmission Project. On January 17, 1997, after the deposit of the initial assessed value of the subject property amounting toP2,468.09 with the Philippine National Bank, the RTC, upon anex-partemotion of NPC, ordered the issuance of a Writ of Possession on the subject property5consonant with Presidential Decree (PD) No. 42.6 On January 24, 1997, the Writ of Possession7was issued in favor of NPC.8 On May 25, 2000, the RTC issued an Order9appointing three (3) new Commissioners to appraise the value of the subject property. They were directed to take their oath within five (5) days from receipt of said Order, to notify the parties and their respective counsels as to the date of the conduct of ocular inspection of the subject property, and to submit a report within fifteen (15) days from the completion of the ocular inspection.

392

On June 15, 2000, two commissioners filed a motion praying that the RTC use the previous Commissioners' Report as basis in determining the amount of just compensation.10 On July 11, 2000, petitioners filed a Motion11asking the Court to order the NPC to pay them or their Attorney-in-Fact Remedios Berenguer Lintag (Remedios Lintag) the amount ofP49,665.63, as the tentative value of the damaged improvements. On August 28, 2000, the RTC directed Field Personnel Wenifredo A. Halcon, Jr. and Augusto V. Ramos, Jr. to confirm that the damage to the improvements in the subject property amounted toP49,665.63.12NPC paid the said amount. On September 13, 2000, pre-trial was held and a pre-trial Order13was issued. The case was set for trial on the merits on November 15, 2000. However, on November 7, 2000, Republic Act (RA) No. 8974 entitled "An Act To Facilitate The Acquisition Of Right-Of-Way, Site Or Location For National Government Infrastructure Projects And For Other Purposes" was approved. On February 14, 2001, petitioners filed a Motion14asking the RTC to direct the NPC to comply with RA No. 8974. In the said motion, petitioners asseverated that pursuant to Sec. 4 of RA No. 8974, they are entitled to 100% of the value of the subject property based on the current relevant zonal valuation made by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), which at the time was pegged atP700.00 per square meter. Thus, petitioners prayed that NPC be directed to payP5,635,000.00 for the subject property. Issue: Whether or not the direct NPC comply with RA No. 8974 Ruling: The petition is bereft of merit. Petitioners' first ground must fail. In the case ofRepublic v. Gingoyon,22this Court held that RA No. 8974 is a substantive law, to wit: It likewise bears noting that the appropriate standard of just compensation is a substantive matter. It is well within the province of the legislature to fix the 393

standard, which it did through the enactment of Rep. Act No. 8974.Specifically, this prescribes the new standards in determining the amount of just compensation in expropriation cases relating to national government infrastructure projects, as well as the payment of the provisional value as a prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of possession. This ruling was reiterated in this Court's Resolution23of February 1, 2006, which further states that: [I]f the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural, and so the converse certainly holds that if the rule or provision creates a right, it should be properly appreciated as substantive in nature. Indubitably, a matter is substantive when it involves the creation of rights to be enjoyed by the owner of property to be expropriated. The right of the owner to receive just compensation prior to acquisition of possession by the State of the property is a proprietary right, appropriately classified as a substantive matter and, thus, within the sole province of the legislature to legislate on.ςηαñrοblεšνιr†υαllαωlιbrαrÿ It is possible for a substantive matter to be nonetheless embodied in a rule of procedure, and to a certain extent, Rule 67 does contain matters of substance. Yet the absorption of the substantive point into a procedural rule does not prevent the substantive right from being superseded or amended by statute, for the creation of property rights is a matter for the legislature to enact on, and not for the courts to decide upon. Indeed, if the position of the Government is sustained, it could very well lead to the absurd situation wherein the judicial branch of government may shield laws with the veneer of irrepealability simply by absorbing the provisions of law into the rules of procedure. When the 1987 Constitution restored to the judicial branch of government the sole prerogative to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it should be understood that such rules necessarily pertain to points of procedure, and not points of substantive law. It is a well-entrenched principle that statutes, including administrative rules and regulations, operate prospectively unless the legislative intent to the contrary is manifest by express terms or by necessary implication24because the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested.25This is based on the Latin maxim:Lex prospicit non respicit(the law looks forward, not backward).

394

In the application of RA No. 8974, the Court finds no justification to depart from this rule.First, RA No. 8974 is a substantive law.Second, there is nothing in RA No. 8974 which expressly provides that it should have retroactive effect.Third, neither is retroactivity necessarily implied from RA No. 8974 or in any of its provisions. Unfortunately for the petitioners, the silence of RA No. 8974 and its Implementing Rules on the matter cannot give rise to the inference that it can be applied retroactively. In the two (2) cases26wherein this Court applied the provisions of RA No. 8974, the complaints were filed at the time the law was already in full force and effect. Thus, these cases cannot serve as binding precedent to the case at bench. As to petitioners' second ground, the parties may be guided by the following principles. Expropriation of lands consists of two stages: Thefirstis concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint x x x. Thesecondphase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners x x x.27 It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed. The process is not complete until payment of just compensation.28Accordingly, the issuance of the writ of possession in this case does not writefinisto the expropriation proceedings. To effectuate the transfer of ownership, it is necessary for the NPC to pay the property owners thefinal just compensation.29 We observe that petitioners are not questioning the authority of the NPC to exercise the power of eminent domain nor the propriety of its exercise. While the constitutional restraint of public use has been overcome, the imperative just compensation is still wanting. Thus, petitioners now appeal for the prompt payment 395

of just compensation. Indeed, just compensation is not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the property owner but also the payment of the property within a reasonable time. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just."30 This Court understands the plight of petitioners. It has been ten (10) years since they were divested of possession of their property, but they still have to be paid just compensation. It may be noted that the expropriation case still pends at the RTC, and it is in that case where a determination of the amount of just compensation shall be made. Inasmuch as this determination necessarily involves factual matters, and considering that this Court is not a trier of facts, at this point, we can only direct the RTC to try the case expeditiously, so that the amount of just compensation for the subject property can be fixed and promptly paid, as justice and equity dictate. For this purpose, the RTC must bear in mind that it is the value of the land at the time of the taking or at the time of the filing of the complaint, whichever came first, not the value of the land at the time of the rendition of judgment which should be considered.31In this case, where the institution of an expropriation action preceded the taking of the subject property,just compensation is based on the value of the land at the time of the filing of the complaint. This is provided by the Rules of Court, the assumption of possession by the expropriator ordinarily being conditioned on its deposit with the National or Provincial Treasurer of the amount equivalent to the value of the property as provisionally ascertained by the court having jurisdiction of the proceedings.32 Finally, this Court takes cognizance of petitioners' manifestation that the NPC, as found by the RTC, failed to pay the initial deposit ofP32,930.00 as required in PD 42.33The RTC had already fixed this amount on the basis of its initial factual findings. The assailed CA Decision adopted the RTC's factual findings. NPC's Comment filed with this Court and even its Petition forCertioraribefore the CA did not address, much less contest, this fact. Because this factual finding was not disputed by the NPC in its pleadings before the CA and before this Court, it is, therefore, deemed admitted.34However, inasmuch as petitioners made no mention of this amount in their prayer before this Court, the same shall simply be considered by the RTC and included in the determination of the final just compensation. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, guided by the foregoing principles, is hereby directed to 396

proceed with the hearing of the expropriation case, docketed as Civil Case No. 966295, and to resolve the issue of just compensation with utmost dispatch. No costs.

Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens G.R No: 206844-45 July 23, 2013 FACTS:On May 5, 2010, the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS signed an agreement, entitled Irrevocable Covenant, containing the list of nominees to share power in their sharing power agreement. The COMELEC issued a Omnibus Resolution in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM) stating that the list of nominees submitted to them shall be permanent. This is in lieu of the empty seat in Congress after the 2010 elections following the resignation of Rep. Kho. Two SENIOR CITIZENS were allocated seats in the House of Representatives, the first being Rep. Arquiza, and Rep. Kho as the second. Rep. Arquiza, honoring Rep. Kho’s resignation, stated that their fourth nominee shall take the latter’s seat considering that the third nominee, Datol, has previously been expelled from the party. COMELEC claims that they shall stay true to the list presented by SENIOR CITIZENS, regardless of Datol’s (being the third nominee) expulsion. Also that the resignation of Rep. Kho shall not be recognized because it will change the order of nominees. ISSUE:Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC for issuing Resolution without due process. RULING: Yes. There is grave abuse on the part of COMELEC for violating due process. Instead, the COMELEC issued the May 10, 2013 Omnibus Resolution in SPP No. 12157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM) without conducting any further proceedings. The Court ruled that the Omnibus Resolution dated May 10, 2013 of the Commission on Elections En Banc in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12191 (PLM) is REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as Coalition of Associations of 397

Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. is concerned, and that the Commission on Elections En Banc is ORDERED to PROCLAIM the Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. as one of the winning party-list organizations during the May 13, 2013 elections with the number of seats it may be entitled to based on the total number of votes it garnered during the said elections.

G.R. No. 149417 June 4, 2004 GLORIA SANTOS DUEÑAS,petitioner, vs. SANTOS SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,respondent. FACTS: Sometime in 1997, the members of the SSHA submitted to the petitioner a resolution asking her to provide within the subdivision an open space for recreational and other community activities, in accordance with the provisions of P.D. No. 957, as amended by P.D. No. 1216.7Petitioner, however, rejected the request, thus, prompting the members of SSHA to seek redress from the NHA. On April 25, 1997, the NHA General Manager forwarded the SSHA resolution to Romulo Q. Fabul, Commissioner and Chief Executive Officer of the HLURB in Quezon City. In a letter dated May 29, 1997, the Regional Director of the Expanded NCR Field Office, HLURB, opined that the open space requirement of P.D. No. 957, as amended by P.D. No. 1216, was not applicable to Santos Subdivision. SSHA then filed a petition/motion for reconsideration,10docketed as HLURB Case No. REM-070297-9821, which averred among others that: (1) P.D. No. 957 should apply retroactively to Santos Subdivision, notwithstanding that the subdivision plans were approved in 1966 and (2) Gloria Santos Dueñas should be bound by the verbal promise made by her late father during his lifetime that an open space would be provided for in Phase III of Santos Subdivision, the lots of which were at that time already for sale.

398

Petitioner denied any knowledge of the allegations of SSHA. She stressed that she was not a party to the alleged transactions, and had neither participation nor involvement in the development of Santos Subdivision and the sale of the subdivision’s lots. As affirmative defenses, she raised the following: (a) It was her late father, Cecilio J. Santos, who owned and developed the subdivision, and she was neither its owner nor developer; (b) that this suit was filed by an unauthorized entity against a non-existent person, as SSHA and Santos Subdivision are not juridical entities, authorized by law to institute or defend against actions; (c) that P.D. No. 957 cannot be given retroactive effect to make it applicable to Santos Subdivision as the law does not expressly provide for its retroactive applicability; and (d) that the present petition is barred by laches. ISSUE: Whether or not the applicability of the doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies RULING: The petitioner contends that the filing of CA-G.R. SP No. 51601 was premature as SSHA failed to exhaust all administrative remedies. Petitioner submits that since Section 1,Rule 43 of the 1997 Rule of Civil Procedure does not mention the HLURB, the respondent should have appealed the decision of the HLURB Board in HLURB Case No. REM-A-980227-0032 to the Office of the President prior to seeking judicial relief. In other words, it is the decision of the Office of the President, and not that of the HLURB Board, which the Court of Appeals may review. We find petitioner’s contentions bereft of merit. The principle of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is, under the factual circ*mstances of this case, inapplicable. While this Court has held that before a party is allowed to seek intervention of the courts, it is a pre condition that he avail himself of all administrative processes afforded him,nonetheless, said rule is not without exceptions.The doctrine is a relative one and is flexible depending on the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circ*mstantial settings of each case. In the instant case, the questions posed are purely legal, namely: (1) whether the respondent had any right to demand an open space and the petitioner had any legal obligation to provide said open space within Santos Subdivision under P.D. No. 957, as amended by P.D. No. 1216, and (2) whether the action had already prescribed under Article 1145 of the Civil Code. Moreover, the Court of Appeals found that SSHA had sought relief from the Office of the President, but the latter forwarded the case to the HLURB. In view of the foregoing, we find that in this particular case, 399

there was no need for SSHA to exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief.

FLORENCIO EUGENIO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FRANKLIN M. DRILON GR No. 109404 Jan 22, 1996 Facts: On May 10, 1972, private respondent purchased on installment basis from petitioner and his co-owner/ developer Fermin Salazar, two lots in the E & S Delta Village in Quezon City. Acting on complaints for non-development docketed as NHA Cases Nos. 2619 and 2620 filed by the Delta Village Homeowners' Association, Inc., the National Housing Authority rendered a resolution on January 17, 1979 inter alia ordering petitioner to cease and desist from making... further sales of lots in said village or in any project owned by him. While NHA Cases Nos. 2619 and 2620 were still pending, private respondent filed with the Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC), a complaint (Case No. 80-589) against petitioner and spouses Rodolfo and Adelina Relevo alleging that, in view of the above NHA resolution, he suspended payment of his amortizations, but that petitioner resold one of the two lots to the said spouses Relevo, in whose favor title to the said property was registered. Private 400

respondent further alleged... that he suspended his payments because of petitioner's failure to develop the village. Private respondent prayed for the annulment of the sale to the Relevo spouses and for reconveyance of the lot to him. On October 11, 1983, the OAALA rendered a decision upholding the right of petitioner to cancel the contract with private respondent and dismissed private respondent's complaint. On appeal, the Commission Proper of the HSRC reversed the OAALA and, applying P.D. 957, ordered petitioner to complete the subdivision development and to reinstate private respondent's purchase contract over one lot, and... to immediately refund to the complainant-appellant (herein private respondent) all payments made thereon, plus interests computed... at legal rates from date of receipt hereof until fully paid. The respondent Executive Secretary, on appeal, affirmed the decision of the HSRC and denied the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit and for having been filed out of time. Petitioner has now filed this Petition for review before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not did the failure to develop a subdivision constitute legal justification for the non-payment of amortizations by a buyer on installment under land purchase agreements entered into prior to the enactment of P.D. 957, "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree"? Ruling: The intent of the law, as culled from its preamble and from the situation, circ*mstances and conditions it sought to remedy, must be enforced. as P.D. 957 is undeniably applicable to the contracts in question, it follows that Section 23 thereof had been properly invoked by private respondent when he desisted from making further payment to petitioner due to petitioner's failure to develop the subdivision... project according to the approved plans and within the time limit for complying with the same. (Such incomplete development of the subdivision and non-performance of specific contractual and statutory obligations on the part of the subdivision-owner had been established in the... findings of the HLURB which in turn were confirmed by the respondent Executive Secretary in his assailed Decision.) Furthermore, respondent Executive Secretary also gave due weight to the following matters: although private respondent started to default on 401

amortization payments... beginning May 1975, so that by the end of July 1975 he had already incurred three consecutive arrearages in payments, nevertheless, the petitioner, who had the cancellation option available to him under the contract, did not exercise or utilize the same in timely fashion but... delayed until May 1979 when he finally made up his mind to cancel the contracts. But by that time the land purchase agreements had already been overtaken by the provisions of P.D. 957, promulgated on July 12, 1976. (In any event, as pointed out by respondent HLURB and seconded... by the Solicitor General, the defaults in amortization payments incurred by private respondent had been effectively condoned by the petitioner, by reason of the latter's tolerance of the defaults for a long period of time.) WHEREFORE, there being no showing of grave abuse of discretion, the petition is DENIED due course and is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.

G.R. No. 119745 June 20, 1997 POWER COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION,Petitioner,v.COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES REYNALDO and ANGELITA R. QUIAMBAO and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK,Respondents. FACTS: Petitioner Power Commercial & Industrial Development Corporation, an industrial asbestos manufacturer, needed a bigger office space and warehouse for its products. For this purpose, on January 31, 1979, it entered into a contract of sale with the spouses Reynaldo and Angelita R. Quiambao, herein private respondents. The contract involved a 612-sq. m. parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-6686 located at the corner of Bagtican and St. Paul Streets, San Antonio Village, Makati City. The parties agreed that petitioner would pay private respondents P108,000.00 as down payment, and the balance of P295,000.00 upon the execution of the deed of transfer of the title over the property. Further, petitioner assumed, as part of the purchase price, the existing mortgage on the land. In full satisfaction thereof, he paid P79,145.77 to Respondent Philippine National Bank ("PNB" for brevity). On June 1, 1979, respondent spouses mortgaged again said land to PNB to guarantee a loan of P145,000.00, P80,000.00 of which was paid to respondent spouses. Petitioner agreed to assume payment of the loan.

402

On March 17, 1982, petitioner filed Civil Case No. 45217 against respondent spouses for rescission and damages before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 159. Then, in its reply to PNB's letter of February 19, 1982, petitioner demanded the return of the payments it made on the ground that its assumption of mortgage was never approved. On May 31, 1983,8while this case was pending, the mortgage was foreclosed. The property was subsequently bought by PNB during the public auction. Thus, an amended complaint was filed impleading PNB as party defendant. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a substantial breach of the contract between the parties warranting rescission RULING: The alleged "failure" of respondent spouses to eject the lessees from the lot in question and to deliver actual and physical possession thereof cannot be considered a substantial breach of a condition for two reasons: first, such "failure" was not stipulated as a condition - whether resolutory or suspensive - in the contract; and second, its effects and consequences were not specified either.13 The provision adverted to by petitioner does not impose a condition or an obligation to eject the lessees from the lot. The deed of sale provides in part:14 We hereby also warrant that we are the lawful and absolute owners of the above described property, free from any lien and/or encumbrance, and we hereby agree and warrant to defend its title and peaceful possession thereof in favor of the said Power Commercial and Industrial Development Corporation, its successors and assigns, against any claims whatsoever of any and all third persons; subject, however, to the provisions hereunder provided to wit: By his own admission, Anthony Powers, General Manager of petitioner-corporation, did not ask the corporation's lawyers to stipulate in the contract that Respondent Reynaldo was guaranteeing the ejectment of the occupants, because there was already a proviso in said deed of sale that the sellers were guaranteeing the peaceful possession by the buyer of the land in question.15Any obscurity in a contract, if the above-quoted provision can be so described, must be construed against the party who caused it.16Petitioner itself caused the obscurity because it omitted this alleged condition when its lawyer drafted said contract. If the parties intended to impose on respondent spouses the obligation to eject the tenants from the lot sold, it should have included in the contract a provision similar to 403

that referred to inRomero vs.Court of Appeals,17where the ejectment of the occupants of the lot sold by private respondent was the operative act which set into motion the period of petitioner's compliance with his own obligation,i.e., to pay the balance of the purchase price. Failure to remove the squatters within the stipulated period gave the other party the right to either refuse to proceed with the agreement or to waive that condition of ejectment in consonance with Article 1545 of the Civil Code. In the case cited, the contract specifically stipulated that the ejectment was a condition to be fulfilled; otherwise, the obligation to pay the balance would not arise. This is not so in the case at bar. Absent a stipulation therefor, we cannot say that the parties intended to make its nonfulfillment a ground for rescission. If they did intend this, their contract should have expressly stipulated so. InAng vs.C.A.,18rescission was sought on the ground that the petitioners had failed to fulfill their obligation "to remove and clear" the lot sold, the performance of which would have given rise to the payment of the consideration by private respondent. Rescission was not allowed, however, because the breach was not substantial and fundamental to the fulfillment by the petitioners of the obligation to sell. As stated, the provision adverted to in the contract pertains to the usual warranty against eviction, and not to a condition that was not met. The terms of the contract are so clear as to leave no room for any other interpretation.19 Furthermore, petitioner was well aware of the presence of the tenants at the time it entered into the sales transaction. As testified to by Reynaldo,20petitioner's counsel during the sales negotiation even undertook the job of ejecting the squatters. In fact, petitioner actually filed suit to eject the occupants. Finally, petitioner in its letter to PNB of December 23, 1980 admitted that it was the "buyer(s) and new owner(s) of this lot."

404

ORLANDO L. SALVADOR v. PLACIDO L. MAPA GR No. 135080, Nov 28, 2007 Facts: On October 8, 1992 then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans,... Several loan accounts were referred to the Committee for investigation, including the loan transactions between Metals Exploration Asia, Inc. (MEA), now Philippine Eagle Mines, Inc. (PEMI) and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). After examining and studying the documents relative to the loan transactions, the Committee determined that they bore the characteristics of behest loans, as defined under Memorandum Order No. 61 because the stockholders and officers of PEMI were known cronies of then President Ferdinand Marcos; the loan was under-collateralized; and PEMI was undercapitalized at the time the loan was granted.

405

Consequently, Atty. Orlando L. Salvador, Consultant of the Fact-Finding Committee, and representing the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed with the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) a sworn complaint for violation of Sections 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against the respondents... the Ombudsman handed down the assailed Resolution,[6] dismissing the complaint. The Ombudsman conceded that there was ground to proceed with the conduct of preliminary investigation. Nonetheless, it dismissed... the complaint holding that the offenses charged had already prescribed,... It bears mention that the acts complained of were committed before the issuance of BP 195 on March 2, 1982. Hence, the prescriptive period in the instant case is ten (10) years as provided in the (sic) Section 11 of R.A. 3019, as originally enacted. Equally important to stress is that the subject financial transactions between 1978 and 1981 transpired at the time when there was yet no Presidential Order or Directive naming, classifying or categorizing them as Behest or Non-Behest Loans. the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans was created on October 8, 1992 under Administrative Order No. 13. Subsequently, Memorandum Order No. 61, dated November 9, 1992, was issued defining the criteria to be utilized as a frame of reference in determining... behest loans. Accordingly, if these Orders are to be considered the bases of charging respondents for alleged offenses committed, they become ex-post facto laws which are proscribed by the Constitution. The Committee filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the Ombudsman denied it on July 27, 1998. Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE CRIME DEFINED BY SEC. 3(e) AND (g) OF R.A. 3019 HAS ALREADY PRESCRIBED AT THE TIME THE PETITIONER FILED ITS COMPLAINT. WHETHER OR NOT ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 13 AND MEMORANDUM ORDER NO. 61 ARE EX-POST FACTO LAW[S] Ruling: The issue of prescription has long been settled by this Court in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,[13] thus:

406

[I]t is well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made because, as alleged, the public officials concerned connived or conspired with the "beneficiaries of the... loans." Thus, we agree with the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period for the offenses with which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be computed from the discovery of the commission thereof and not from the day of such commission. Since the prescriptive period commenced to run on the date of the discovery of the offenses, and since discovery could not have been made earlier than October 8, 1992, the date when the Committee was created, the criminal offenses allegedly committed by the respondents had not... yet prescribed when the complaint was filed on October 4, 1996. The constitutionality of laws is presumed. To justify nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful or arguable implication; a law shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond... reasonable doubt. The presumption is always in favor of constitutionality. In any event, we hold that Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are not ex post facto laws. An ex post facto law has been defined as one (a) which makes an action done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed; or (c) which... changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order... to convict the defendant.[22] This Court added two (2) more to the list, namely: (e) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful; or (f) that which... deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law generally prohibits the retrospectivity of penal laws.

407

The subject administrative and memorandum orders clearly do not come within the shadow of this definition. Administrative Order No. 13 creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, and provides for its composition and functions. It does not mete out penalty for the act of granting behest loans. Memorandum Order No. 61 merely provides a frame of reference for determining behest loans. Not being penal laws, Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be characterized as ex post facto laws. There is, therefore, no basis for the Ombudsman to rule that the subject administrative and memorandum orders are ex post facto.

G.R. No. 175781 March 20, 2012 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. FRANCISCA TALARO,*GREGORIO TALARO,**NORBERTO (JUN) ADVIENTO, RENATO RAMOS, RODOLFO DUZON,***RAYMUNDO ZAMORA**and LOLITO AQUINO,Accused. NORBERTO (JUN) ADVIENTO, RENATO RAMOS and LOLITO AQUINO,Accused-Appellants. FACTS: Around 6 o'clock in the morning of April 26, 1994, tricycle driver Rodolfo Duzon was at the parking area in thepoblacionof Urdaneta waiting for passengers, when accused-appellant Renato Ramos approached him. Accused-appellant Ramos offered to pay Rodolfo Duzon ₱200.00 for the latter to drive Ramos' motorcycle to Laoac, Pangasinan to take some onions and turnips there. Duzon agreed, so after 408

bringing his own tricycle home to his house in Bactad, Urdaneta, he then drove Ramos' motorcycle to thepoblacionof Urdaneta. At thepoblacion, Ramos bought a basket where he placed the onions and turnips. Ramos then told Duzon to drive the motorcycle to Laoac, but they first passed by Garcia Street in Urdaneta. At a house along Garcia Street, Ramos alighted and talked to someone whom Rodolfo Duzon later came to know as accused-appellant Lolito Aquino. Ramos then told Duzon that after coming from Laoac, Duzon should leave the motorcycle at that house on Garcia Street with Lolito Aquino. Ramos and Duzon then proceeded to Laoac, stopping at a gas station where they fueled up. Ramos alighted from the motorcycle at the gas station and, taking along the basket of onions and turnips, walked towards Guardian Angel Hospital (the clinic owned by the Alipios). Five minutes after Ramos alighted, Duzon heard three gunshots coming from the west, and moments later, he saw Ramos, who was coming toward him, being chased by another man. When Ramos got to the motorcycle, he ordered Duzon to immediately drive away, and poked a gun at Duzon's back. Ramos then instructed Duzon as to the route they should take until they reached Urdaneta where Ramos alighted, leaving Duzon with instructions to bring the motorcycle to Garcia Street, leave it with Lolito Aquino, then meet him (Ramos) again at thepoblacionwhere he (Duzon) will be paid ₱200.00 for his services. Duzon did as he was told, but when he met with Ramos at thepoblacionand asked for the ₱200.00, Ramos got mad and shouted invectives at him. A few days later, he again ran into Ramos who warned him to keep his silence, threatening to kill him (Duzon) too if he tells anyone about the killing. Accusedappellant Norberto (Jun) Adviento also threatened him not to reveal to anyone whatever he knows about the crime. That was why Duzon decided to keep quiet. Later, however, he revealed the matter to his brother, Victoriano Duzon, who accompanied him to the Criminal Investigation Services (CIS) Office in Urdaneta so he could give his statement. He executed affidavits, assisted by a lawyer from the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), attesting to what he knew about the crime, in his desire to be a state witness. ISSUE: Whether or not the crime committed is murder RULING: Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederateswhich follows incidentally in the execution of a common design as one of its probable and natural consequences even though it was not intended as part of the original design. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

409

In this case, the existence of a conspiracy has been established by the testimony of Raymundo Zamora, positively identifying all three accused-appellants as the ones he saw and heard transacting with Francisca Talaro on April 24, 1994 to kill Atty. Melvin Alipio for the price of P60,000.00, and pointing to Lolito Aquino as the one who demanded and received part of the payment after Atty. Alipio had been killed. The credibility of Raymundo Zamora's testimony is further bolstered by Lolito Aquino's admission23that he and Renato Ramos even conducted surveillance on the victim a day before Renato Ramos carried out the shooting, and that the motorcycle used as a getaway vehicle belonged to him. Rodolfo Duzon also pointed to Renato Ramos as the gunman; he also pointed to Renato Ramos and Norberto (Jun) Adviento as the ones who threatened to kill him if he talks to anyone about the shooting. All the proven circ*mstances point to the conclusion that accused-appellants acted in concert to assure the success of the execution of the crime; hence, the existence of a conspiracy is firmly established. Lolito Aquino's admission, and accused-appellants' positive identification of Raymundo Zamora and Rodolfo Duzon cannot be belied by accused-appellants' mere denial. It is established jurisprudence that denial and alibi cannot prevail over the witness' positive identification of the accused-appellants.24Moreover, accusedappellants could not give any plausible reason why Raymundo Zamora would testify falsely against them. InPeople v. Molina,25the Court expounded, thus: In light of the positive identification of appellant by the prosecution witnesses and since no ill motive on their part or on that of their families was shown that could have made either of them institute the case against the appellant and falsely implicate him in a serious crime he did not commit, appellant's defense of alibi must necessarily fail. It is settled in this jurisdiction that the defense of alibi, being inherently weak, cannot prevail over the clear and positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. x x x26(Emphasis supplied) Accused-appellant Lolito Aquino claimed he merely admitted his participation in the crime out of fear of the police authorities who allegedly manhandled him, however, the trial court did not find his story convincing. The trial court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is conclusive on this Court as it is the trial court which had the opportunity to closely observe the demeanor of witnesses.27The Court again explained the rationale for this principle inMolina,28to wit:

410

As oft repeated by this Court, the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is viewed as correct and entitled to the highest respect because it is more competent to so conclude, having had the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and deportment on the stand, and the manner in which they gave their testimonies. The trial judge therefore can better determine if such witnesses were telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Further, factual findings of the trial court as regards its assessment of the witnesses' credibility are entitled to great weight and respect by this Court, particularly when the Court of Appeals affirms the said findings, and will not be disturbed absent any showing that the trial court overlooked certain facts and circ*mstances which could substantially affect the outcome of the case.29 The Court cannot find anything on record to justify deviation from said rule. Accused-appellant Renato Ramos insisted that he was not properly identified in open court, and considering that there are so many persons named "Renato Ramos," then there can be some confusion regarding his identity. There is no truth to this claim. Ramos was properly identified in open court by Raymundo Zamora, as one of the men he saw and heard transacting with Francisca Talaro for the killing of Atty. Alipio.30Hence, there can be no doubt as to which Renato Ramos is being convicted for the murder of Atty. Alipio. Another strong indication of Lolito Aquino's and Renato Ramos' guilt is the fact that they escaped from detention while the case was pending with the trial court. Renato Ramos escaped from prison on December 20, 1994,31while Lolito Aquino escaped on May 5, 1996.32It has been repeatedly held that flight betrays a desire to evade responsibility and is, therefore, a strong indication of guilt.33Thus, this Court finds no reason to overturn their conviction. Nevertheless, this Court must modify the penalty imposed on accused-appellants Norberto (Jun) Adviento, Lolito Aquino, and Renato Ramos. InPeople v. Tinsay,34the Court explained that: On June 30, 2006, Republic Act No. 9346 (R.A. 9346), entitledAn Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines,took effect. Pertinent provisions thereof provide as follows: Section 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), 411

otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659) otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law and all other laws, executive orders and decrees insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly. Section 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed: (a) the penalty ofreclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or xxxx SECTION 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended. It has also been held inPeople vs. Quiachonthat R.A. No. 9346 has retroactive effect, to wit: The aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 9346 is applicable in this case pursuant to the principle in criminal law,favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to accused are given retroactive effect. This principle is embodied under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides as follows: Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws, a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.1âwphi1 However, appellant is not eligible for parole because Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346 provides that "persons convicted of offenses pushed withreclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced toreclusion perpetuaby reason of the law, shall not be eligible for parole." Hence, in accordance with the foregoing, appellant should only be sentenced to sufferreclusion perpetuawithout eligibility for parole.35 412

The awards for damages also need to be modified. InPeople v. Alberto Anticamara y Cabillo, et al.,36the Court held that in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence on heinous crimes where the imposable penalty is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to R.A. No. 9346, the award of moral damages should be increased from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00, while the award for exemplary damages, in view of the presence of aggravating circ*mstances, should be ₱30,000.00. WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 15, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00071 is herebyAFFIRMEDwith theMODIFICATIONthat the penalty of death imposed on accused-appellants isREDUCEDtoreclusion perpetuawithout possibility of parole in accordance with R.A. No. 9346; andINCREASINGthe award of moral damages from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00, and the award of exemplary damages from ₱25,000.00 to ₱30,000.00. The rest of the award of the Court of Appeals is hereby maintained.

G.R. No. 154213 : August 23, 2012 EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN MARITIME LTD. AND AGEMAR MANNING AGENCY, INC., Petitioners, v. ESTANISLAO SURIO, FREDDIE PALGUIRAN, GRACIANO MORALES, HENRY CASTILLO, ARISTOTLE ARREOLA, ALEXANDER YGOT, ANRIQUE BATTUNG, GREGORIO ALDOVINO, NARCISO FRIAS, VICTOR FLORES, SAMUEL MARCIAL, CARLITO PALGUIRAN, DUQUE VINLUAN, JESUS MENDEGORIN, NEIL FLORES, ROMEO MANGALIAG, JOE GARFIN and SALESTINO SUSA, Respondents. BERSAMIN, J.:

413

FACTS: Respondents Estanislao Surio, et al. were former crewmembers of MT Seadance, a vessel owned by petitioner Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Ltd. (Eastern). On December 23, 1993, Eastern filed against Surio, et al. a complaint for disciplinary action based on breach of discipline and for the reimbursem*nt of the wage increases in the Workers Assistance and Adjudication Office of the POEA. During the pendency of the administrative complaint in the POEA, R.A. No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995) took effect on July 15, 1995. Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 vested original and exclusive jurisdiction over all money claims arising out of employer-employee relationships involving overseas Filipino workers in the Labor Arbiters. The jurisdiction over such claims was previously exercised by the POEA under the POEA Rules and Regulations of 1991 (1991 POEA Rules). The POEA dismissed the complaint for disciplinary action. Eastern elevated the matter to the NLRC. The NLRC also dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Likewise, the CA also denied the Eastern’s petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction to review on appeal cases decided by the POEA on matters pertaining to disciplinary actions? RULING: The petition for review lacks merit. Although Republic Act No. 8042, through its Section 10, transferred the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide money claims involving overseas Filipino workers from the POEA to the Labor Arbiters, the law did not remove from the POEA the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all disciplinary action cases and other special cases administrative in character involving such workers. When Republic Act No. 8042 withheld the appellate jurisdiction of the NLRC in respect of cases decided by the POEA, the appellate jurisdiction was vested in the Secretary of Labor in accordance with his power of supervision and control under Section 38(1), Chapter 7, Title II, Book III of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. In conclusion, we hold that petitioners should have appealed the adverse decision of 414

the POEA to the Secretary of Labor instead of to the NLRC. Court of Appeals’ decision AFFIRMED.

JUANITA NARZOLES v. NLRC GR No. 141959 Sep 29, 2000 FACTS: Petitioner-employees appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission because of the adverse decision of the Labor Arbiter dismissing their complaint for illegal dismissal. The NLRC modified the decision and ordered respondents to reinstate petitioners “but without backwages.” Petitioners received the NLRC decision on July 23 1998 and filed a motion for reconsideration on August 3, 1998. On September 1, 1998, Section 4, Rule 65 as amended by Circular No. 39-98 provides that if the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration in due 415

time after notice of said judgment, order, or resolution the period herein fixed shall be interrupted. And if the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of such denial. No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days. On October 19, 1998, petitioners received a copy of the NLRC Resolution denying their motion for reconsideration. Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari on December 17, 1998. The court referred the case to the Court of Appeals. Acting on the petition, the CA denied the same for late filing, applying Section 4, Rule 65 amended by Circular No. 39-98 in computing the period for the filing of the petition for certiorari. It shows that the petitioner’s last day to file their petition for certiorari is December 8, 1998. The petition was filed before the Honorable Supreme Court. Consequently, this court hereby resolves to dismiss the petition for having been filed beyond the reglementary period. Their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA, petitioners filed the present petition for review. ISSUE: Whether or not the amendment apply to cases where the motion for reconsideration was filed before the amendment although the petition was filed after the amendment took effect. RULING: The Court has observed that Circular No. 39-98 has generated tremendous confusion resulting in the dismissal of numerous cases for late filing. This may have been because, historically, even before the 1997 revision to the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party had a fresh period from receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration to file a petition for certiorari. Were it not for the amendments brought about by Circular No. 39-98, the cases so dismissed would have been resolved on the merits. Hence, the Court deemed it wise to revert to the old rule allowing a party a fresh 60-day period from notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration to file a petition for certiorari. The Court resolved, in A.M. No. 002-03-SC, to further amend Section 4, Rule 65. The Resolution further amending Section 4, Rule 65 can be described as curative in nature, and the principles governing curative statutes are applicable. Curative statutes are enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings which would otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain legal requirements. They are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities and curb certain evils. They are intended to enable persons to carry into effect that which they have designed or intended, but has failed of expected legal consequence by reason of some statutory disability or irregularity 416

in their own action. They make valid that which, before the enactment of the statute was invalid. Their purpose is to give validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with. Curative statutes, therefore, by their very essence, are retroactive. The filing of the petition for certiorari in this Court, therefore, is deemed to be timely, the same having been made within the 60-day period provided under the curative Resolution. The Court resolved to give due course to, and grant, the petition. The case is hereby remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings

MA. LOURDES C. FERNANDO, IN HER CAPACITY AS CITY MAYOR OF MARIKINA CITY, JOSEPHINE C. EVANGELISTA, IN HER CAPACITY AS CHIEF, PERMIT DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE CITY ENGINEER, ALFONSO ESPIRITU IN HIS CAPACITY AS ENGINEER OF MARIKINA CITY.- PETITIONERS VS ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE AND ST. SCHOLASTICA'S ACADEMYMARIKINA, INC.- RESPONDENT, GR. No. 161107, MARCH 12, 2013 Mendoza, J.: 417

FACTS: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to set aside the CA ruling. St. Scholastica College and St. Scholastica Academy are educational institutions organized under Philippine Law with a principal address at Malate, Manila, and Marikina. St. Scholastica is the owner of 4 parcels of land with an area of 56, 306.80 square meters located in Marikina Heights with TCT No. 91537. Inside was the residence of the Sisters of the Benedictine, the order of formation of the house of Novices and the retirement for the elderly sisters. The property is enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter fence built around 30 years ago. On September 30, 1994, Sangguniang Panlungsod of City of Marikina enacted Ordinance No. 192, entitled regulating the Construction of fences and walls in the City of Marikina. On April 2, 2000, City government of Marikina sent a letter to the Respondents, ordering them to demolish and replace the fence of their Marikina property to make it 80% see-thru and at the same time, to move it by 6 meters to provide parking space for vehicles to park. On April 26, 2000, Respondents requested an extension of time to comply with the order, however, Mayor Fernando insisted on the enforcement of the Ordinance. Respondent then filed a Petition for Prohibition with an application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) before RTC Marikina. Respondents argued that the petitioners were acting in excess of jurisdiction in enforcing Ordinance No. 192 Series of 1994, asserting that such contravenes Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution and would result in great losses. However, Petitioners contend that the ordinance was a valid exercise of police power. 418

On June 30, 2000, RTC issued a WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION enjoining Petitioners from implementing the demolition of the fence at St. Scholastica Marikina. On December 1, 2003, CA dismissed the Petitioner's appeal and affirmed the RTC decision. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT CA ERRED IN DECLARING THAT CITY ORDINANCE 192 SERIES OF 1994 IS NOT A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER. WHETHER OR NOT CA ERRED IN RULING THAT AFOREMENTIONED ORDINANCE IS AN EXERCISE OF THE CITY OF THE EMINENT DOMAIN. WHETHER OR NOT CA ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE CITY VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE IN IMPLEMENTING ORDINANCE 192 SERIES OF 1994. WHETHER OR NOT CA ERRED IN RULING THAT THE ABOVE-MENTIONED ORDINANCE CANNOT BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE APPLICATION. RULING: The ultimate question is whether Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance 192 Series of 1994 are a valid exercise of police power by the City of Marikina. Police Power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people. The test of a valid ordinance must not only be within the corporate powers of the LGU to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, but it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: 1) Must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) Must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) Must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) Must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) Must be general and consistent with public policy; 6) Must not be unreasonable; Ordinance 192 must be struck down for not being reasonably necessary to accomplish the City's purpose, more importantly, it is oppressive of private rights, arbitrary intrusion, and a violation of due process clause. 419

The court is of the view that the implementation of the setback requirement would be tantamount to taking of Respondents private property for public use without just compensation in contravention to the Constitution. As to the beautification purpose of the assailed ordinance, the state may not under the guise of police power, infringe on private rights solely for the sake of the aesthetic appearance of the community. Ordinance No. 217 amended Section 7 of Ordinance No. 192 Series of 1994 by including educational institutions which were intentionally omitted, and giving said educational institutions 5 years from the passage of such ordinance 192 and not Ordinance 217 to conform its provisions. Petitioners argued that the amendment could be retroactively applied because the assailed Ordinance is a curative statute which is retroactive in nature, however, Petitioners failed to point out any irregular or invalid provisions. As such the assailed ordinance cannot qualify as curative and retroactive in nature. The Petitioners were acting in excess of their jurisdiction in enforcing Ordinance 192 against the Respondents. The Writ of Prohibition is hereby issued commanding Mayor Fernando et al to permanently desist from enforcing or implementing Section 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance 192 Series of 1994 on St. Scholastica's property in Marikina.

Maxey vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No: 45870 11 MAY 1984 FACTS: Relevant Provision of Law: Art. 144 of the Civil Code1 Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales started living together in 1903 but were only married in a 420

“military fashion.” However, they had a church wedding in 1919. The properties in dispute were acquired in 1911 and 1912. In 1919, Regina died. Melbourne remarried and in 1953, his second wife Julia (using a power of attorney) sold the properties to private respondents spouses Macayra. Julia is of the belief that said properties were exclusive to Melbourne. Petitioners are children of Melbourne and Regina. They seek the annulment of the above sale and recovery of possession. They allege that such properties were conjugal properties of their parents’ marriage as they were bought with their joint effort and capital. The trial court ruled for the petitioners, while the CA found otherwise. ISSUES: (1) W/N Melbourne and Regina were married in 1903 in military fashion RULING: Act No. 3613 recognizing military marriages was only enacted in 1929. The military wedding did not make a valid marriage. They were only legally married in 1919. (2) W/N the properties in question were conjugal or exclusive to Melbourne RULING: They were conjugal property. The CA disputed the application of Art. 144 of the Civil Code because it could not be applied retroactively in prejudice of vested rights. But even if Art. 144 did apply, the CA is of the view that the property could not have been acquired by the spouses’ joint efforts because this pertains to monetary contributions and Regina was a mere housewife. SC rules otherwise. It applies Art. 144 retroactively because no vested rights of Melbourne were impaired because there exists a concurrent right of Regina or her heirs to a share of the properties in question. The disputed properties were owned in common by Melbourne and the estate of his late wife Regina when they were sold. Art. 144 recognizes that it would be unjust to require a woman who is a wife in all aspects of the relationship except for the requirement of a valid marriage to abandon her home and children, neglect her traditional household duties, and go out to earn a living or engage in business before the rules on co-ownership would apply. It does not matter that she made no monetary contribution, for the "real contribution" to the acquisition of property must include not only the earnings of a woman but also her contribution to the family's material and spiritual goods through caring for the children, administering the household, husbanding scarce resources, freeing her husband from household tasks, and otherwise performing the traditional duties of a housewife. But given that the properties were owned in common by the spouses, Julia’s sale over Melbourne’s share is valid. Petitioners should return one-half of the purchase price of the land to private respondents while the latter should pay some form of rentals for their use of one-half of the properties. 421

LUCIANO VALENCIA and FRANCISCO OCAMPO,Petitioners, v. HON. JOSE T. SURTIDA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, and RUFINA SUBASTIL,Respondents. FACTS: In the complaint filed therein, on or about February 14, 1959, Rufina Subastil, the main respondent herein, alleged that she is the owner and possessor of 422

a riceland situated in Sampaloc, Gainza, Camarines Sur, and more particularly described in said pleading; that, at the inception of the agricultural season, sometime in July, 1950, defendants therein, namely, Luciano Valencia and Francisco Ocampo, husband and wife, who are petitioners herein, entered into a verbal contract with her whereby they agreed to cultivate the southern portion of said lot and pay her five (5) cavanes of clean palay, by way of rental for each agricultural year; and that, after complying with this obligation during the year 1950-1951, petitioners thereafter failed and refused to do so, as well as to vacate the land, despite repeated demands, for which reason Rufina Subastil prayed that petitioners be sentenced to vacate the land and deliver the same to her, as well as to pay her the equivalent of the unsatisfied rentals and those which may accrue until possession shall have been given to her, in addition to P500 as moral, actual and consequential damages, P200 as attorney’s fees and the costs. Not having filed a responsive pleading, petitioners were declared in default on August 24, 1959. Respondent Judge then received the evidence for Rufina Subastil, and later on, rendered judgment, on or about October 27, 1959, finding that petitioners were, since 1950, tenants of Rufina Subastil under a 70-30 sharing basis, representing five (5) cavanes of palay a year for her, which were paid by petitioners during the agricultural year 1950-1951, but not subsequently thereto, and sentencing petitioners to vacate the land and to pay P400.00, as well as the costs, to Rufina Subastil. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the Court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action RULING: This motion for reconsideration was denied, and, soon thereafter, respondent Judge issued an order directing the execution of said decision, whereupon petitioners instituted this action forcertiorariupon the ground that the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur had no jurisdiction over said case No. 4457, it appearing on the face of the complaint therein that its purpose was to eject the petitioners as tenants of an agricultural land and respondent Judge having, in his aforementioned decision, ordered the ejectment of petitioners herein as such tenants of an agricultural land, which is within the exclusive competence of the Court of Agrarian Relations. In their answer, respondents herein alleged, inter alia, that there could have been no tenancy relationship between petitioners herein and Rufina Subastil because 423

petitioners asserted in their motion for reconsideration that the land in question belongs to them; that, assuming that said relationship had existed, non-compliance with the conditions thereof terminated said relationship; and that, in any event, Republic Act No. 1199, which took effect on August 30, 1954, is inapplicable to the parties in said Case No. 4457, their relationship as landlord and tenants having begun prior thereto. Respondents’ pretense is clearly untenable for Civil Case No. 4457 was begun on or about February 14, 1959, when Republic Act No. 1199 was already in force. The application of this statute to said case would, therefore, be prospective in nature, aside from the fact that it is already settled that laws enacted in the exercise of the police power, to which said Act belongs, may constitutionally affect tenancy relations created before the enactment or effectivity thereof (Viuda de Ongsiako v. Gamboa, 47 Off. Gaz., 5613). Again, respondent Judge having found that petitioners are tenants of an agricultural land, it is clear that their ejectment is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur (Bakit v. Asperin, L-15700, April 26, 1931), for pursuant to section 21 of Republic Act No. 1199:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "All cases involving the dispossession of a tenant by the landholder or by a third party and/or the settlement and disposition of disputes arising from the relationship of landholder and tenant, as well as the violation of any of the provisions of this Act, shall be under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of such court as may now or hereafter be authorized by law to take cognizance of tenancy relations and disputes."cralaw virtua1aw library and Republic Act No. 1267, creating the Court of Agrarian Relations, provides, in Section 7 thereof, as amended by Republic Act No. 1409, that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "The Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle all questions, matters, controversies or disputes involving all those relationships established by law which determine the varying rights of persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land where one of the parties works the land: Provided, however, That cases pending in the Court of Industrial Relations upon approval of this Act which are within the jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations, shall be transferred to, and the proceedings therein 424

continued in, the latter court."cralaw virtua1aw library WHEREFORE, the decision complained of is hereby annulled, with costs against respondent Rufina Subastil. It is so ordered.

RODOLFO GUEVARRA AND JOEY GUEVARRA,Petitioners,v.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondent. 425

G.R. No. 170462 February 05, 2014 FACTS: Rodolfo and his son, Joey, were charged with the crimes of frustrated homicide and homicide under two Informations which read: In Criminal Case No. Br. 20–1560 for Frustrated Homicide:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary That on or about the 8thday of January, 2000, in the municipality of Alicia, province of Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, with intent to kill and without any just motive, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack, hack and stab for several times with a sharp pointed bolo one Erwin Ordoñez, who as a result thereof, suffered multiple hack and stab wounds on the different parts of his body, which injuries would ordinarily cause the death of the said Erwin Ordoñez, thus, performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of their will, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to the said Erwin Ordoñez, which prevented his death.RoblesVirtualawlibrary In Criminal Case No. Br. 20–1561 for Homicide:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary That on or about the 8thday of January, 2000, in the municipality of Alicia, province of Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, with intent to kill and without any just motive, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack, hack and stab for several times with. sharp pointed bolo one David Ordoñez, who as. result thereof, suffered multiple hack and stab wounds on the different parts of his body which directly caused his death.5ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Although the informations stated that the crimes were committed on January 8, 2000, the true date of their commission is November 8, 2000, as confirmed by the CA through the records.6The parties failed to raise any objection to the discrepancy.7cralawred On arraignment, the petitioners pleaded not guilty to both charges.8The cases were jointly tried with the conformity of the prosecution and the defense. At the pre–trial, 426

the petitioners interposed self–defense, which prompted the RTC to conduct reverse trial of the case.9During the trial, the parties presented different versions of the events that transpired on November 8, 2000. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE PRESENCE OF THE JUSTIFYING CIRc*msTANCE OF SELF–DEFENSE DESPITE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE SHOWING THE ELEMENTS OF SELF–DEFENSE. RULING: We deny the present petition as we find no reversible error in the CA decision of October 24, 2005. At the outset, we emphasize that the Court’s review of the present case is via petition for review under Rule 45, which generally bars any question pertaining to the factual issues raised. The well–settled rule is that questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions for review under Rule 45, subject only to certain exceptions, among them, the lack of sufficient support in evidence of the trial court’s judgment or the appellate court’s misapprehension of the adduced facts.24 The petitioners fail to convince us that we should review the findings of fact in this case. Factual findings of the RTC, when affirmed by the CA, are entitled to great weight and respect by this Court and are deemed final and conclusive when supported by the evidence on record.25We find that both the RTC and the CA fully considered the evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense, and they have adequately explained the legal and evidentiary reasons in concluding that the petitioners are guilty of the crimes of frustrated homicide and homicide. In the absence of any showing that the trial and appellate courts overlooked certain facts and circ*mstances that could substantially affect the outcome of the present case, we uphold the rulings of the RTC and the CA which found the elements of these crimes fully established during the trial. The crime of frustrated homicide is committed when: (1) an “accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying circ*mstance for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is present.”26 427

On the other hand, the crime of homicide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the accused killed that person without any justifying circ*mstance; (3) the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and (4) the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circ*mstances of murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide.27 The petitioners’ intent to kill was clearly established by the nature and number of wounds sustained by their victims. Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, among other things, of the means used by the malefactors; the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim.28The CA aptly observed that the ten (10) hack/stab wounds David suffered and which eventually caused his death, and the thirteen (13) hack/stab wounds Erwin sustained, confirmed the prosecution’s theory that the petitioners purposely and vigorously attacked David and Erwin.29In fact, the petitioners admitted at the pre–trial that “the wounds inflicted on the victim Erwin Ordoñez would have caused his death were it not for immediate medical attendance.”30 By invoking self–defense, the petitioners, in effect, admitted to the commission of the acts for which they were charged, albeit under circ*mstances that, if proven, would have exculpated them. With this admission, the burden of proof shifted to the petitioners to show that the killing and frustrated killing of David and Erwin, respectively, were attended by the following circ*mstances: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victims; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the persons resorting to self–defense.31 Of all the burdens the petitioners carried, the most important of all is the element of unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least. threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon. person.32The element of unlawful aggression must be proven first in order for self–defense to be successfully pleaded. There can be no self–defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self– defense.33 As the RTC and the CA did, we find the absence of the element of unlawful aggression on the part of the victims. As the prosecution fully established, Erwin and 428

David were just passing by the petitioners’ compound on the night of November 8, 2000 when David was suddenly attacked by Joey while Erwin was attacked by Rodolfo. The attack actually took place outside, not inside, the petitioners’ compound, as evidenced by the way the petitioners’ gate was destroyed. The manner by which the wooden gate post was broken coincided with Erwin’s testimony that his brother David, who was then clinging onto the gate, was dragged into the petitioners’ compound. These circ*mstances, coupled with the nature and number of wounds sustained by the victims, clearly show that the petitioners did not act in self– defense in killing David and wounding Erwin. The petitioners were, in fact, the real aggressors.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner v GSIS, respondent (DIGEST) 429

G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997

FACTS: The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding, two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation (MPHC), a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder and the execution of the contracts, the MPHC matched the bid price in a letter to GSIS. MPHC sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid, MPHC came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotelhas been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. Respondents assert that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy sinceit is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s). ISSUE: Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing. 430

RULING: Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.

431

Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board GR Nos. 157870, 158633, 161658 November 3, 2008 Facts: Petitioners question the constitutionality of Section 36 of RA 9165, a.k.a. the Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002. Section 36 requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses, particularly those who are charged with offenses punishable by a penalty of not less than 6 years and 1 day of imprisonment. On December 23, 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution 6486, which provides the rules on the mandatory drugs testing of candidates for public office. It requires the COMELEC offices and employees concerned to submit two separate lists of candidates: one for those who complied with the mandatory drug testing and the other of those who failed to comply. It was Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. who opposed such resolution, contending that it was unconstitutional as it imposes an additional qualification for senators. Issue: 1. Do Section 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution 6468 impose an additional qualification for candidates for senator? 2. Is RA 9165 unconstitutional? Ruling: 1. Yes. The COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Section 36, validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution provides. The COMELEC resolution effectively enlarges that qualification requirements for senator, enumerated under Section 3, Article VI of the Constitution. 2. The provision of RA 9165 requiring mandatory drug testing for students (Section 36[b]) are constitutional as long as they are random and suspicionless. This is because schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students, and schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair and non-discriminatory. The provision requiring mandatory drug testing for officers and employees of public and private offices (Section 36[d])are also justifiable. The privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is reduced. A degree of impingement upon such privacy 432

has been upheld. To the Court, the need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to override the individual’s privacy interest under the premises. On the other hand, the Court finds no justification in the mandatory drug testing of those prosecuted for crimes punishable by imprisonment of more than 6 years and 1 day (Section 36[f]). The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are randomness and suspicionless. In this case, it cannot be said that the drug testing is random. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. In sum, Section 36(c) and (d) are constitutional, but 36(f) is not.

433

SABIO VS. GORDON G.R. NO: 174340 17 OCT 2006 FACTS: A Senate Resolution was introduced by Senator Miriam Santiago "directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the POTC, PHILCOMSAT and Philcomsat Holdings due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors” Then PCGG Chairman Camilo Sabio was invited by the Senate to be one of its resource persons. Chairman Sabio declined, invoking Section 4 (b) of EO No. 1 which provides that "No member or staff of the [PCGG] shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance" Notwithstanding the Subpoena Ad Testificandum issued by Senator Gordon to Chairman Sabio and other PCGG Comissioners, they refused to appear before the Senate and pointed out that the anomalous transactions referred to in the Senate Resolution are subject of pending cases before the regular courts, the Sandiganbayan and the Supreme Court for which reason they may not be able to testify thereon under the principle of sub judice. Section 4 (b) of EO No. 1 is challenged on the ground that it tramples upon the Senate's power to conduct legislative inquiry under Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution. RULING: Section 4 (b) of EO No. 1 is unconstitutional. Power of Legislative Inquiry 1. The power of inquiry is inherent in the power to legislate. The power of inquiry with process to enforce it - is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. Hence, there need not be | Page 2 of 3 any express provision in the Constitution granting such powers to the legislative since it is already impliedly included in the function of legislation. 2. Notably, Article VI, Section 21 grants the power of inquiry not only to the Senate and the House of Representatives, but also to any of their respective committees. 3. Section 4(b) is directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21 as it exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress' power of inquiry. The Congress' power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends "to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish.” PCGG belongs to this class. 4. Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with the principle of public accountability. It places the PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of courts, Congress and other 434

administrative bodies. 5. Corollarily, Sec. 4(b) also runs counter to the following constitutional provisions: Art. II, Sec. 28 (policy of full public disclosure), Art. III, Sec. 7 (right of the people to information on matters of public concern). Right to Privacy 6. One important limitation on the Congress' power of inquiry is that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." This means that the power of inquiry must be "subject to the limitations placed by the Constitution on government action." (i.e. Bill of Rights) 7. The Bill of Rights guarantees the right to privacy. In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy, a court must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion. 8. The legislative inquiry focuses on acts committed in the discharge of duties as officers and directors of the said corporations. Consequently, the directors of POTC, Philcomsat have no reasonable expectation of privacy over matters involving their offices in a corporation where the government has interest. Certainly, such matters are of public concern and over which the people have the right to information.

435

MACALINTAL VS. COMELEC G.R. NO: 157013 10 JULY 2003 FACTS: Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act) provides that all citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections, may vote for president, vicepresident, Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 disqualifies from voting an immigrant or permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country, UNLESS he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of his/her registration under the said law. -Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 in relation to Section 4 of the same Act empowers the COMELEC to order the proclamation of the winning candidates (president, vicepresident, senators and party-list representatives). Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 created the “Joint Congressional Oversight Committee” with the power to review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the COMELEC. Arguments of Macalintal: (1) Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding an election. He cites the ruling of the Supreme Court in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals, wherein it was held that a “green card” holder immigrant to the United States is deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence in the Philippines; (2) Section 18.5 is unconstitutional, as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-president; (3) Sections 19 and 25 creating the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee are unconstitutional intrudes into the independence of the COMELEC. Should the rules promulgated by the COMELEC violate any law, it is the

436

Court that has the power to review the same via the petition of any interested party, including the legislators. ISSUE: (1) Whether or not Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution; (2) Whether or not Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is unconstitutional insofar as it involves the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-president; (3) Whether or not the creation of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee violates Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution mandating the independence of constitutional commissions. RULING: (1) No. Contrary to Macalintal’s claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the Constitution, Congress enacted the law prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting in compliance with the constitutional mandate. Such mandate expressly requires that Congress provide a system of absentee voting that necessarily presupposes that the “qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad” is not physically present in the country. The provisions of Sections 5(d) and 11 are components of the system of overseas absentee voting established by R.A. No. 9189. The qualified Filipino abroad who executed the affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile in the Philippines. He is presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this country. His having become an immigrant or permanent resident of his host country does not necessarily imply an abandonment of his intention to return to his domicile of origin, the Philippines. Therefore, under the law, he must be given the opportunity to express that he has not actually abandoned his domicile in the Philippines by executing the affidavit required by Sections 5(d) and 8(c) of the law. x x x x Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice versa; a person cannot be at the same time, both a resident and an absentee. However, under our election 437

laws and the countless pronouncements of the Court pertaining to elections, an absentee remains attached to his residence in the Philippines as residence is considered synonymous with domicile. x x x x For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile. x x x x To repeat, the affidavit is required of immigrants and permanent residents abroad because by their status in their host countries, they are presumed to have relinquished their intent to return to this country; thus, without the affidavit, the presumption of abandonment of Philippine domicile shall remain. (2) Yes. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution only insofar as said Section totally disregarded the authority given to Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of president and vice-president. Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach “on the power of Congress to canvass the votes for president and vicepresident and the power to proclaim the winners for the said positions.” x x x x The canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for president and vice-president for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress. NOTE: Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 was declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect only to the power given to the Comelec to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-President, which is lodged with Congress under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. However, its consitutionality was UPHELD insofar as the authority given to the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for the Senators and party-list representatives. (3) Yes. By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR for The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC. The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19 stating that, “the Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior 438

approval,” and the second sentence of the second paragraph of Section 25 stating that, “it shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission,” whereby Congress, in both provisions, arrogates unto itself a function not specifically vested by the Constitution, should be stricken out of the subject statute for constitutional infirmity. Both provisions brazenly violate the mandate on the independence of the COMELEC.

439

G.R. No. 202242 July 17, 2012 FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ,Petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.,Respondents. FACTS: The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the vacant seat of Supreme Court Chief Justice following Renato Corona’s departure. Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it conceived of a body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that “(1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.” In compliance therewith, Congress, from the moment of the creation of the JBC, designated one representative from the Congress to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio members. In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. During the existence of the case, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sat in JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers originally envisioned a unicameral legislative body, thereby allocating “a representative of the National Assembly” to the JBC. The phrase, however, was not modified to aptly jive with the change to bicameralism which was adopted by the Constitutional 440

Commission on July 21, 1986. The respondents also contend that if the Commissioners were made aware of the consequence of having a bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral one, they would have made the corresponding adjustment in the representation of Congress in the JBC; that if only one house of Congress gets to be a member of JBC would deprive the other house of representation, defeating the principle of balance. The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives of Congress to be members of the JBC does not render JBC’s purpose of providing balance nugatory; that the presence of two (2) members from Congress will most likely provide balance as against the other six (6) members who are undeniably presidential appointees Supreme Court held that it has the power of review the case herein as it is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all the citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders. ISSUE: Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, defeats the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution. RULING: No. The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress to perform the functions of the JBC is violative of the 1987 Constitution. As such, it is unconstitutional. One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As such, it can be clearly and unambiguously discerned from Paragraph 1, Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution that in the phrase, “a representative of Congress,” the use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1)

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representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided. Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated. Every meaning to be given to each word or phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body of the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases and its meaning may be modified or restricted by the latter. Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC Considering that the language of the subject constitutional provision is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort extrinsic aids such as records of the Constitutional Commission. Nevertheless, even if the Court should proceed to look into the minds of the members of the Constitutional Commission, it is undeniable from the records thereof that it was intended that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. The underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter. With the respondents’ contention that each representative should be admitted from the Congress and House of Representatives, the Supreme Court, after the perusal of the records of Constitutional Commission, held that “Congress,” in the context of JBC representation, should be considered as one body. While it is true that there are still differences between the two houses and that an inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of the legislative powers conferred to them by the Constitution, the same cannot be applied in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial officers. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department. The framers of Constitution, in creating JBC, hoped that the private sector and the three branches of government would have an active role and equal voice in the 442

selection of the members of the Judiciary. Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have more quantitative influence in the JBC by having more than one voice speak, whether with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would “negate the principle of equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the Constitution.” It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against that mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, providing Congress with an equal voice with other members of the JBC in recommending appointees to the Judiciary is explicit. Any circumvention of the constitutional mandate should not be countenanced for the Constitution is the supreme law of the land. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer. Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate the call of situations and much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of the government and the people who run it. Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid. In the interest of fair play under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar Council IS declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one ( 1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8( 1 ), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. This disposition is immediately executory.

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FRANCISCO JR VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES G.R. NO: 160261 10 SEPTEMBER 2003 FACTS: On 2 June 2003, Former Pres. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against C.J. Davide, Jr., among others.* The House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss the complaint on 22 Oct 2003 for being insufficient in substance. The Committee Report to that effect has not been sent to the House in plenary. The following day and just nearly five months since the filing of the first complaint, a second impeachment complaint** was filed by respondents house representatives. Thus arose the instant petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus against the respondents House of Representatives, et. al., (the House) most of which contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates Sec. 3(5), Art. XI of the Const. which provides: “No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.” The House argues: the one year bar could not have been violated as the first impeachment complaint has not been initiated. Sec. 3(1) of the same is clear in that it is the House, as a collective body, which has “the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.” “Initiate” could not possibly mean “to file” because filing can, as Sec. 3 of the same provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of the House; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsem*nt by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House.*** Since the House, as a collective body, has yet to act on the first impeachment complaint, the first complaint could not have been “initiated”. ISSUE: Is the second impeachment complaint barred under Section 3(5) of Art. XI of the Const.? RULING: Yes. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission clearly revealed that the framers intended “initiation” to start with the filing of the complaint.**** The vote of one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not initiate the 444

impeachment proceedings which was already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint. [Thus, under the one year bar on initiating impeachment proceedings,] no second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action [within one year from filing of the first verified impeachment complaint]. To the argument that only the House as a body can initiate impeachment proceedings because Sec. 3(1) of Art. XI of the Const. says “The House x x x shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment,” this is a misreading and is contrary to the principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating “impeachment cases” with “impeachment proceeding. On the ground of culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes. On the ground of the alleged results of the legislative inquiry conducted on the manner of disbursem*nts and expenditures by C.J. Davide, Jr. of the Judiciary Development Fund. Const., Art. XI, Sec. 3: x x x x x x x x x (2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsem*nt by any Member thereof x x x (3) A vote of at least onethird of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to either affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. x x x x x x x x x x x x The well-settled principles of constitutional construction:First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Second, where there is ambiguity,ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat 445

another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together. (Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, et al., G.R. No. 160261 [2003]) Following the principle of reddendo singula singulis, the term “cases” must be distinguished from the term “proceedings.” An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Under Sec.3(3), Art. XI, the House, by a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House has “exclusive power” to initiate all cases of impeachment. On the other hand, the impeachment proceeding is not initiated when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial. (Ibid.) There was a preliminary issue on whether the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings. The Court ruled in the affirmative. Our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Reps the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power: the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official (Art. XI, Secs. 3 (2), (3), (4) and (5)). Where there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies, our courts are dutybound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits pursuant to its expanded certiorari jurisdiction under Art. VIII, Sec. 1: the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. (Id.) N.B. There are two types of political questions: (1) justiciable and (2) non-justiciable. The determination of one from the other lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.

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G.R. No. 166471: March 22, 2011 TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE Petitioner,v. LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT, Respondent. CARPIO,J.: FACTS: Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) is a cooperative, organized to provide domestic water services in Barangay Tawang, La Trinidad, Benguet. La Trinidad Water District (LTWD) is a local water utility created under Section 47 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 198, as amended. It is authorized to supply water for domestic, industrial and commercial purposes within the municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet. TMPC filed with the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) an application for a certificate of public convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain a waterworks system in Barangay Tawang. LTWD opposed TMPCs application, arguing that its franchise is exclusive as provided under PD 198. A CPC is however granted. LTWD filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by NWRB. LTWD then appealed to the RTC where it court set aside the NWRB decision. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition may be granted RULING: Yes. RTC Decision Set Aside. Political Law- No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens,nor shall such franchise, certificate or authorizationbe exclusive in characteror for a longer period than fifty years. 447

Plain words do not require explanation. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions are clear franchises for the operation of a public utility cannot be exclusive in character. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly and clearly state that,"nor shall such franchise x x x be exclusive in character."There is no exception. When the law is clear, there is nothing for the courts to do but to apply it. The duty of the Court is to apply the law the way it is worded. What cannot be legally done directly cannot be done indirectly. This rule is basic and, to a reasonable mind, does not need explanation. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.

Indeed, the President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises that are exclusive in character. What the President, Congress and the Court cannot legally do directly they cannot do indirectly. Thus, the President, Congress and the Court cannot create indirectly. In PD No. 198, as amended, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) created indirectly franchises that are exclusive in character by allowing the BOD of LTWD and the LWUA to create directly franchises that are exclusive in character.

In case of conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the Constitution always prevails because the Constitution is the basic law to which all other laws must conform to. The duty of the Court is to uphold the Constitution and to declare void all laws that do not conform to it. Petition Granted. Section 47 of PD 198 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

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ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW Labor Party v. Comelec G.R NO: 147589 and 147613 26 JUNE 2001 FACTS: Akbayan and Ang Bagong Bayani filed their MOTIONS before Comelec to have some party-list groups DELETED FROM THE OFFICIAL LIST OF PARTIES. (for the 2001 elections) They contend that there are SOME POLITICAL PARTIES (PMP, LAKAS-NUCD, NPC, LDP, AKSYON DEMOCRATICO, PDP-LABAN, NATIONALISTA) included in the party-list system. They argue that the party-list system is for the marginalized and underrepresented. ISSUE: Whether COMELEC was correct in including some of these political parties in the Party-List Election. RULING: SC: THEY ARE QUALIFIED. These political parties cannot be disqualified from the party-list election merely on the ground that they are political parties. The Constitution provides that the members of the House may be elected through a party list system of REGISTERED NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS. Under the Party List Law RA 7941, a PARTY is defined as either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties. A political party is also defined as a group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles, and policies for the general conduct of government, and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as 449

candidates for public office. Thus, political parties, even the major ones, may participate in the party-list elections. While RA 7941 mentions the labor, peasants, fisher folk, urban poor, ICCs, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, OFWs and professionals as marginalized and underrepresented, the ENUMERATION IS NOT EXCLUSIVE. Looking into the Policy behind RA 7941, it is not enough for a candidate to claim representation among these enumerated groups because representation is easy to claim and feign. The party list group (even political parties) must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented. Again, the POLICY OF THE LAW: To enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors who lack well defined political constituencies but who could contribute to legislation. SC: CASE REMANDED TO COMELEC TO DETERMINE QUALIFICATIONS OF THESE POLITICAL PARTIES. GUIDELINES: 1. Party must truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors 2. Major political parties allowed but they must still represent the marginalized 3. Religious sector may not be represented but a religious leader may be a nominee 4. Must not be disqualified under Sec 6 RA 7941 5. Must be independent from the government (not adjunct, not funded, not assisted) 6. Nominees must themselves be qualified (age, residence, citizenship) 7. Nominees must belong to the marginalized/underrep 8. Nominee must be able to contribute to appropriate legislation

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J.M TUASON & CO., INC. V. LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION G.R. NO: 21064 18 FEBRUARY 1970 FACTS: R.A. 2616 authorized expropriation of the Tatalon Estate in Quezon City owned by petitioner and 2 others. Lands were to be divided to lots to be sold. They prayed that it be declared unconstitutional because violative of equal protection clause since statute applies only to Tatalon estate. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT A PERSON SHALL BE DENIED EQUAL PROTECTION RULING: No person shall be denied equal protection. A judicial being is included within its terms. Those adversely affected may under such circ*mstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least discrimination that finds no support in reason. Petitioner failed to prove denial of equal protection. Occupants believe in gf that veterans subdivision is the real owner. Only when the place vastly improved with building of roads, infrastructure did petitioner claimed for the first time that they are the owners.

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CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SUPRA FACTS: The two petitions in this case sought to declare unconstitutional Executive Order No. 284 issued by then President Corazon C. Aquino. The petitioners alleged that Section 1, 2 and 3 of EO 284 contravenes the provision of Sec. 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution The assailed provisions of EO 284 are as follows: Section 1:A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government and government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor. Section 2:If they hold more positions more than what is required in section 1, they must relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than two positions other than his primary position. Section 3:AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary. 

13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, meanwhile, states that:

Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or 452

their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office. The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including governmentowned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. PETITIONERS CONTENTION:EO 284 adds exceptions to Section 13 of Article VII other than those provided in the constitution. According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in government are those provided in the Constitution namely: 1. TheVice President(may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3 par.2 of Article VII: “The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation.”) and thesecretary of justice(as an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII: “A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, theSecretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.”) ISSUE:Whether or not EO 284 is unconstitutional RULING: Yes. EO 284 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The court said, by allowing Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries to hold at least two positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment which is a direct contravention of the express mandate of Article VII, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself. The explained that the phrase“unless otherwise provided in this constitution”must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the constitution itself which are Section 3 of Article VII (for VP) and Section 8 of Article VIII (for Secretary of Justice).

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Thus, thePETITIONisGRANTED.

NITIFAN V. CIR G.R. NO: 78780 23 JULY 1987 FACTS: The Chief Justice directed theFiscalManagement and Budget Office of the Supreme Court to discontinue the withholding of taxes from thesalariesof the Justices of the Supreme Court as well as from thesalariesof all other members of the judiciary.This was affirmed by the Supreme Court en banc. Judges Nitafan, Polo and Savellano from RTC Manila filed apetitionto prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from theirsalaries.They submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of theirsalaries, contrary to theprovisionof Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that during their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased," even as it isanathemato the Ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution." ISSUE: Whether or not the members of the Judiciary exempt fromincome taxes? RULING: No. Thesalariesof members of the Judiciary are subject to the generalincome taxappliedto all taxpayers. Although such intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the 1987 Constitution, the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commissionregarding the constitutionalprovisionin question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers was to make thesalariesof members of the Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional 454

construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. Hence, the doctrine in Perfecto v. Meer and Endencia vs. David (declared thesalariesof members of the Judiciary exempt from payment of theincome taxand considered such payment as a diminution of theirsalariesduring their continuance in office) do notapplyanymore. The framers of the fundamental law, as the alter ego of the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning andimportof Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they haveadopted. Stated otherwise, weaccorddue respect to the intent of the people, through the discussions and deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the government and should share the burden of general income taxation equitably.(Nitafan vs.Commissioner of Internal Revenue,G.R. No. 78780, July 23, 1987)

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G.R. No. L-51042 September 30, 1982 DIONISIO MALACORA, and LUCIA, MARABULAS,petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CONSUELO LIBARNES and RODRIGO LIBARNES,respondents. FACTS: Appeal by certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals which modified the judgment of the trial court, the Court of Agrarian Relations, Branch I, Butuan City. the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, questioned orders of June 27,1978 and August 1, 1978, as wen as the writ of execution of October 7, 1974, the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale and Sheriff's Final Deed of Sale are hereby annuled and set aside, with costs against the private respondents."1 From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the following facts as set forth therein are undisputed: On April 14, 1971, the respondent court rendered a decision in CAR Case No. 6, entitled "Dionisio Malacora and Lucia Marabulas vs. Rodrigo Libarnes and Consuelo Libarnes", the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the herein defendants RODRIGO LIBARNES and CONSUELO LIBARNES to pay the herein plaintiffs DIONISIO MALACORA and LUCIA MARABULAS the total amount of TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED AND NINETY FIVE (P2,595.00) PESOS for onehalf of all the coconut trees and of TEN (P10.00) PESOS for one-half of the 456

banana plants said plaintiffs planted on the defendants' land and after payment of said amounts their tenancy relation will be considered as terminated and the said plaintiffs will be allowed to surrender and leave their tenanted holding. Both parties in this case are hereby ordered to pay fifty-fifty the court fees, the plaintiffs to pay their one-half share upon receipt of the payments for one-half of the improvements as herein above ordered. Defendants, petitioners herein, appealed to this Court (CA-G.R. No. 00658-R) which modified the judgment as follows: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with the modification that the petitioners are ordered to pay P8.00 per coconut trees for one- half of all the coconut trees which the private respondents had planted on the land in question, without pronouncement as to costs. After Our decision became final and the case had been returned to the respondent court, plaintiffs, private respondents herein, filed a motion for execution. Acting on the motion, the respondent court, on September 20, 1974, entered an order of execution; and on October 4, 1974, the Clerk of Court issued a writ of execution which commanded petitioners 'to pay plaintiffs Dionisio Malacora and Lucia Marabulas the total amount of P2,184.00 for the 273 coconut trees planted by the plaintiffs. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the writ of execution? RULING: No. From the plain language of the provision, the Constitution could not have intended anything but full and immediate compliance therewith. The manifest purpose of the provision is to avoid delay in the disposition of cases, which always is a cause of injustice, under the familiar aphorism that "justice delayed is justice denied." It would, at the same time, ease up the clogged dockets of the courts, which had long presented a problem that defies solution, despite the striving of this Court in constant quest of one. To begin with, it is, to me, not correct to say that it is impossible to comply with the provision of Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. There is nothing hard to just follow its simple mandate of considering an appealed decision affirmed if no decision is rendered before the lapse of time limit set therefor. What may be impossible is for the Supreme Court, for example, to decide a case on the merit within the eighteen 457

(18) months given to it from its submission for decision, because so many other appealed cases had already accumulated and will increasingly do so, as long as We do not apply the clear mandate of the Constitution. It is precisely with full cognizance of this fact-the impossibility of avoiding delays in disposing of appealed cases on the merits-that prompted the adoption of this special remedy by no less than the Constitution because similar time limitations as provided by mere statutes, without an alternative prescription of what would be the effect of failure to meet the deadline, had been held merely directory. To hold the Constitutional provision as also merely directory would render it nugatory, because the unmistakable and clear intent of the framers would be put to naught. The automatic affirmance of the appealed provision in case of failure to decide or resolve within the time limit is precisely the alternative prescription, believed to' better serve the cause of justice than waiting, no n-latter how long, for a decision on the merit. This may be illustrated with a case in which a money award is made in favor of the plaintiff. By applying the Constitution, the appealed decision is deemed affirmed if no decision is rendered within the applicable maximum period allowed. Without the constitutional provision, it may take many years more from the lapse of that period before decision is actually rendered on the merits. If statistics showing that 95% more or less, of the appealed cases to this Court are affirmed is accurate, the appealled decision would, in all probability, be affirmed, if decision on the merits is rendered. The injustice caused by the delay becomes instantly patent when it is considered that if the award is paid earlier, the money would have a greater purchasing value than when it is paid years later. This is due to inflation which had long since gripped the whole world so tightly and unrelentingly as the Constitutional Convention was obviously aware of, for which it saw the need of inserting the unique and novel provision in the new Constitution, as a much needed extraordinary remedy.

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Gamboa v. Teves etal., GR No. 176579, October 9, 2012 FACTS: The issue started when petitioner Gamboa questioned the indirect sale of shares involving almost 12 million shares of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) owned by PTIC to First Pacific. Thus, First Pacific’s common shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby increasing the total common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47%. The petitioner contends that it violates the Constitutional provision on filipinazation of public utility, stated in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which limits foreign ownership of the capital of a public utility to not more than 40%. Then, in 2011, the court ruled the case in favor of the petitioner, hence this new case, resolving the motion for reconsideration for the 2011 decision filed by the respondents. ISSUE:Whether or not the Court made an erroneous interpretation of the term ‘capital’ in its 2011 decision? RULING:The Court said that the Constitution is clear in expressing its State policy of developing an economy‘effectively controlled’by Filipinos. Asserting the ideals that our Constitution’s Preamble want to achieve, that is –to conserve and develop our patrimony, hence, the State should fortify a Filipino-controlled economy. In the 2011 decision, the Court finds no wrong in the construction of the term ‘capital’ which refers to the ‘shares with voting rights, as well as with full 459

beneficial ownership’ (Art. 12, sec. 10) which implies that the right to vote in the election of directors, coupled with benefits, is tantamount to an effective control.Therefore, the Court’s interpretation of the term ‘capital’ was not erroneous. Thus, the motion for reconsideration is denied.

TANADA VS. ANGARA GR No. 118295 May 2, 1997 FACTS: The Philippines joined World Trade Organization as a founding member with the goal of improving Philippine access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports. The President also saw in the WTO the opening of new opportunities for the services sector, the reduction of costs and uncertainty associated with exporting and the attraction of more investments into the country. On April 15, 1994, respondent Navarro, then DTI Secretary, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations. On December 14, 1994, the Senate concurred in the ratification of the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the WTO which includes various agreements and associated legal instruments. On December 16, 1994,the President signed the Instrument of Ratification. ISSUE: 1. Whether the WTO Agreement violated the mandated economic nationalism by the Constitution

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2. Whether the provisions of the WTO Agreement restricts and impairs Philippine sovereignty, specifically the legislative power vested in the Congress 3. Whether the Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement and its annexes but not in the other documents referred to in the Final Act is defective and insufficient and thus constitutes abuse of discretion RULING: 1. No. The Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair. The constitutional policy of a selfreliant and independent national economy does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international community. 2. No. While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and allencompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of the world. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our laws. A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation on the parties. By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. The Philippines has effectively agreed to limit the exercise of its sovereign powers of taxation, eminent domain and police power. The underlying consideration in this partial sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment of the other contracting states in granting the same privilege and immunities to the Philippines, its officials and its citizens. The same reciprocity characterizes the same commitments under WTO-GATT. The point is that a portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.

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3. No. The petitioners submit that concurrence in the WTO Agreement alone is flawed because it is in effect a rejection of the Final Act. The Court held that a final act is an instrument which records the winding up of the proceedings of a diplomatic conference and not the treaty itself. On the other hand, the WTO Agreement itself expresses what multilateral agreements are deemed included as its integral parts. It should be added that the Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown by the member’s deliberation.

Oposa vs Factoran GR No. 101083 July 30 1993 FACTS: A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to: Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country; Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs; and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations. 462

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: 1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him; 2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of the government. ISSUE: Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?” RULING: Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

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Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit G.R. No. 177131 7 June 2011 FACTS: This case arose when the COA issued Resolution No. 99-011on August 19, 1999 (“the COA Resolution”), with the subject “Defining the Commissions policy with respect to the audit of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines.” In its whereas clauses, the COA Resolution stated that the BSP was created as a public corporation under Commonwealth Act No. 111, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 460 and Republic Act No. 7278; that inBoy Scouts of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Supreme Court ruled that the BSP, as constituted under its charter, was a “government-controlled corporation within the meaning of Article IX(B)(2)(1) of the Constitution”; and that “the BSP is appropriately regarded as a government instrumentality under the 1987 Administrative Code.” The COA Resolution also cited its constitutional mandate under Section 2(1), Article IX (D).Finally, the COA Resolution reads: NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, the COMMISSION PROPER HAS RESOLVED, AS IT 464

DOES HEREBY RESOLVE to conduct an annual financial audit of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, and express an opinion on whether the financial statements which include the Balance Sheet, the Income Statement and the Statement of Cash Flows present fairly its financial position and results of operations. x x x x BE IT RESOLVED FURTHERMORE, that for purposes of audit supervision,the Boy Scouts of the Philippines shall be classified among the government corporations belonging to the Educational, Social, Scientific, Civic and Research Sector under the Corporate Audit Office I, to be audited, similar to the subsidiary corporations, by employing the team audit approach. ISSUE: Whether or not Boy Scout of the Philippines is a government owned and controlled corporation subject for COA’s audit jurisdiction.

RULING: YES. After looking at the legislative history of its amended charter and carefully studying the applicable laws and the arguments of both parties, we find that the BSP is a public corporation and its funds are subject to the COA’s audit jurisdiction. The BSP Charter (Commonwealth Act No. 111, approved on October 31, 1936), entitled “An Act to Create a Public Corporation to be Known as the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, and to Define its Powers and Purposes” created the BSP as a “public corporation” to serve the following public interest or purpose: Sec. 3. The purpose of this corporation shall be to promote through organization and cooperation with other agencies, the ability of boys to do useful things for themselves and others, to train them in scoutcraft, and to inculcate in them patriotism, civic consciousness and responsibility, courage, self-reliance, discipline and kindred virtues, and moral values, using the method which are in common use by boy scouts. The BSP as a Public Corporation under Par. 2, Art. 2 of the Civil Code 465

There are three classes of juridical persons under Article 44 of the Civil Code and the BSP, as presently constituted under Republic Act No. 7278, falls under the second classification. Article 44 reads: Art. 44. The following are juridical persons: (1) The State and its political subdivisions; (2)Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law; (3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member. (Emphases supplied.) The BSP, which is a corporation created for a public interest or purpose, is subject to the law creating it under Article 45 of the Civil Code, which provides: Art. 45. Juridical persons mentioned in Nos. 1 and 2 of the preceding article are governed by the laws creating or recognizing them. Since the BSP, under its amended charter, continues to be a public corporation or a government instrumentality, we come to the inevitable conclusion that it is subject to the exercise by the COA of its audit jurisdiction in the manner consistent with the provisions of the BSP Charter.

466

G.R. No. 143855: September 21, 2010 REPRESENTATIVES GERARDO S. ESPINA, ORLANDO FUA, JR., PROSPERO AMATONG, ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS, RAUL M. GONZALES, PROSPERO PICHAY, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI AND FRANKLIN BAUTISTA, Petitioners, v. HON. RONALDO ZAMORA, JR. (EXECUTIVE SECRETARY), HON. MAR ROXAS (SECRETARY OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY), HON. FELIPE MEDALLA (SECRETARY OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY), GOV. RAFAEL BUENAVENTURA (BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS) AND HON. LILIA BAUTISTA (CHAIRMAN, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION), Respondents. ABAD, J.: FACTS: On March 7, 2000, President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law Republic Act (R.A.) 8762, also known as the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000. It expressly 467

repealed R.A. 1180, which absolutely prohibited foreign nationals from engaging in the retail trade business. R.A. 8762 now allows them to do so under four categories. R.A. 8762 also allows natural-born Filipino citizens, who had lost their citizenship and now reside in the Philippines, to engage in the retail trade business with the same rights as Filipino citizens. On October 11, 2000, petitioners, all members of the House of Representatives, filed the present petition, assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 8762 on the following grounds: The law runs afoul of Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Constitution which enjoins the State to place the national economy under the control of Filipinos to achieve equal distribution of opportunities, promote industrialization and full employment, and protect Filipino enterprise against unfair competition and trade policies. The implementation of R.A. 8762 would lead to alien control of the retail trade, which taken together with alien dominance of other areas of business, would result in the loss of effective Filipino control of the economy. Foreign retailers like Walmart and K-Mart would crush Filipino retailers and sari-sari store vendors, destroy self-employment, and bring about more unemployment. The World Bank-International Monetary Fund had improperly imposed the passage of R.A. 8762 on the government as a condition for the release of certain loans. There is a clear and present danger that the law would promote monopolies or combinations in restraint of trade. Respondents Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, Jr., Trade and Industry Secretary Mar Roxas, National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) Secretary Felipe Medalla, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Gov. Rafael Buenaventura, and Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Lilia Bautista countered that: Petitioners have no legal standing to file the petition. They cannot invoke the fact that they are taxpayers since R.A. 8762 does not involve the disbursem*nt of public funds. 468

The petition does not involve any justiciable controversy. Petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of R.A. 8762. Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Constitution are not self-executing provisions that are judicially demandable. The Constitution mandates the regulation but not the prohibition of foreign investments. It directs Congress to reserve to Filipino citizens certain areas of investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the national interest so dictates. But the Constitution leaves to the discretion of the Congress whether or not to make such reservation. It does not prohibit Congress from enacting laws allowing the entry of foreigners into certain industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner lawmakers have the legal standing to challenge the constitutionality of R.A. 8762 Whether or not R.A. 8762 is unconstitutional RULING: Legal standing or locus standi refers to the right of a party to come to a court of justice and make such a challenge. More particularly, standing refers to his personal and substantial interest in that he has suffered or will suffer direct injury as a result of the passage of that law. Here, there is no clear showing that the implementation of the Retail Trade Liberalization Act prejudices petitioners or inflicts damages on them, either as taxpayers or as legislators. Still the Court will resolve the question they raise since the rule on standing can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs when the public interest so requires or the matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of paramount public interest. As the Court explained in Tanada v. Angara, the provisions of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the declarations of principles and state policies, are not self-executing. Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts. 469

Furthermore, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires the development of a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of Filipino monopoly of the economic environment. The objective is simply to prohibit foreign powers or interests from maneuvering our economic policies and ensure that Filipinos are given preference in all areas of development. More importantly, Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution gives Congress the discretion to reserve to Filipinos certain areas of investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the national interest requires. Thus, Congress can determine what policy to pass and when to pass it depending on the economic exigencies. It can enact laws allowing the entry of foreigners into certain industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens. In this case, Congress has decided to open certain areas of the retail trade business to foreign investments instead of reserving them exclusively to Filipino citizens. The NEDA has not opposed such policy. Certainly, it is not within the province of the Court to inquire into the wisdom of R.A. 8762 save when it blatantly violates the Constitution. But as the Court has said, there is no showing that the law has contravened any constitutional mandate. The Court is not convinced that the implementation of R.A. 8762 would eventually lead to alien control of the retail trade business. Petitioners have not mustered any concrete and strong argument to support its thesis. The law itself has provided strict safeguards on foreign participation in that business. Thus First, aliens can only engage in retail trade business subject to the categories aboveenumerated; Second, only nationals from, or juridical entities formed or incorporated in countries which allow the entry of Filipino retailers shall be allowed to engage in retail trade business; and Third, qualified foreign retailers shall not be allowed to engage in certain retailing activities outside their accredited stores through the use of mobile or rolling stores or carts, the use of sales representatives, door-to-door selling, restaurants and sari-sari stores and such other similar retailing activities.

470

ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES MARANAN AND LORENZO SANCHEZ,petitioners,v.PHILIPPINE AMUsem*nTS AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), respondent. G.R. No. 91649 May 14, 1991 FACTS: The PH Amusem*nt and Gaming Corp. was created by PD 1067-A and granted a franchise under PD 1067-B. Subsequently, under PD 1869, the Government enabled it to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law, under declared policy. But the petitioners think otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant petition seeking to annul the PAGCOR Charter — PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because of the following issues: ISSUE: (1) WON it waived the Manila City gov't's right to impose taxes and license fees, 471

which is recognized by law. (2) WON it has intruded into the LGUs' right to impose local taxes and license fees, and thus contrary to the principle of local autonomy enshrined in the Constitution. (3) WON it violates the equal protection clause as it allows some gambling acts but also prohibits other gaming acts. (4) WON it violates the Cory gov't's policy of being away from monopolistic and crony economy, and toward free enterprise and privatization. RULING: (1) No. The fact that PAGCOR, under its charter, is exempt from paying tax of any kind is not violative of the principle of local autonomy. LGUs' have no inherent right to impose taxes. LGUs' power to tax must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed by the state itself which has the inherent power to tax. The charter of LGUs is subject to control by Congress as they are mere creatures of Congress. Congress, therefore, has the power of control over LGUs. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power. (2) No. LGUs' right to impose license fees on "gambling", has long been revoked. As early as 1975, the power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of "franchise, licenses or permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National Government. Furthermore, LGUs' have no power to tax instrumentalities of the gov't such as PAGCOR which exercises governmental functions of regulating gambling activities. (3) No. The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary. A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. The Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same. (4) No. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of government and of the 472

people themselves as the repository of all state power. On the issue of monopoly, the same is not necessarily prohibited by the Constitution. The state must still decide whether public interest demands that monopolies be "regulated" or prohibited. Again, this is a matter of policy for the Legislature to decide. The judiciary can only intervene when there are violations of the statutes passed by Congress regulating or prohibiting monopolies.

Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance G.R. No. 115455 October 30, 1995 FACTS: PPI contends that by removing the exemption of the press from the VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates against the press. CREBA asserts that R.A. No. 7716 impairs the obligations of contracts, and violates the rule that taxes should be uniform and equitable and that Congress shall “evolve a progressive system of taxation”. CUP argues that legislature was to adopt a definite policy of granting tax exemption to cooperatives that the present Constitution embodies provisions on cooperatives. To subject cooperatives to the VAT would, therefore, be to infringe a constitutional policy.

473

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7716 is unconstitutional. RULING: No. In withdrawing the exemption, the law merely subjects the press to the same tax burden to which other businesses have long ago been subject. The VAT is not a license tax. It is imposed purely for revenue purposes. Equality and uniformity of taxation mean that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class be taxed at the same rate. It is enough that the statute or ordinance applies equally to all persons, firms, and corporations placed in similar situation.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Court made an erroneous interpretation of the term ‘capital’ in its 2011 decision? RULING:The Court said that the Constitution is clear in expressing its State policy of developing an economy‘effectively controlled’by Filipinos. Asserting the ideals that our Constitution’s Preamble want to achieve, that is –to conserve and develop our patrimony, hence, the State should fortify a Filipino-controlled economy. In the 2011 decision, the Court finds no wrong in the construction of the term ‘capital’ which refers to the ‘shares with voting rights, as well as with full beneficial ownership’ (Art. 12, sec. 10) which implies that the right to vote in the election of directors, coupled with benefits, is tantamount to an effective control.Therefore, the Court’s interpretation of the term ‘capital’ was not erroneous. Thus, the motion for reconsideration is denied.

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Assignment-Statcon1 Perez - PDFCOFFEE.COM (2024)

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